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THE BLUM EXPERIMENT[1]

ROGER AUBOIN

THE French generally pride themselves on being the most logical people in the world, and their friends readily concede this to them, even when they find it a rather exaggerated, rather irritating quality. Yet this logic, which seems to play so large a part in French life, sometimes, one must admit, plays but a minor part in public affairs.

A little over ten years ago, M. Poincaré took office. All the economists, and especially the eminent members of the Committee of Experts, were agreed that the franc ought to be stabilised, actually and then legally, as soon as possible, in order to provide a solid foundation for economic and financial recovery. But public opinion was opposed to the stabilisation of the franc, since it involved both the definite recognition of a lowered value for the currency and also international agreements which, rightly or wrongly, were regarded as burdensome. M. Poincaré was thus constrained to delay the stabilisation for two years and to put the cart before the horse, finishing his work with a measure which should logically have prefaced it.

The "Blum Experiment" of 1936 bears, in this respect, a curious resemblance to the "Poincaré Experiment" of 1926. Confronted, like his distinguished predecessor, by a monetary problem, the solution of which was the key to all the other problems, M. Blum also decided, for political reasons, to postpone it, and, reversing the natural order, to deal with social before economic requirements. Their similar reaction in these historic circumstances is perhaps not purely accidental. It is well known that M. Poincaré and M. Blum, different in so many ways, had the highest regard for each other and, indeed, considerable sympathy. In adopting what was, from the strictly economic point of view, a paradoxical attitude, both of them were entirely in harmony with public opinion. In France, a country of lawyers and peasants, economic considerations have never had so decisive an influence on opinion as in countries with ancient maritime and commercial

[1] Translation of an Address given at Chatham House on May 5th, 1937; Mr. H. Wickham Steed in the Chair.

M. Blum and his Cabinet resigned on June 21st, 1937, the Senate having rejected by 168 votes to 96 a Bill giving the Blum Cabinet dictatorial power to solve the financial crisis. This Bill had previously been passed by the Chamber.

traditions, where continuous adaptation to economic realities has become an instinctive national reaction.

I want this evening to try to explain to you those particular features of the "Blum Experiment" which distinguish it from other French or foreign "experiments" and which make it appear in some eyes productive and original, in others illogical and hazardous. It so happens that, without being in any way concerned in party struggles, I have actually been drawn to follow the events of recent months very closely, and I know several of the principal actors personally. I want simply to share my impressions with you without having any ambition to give a complete account of the happenings of the past twelve months.

In order to understand the trend of the "Blum Experiment" from its origin, you must bear in mind the material and moral situation in France at the time that the present Government assumed office. A great deal of energy had been expended in the struggle against the effects of the crisis, and particularly in the effort to reduce public expenditure. Optimists (that is to say, chiefly, those in office, for the optimism of politicians is always related to their proximity to power) laid emphasis on the results which had been achieved and the recovery noted at the beginning of 1936. But it required much goodwill to base any great hopes on this partial recovery. From the financial point of view, receipts continued to fall off, and the deficit, which the reduction of expenditure made with so much effort was designed to reduce, was constantly recreated. From the economic point of view, the country suffered more than anything from the profound disequilibrium which was revealed in the disparity of prices, the excessive difference between retail and wholesale prices and between national and foreign prices. The disparity with foreign prices was lessened in the course of 1935, but the exceedingly low level to which prices had fallen (a fall of about 50 per cent. of the wholesale prices of 1929) was intolerable to producers. The whole policy of the Government, customs protection, quotas, subsidies, voluntary or legal limitation of production, aimed at improving these prices. It succeeded, moreover, and agricultural prices began to rise in the autumn. The rise from July 1935 to May 1936 was of more than 25 per cent.

From that moment it was clear that there was no hope of seeing French prices adjusted directly to foreign prices. It is not surprising that, in these circumstances, the conviction spread that it would be impossible to avoid an indirect adjustment by means of

a reduction in the value of the franc. It was this conviction which was responsible for the constantly unfavourable tendencies in the foreign exchange market, and the increasingly tight condition of the money market.

The Bank of France, which lost gold to a value of ten thousand million francs in the spring of 1935, regained only an insignificant amount at the time of the Decrees, and lost another ten thousand million between the summer of 1935 and May 1936 after the Decrees, precisely when it was hoped that the policy of stringent economy which had been adopted would make possible the restoration of credit and the reversal of this tendency. The position of the Bank in itself was very strong, but there was no serious hope of a lasting improvement in the situation until an end had been put to the disequilibrium of the French economy, and above all to the fundamental contradiction of a policy which was trying at the same time to maintain a high level of internal prices and to avoid the monetary adjustment which would have made that level bearable in international values.

The persistence of the crisis and the relative check to the measures taken to meet it were felt all the more keenly because, in order to obtain the necessary sacrifices from the country, numerous solemn promises of success had been made, and this now provoked a strong feeling of disappointment and discontent. This was clearly shown at the elections, which returned an increased majority of the Left, a majority in which for the first time the chief place was held by the orthodox Socialists with about 150 seats. The Radicals had only about 140 seats with the Independent Socialists, while the Communists made a big forward stride, forming an extreme Left in control of 72 seats.

The significance of the voting was apparent and was not contested by anyone, even the minority. The country had clearly voted against the *ligues*, the threat of Fascism which had very unwisely been paraded before it; against the political supremacy of the great economic organisations symbolised by "the two hundred families"; and, above all, against the persistence of the crisis.

Although the Socialists had come first in the redistribution of seats, they had not a sufficient majority to carry out a Socialist policy. Socialists and Communists together represented only a bare third of the electorate, and of that third many were certainly not collectivists. In Parliament they just about balanced the Opposition of the Centre and the Right. The victorious parties

therefore came to an agreement on a minimum programme, the programme of the *Front Populaire.* This programme included important Social reforms, but had nothing revolutionary in it. The Léon Blum Government, supported by the four majority parties, Radicals, Socialists, Independent Socialists and Communists, and composed of members of the first three, as the Communists refused to take office, was, as it proclaimed loudly from the beginning, a reforming, not a revolutionary Government, a Government charged with the carrying out of the common programme of the *Front Populaire,* not of a Socialist programme.

To carry out even this limited programme was a heavy enough task. The Government was simultaneously confronted by several fundamental problems: a monetary problem which had been postponed, but was becoming more and more pressing; an economic problem which called for all its energy; a social problem, rendered more acute by the arrival in power of parties representing a mass of workers determined to obtain their demands; and a financial problem, made very difficult by the fact that to the already heavy burdens bequeathed by the War and the reconstruction of the devastated areas were now added fresh expenses to maintain national defence at the level required by the international situation. The solution of any one of these problems would have been a thankless task. To face all three at once was a paradoxical undertaking, all the more so when they had to be solved within the framework of a democratic parliamentary régime, which excluded compulsory measures on principle; and in an international situation which would not permit France to isolate herself but, on the contrary, required her to draw closer to the great free peoples who are the natural defenders of peace.

From the economic and political point of view, the Government had one great advantage, but at the same time was faced with a great difficulty. The advantage was that it could pursue a policy which corresponded in very large measure to the most pressing needs. It had simply to make a deliberate break with the previous policy, to adjust the international value of the franc broadly to its internal value, thus restoring the economic equilibrium destroyed by the crisis and stimulating a recovery of activity, which would create the margin of profit needed for wide social reforms. This was exactly the policy which M. Blum's predecessors had been unable, or unwilling, to pursue. By adopting a policy directly opposed to theirs, he could benefit by this to the advantage of his own political and social preoccupations. It was a policy inspired to some extent by that carried out

with success in various countries, in some cases by labour parties themselves, such as the Scandinavian Socialist parties and the Belgian Labour Party and by innovators like President Roosevelt and M. Van Zeeland, and could be quite well adapted to the aims of a reforming but not Socialist Government, such as the Blum Government was by its very constitution.

The difficulty was that this policy turned on the devaluation of the franc, against which public opinion had been set for several years and towards which all parties, without exception, had pronounced themselves strongly. The public hostility to devaluation was natural enough in a country which had been through the post-War inflation and had recently regained monetary stability. But the feeling was exploited by the political parties. The Opposition hastened to spread the idea that it was the *Front Populaire's* arrival in power which made the " amputation " of the franc inevitable. The Communist Party, on the other hand, wished to outdo the prejudices of the public and, by depriving the Government of the means of carrying out the only policy the economic situation permitted, wanted to drive it either to a defeat or to measures of economic coercion, which in either case would be favourable for its own propaganda.

Events precipitated matters. A few days after the Government's official assumption of office, the strike movement, started a little earlier, extended gradually to a large part of the national activity. Workers and employees, conscious of their electoral victory, wanted immediate satisfaction, and a section of the leaders was not loath to present the Government with an accomplished fact and so deprive it of the moral credit of the reforms it was prepared to carry out.

The increase in unemployment had caused the workers to adopt the tactics of the stay-in strike, and although on the whole everything was done in remarkably good order, this new method did not fail to result in some illegalities. The resulting situation was very dangerous and embarrassing for the Government, which might have been forced either to let the abnormal situation develop without taking action, or to have recourse to force in order to bring it to an end. In either case its work would have been compromised before it ever began. Happily a large proportion of the workers escaped contagion. Notably employees in the Public Services and Government Officials remained at their posts and supported the Government. The latter hastened to draw up an agreement and the central organisations of employers

and workers had the wisdom to facilitate this. On June 7th, the two organisations, the C.G.T. (*Confédération Générale du Travail*) and the C.G.P. (*Confédération Générale du Patronat*), signed, at the Presidency of the Council in the Hotel Matignon, the agreements known as the Matignon Agreements, which provided for an immediate return to work and important reforms : an increase in wages of from 7 to 12 per cent. with a rise in " abnormally low " wages, the appointment of workers' delegates, the conclusion of collective labour conventions, a fortnight's paid annual holiday, and the reduction of the working week to forty hours. The wave of strikes quickly subsided. At the crucial moment the workers' leaders publicly admitted that all their demands could not be granted, and the Government, on the other hand, took various obvious police measures which made the hotheads think twice.

Now that we are able to look back on these events from a little distance, we can see that the Republic at that time surmounted, under particularly difficult conditions, the most serious social crisis that had arisen since 1875. When in 1925 I visited the Hotel Matignon, which M. Painlevé, with whom I was then working, wanted to make the residence of a Prime Minister without portfolio, I little thought that this ancient building, before the War the scene of the diplomatic rites of the old Austria-Hungary, would twenty years later see accomplished within its walls a peaceful revolution and what can rightly be called the birth of the charter of labour. A happy result indeed, for if, in the historic phrase, true in the twentieth as in the nineteenth century, industrial workers have no assured position in the existing social structure, nothing could be more useful than to give them the moral and material share in the patrimony of the nation to which they are entitled.

The June strikes, though they were settled, had, however, the unfortunate psychological effect of creating a great deal of bitterness between workers and employers, especially between the workers and those in direct contact with them, small employers, engineers and foremen, and of spreading both at home and abroad the sense of insecurity which was often already extreme. The Government was thus forced to introduce reforms in the economic field, involving heavy financial burdens, before it had been able to secure the economic recovery which would support them. Throughout the whole period from June to September 1936, which forms what one might call the first stage of the " Blum Experiment," the Government suffered a great deal from this initial contradiction.

It is true that the Government, at least in its official declara-

tions, congratulated itself on having escaped disaster. Each class of society is readily convinced that the improvement of its own lot is actually of the greatest benefit to the whole community. There are employers' combines which have asserted that when individual interests have reached the dimensions of their own, they become indistinguishable from the general interest. The workers naturally hold the same opinion. Everyone believes that in order to improve trade, he himself must first be made a good customer. That is the whole principle of the purchasing-power theory, which possibly contains some truth, but has appeared very opportunely to give some semblance of economic logic to a situation which in fact has little to do with either logic or economics. " Let us first give better pay to the mass of wage-earners; their increased demand on the market will revive trade and give work to the unemployed; and the increased turnover will enable business undertakings to bear the increased costs which will be thrown on them." This was an attractive theory —too attractive, indeed, since unfortunately it has not been in the least borne out by events.

The Government throughout the whole period did not fail to show great prudence. Two important points in the *Front Populaire* programme were the denunciation of the Decrees and the reform of the Bank of France. In the former case the Government took care not to sweep away all the economies made by its predecessors, and even to-day, a year after its assumption of office, some official salaries are still subject to cuts made in consequence of the 1935 Decrees, which the rise in prices makes particularly hard. In the same way the Government took care not to modify the function of the Bank of France nor its character as a private bank. The primary object of the Law of July 24th, 1936, was the abolition of the former Governing Board, which was nominated by the two hundred largest shareholders and personified in the eyes of the public the famous " two hundred families," and its replacement by a General Board, composed of representatives of all the national economic forces as well as administrators elected by the whole body of shareholders. The Government, moreover, in announcing that fiscal reforms were going to be made in a democratic spirit, appealed for the confidence of savings and to the credit which the country ought to allow itself, which obviously precludes any extreme financial measure.

However, in spite of official hopes and although the forty-hour law had not yet been applied, the situation, instead of improving,

grew appreciably worse. Throughout the summer the indices of production, of transport, of exports and of employment showed a worse depression than in the worst months of the preceding year, which had themselves beaten the record. In fact the fundamental disequilibrium from which France was suffering, and of which the disparity of prices was the clearest symptom, had simply been aggravated. The index of wholesale agricultural prices, which had already gone up more than 25 per cent. between July 1935 and May 1936, continued to rise by 4 per cent. up to September. The index of wholesale industrial prices, which until then had been fairly stable, rose in its turn by 11 per cent. The index of retail prices, mainly on account of the rise in food prices, rose by 8 per cent. between May and September, after having risen by 9 per cent. between July 1935 and May 1936. So that retail prices had risen more in one year *without devaluation* than they had in Belgium twelve months after a devaluation of 28 per cent. This rise in prices in national currency, though no doubt necessary for economic recovery, was unbearable in international values, since it was added to prices already above the level of the world market by an average of 20 per cent.

The disequilibrium was thus acute and collapse sooner or later was inevitable, and in consequence the trend of the exchange market was constantly unfavourable to the franc and the tightness of the money market was constantly unfavourable to the Treasury. Under this régime the only goods which it was possible to procure by payment on account with francs were gold and foreign *Devisen* maintained at an artificially low fixed rate. It was not surprising that there was a demand for these and that the cash of the Bank of France was reduced by September to 50,000 million francs.

The situation was from that time on blindingly clear. The alternatives were either to accept the necessity of adjusting the value of the franc to the actual economic situation, especially to the higher price level, or to conceal the disagreeable truth by establishing exchange control, which could not prevent an actual depreciation abroad and would certainly have accentuated the economic paralysis. The temptation to choose the latter alternative was very great for a Government of the Left, and of the extreme Left. It was, moreover, openly advocated by a large section of its Communist allies, and it accorded with the over-simplified ideas of many who confuse restrictive measures with a rational economic control. Contrary to many expectations, however, it was the courageous solution which prevailed.

It is in fact impossible to detach the economic and financial régime of a country from its general policy. As President Roosevelt recalled in a striking sentence in his speech at Buenos Aires, it was no accident that the nations which had carried the process of imposing trade restrictions furthest were those which proclaimed most loudly that they required war as the instrument of their policy. They were also those where the standard of living was lowest and where the democratic ideal was most forgotten.

At a decisive moment the Government was again confronted by the dilemma which had existed from the first day: either it must carry out even drastic reforms on the basis of a restored but free economy and by the methods which have met with success in other democratic countries; or else it must resign itself to the restrictive methods of the totalitarian States, which in every case lead to isolation if not to dictatorship. The devaluation of the franc was, on the contrary, an opportunity for initiating fresh international co-operation. The Government understood this so well that it waited to introduce its monetary reform until the conversations taking place with Great Britain and the United States had ended, so that the re-alignment of the franc, instead of further depreciating, might be a step towards the currency stability of the chief currencies and a prelude to closer international co-operation.

The second stage of the " Blum Experiment," which lasted from September 1936 to March 1937, was thus opened. The results obtained during this period should not be under-estimated. The chief and most decisive result was that the Government, faced by an historic choice, adopted the right solution and lifted the burden which had weighed for so long like a mortgage on French policy, thus opening the way for lasting economic recovery. What is more, it made this choice in spite of the strongest political pressure. The Government, which had already courageously run counter to a section of its own supporters in the field of foreign policy in pronouncing for non-intervention in Spain, succeeded in winning a second victory over its own ranks in the economic field. This fact is of inestimable value. The rise in prices in internal value and their simultaneous fall in external values brought considerable relief. From that time the indices, till then persistently unfavourable, began for the first time for a long while to change and become favourable.

Unfortunately, a political mistake and a technical mistake partly neutralised the happy effects of the monetary reform.

The political mistake was the failure to seize the occasion of so important and delicate a monetary reform as an opportunity to impose what three months later was called the " pause." Moreover, instead of laying it down as a principle from the first that the devaluation of the franc was a simple corrective indispensable for the re-establishment of the equilibrium destroyed by the previous high prices, " compensations " were rashly promised to a series of interests, while others were to be penalised. The result of this was, on the one hand, to check the natural return of capital, especially by the confiscation of the profit on gold holdings, and, on the other hand, to lead to further rises in prices.

The technical mistake was the adoption of a fixed rate of 105 francs to the £1, half-way between the legal minimum of 98 francs and the maximum of 112.50 francs, so that the Equalisation Fund lost gold automatically at the slightest unfavourable tendency. The disadvantages of a flexible currency were thus combined with those of a rigid one. The Government, it is true, hastened to counteract these disadvantages. It announced that a " pause " was necessary, and also moderation in the adjustment of wages to prices. Then, directing its efforts to the one field in which they could be effective, it suppressed, for the first time since the crisis, a number of quotas and reduced some duties. But given the rise in costs of production, this unilateral action could not go beyond very modest limits. In spite of the Government's efforts, the conviction that the rise in prices and wages would continue, and that the burden on the Treasury was too heavy, led to a further spreading of the feeling that devaluation was inevitable and maintained a trend on the foreign exchange market steadily unfavourable to the franc.

At the beginning of March 1937 the situation was again such that decisive action was imperative. And again, in spite of the resistance and reluctance of a section of the majority, the necessary decision was taken in the Declaration of March 5th, which opened the third and present phase of the " Blum Experiment."

In the Declaration of March 5th, 1937, the Government took a certain number of decisions of capital importance. In the first place, it called into collaboration in the direction of the Exchange Equalisation Fund men of undisputed authority in the economic field, like M. Charles Rist. Secondly, all the restrictions still hampering the movement of gold and *Devisen* were removed, and a start has thus been made on the road to complete re-establishment of freedom of capital movement. Thirdly, a

financial plan was outlined. The Government bound itself not to propose any new budgetary expenditure unbalanced by equivalent economies. It reduced by 6000 million francs the payments to be made for public works, now rendered to some extent superfluous by the economic recovery. It decided to meet the initial military expenditure by a National Defence Loan of 10,500 million francs. Thus the charges on the Treasury were brought to a total which could be met by normal means.

Some people maintained that the Government could never make such radical decisions in opposition to the prejudices of its own followers. Others feared that even if the Government did do so, savings would be held back from lack of confidence, which would have had the effect of driving the authorities to compulsory measures. But events proved these fears to be unjustified. Not only did the Government deliberately adopt the policy of March 5th, but it also lost no opportunity of confirming and defining it. Savings did not hold back for political reasons, once a coherent economic and financial plan was presented, but, on the contrary, responded with such alacrity that 5000 millions were subscribed within a few hours. It took the unfortunate Clichy incident to hinder the placing of a part of the second issue.

At the same time, the new tactics adopted by the Exchange Equalisation Fund had its effect. It allowed, as far as one can judge, for its operations are not made public, the building up of considerable reserves and a better adjustment of the exchange rate of the franc, within the legal limits, to the actual economic situation. But naturally it is not technical efficiency, however great it may be, but general policy which decides the fate of a currency.

Where do we stand to-day and where are we going? That is the question which everyone is asking. I should like to conclude this paper, without risking any rash prophecies, by making a number of comments which may help you to understand events better.

As Mr. Philip Carr wittily said, when speaking here in October 1936, it is very difficult for the English to understand what is happening in a country where traffic keeps to the right instead of the left, where windows open inwards and where everyone goes home for lunch : with all the more reason when the French themselves do not always understand their own position. For some the only question is the fall of "this dreadful Blum." For others the *Front Populaire* is indestructible and can do no wrong.

If one regards the situation impartially, it is apparent that the fundamental disequilibrium, that of prices, which barred the road to recovery, is, if not completedly corrected, at least very greatly lessened since the devaluation.

From September 1936 to March 1937 wholesale prices rose by 32 per cent., while retail prices rose by only 16 per cent.; that is, by exactly half. The gap between the indices, which had been considerable, from 300 for imported goods to 500 for retail prices, has gone, and the same indices have appeared as about 500 and 575 for several weeks, which is fairly satisfactory—a reduction in the difference from 66 to 15 per cent.

The second important fact is that since the beginning of the year there has been a marked slowing down in the rise of prices, and for the time being there is relative stability. At the present level the disparity between French and foreign prices has practically disappeared. In gold values the cost of living in Paris has fallen since last August by about 20 per cent., which was more or less exactly the extent of the previous disparity. The influx of foreign tourists to France is a proof of this.

These facts are important, and they are a direct consequence of the devaluation. It is therefore quite inaccurate to say that the devaluation has been ineffective or that the rise in prices has neutralised its effects. It is, however, true that the rise in some prices has been excessive and too rapid, and that the recovery of economic activity is small, in all cases much less than there has been in other countries, such as Belgium, Switzerland and Holland. Industrial production has improved, but in a very small way, just enough to balance the decline between May and September. The exchange also shows a very moderate improvement. Foreign trade has increased on the whole, but the increased value comes mainly from the rise in prices and relates far more to imports than to exports. So far as manufactured goods are concerned, the improvement in sales, though real, is slight, and the deficit in the balance of trade for the first quarter of 1937 was 5000 million francs, which would not be disturbing if production were, as it should be, in full expansion. Unemployment has decreased, and remains consistently about 75,000 below the figures for the preceding year. The reduction is, however, much less than might have been expected from the economic recovery and the application of the forty-hour law.

In spite of the modest appearance of the recovery, revenue receipts have been fairly good. The ordinary budget for 1937 was fixed at 48,000 million francs, the previous year's receipts

having been less than 40,000 million francs. A surplus of 4000 million francs was anticipated, which would leave a deficit in 1937 of about 4500 thousand million francs to be worked off only in 1938. But the receipts for the first quarter of 1937 have risen steadily not only above those of 1936, but above the estimates, which they have exceeded by 300 millions in March alone. It is to be feared that the results of subsequent months will not be so good, but we may hope that the deficit on the ordinary budget for the current year will be reduced. This would be a great achievement, and all the more important as a great deal still remains to be done to bring about the reintegration in the ordinary budget of the capital expenditure which now appears in the extraordinary budget, and amounts this year to 10,000 million francs for national defence and 6000 million for public works, without including the deficits on some of the public services, such as the railways.

To sum up the situation, one may say that recovery has been started by the devaluation, but that it is slowed up by two excessive burdens which weigh on it heavily. The first is the over-rigid application of the forty-hour law, which, associated in many cases with a deplorable decrease in output, restricts production and encourages an excessive rise in prices. The second handicap is the excessive capital consumption by the State and public services, which keeps the rate of interest too high and deprives the national economy of its natural means of action. Obviously a great deal of this heavy expenditure is due to the burdens left by the last War and to the present needs of national defence, on which 15,000 million francs were spent last year and more than 20,000 million are to be spent this year. But this is yet another reason for rejecting on principle any additional expenditure and for adhering firmly to the programme of March 5th. The Government wants to do this. Will it be able?

I will give you frankly my own impressions of the situation. First of all, do not believe those who tell you that M. Léon Blum is tired of power or discouraged by what he has done. Nor should you believe those who say that he has modified his ideas and is ready to drop them. My impression is that, on the contrary, he is quite determined to continue the same line of action, supported by a far more solid Parliamentary majority than is supposed, and also by a far more loyal public opinion. He knows very well that if there were fresh elections to-morrow he would stand a very good chance of returning to power with the same, if not an increased, majority and that gives him great strength. My impression is

that he has abandoned none of his ideas. He is and remains a Socialist, but he is too intelligent not to recognise facts and bow to them.

In September and again in March he came up against a number of financial facts, and he gave way to them. He refused to employ restrictive methods, because such measures would have meant a policy of isolation, which he would not permit for reasons both of general and of international policy. That, in my opinion, is an essential point in M. Léon Blum's policy. It inspired his decisions of yesterday and will inevitably inspire his decisions of to-morrow. The extent to which it prevails even over personal and theoretical preferences is the best guarantee that the policy which led to the Monetary Agreement of September 1936 and the Declaration of March 1937 is not a passing accident, but a permanent orientation. M. Léon Blum appreciates this very clearly, and is ready to face the difficulties which this policy will naturally raise with a section of his supporters.

The present "pause" which the Government advocates is not an accident; it is the second and an essential aspect of the experiment. Logic would have required first the restoration of economic prosperity, and then social reforms proportionate to the results achieved. That is roughly the plan followed with success by M. Van Zeeland. M. Léon Blum reversed the order. He introduced the reforms first; he must subsequently secure the economic improvement which will provide them with a solid foundation. That is the "pause."

The drawback to this method is that of having, as we say, "eaten the white bread first," and the wisdom and patience, which in other countries were called for first, have now to be exercised afterwards. I believe, however, that, if the Government demands it, that wisdom and patience can be secured from its supporters. The best proof of this is that it would carry through the devaluation in spite of its unpopularity; that M. Blum could adopt the programme of March 5th in spite of the dislike to it of a section of his followers; and that he has just now given a polite but firm refusal to the demands of the C.G.T. for a fresh programme of public works.

The essential point is that the Government must succeed in transforming the negative conception of the "pause" into a positive policy, which perhaps will not give satisfaction to everyone, but will allow of the consolidation of economic progress and social reform. Action is called for in three directions. First, to secure greater flexibility and the adaptation of the recent social

reforms to the practical needs and infinite diversity of economic life. It is not so much the reforms themselves which are intolerable, as the sudden and too direct way in which they have been introduced one on top of another. The best proof that modifications are possible is to be found in the fact that they have been made, for example, in the coal mines. Employers and workers have agreed to combine a moderate increase in the workers' wages with an additional working day every fortnight, which in fact works out at a forty-five hour week, and has permitted the restoration of production to its former level and at the same time the re-employment of workers.

Secondly, a rigorous budgetary policy must be maintained and enforced. Here, happily, conditions are favourable. For the first time for a long while, the Finance Minister can see his estimates realised. He even has the advantage of a slight surplus. This should be a strong encouragement to him to keep within the estimates, and not to compromise an improvement from which he derives the benefit. A plan must be drawn up for progressively inserting in the budget the greater part of the extraordinary expenditure and for getting rid of the deficits on the public services. It is believed that the Government is now drawing up such a plan which will be indispensable, if it is effective and well thought out.

Thirdly, a step forward must be made towards a freer commercial policy. The present system of duties and quotas was no doubt inevitable during the depression and the collapse of foreign currencies, but it does not correspond to the requirements of a period of recovery, since it paralyses exchange and tends to cause an excessive rise in prices. For the first time for many years the French Government is in favour of a more flexible policy. It has already suppressed a small number of quotas, and I know that M. Léon Blum is personally determined to take a further step as soon as some agreement is possible. Now that the United States Administration has adopted a new attitude towards international co-operation, circumstances are favourable, and it would be a pity not to take advantage of them. And moreover, as we have seen, it is the policy of international co-operation which has had most weight with the Government at critical moments and the intention to hold to it is really very strong.

In every country, however, the forces which emphasise short-sighted interests are always powerful and active. The only way to neutralise them is to take a step forward as soon as is reasonably possible, however modest it may be, towards the closer economic

›eration which would complete the advance made in ›mber by the Monetary Agreement and which was expressly ›aged in that Agreement. If that result were in sight, r as a result of the inquiry entrusted to M. Van Zeeland, or ugh some provisional agreement while waiting for the iry to achieve more ambitious results, I am convinced that ould have a happy and perhaps decisive effect on French y. All the countries which are working for the consolidation ›ace and the re-establishment of internal trade have their to play and their contribution to make. Everything depends ie practical results which can be obtained by this method of ıal understanding and reciprocal concessions. It is these ts, positive or negative, which will give the "Blum Experi-," as it is at present being carried out, all its meaning and ficance.

Summary of Discussion.

R. H. WICKHAM STEED, the Chairman, said that the moderation which the speaker had used his adjectives had created an impres- of solidity in the French position which had not perhaps before fully appreciated. In no sense had the lecture been propaganda, . sincere examination of the conditions and possibilities in France.

UESTION : Did M. Auboin feel that the *Front Populaire* provided manent and durable foundation for parliamentary government ance?

. AUBOIN replied that in his opinion the *Front Populaire* was for ime being more solid than was supposed, because it rested on a al opinion rather than on a particular programme. There was ely a single point in common between a Radical and a Communist, .s long as there was no question of carrying out either a Socialist y or a Communist policy, the country as a whole was very favour- to the *Front Populaire*. Things of course would obviously change at policy did not succeed or if its practical drawbacks were ıtuated.

[R. E. D. GANNON inquired about the state of confidence in the : market and the return of capital. Was the optimism of M. ›in's address shared by the small and large investor and in upper le-class circles? And, if not, was not something very important ng for the success of the Blum Experiment? Was the "pause" ng effective in industry? His own information suggested that stry was suffering from too great a swing of the pendulum and low a return in the other direction. Possibly the Exhibition was ng 1937 an abnormal year. With regard to paid holidays, it was d to diminish unemployment, and this had been done, but there

were other difficulties. Some factories had to close entirely for a fortnight on account of the paid holidays, and this meant an appreciable diminution of output. What was the attitude of the C.G.T. to the forty-hour week from this point of view? Did they intend to insist on its rigorous application?

M. Auboin replied that with regard to the return of capital, the important thing was the general trend of the foreign exchange market, and the Blum Experiment would succeed if that trend became and could be kept favourable. The Declaration of March 5th had proved that even a *Front Populaire* Government could secure a burst of financial confidence when it acted independently of political questions. The Government must, however, transform its "pause" into a positive policy, giving an impression of a detailed and efficient programme. With regard to paid holidays, this was the one point on which opinion was unanimous. As soon as the measure was introduced, everyone perceived that it should have been done long ago. The forty-hour week, on the other hand, raised many difficulties.

Mr. Horsfall Carter asked if there was not dissatisfaction because the Government, after its electoral promises of reform of the Bank of France, had confined itself to appointing a fresh Board. Were there any non-Marxist and non-Socialist groups in France which advocated drastic monetary reform on a social credit basis? He had in mind a M. Duboin who had written *La grande révolution qui vient.*

M. Auboin said that the reform of the Bank as carried out had, he thought, settled the question for the time being. It was very moderate and had not touched monetary machinery.

There were people with all sorts of ideas on currency. When monetary disequilibrium had been allowed to develop, recourse was had to various expedients, such as inflation or exchange control: theories could always be found to justify practical necessities. Progress could certainly still be made in currency matters, but in this field, more than in any, theories were not to be trusted.

Mr. C. H. Luke asked if the lecturer thought that the natural conservatism of the French people, particularly the peasants, would counteract the present Communistic tendencies, assuming that the standard of living of certain of the French people, particularly those belonging to the *Front Populaire,* was rather low.

M. Auboin replied that the propaganda of the Left parties, particularly of the Communists, could only spread on condition that it was not Communist. He had heard a Communist candidate telling the peasants in a district where rents were paid not in money but by giving half their produce to the landlord, that in the towns people taking 8, 10 or 12 per cent. interest were imprisoned as usurers, while

they (the peasants) were paying the landlords at the rate of 50 per cent. and were being robbed. This argument, which had nothing to do with doctrinaire Communism, had met with great success.

THE CHAIRMAN recalled M. André Siegfried's remark that a Frenchman's heart was on the Left but his pocket on the Right, and every Frenchman had a pocket; and also his story of the Socialist mayor who always complained that people were not advanced enough and who, when asked how far he would go, had replied, "Always to the left, but not beyond."

QUESTION: Was it true, as was suggested by the Paris correspondent of *The Times*, that the want of logic in the commercial measures already taken by the Government was affecting agricultural products and that they were meeting with obstinate resistance from agricultural interests?

M. AUBOIN said that if there was any desire to introduce theoretical measures, such as the sudden introduction of a liberal régime in all fields, it would be altogether chimerical. A complete liberal régime had never existed in France. It was essential in France to maintain equilibrium between the agricultural population and the industrial population, but it was necessary to get out of the abnormal situation due to the crisis which had resulted in excessive restrictions on trade. A committee under M. Charles Rist's chairmanship had carefully studied methods of transforming the existing quota system into one of more normal protection, such as had existed before the crisis. This would maintain protection for agricultural products, especially wheat which was under the special régime of the Office du Blé.

MR. M. ZVEGINTZOV said that he had attended a conference in which some leaders of the C.G.T. had taken part, and he had received the impression that they were worthy but rather ignorant people. They had obtained in a very short time reforms which they did not yet understand. Consequently M. Blum's "pause" was very important for them. The question was whether they were wise enough to see that they needed this pause in order to understand the new economic and political circumstances which were arising. Granted that there had been some economic and financial recovery, was it not still true that long-term capital interest rates were so high in France that they were a serious handicap on industry? It would be impossible to secure equilibrium between French and world prices so long as these rates were almost double those in other developed countries such as the United States and Great Britain. This was a fatal handicap, since French industry was on practically the same level as in other civilised countries. The cause was obviously political, perhaps it lay in the fear of the capitalists. Was M. Blum strong enough to persuade his adherents on the extreme Left that a political

pause was as essential as an economic pause? If not the recovery would end abruptly.

M. Auboin agreed that there was great inexperience among the workers, especially those who had only recently joined the syndicates. A small number really understood the problems, but they represented only a minority. One of the objects of the "pause" should be to allow of economic consolidation and better understanding of economic problems. If the Blum Experiment failed, it would be through the mistakes of those who were to benefit by it but did not understand their true interest. But each time the Government had clearly seen what had to be done, it had succeeded in imposing its policy, in spite of the feeling of its own supporters, therefore it could probably achieve what it set out to do. The difficulty was that each time it had to begin all over again. That was why it was essential to transform the negative position into a positive one.

Long-term interest rates were abnormal because the consumption of capital was in excess of the requirements of the State and taxes were too heavy. But if there were a technically sound financial plan which the Government was determined to carry out, the reversal of the tendency would be immediate, though the restoration of complete equilibrium would obviously be a long task.

POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE[1]

By Mr. D. Graham Hutton

I had the good fortune to be able to make two separate tours of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe within the last six months; the first to Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia, and the second to Czechoslovakia again, Poland and Germany. The observations I have to make have therefore perhaps the interest that they are the result of a comparison of the conditions in this rather stormy part of Europe at six months' remove in time.

May I begin by reminding you of the very strong interdependence between politics and economics in Central and Eastern Europe—an interdependence more important perhaps than the normal interdependence between those two realms of public affairs. In 1930–31, when the economic depression was first beginning to make its effects felt in Central Europe, the countries of that disturbed region underwent internal political disturbances. Their foreign policies underwent at the same time a certain reorientation. It was most noticeable of course in the countries that were almost one hundred per cent. agrarian, the countries therefore which depended upon the export of their agrarian produce to the consuming and more industrialised countries. At the same time they were countries that were very largely debtors on international account.

We do not need to emphasise at this time the importance of the financial breakdown in Hungary, the financial breakdown in Austria, the difficulties which followed and gave rise to a long deflationary period in Poland. In Roumania and Yugoslavia the story was much the same. One of the most striking phenomena to-day in the economic sphere is the sudden rise in the prices of primary products. The prices of most of the primary products of the world have been slowly rising for a matter of eighteen months to two years. But the rate of that rise has increased during the last nine months to twelve months with quite a disturbing

[1] Address given at Chatham House on April 27th, 1937; with Mr. Norman Ewer in the Chair.

velocity; and this has had several peculiar effects in these Central and Eastern European countries—peculiar politically, and peculiar economically. Two years ago, any interested English observer visiting these countries would have been an unwise optimist if he had concluded that either economic recovery or political appeasement was possible in these countries. During the last twelve months, however, most of us must have been impressed with the resurgent possibilities of both political appeasement and economic recovery in that area.

I want first of all to remind you that 1931 and 1932, the depression years, were also the years of the first Stresa Conference, of the agrarian *bloc*, of the financial crashes in Central Europe, of the abortive proposal for a customs union between Germany and Austria, of the Tardieu plan, and other things. In those years it was thought that it would only be a short space of time before the Central European countries and their Eastern and South Eastern neighbours would conclude both economic and political agreements. It was thought that the political agreements would be buttressed by the economic agreements; that this whole structure would secure a certain internal coherence; and that the rest of Europe would not need to expect that region again to become the cockpit of Europe. The economic depression stopped all that; and before the economic depression had proceeded very far on its course, events in Germany and in Italy had completely altered the political outlook in Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, the development of the rearmament programme of Germany, of the assiduous destruction of certain clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, of the Abyssinian conflict with its resultant effect on the alignment of the Great Powers in Europe and on the League of Nations, had an enormous influence upon the foreign policies of the smaller countries of Europe.

If I start with Austria and Hungary, it is not that they have the most delicate structure economically and politically, but because they were the first really to be caught in the economic depression. Partly as an economist and partly as one interested in international relations of all kinds, I have been most impressed by the first effects of the rise in commodity prices in Austria and Hungary.

Internal politics have, I think, an almost complete correlation with the economic condition of a country. That has been most noticeable in the case of Hungary. A matter of three or four years ago it would have been perhaps unwisely optimistic to have expected that the Hungarian parliamentary machine, the

Hungarian economic structure, would have suddenly become effective, and that a new coherence would have been discovered in all Hungarian public life; the effect of the economic depression had been so disastrous on a country of such a small population, a country almost wholly dependent on export of primary products. And yet within the last twelve to eighteen months there has been quite a remarkable development inside Hungary. This development has expressed itself in a more hopeful, more traditional attitude towards democracy; as if it were really effective; as if the political institutions of the nineteenth century had still their effective power in the world outside Hungary.

The death of the Prime Minister, General Gömbös, last autumn brought a tragic end to a régime the composition and aims of which nobody knew really thoroughly. For the last five years, people knew that something of a military or totalitarian character might develop in internal Hungarian politics; and yet the removal by the hand of death of the only man who was able to bring about any such régime in Hungary threw most of the Hungarians themselves back upon their old traditional beliefs in democracy, constitutionalism, and so on. It was a small influence; but an influence which has had a very great effect in internal Hungarian politics.

Secondly, in Hungary, people have for long despaired of any economic recovery at all. When people despair of things economic, they are likely to despair of things political at the same time. But there has recently been quite a considerable and extensive economic amelioration in Hungary, with the normal correlation (in a peasant State) that the degree of nervousness among millions of people who are, and can only hope to be, peasants, has gradually abated. You have now a state of political affairs inside Hungary which is almost exactly the state of affairs in Hungary in the 1890's. That is to say, you have the return to the belief in the constitution. You have a return to the constitutional party structure. You have an abandonment to a considerable extent, but not altogether, of the idea of totalitarianism. And of course with this you have a certain reorientation of foreign policy.

This reorientation in Hungarian foreign policy during the last six months has roughly followed these lines. Hungary has claimed territorial revision of her frontiers ever since the Peace. She has been prepared to go along the road with any Great Power that seemed able to guarantee her, whether peaceably or not, the revision of her frontiers. She was most prepared to travel with the

Italy of Signor Mussolini. The Italy of Signor Mussolini, owing to other exigencies, has not been so preoccupied with Hungarian revision in the last six to nine months. It has made its peace with Yugoslavia. The Hungarians have consequently been decidedly disillusioned. On the other hand, a good deal of powerful influence in Hungarian political life was favourable towards Germany, and always had been. In the last year or so Hungarians have been watching internal developments in Germany closely; and at the same time Hungarian business men, who have debts to collect in Germany and cannot collect them, have been led to believe that all was not well inside one of the two big totalitarian States in Europe. Consequently, with a small country of eight and a half million people, Hungary, having to decide between one totalitarian State and the other totalitarian State, has come within the last six to nine months very near the point of crying, "A plague on both your houses!"

It is the nature of totalitarian States, reposing as they do upon the unfettered responsibility of one man or of a small oligarchy, to over-reach themselves. In foreign affairs both the Italian and German States have been inclined to over-reach themselves in Central Europe. If the result is not as striking in Austria as it is in Hungary, I do not think that it is any the less important. But in Hungary certainly, my impression was that this new atmosphere—one can hardly call it anything else—was capable of a great deal of good; capable, indeed, of transforming, to quite a considerable extent, the complexion of the whole Danubian basin. I would emphasise once again the great stumbling-block that the intransigent plea for Hungarian territorial revision had constituted for so many years. You have seen in the papers within the last two weeks that official pronouncements have been made in Hungary which indicate that, while cleaving to the principle of revision, the intransigence is not so evident.

In the economic sphere that has even gone further. For example, it has always been the ambition of the three Little Entente States to come to some kind of economic working arrangement with Austria and Hungary. What constantly blocked it was the force of Hungarian revisionism, which force was exerted, of course, upon whatever Government happened to be ruling in Hungary at that time. It was almost impossible for any Hungarian Government to stand against it. The Austrians were much more prepared to co-operate economically with the States of the Little Entente, for a very obvious reason—namely, the industrial area of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which was

divided among Austria and Czechoslovakia. Consequently, any arrangements of Austria with Czechoslovakia industrially would have given them the key position in the whole Five States' area. Hungary's industries were always, even before the War, highly protected. Consequently her industries could hardly hope to compete on such advantageous terms with the industries of Czechoslovakia and Austria. Therefore this political metamorphosis inside Hungary, and the greater readiness of the Hungarian Government to come to an economic arrangement with the States of the Little Entente, is a good bull point, on the face of it, for Central European co-operation.

But now I must pass to the wider canvas, because Hungary has been, after all, only the anvil upon which two alternate hammers, both political and economic, have been banging away: first, the German hammer, and secondly the Italian.

The countries of the Rome Protocol group, Austria, Hungary and Italy, were not as favourably constituted, economically, as the countries of the Little Entente, or as the imaginary triangle, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, might have been. For this reason: both Austria and Hungary do much more business with other States than they do with Italy; and they always have done. As the Little Entente have for long discovered, and as the countries of the Rome Protocol have for three or four years been discovering, it is extremely difficult for political objectives to alter the direction of trade. You can alter them to a certain extent; but you cannot alter them very much. For instance, the working of the Ottawa Agreement has shown that you can alter to a certain extent the direction of trade, both in imports and exports; but you cannot alter it very much. It is a very small percentage movement. And that is what has happened, both in the Little Entente States and in the countries of the Rome Protocol group. Consequently, when you add the influence of recovery in Europe, the recovery in the prices of agricultural products, and the recovery in foreign trade as a whole, to the influences which were making themselves felt in the purely political field, pressure upon the Hungarian and Austrian Governments to make some kind of *modus vivendi* economically with the Little Entente became very much stronger. It has been almost irresistible within the last six to nine months. That has been another of the influences which have been making for a revision of economic and political ties in the Danubian Basin.

The most important influence, however, comes entirely from outside. That influence is not the effect of the rise of prices upon

the exports of the agricultural countries, but the effect of the rise of prices upon the imports of the totalitarian States, Germany and Italy. The economic régime in Germany was enabled, when prices of agricultural produce were still falling in the world and when markets were still narrowing, to drive very advantageous bilateral bargains with the small States who were driven almost to despair in trying to sell their surplus produce. In this way, the German economic system managed to increase the percentage of its imports from these small States very considerably; to wipe out nearly all its export surpluses; and at the same time to increase to a very large extent, almost to an overwhelming extent, the dependence of the small States upon the German market. For instance, 60 per cent. of Bulgaria's exports went to Germany eighteen months ago; the dependence of a small country upon a large country to that extent is almost unprecedented. The consequence was that with Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and even Roumania, Germany was able to exercise a kind of economic attraction, which had, of course, an obvious political effect inside each of these countries. As a small example, it was quite impossible for the government of the day in any one of these smaller countries to take a strong, shall I say pro-League, line during the Abyssinian crisis. Either they took no line at all, as did Austria and Hungary, or they took a very grudging line. The reason was, not that they were particularly politically enamoured of the régimes of Germany and Italy, but simply that it was extremely difficult for them, as governments, to proceed against a very large percentage of their business men or peasants who were entirely dependent on the markets of one of the totalitarian States. When the recovery in world prices came, it came in world markets, not in the totalitarian narrow price-controlled markets. It came in London and Liverpool; it came in sterling; in the markets where one could get a free exchange. The small countries much preferred to sell for free exchange rather than for blocked marks or blocked lire. You then saw the unfortunate situation of Yugoslavia last autumn when she found herself with five hundred million dinars blocked in Germany, which could only be unfrozen by imports of photographic apparatus, or munitions, or girders for bridges—which to-day they would not be able to get because steel is wanted for other things in Germany—and harmonicas. The effect of that kind of trade is to make the peasants, the exporters of the smaller countries, dependent entirely upon a price structure imposed upon them by the larger States. I will put it in this way, that a peasant who sends his pork, or plums, or wheat, or

whatever it may be, to Germany from, say, Yugoslavia, has to claim back from his government, as and when the dinars become unblocked or unfrozen from Germany, the proceeds of the goods which come from Germany and are sold to other people in Yugoslavia. Well, the capacity of Yugoslavia to absorb photographic apparatus, or harmonicas, and other things of that nature, is limited. The result is that either the dinars are not unfrozen—as has been the case, and it partly accounts for the recent Yugoslav trade agreement with Italy—or else they are unfrozen by deliveries of things which the *government* can consume: namely, munitions, or bridges, or something which can be used in public works. I have used Yugoslavia as an example; but this system of trade with Germany and Italy has existed over nearly every smaller country in Central and South-Eastern Europe. And since the rise in world prices became sharp and sudden a matter of nine to twelve months ago, the attraction of the German and Italian markets for the smaller States has lessened to a quite surprising degree.

You do not expect to see miracles in six to nine months, not in modern Europe. But it surprised me to see that the same people to whom I spoke in September and October last year, and in March and April of this, were now most optimistic politically and economically, and were less enamoured both of trade and political relations with Germany and Italy. Of course, they were also more than a little confused, because they did not know where they were going, or being led, either economically or politically.

Apart from the obvious political importance and connections of the Little Entente countries these States have been trying for a long time to maintain some kind of economic link and to strengthen that link. They have not been particularly successful, because of the economic structure of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy before the War which, as I say, confined the industrial region to Czechoslovakia and Austria, and left the part which is now Yugoslavia and Roumania and Hungary almost entirely agrarian. The effect of normal protectionism after the War, coupled with the abnormal protectionism, the rabid economic nationalism since the years 1929–30, has been to barricade their markets off from each other. They have been trying to get over that for a matter of three years since the Statute of the Little Entente was signed; and it has not been particularly successful, for much the same reason that attempts to bring Austria and Hungary together economically have not been particularly successful. In Austria, agriculture was highly protected; and in Hungary, industry was highly

protected. In the same way in Czechoslovakia, an industrial State, agriculture has been highly protected for ten years, with the result that this year, for the first time since its foundation, Czechoslovakia becomes a wheat exporting State. Roumania has protected her industries very highly; and Yugoslavia, an agricultural country, has also protected her industries. The result of all these things is to make it extremely difficult for the three partners, however politically united, to strengthen the economic links between them.

Nevertheless the rise in world prices has again effected something. In Czechoslovakia, for example, dependent entirely upon imports of raw materials through foreign territory, the effect of the rise in world prices has been to increase the natural demand of business men and merchants and bankers that trade should be a little freer. The first initiatives in this direction were taken by the Prime Minister, M. Hodža, a matter of a year ago. He met at that time, when the confusions of sanctions had not quite died down, with a complete rebuff from Italy. The rebuff was not only from Italy, unfortunately; it was also from Hungary. And as Czechoslovakia had been fighting a trade war for six years with Hungary, the omens were not auspicious. But M. Hodža persevered, and, using Dr. Schuschnigg and Vienna as a channel, he contrived to render the Government of Hungary, after the death of General Gömbös last October, more sympathetic. The result was, as I have already stated, that the Hungarian Government became more kindly disposed, not for political reasons but for purely economic reasons, to the idea of closer Danubian economic co-operation. A year ago, when M. Hodža tried this initiative, the spoke was put in the wheel by General Gömbös, who reminded Signor Mussolini that in the Rome Protocols it was specifically laid down that on matters of external relations to any other party these three countries should remain sovereign. General Gömbös at that time said : " I am not going to have any economic co-operation with Czechoslovakia." About November to December last, the new policy became evident in Hungary; and I have reason to think that a Hungarian–Czechoslovak commercial treaty is actually in black and white, and that it will not be very long before it is signed. Then, six years' economic warfare between Czechoslovakia and Hungary will be concluded and something like normal economic relations will be re-established.

That is encouraging, both in the political and economic spheres, when one considers that Czechoslovakia and Hungary have been

economically and almost politically at each other's throats for a very long time. At the same time the political relations between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and the rest of the Balkan Entente have led to a proposal for economic co-operation, for the freeing of trade in the Balkan countries, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Roumania. There is then, if you take this whole basin stretching right down to Greece and Turkey, a possibility of relieving the economic tension which for about seven years has pressed so heavily upon the whole of this area that any political appeasement has been practically impossible. It is, I think, one of the most encouraging features in that landscape.

Let us now look at this development from the perspective of German and Italian influence upon this whole region. Colonel Beck, the Foreign Minister of Poland, has recently been in Bucharest, and for some time Polish–Roumanian relations have been improving. There has also been a suggestion that a Polish–Roumanian agreement would be concluded, so as to make a *cordon sanitaire* between Germany and Russia, stretching from the Baltic right down to the Black Sea. Now, I do not believe that that is the real purpose behind whatever negotiations have been going on between Poland and Roumania.

The plain fact of the matter, as I see it, is that Germany and Italy have for a long time been disputing for the hegemony over Central Europe as a whole. There was, for instance, six years ago the suggestion for the Austro-German customs union. It failed. The Little Entente then came closer together. They tried to come closer together still economically. That was more or less a failure. Then Signor Mussolini came forward with the Four-Power Pact which was to give the two Great Powers, Germany and Italy, the hegemony over Central Europe. The small Powers of Central Europe and Poland baulked that. Then came the Rome Protocols which were also to give Austria and Hungary to Mussolini, economically and politically. That went on till the Nazi régime in Germany made it extremely difficult for Signor Mussolini to hold Austria in perpetuity. It looked as if he might have the usufruct of it, but the reversion would certainly be Germany's. That has become more evident in the last two years, not only to outside observers, but I think also to Signor Mussolini. It may well be that the recent discussions between General Goering and the Duce and the discussions between the Duce and Dr. Schuschnigg at Venice had as their object the clarification of the relations between Germany and Italy over Central Europe.

Now, from the economic standpoint it is extremely difficult

either for Germany or for Italy to clarify these relations in Central Europe. Consider for a moment the economic position of Germany and Italy to-day. They have a set of existent clients, or potential clients whom they wish to make into clients, dependent upon whatever economic favours they can give. What are the economic favours they can give now? While I was in Prague, Dr. Stoyadinovitch signed the Yugoslav–Italian pact, which caused such a furore among the States of the Little Entente and even outside that ambit. I know it looked as if Italy was making great headway in Central and South-Eastern Europe. But to make political headway in that region of debtor States and of States exporting agricultural surpluses requires a well-managed market and a good deal of finance to absorb these surpluses and keep these debtor States going. In the last twelve months nothing has been more striking in the economic sphere than the economic difficulties into which both the German and the Italian régimes have run. To keep her political clients, Germany to-day has to be prepared to take their surplus products, and to pay for those surplus products on the nail. Four years ago she did not need to do that. All she needed to say four years ago was: "I will take your surplus products. You will have credit in Berlin." The credit took two or three years to wipe off, if it ever was wiped off. But those days have gone by. Prices have risen, and one can get free *Devisen* on the world market. Germany has to keep, as Italy has to keep, clients politically favourable to them when they have no free *Devisen* to offer. The only things that they can offer are the products of their own economic machines. That is to say, Italy can offer to Yugoslavia, for example, much the same things that Yugoslavia produces, or on the other hand industrial products. Now, if they are to be industrial products from Italy, as before they had to be industrial products from Germany, they must come out of the wherewithal which Italy has to produce these things. And Italy is dependent on imports of industrial raw materials in the same way that Germany is; even more so than Germany. The result is that this pressure upon the economic systems of Germany and Italy is declaring itself in two ways to-day, and the smaller States of Europe are becoming keenly aware of it.

The two ways are these: first the pressure is exerted upon the rearmament programmes of both Italy and Germany. Those programmes are placed by their régimes—quite rightly if you accept the political aims of those régimes—first. Consequently they take precedence over civil industry. Secondly, the products

of civil industry are needed to buy the surpluses of their smaller clients. Now, they cannot have it both ways, and the smaller States know this. They know that Germany and Italy must decide whether they will allow the economic machine to produce the necessary amount of industrial goods for despatch to Hungary, Yugoslavia, and so on, or whether they will allow the rearmament programmes to go ahead as fast as they have been going ahead and consume thereby the whole of the now dearer imports of industrial raw materials for which they can still pay. This dilemma has become more acute as world prices have risen during the last nine months. Wherever I went on both occasions I found the economists, the business men and the politicians of all these smaller States rather gleefully rubbing their hands and saying: "Well—politics apart, of course, and whether sympathetic or not with Italy and Germany—we are in a favourable economic position. We can say to them that we were dependent upon them four years ago; this year they are dependent upon us. If we do not want to sell in Germany or Italy, then we can sell on Amsterdam or Liverpool or Stockholm, or wherever it may be, and we shall now get free *Devisen*." I have emphasised this at considerable length because to my mind it is this one influence of rising prices and expanding markets which has caught the totalitarian States short of materials on the one hand, and on the other hand has improved the economic position of their potential clients.

The upshot of all this has been that political and economic tension in Central Europe has noticeably declined. When I spoke to Czech politicians and economists last October they were nervous. To-day they are not so nervous. They are not wildly optimistic. You have to take leave of your senses to-day to be wildly optimistic about the situation in Central Europe. It is quite possible that at any time a dictator will run amok. Indeed, it is our great danger to-day (and also that of the totalitarian States) that the head of a totalitarian State may suddenly lose his senses. You can impress upon the head of a totalitarian State, perhaps, that it would be better economically if such and such a political policy were followed. But you cannot ensure that he will act on rational assumptions. All these smaller countries are aware of that. They are all looking towards Paris and London. They all say: "We should be happier if we saw some indication of what Paris and London propose to do economically and politically; but this we do know, that the economic situation is not as favourable as it was to the totalitarian States. The second thing we know is that our position is very much better."

Now, out of these two things it is not very difficult to deduce a certain amount of optimism. But that optimism has not gone to their heads. They have a little more economic wherewithal to face possible contingencies; and at the same time the countries from which those contingencies may arise are not so favourably placed economically. The two things together give grounds for a certain amount of cautious optimism.

In conclusion, I want to draw together the threads of my argument. As you go farther from Vienna, Budapest, Prague and Belgrade, you see them in perspective: first of all their politics and economics, secondly you glimpse the larger canvas, where wider lines, harsher colours, are drawn. If you go to Warsaw, for example, you feel at once that you are removed from the Central European cockpit. But you are not removed from the dangers. The situation in Poland to-day politically and economically is almost the same as the situation in Central Europe. However much the Poles may say: "You see, our position is quite different from the position of Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria, and these other unfortunate countries who form the arena for the disputes of the Great Powers. Our position is that nobody wants to take us and we do not want to take anybody. We are surrounded on the one side by a régime for which we have no particular liking, and on the other by another régime for which we have no particular liking either. The lucky thing is that the two régimes dislike each other intensely. Consequently we benefit from both. All we have to do is to play our cards now in this direction, now in that, and with a judicious amount of exacerbation on this side and on the other we can keep our situation fairly comfortable. The economic problem is the thing which preoccupies us." Well, you are not very long in Warsaw before you find that that is not quite true. In fact the Central European problem preoccupies the Poles to a considerable extent. And there is a fairly obvious economic explanation of it. If Czechoslovakia were obliterated from the map, the industrial region of Poland would lie at the mercy of whatever Power obliterated Czechoslovakia. The Polish "Corridor," the only outlet for that industrial region, would be worthless. The Silesia–Gdynia railway, built with French money, and costing quite a lot, would be worthless. The industrial backbone of Poland would be broken. The whole terrain would lie at the mercy of whatever Power liked to step in from its advantageous position in Czechoslovakia. The Poles know this, and they do not like talking about it. That is natural. But a good deal of this *chevauchant* attitude of Poland

during the last two or three years is explicable in terms of the Central European problem, not of the Russo-German problem at all. I do not think that Poland is as preoccupied as we think, nor *need* she be as preoccupied as we think, over the possibility of a clash between Germany and Russia.

The thing which is really preoccupying Poland, and quite rightly, is the possibility of a breakdown—military, economic, political or otherwise—in Austria and Czechoslovakia. If anything happens there, if there is a war or aggression, if there is a complete refashioning of the economic structure of those countries, then Poland's industrial basin is absolutely at the mercy of the Power that is strong and has the hegemony over Central Europe. And Poland is a nation of thirty-four million people, with a natural increase of population in 1936 of four hundred and twenty thousand, a natural increase which is still increasing each year. Of these, about twenty-five to twenty-six million are peasants dependent upon their exports; and the whole of the rest of the country's consumption of industrial goods is dependent upon this one industrial area of Poland. One hardly needs to mention the strategical situation of Poland. In these circumstances the Poles look, I think, with more anxious eyes towards the south than they do towards the Baltic, to Danzig, or even to the "Corridor." They say: "Well, we know that if the Corridor goes, that is the end. We do not think it is going yet. We do not think that it is going first. But we do think that if anything happens to the south, and our industrial area—our Achilles heel—is threatened, then there is no need for anybody to worry about the Corridor, or Danzig, or the Silesia–Gdynia railway. They can all be struck and destroyed from Silesia itself." Point is added to this argument, this series of preoccupations, by the expiry in July of the Upper Silesia Convention which has been running for fifteen years. The Poles are fairly optimistic. They know that if a plebiscite were held they would get a majority. But just as in Europe to-day there is no more question of the sanctity of treaties, so there is really no more question of the results of plebiscites. The real point is, what is likely to happen in the various strategical regions from which dangers might come? And arguing from those premises, the Poles have no very great difficulty in keeping their eyes on Central Europe rather than on Danzig. That explains, perhaps, why Colonel Beck quite light-heartedly accepted the responsibility from the Committee of Three for negotiating with Germany over Danzig. I do not think Danzig is the danger.

Where, then, do these half-economic, half-political arguments

and facts lead us? First of all, I think there is the greater possibility of economic co-operation in a very dangerous political area of Europe. Secondly, and this is a very important point, this possibility has arisen among States who are free and willing to do it for themselves, not pressed by big Powers from behind for the purposes of the big Powers. The third point is this: the two totalitarian States which constitute the real danger in Central Europe—the two totalitarian States who have given us the term "the Rome–Berlin axis" to think about—are in a weaker economic position to-day than they have ever been. From all the evidence one can gain, and in all quarters, there seems to be common agreement upon that. There is exhaustion of reserve assets, reduction of key stocks for key industries, and so on. Now, from those facts alone one arrives at the old statement of alternatives; not a dilemma, but merely a statement of alternatives. Is it likely that a reasonable decision will be made? Or is it likely that acts of despair will be committed? Which will it be? You can judge that statement of alternatives for yourselves. You can select which alternative you like on merely economic premises, or on the political. Perhaps the only way one can select it is by knowing the psychology of the two people concerned: the Duce and Führer. That, I am afraid, I do not know. But everybody to whom I talked, in a matter of six or seven countries, everybody whom I saw a second time recently compared with six months ago, put the same point to me more strongly. The most favourable political act that could be done for Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to-day is to increase trade. If the French and the British—and, in fact, all the countries who have free currencies, a free exchange, no exchange controls and little economic control—expanded trade, then the political situation in Europe would be very much easier, and especially in Central Europe.

It is interesting that, for the first time in my knowledge during the last seven years, and I have been going there every year, I have found people in the danger spots of Europe talking about relieving political tension by increasing trade, and willing to go a certain amount of the road with other countries. Some of those countries, as in the case of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, one might say were almost sworn enemies; but not so much sworn enemies to-day that they cannot see where their economic interests lie. To my mind the only question that remains for the democracies of Europe outside this belt is: "Are they prepared, able, willing, to take their part and play their part in purely economic develop-

ment?" This, more than anything else, has the possibility of relieving the political tension in the most tense parts of the Continent. It is a question which I can only put; I cannot resolve it; and I do not suppose anyone can resolve it; but it gives us in Great Britain, as it is giving the statesmen of France and the United States and Scandinavia, furiously to think. Our foreign policy, our interests, depend upon these two things in these dangerous areas of Europe: on the one hand, there is the inherent strength of the small States among themselves; on the other hand, the strength of the two totalitarian States, who have boasted that they will make European politics revolve about the Rome–Berlin axis. The latter have decided to try their strength. Will the democracies collaborate, too?

Summary of Discussion.

MR. W. NORMAN EWER (in the Chair) asked to what extent the stoppage or deflection of trade caused by sanctions had had a lasting effect on Italy. Had that trade, after the lifting of sanctions, flowed back into its normal channels?

MR. HUTTON replied that, as far as one could be informed from Italy, which was not extremely far, they had lost about 70 per cent. of trade through sanctions; but that was only a rough figure. They had now got back not more than half of what they had lost. For practically a year they had been running with a deficit on the trade account for each month. This deficit had been sufficient to force the Italian authorities to sell securities in Paris, Zurich, Amsterdam and New York, but not London.

An enormous number of securities held by private citizens had been commandeered by the Government. Those citizens got back other bonds inside Italy. The figure given to the speaker for this deficit was something of the order of five million pounds a month. This was a considerable amount for Italy. The public gold reserve had been used as window-dressing. There were still twenty to thirty million pounds' worth of securities that could still be sold. Then they would fall back on the gold reserve. All this excluded the internal economic subsidies to different industries, which were thereby enabled to undercut foreign competition, especially in the South American market. The general situation of foreign trade was extremely bad.

SIR WILLIAM GOODE said what a pleasure it was to hear someone who knew his job and took the trouble to go to the countries concerned and speak with all shades and classes of opinion.

He would like to mention a statement[1] made by Count Bethlen in the Hungarian Parliament a week ago, which put in a practical and

[1] *Pester Lloyd*, 21st April, 1937.

concrete form the general conclusions mentioned by the speaker. It was the most remarkable statement made by a Hungarian authority for at least fourteen years. Speaking on the Budget Debate, Count Bethlen said that for the last four years Hungary had been to some extent supported by the Rome Protocols, as Hungarian wheat had been assured of a higher price in Italy. Signs of a World Economic Conference were beginning to show themselves, though as yet very indistinctly. That gave Hungary time to prepare a scheme to secure its economic structure. He considered the best thing for Hungary would be a preference system to embrace all Central European countries. It was ridiculous that some next-door neighbour could not buy Hungarian wheat and imported wheat from the Argentine. His idea was to have something similar to England's system of colonial preference. It was the Government's duty to prepare something on these lines and be ready to take the necessary diplomatic steps when the time came. First the present economic restrictions must be removed, as preferential agreements could not run parallel with quotas and counter-quotas. A further essential condition was a settlement of Hungary's foreign debts, and this, again, would be possible only if the country had a sufficiently favourable trade balance to care for the debt service. Another necessity was that the National Bank should be supported in its work of maintaining the stability of the pengö. He thought the time had come to arrive at an arrangement regarding the foreign debt. It would also be a good thing to consider a lowering of the protective customs duties on industrial manufactures, for the circumstances had changed fundamentally since 1921—at that time Hungary's industries were weak while agriculture was very prosperous. Now the tables had been turned. The Prime Minister, replying to Count Bethlen, agreed as to the desirability of a Central European preference system, but the great difficulty was that these countries were obliged to import raw materials. He did not allude to the question of a foreign debt settlement. Sir William asked Mr. Hutton what he thought of Count Bethlen's speech and the Hungarian Prime Minister's reply.

Mr. Hutton replied that the economic significance of Count Bethlen's statement was very great. It bore out the report that a commercial treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia was practically ready for signature; Czechoslovakia was obviously intended by the reference to a neighbour country importing wheat from the Argentine. Whether Hungary would be wise to press for an entire Central European preference system at the moment was another matter. In the case of the colonial preference system the British Commonwealth was more or less a single political unit. It would be awkward for Britain if the Scandinavian countries or the South-Eastern European countries declared themselves single units in economics, thus waiving the most-favoured-nation clause with regard to these countries. This they would have a perfect right to do according to our own Ottawa pre-

cedent. That was why he thought it better, at the present moment, to concentrate on extending trade over the widest possible area, rather than grudgingly to waive the most-favoured-nation clause for Scandinavia, but not for Belgium; over Central Europe, but not for Bulgaria or Greece.

MR. C. H. LUKE said that the speaker had mentioned the fact that the Central and South-Eastern European countries, Germany and Italy excluded, would like a closer economic *rapprochement* with Great Britain and France. In view of his statement regarding the economic state of both Germany and Italy did he not think that that would lead to war with one or both of those countries?

MR. HUTTON said that there were two independent answers to that question. Either one must assume that Germany and Italy were once again going to take their place in a freer trading system, or one must assume that they were not. Whether they did or not did not lie in the power of an economist in those countries to decide. The matter would be decided in the purely political background. Therefore the question of war being made by either of those countries did not really depend upon a greater amount of collaboration between Great Britain, France and Central and South-Eastern Europe; because if Germany and Italy were *going* to come into a wider European economic system, that system had got to be started somewhere. If it began by being more attractive to England and France, it might increase the pressure upon Germany and Italy to join it. This did not necessarily make for peace; because the decision for peace or war would not be taken upon that basis. But it did make the way easier, if the *will* to peace were there. It was very important to-day to make it attractive to come into a wider and freer economic system; and the easiest way of beginning was to start with those countries who were not completely tied up in the economic apparatus of totalitarian States.

MR. M. ZVEGINTSOV said that he would like to take the point made by the last speaker further and ask for more explanation. With the rise in prices the world was becoming more and more divided into Haves and Have-Nots. The very factors which were tending to improve the conditions of the Central European countries both politically and economically were acting adversely on Italy and Germany. Not only were the forced loans extorted from those countries by Dr. Schacht coming to an end, but also he had now to pay something like 25 or 30 per cent. more for wheat and foodstuffs, and nearly double for copper and other metals. The same thing applied to Signor Mussolini. Therefore the more this collaboration and political appeasement took place with those countries who were struggling out of the totalitarian net (undoubtedly the best place to start) the wider became the gulf between these two sets of countries. The speaker had included Germany in his recent trip. Could he say what were the repercussions, if

any, of this state of affairs in that country? Dr. Schacht, while not perhaps an opportunist, might pardonably feel that when Hitler and Goering went he would like still to be there ready to sign on the dotted line if anybody offered him a loan. On the other hand what was the feeling among the extremists of the Party?

MR. HUTTON replied that that was the kernel of the whole affair. His impression in Berlin had been that the acute shortage of key raw materials, which had even gone to such lengths that men employed in key factories had been discharged and unemployment had thereby risen, was acting as a damper on the extremists' political zeal. The remarks of Dr. Schacht made recently at Brussels, and the official communication which Mr. Lansbury was able to publish from Herr Hitler, had probably more behind them than was at present realised. The situation there was extremely acute. He had spoken with a diplomat well able to judge of things military and strategic whose opinion was that Germany could not stand up even to a small war for more than six months. If one could judge by economic evidences, the amount of food the worker could get in Germany, its quality, the standard of living, the stamina of new recruits, this seemed true. Germany was in the position that she could not go to war except as an act of suicidal despair. Such an act could not be ruled out, of course. But it was the speaker's impression that this kind of act would be much more likely to be done by Italy than Germany. It was true that the rise in prices had a different effect on the smaller countries from that on the totalitarian States; and it was also true that this gulf would widen, and had done so already. Things were already more acute in the latter States than they had been nine months ago. But whether the dictators of those countries could drive their populations to a suicidal act of despair was quite another thing. The economic situation in those countries had reached the point where the people were aware of the sacrifices of peace. If they were then asked to make the sacrifice of war, they might have the war; but they would not be able to make it last very long, and they might not win it. From various conversations in Germany the speaker had concluded that in the event of war, owing to the economic structure of the country alone, a certain amount of dislocation would at once set in. There was already dislocation in key industries. There were also acute shortages and dislocation in the agricultural areas owing to the self-sufficiency programme; and in the towns, a lack of pig meat, poultry and eggs.

The speaker had heard that the relations between General Goering and Dr. Schacht had improved. Up till now the latter had been the scapegoat; in future it would be General Goering. He was in charge of the foreign exchange control, and of the Four Years Plan. These were now Party mechanisms. Dr. Schacht was quite prepared to travel abroad and suggest the freeing of trade, as long as the more ungainly babies were carried at home.

The other end of the Rome-Berlin axis, Italy, was more important;

because while Italy had a lower standard of living than Germany and was much less industrialised, her possibilities of running herself on an economic self-sufficiency programme were infinitely less than those of Germany. There were some things that by no stress of human imagination or ingenuity could Italy ever manufacture for herself. They were important things; and she had to have the foreign trade to buy them. The Abyssinian war was still being paid for. It was not merely a question of defaulting on the internal debt, but of finding the wherewithal to keep the soldiers in Abyssinia—which meant food and ships and materials. The situation of Italy was known all over Central Europe; and Central European countries were much more concerned about the actions of Signor Mussolini than about those of Herr Hitler. The speaker thought that the situation was such that if the two dictators were offered a "golden bridge"—he did not mean a loan—over which they could elegantly and without loss of face retrace their steps, they would probably do so.

MISS M. CURREY asked whether Germany was importing raw materials from Russia, and if so in what quantities.

Secondly, she would like to know whether the speaker could give a reason why the internal conditions of Germany and Italy were so different. She had been to Italy recently, and the price of food, except for meat, had not risen; in Florence it had gone down a little, and in Rome was a little higher owing to the presence of foreigners in enormous numbers. At the beginning of the sanctions period there had been some difficulty in getting second-grade eggs from Yugoslavia, but very soon matters had been arranged satisfactorily, and goods of all kinds had continued to arrive in Italy from that country during practically the whole of the sanctions period. She had found an abundance of good food in Italy, and wondered at the apparent difference in the internal condition of two countries when the lecturer described their economic difficulties as being so alike.

MR. HUTTON replied that German imports from the U.S.S.R. had declined very much during the last eighteen months. At no time had the economic convention been denounced by Germany. It was still valid, and the credit agreement for facilitating this trade was still running and would probably be renewed. There were no trade difficulties between the two countries, except that Russia was not particularly interested in supplying Germany if she could obtain orders from other countries. Russia, of course, was finding other kinds of exports to put upon the world market than she had seven years ago—notably gold.

As to the speaker's remarks on the standard of living in Italy, her impression was important; but he had been speaking of the economic structure, the chief key industries of the country, especially with a view to the possibilities of war. Italy had a great peasant population, who could live quite well on a very modest standard of living—the standard

of living of forty or fifty years ago. For a foreigner who had money to spend, obviously there was food to be bought. In Germany he had been able to find plenty to eat, to go to the cafés, the Zoo, and the Opera. But that gave him no idea of the standard of living of a Düsseldorf worker. It was possible that even the workers had not yet suffered so very much from the fall in the standard of living. Nevertheless, the situation of Germany's and Italy's national economic structures remained desperate. It was possible to find the wherewithal to prevent people from starving; but war could not be waged on that basis. Iron and steel were needed; machinery had to function more or less in perfect order. You had not only to give a peasant some bread and olive oil for his mid-day meal, but to export the olive oil and even the wheat so as to get necessary raw materials. Italy had imported wheat from Hungary and sold it at a loss on Amsterdam in order to get raw materials; and Germany had done the same sort of thing. The state of the key industries and that of the central banking systems in both countries was the only possible key to the real economic situation in Italy and Germany. This situation was more serious to-day than at any time since the Nazi régime came into power, or since the "forward" foreign policy of Mussolini developed in 1932.

MR. G. SOLOVEYTCHIK said that he wished to challenge the speaker's statement that either Herr Hitler or Signor Mussolini would be prepared to cross a golden bridge if it were offered to them in order to save their faces. There was no evidence to warrant so sweeping a statement. If it were true that at the beginning of the régime Mussolini inflicted his will upon an unwilling population, it was equally true that now he had the whole of Italy behind him, and sanctions and the Abyssinian affair had largely contributed to that situation. While Herr Hitler, far from forcing upon the Germans an unpopular and alien régime, had, and it was Germany's and Europe's misfortune, found the form, the words and the system to express that which to the vast majority of Germans was profoundly congenial. Even a loan, which the speaker had brushed aside, would not help the Germans or Italians very much. The situation was very grave, and it was a question of the psychological background and hysterical temperament of these two nations; the more concessions were made by the democratic Powers the more would Herr Hitler's and Signor Mussolini's ambitions grow.

The speaker had said that Poland was acutely aware of the situation on her Czechoslovak frontier, but as yet the Poles had done nothing to improve their extremely strained relations with Czechoslovakia. Those relations were very bad, partly because the Poles considered the Czechs as an inferior branch of the Slav race, and they showed no signs of wishing a *rapprochement*. This was remarkable when one considered that a German invasion of the Danubian basin would be a death blow to Poland. The Poles realised that it was in their interest to keep the Russo-German conflict going as long as possible. One thing that greatly helped to perpetuate that conflict was the Franco-Soviet pact,

and yet the Poles seemed to object to it more than to anything else. Could the speaker throw any light upon these matters in view of his recent trip?

MR. HUTTON said that one big reason why the Poles disliked the treaty with the Czechs was that the result was that the Corridor question had been temporarily settled, and the most dangerous spot in Europe had become the Czech frontier with Germany. Now the Poles did not want to be involved in that area. Secondly the relations between Warsaw and Prague had improved through a third capital, through Bucharest, and by the French pressure upon Warsaw in the last six to nine months. It would not be surprising if the main difficulties were settled by some sort of formula within the next six months.

But the driving force behind Polish policy to-day, and this might explain their aversion to the Franco-Soviet pact, was not the building up of an overwhelming combination, in which Poland would participate, to ring round Germany, but to build up a *cordon sanitaire* between Germany and Russia. Naturally Poland and Roumania could not do very much by themselves, but the heady wine of self-assertion, of which the Poles had drunk freely, was difficult to get over. Their reply, when asked what they would do, was always: "Nothing; just sit still; remain neutral; and man the frontiers, of course." They wanted to preserve good relations with Czechoslovakia, and to improve them if possible. But they did not want any dealings with the Little Entente, which they regarded as rather rickety. They wanted to sit still and play the Russo-German battledore and shuttlecock as long as possible. It gave them a strategical advantage; but it seemed to the speaker rather like the strategical advantage of a lamb between two wolves. In the end the Poles would have to make a decision. At present they were not particularly anti-Czech. They even expressed sympathy with the Czech Government's action over the Henlein party. They were intelligent enough to see that that was a test case, in a test area, of what might happen in Poland. The Silesian Convention came to an end this year. So the Polish attitude was naturally that national sovereignty must always be respected. They had, therefore, *malgré eux*, a certain sneaking sympathy with the Czech Government.

Whether the two dictators would be prepared to make a dignified and not inelegant exit over a bridge, if one were provided, that, of course, was a matter of opinion. He might be hopelessly wrong; but it was his opinion that at the moment the German régime was not likely to explode outwards. If this were so, it must come to some sort of *modus vivendi* with the rest of the world. And if the rest of the world had the good sense to make economic co-operation a paying proposition, then it was not likely that the hotheads of the Party would get their way over the Reichswehr. Dr. Schacht had a great deal of influence, especially with big business men; and a large percentage of the German people had been told for four years that Herr Hitler's and

the Party's only policy was to bring peace. It would be rather difficult to turn round and suddenly tell them to go to war. A certain amount of psychological preparation was necessary for every lie. (That was a quotation from a book written by a dictator.) The stories against Czechoslovakia had died down. There was little mention now of the plague carrier of Bolshevism, and the Soviet aerodromes on Czech territory.

The supreme problem for the democracies was not building up a combination *against* Germany or Italy, but to provide a safe get-away from war. This must be done, and done soon. In October next Germany was not going to have a particularly good harvest; and then unpleasant things might happen. A get-away must be found that was safely hedged with controls; because the written word could not be trusted any more. The other way, the act of despair, meant suicide for a great nation which had already committed suicide once within the last twenty-two years. It meant, moreover, the suicide of the dictatorial Party now in power. There was no effective opposition in either Italy or Germany to the dictatorial power. Grumbling there might be, but no effective opposition. Therefore, if there were a chance for the dictators to make a get-away from war and yet remain in power, it was probable they would take it. Hitler particularly would be more prepared to take this way out, because he was not a "one-man-band." Mussolini was. Hitler had an enormous industrial section of his country dependent on other factors than the home market, despite the Four Years Plan. He had a party headed by ambitious men; and he had deliberately taken care to place himself above Party questions. This meant that the Party proceeded on decisions that he himself did not necessarily take. He had thus been able to preserve a transcendental attitude. It would be difficult for him suddenly to act as if he were a "one-man-band"; and probably he would not try to do so. The Reichswehr's prestige and power inside Germany were coming back, after the blow they had suffered over the occupation of the Rhineland. Against that act they had advised, saying that France and England would do something. They had proved wrong; the Party right. Their influence, however, had been growing since then, and it was not likely that the Führer would suddenly launch a thunderbolt of war upon his people. The situation in Italy and in the Mediterranean, including the Spanish conflict, was much more difficult for us in Great Britain to gauge.

SOCIAL CHANGES IN TURKEY

By Fräulein Lilo Linke [1]

The other day I attended the lecture of a learned professor on Modern China. The professor was so anxious to give the necessary "perspective" to his description of present conditions that at the end of his allotted time he was still dealing with Marco Polo. I am not a scientist, and shall therefore take you straight into 1935, the year of my Turkish journey. But I have to ask forgiveness for the absence of all book-learning, which forces me to limit my lecture to a description of the things I saw and heard myself.

The Turkish Government very kindly gave me permission to travel even in the eastern parts of Asia Minor, which are under military control and to which foreigners are only rarely admitted. Thus I was able to traverse the country from the Black Sea to the Syrian frontier in the south, and from Smyrna to the Russian frontier in the east. In the western half of the country I travelled by railway, and in the eastern by motor-car and on lorries—the railway there is only under construction. I stayed in villages and small provincial towns, at Ankara, the new capital, and Istanbul, the old; and in doing so I passed through many climates, landscapes and centuries. But nowhere, not even at Ankara, did I find the contrasts more sharply expressed, the past, the present and the future closer to each other, than at Kayseri, and it is therefore of this place and the problems with which it has to deal that I shall first speak, as a typical example of what is going on in Turkey to-day.

Kayseri, the Biblical Cæsarea, is a town of some 50,000 inhabitants, right in the heart of the country. I need not deal with its long history; it was once important as a meeting point of the caravans coming from many directions, and as the seat of rich wool merchants whose sheep grazed on the endless plateau surrounding the town. Some beautiful ruins and mosques remain as signs of its former glory, and some large whitewashed houses with overhanging balconies built for the wealthy mer-

[1] Address given at Chatham House on March 4th, 1937; Mrs. Vyvyan Adams in the Chair.

chants; but the majority of the buildings are as modest and shabby as in any other Turkish, or I might say Oriental, town. There are bazaars and a market-place, one or two modern buildings and a monument of Atatürk which appears quite out of place. The crowds in the street are poorly dressed, and the women wear large cotton *charshafs* and are heavily veiled. And wherever you go, almost without lifting your eyes, you see the snow-clad pyramid of the Ercias Dagh, a former volcano, which rises with surprising suddenness against the clear sky.

In 1933 the railway line pushing eastward from Ankara reached the town and, almost without taking breath, continued its way past Kayseri, to halt for the time being at Sivas. Approximately at the same time a German company constructed a short north-western connection with a benzine-driven, one-van train to the second main west–eastern line farther south. Thus the town was in the course of a few years deprived of its independent life and seclusion and, it seemed, was doomed to become a small provincial railway junction, hard hit by the world crisis and the general economic transformation, when the Government decided to set up one of the largest industrial enterprises to be erected under the State five-year plan just outside the town on the other side of the railway line.

I arrived there late one evening in June, when within half an hour a bitterly cold night followed almost without transition a hot and dust-clouded day. A Chevrolet took me straight over a bumpy road to the nearby factory. It was in the last stages of construction, a vast enterprise which started production in September 1935 and is now spinning, weaving and dyeing about a quarter of Turkey's consumption in rough cotton cloth, chiefly used by peasants and soldiers.

To me, that night, it seemed as if I had suddenly been taken to Hollywood, where fantastic constructions had been set up for another "Things to Come." Columns, chimneys, tremendous sheds with queer-shaped roofs, and the ground torn open by a thousand sewage-workers, an incredible confusion of ditches and heaps of sand, wires, cables, odd pieces of machinery, and the whole so badly lit that I stumbled again and again. Once I stepped on a dark bundle on the ground which began to move under my feet—one of the workers was sleeping there, wrapped in a ragged quilt.

When I reached the canteen, my eyes fell on a large picture of Atatürk confronted by one of Lenin, and between them hung broad red streamers with an inscription in Turkish and Russian: "Long live the Turkish–Russian friendship." I later discovered

.hat I had not come across the headquarters of a Turkish Communist party, but that the cotton *Kombinat* was the first great ;nterprise of Turkish–Russian economic collaboration.

Now, keeping in mind the town as a background, which were :he problems by which the Kayseri Bez Fabrikasi was confronted? [he most important, of course, is that of finding suitable workers, ınd here you have to distinguish between the male and female workers, both of whom present their own difficulties. Let me irst deal with the men.

Turkish industry could only develop after the abolition of he capitulations. Until the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire ıll manufactured goods were imported duty-free from certain :ountries abroad. In Turkey itself Greeks and Armenians held he positions of merchants and bankers. The Turks were ›easants, soldiers, civil servants and rulers of the country, but ıad never been in contact with capitalism, nor had they developed ı capitalist mentality. When, in October 1923, after the War of ndependence, the Republic was established, and Turkey, in ıer desire to become independent from foreign nations, decided o build up her own industry, the State had no choice but to ake matters into its own hands and become the leading and nost important entrepreneur.

Where, then, could the necessary workers be found? There :xisted only very small groups which had as yet come in contact vith any organised work; for instance, those men who had ›een working in the few Istanbul factories and workshops, those vho had worked in the coal mines at the Black Sea coast, and hose working on the cotton fields in the south. They all had ertain things in common. They did not believe that man is ›orn to work and be proud of it, they had no feeling for the ontinuity of work and its discipline.

The moment they had succeeded in saving a small amount which was possible in spite of their low wages, since they only pent a few coppers daily on a handful of olives and bread or ice and slept under the most primitive shelters imaginable) hey left off working, stretching what they had until necessity orced them back under the yoke, or returning home to their illages and living on what the soil and the labour of their /omenfolk provided for them. In the latter case the savings /ere spent on luxuries, tea, coffee, sugar, salt, or some garments. 3ut the larger part had to be handed over with embittered esignation to the tax-collector, who with unfailing regularity ›und his way even to the remotest places.

If the workers had, after such a breathing spell, returned to the same factory or coal mine or cotton field, all might have been well. But these men carried the nomad spirit into their work and were here to-day and there to-morrow. They came from Erzurum and Sivas and Konya to work hundreds of miles away for the rich cotton-farmers around Adana, and on hearing of a chance to earn a few piastres more some fifty miles farther off, they set out in small groups at the end of their weekly engagement, with their chosen headman, who acted as negotiator.

Not only did the newly established Government factories, or the companies responsible for the railway construction, have to " break in " these workers, but they had to fall back on simple peasants for their manual labourers. I got an idea of the difficulties involved in this when I watched the men arriving for work at the Kayseri factory. Since the factory as such was not yet working, these men were occupied as building and sewage workers and so on. Imagine two thousand men of the type I described arriving at a certain hour, many of them having spent the night wrapped up in their quilts and lying somewhere in the open, dressed in ragged garments, half European, half produced in the country, of handwoven cloth or sheepskins. To wall in the human flood temporary gates and fences had been put up. A strict control was necessary, if for no other reason than to keep account for the paying of wages, which the men received at intervals of a month, partly to force them to stay, but also because otherwise the labour involved in keeping their accounts would be greater still.

How can you control two thousand men, who at that time had no family name (meanwhile a family name has become obligatory), who could neither read nor write, and who could see no justification for the discipline and control they had to undergo? In the beginning each worker's name was taken down by a clerk. Thus the control took from two to three hours each time. There was not a day without revolts, and, characteristically enough, the overseers who were attacked and beaten were always those who had treated the men most decently.

Then check clocks were installed. But the men got hopelessly mixed up with their cards, and the confusion threatened to be greater than ever. One of the men supervising the control went mad, and I am not surprised. Then a German engineer was charged with organising the affair, and the first thing he did was to make the men sew their numbers to the lapels of their coats, and the overseers themselves carried out the clocking-off.

When another revolt broke out, the same German engineer threw himself among the mass of fighting men and tore the numbers off the lapels of those he considered responsible. Then he tore up their cards in front of their eyes, which meant that the men were sacked and lost all claim to their wages.

There were other difficulties to be dealt with. The men, perhaps under the influence of those from Kayseri whose cunning and cleverness in business are proverbial, carried away everything that could be moved—nails, odd bits of wire, old sacks, tools, and so on. Thus every evening they had to be searched, which prolonged the tedious procedure. But, partly as a triumph of organisation, partly because the men grew used to it, the time of the control was reduced to about three-quarters of an hour, and the engineer was optimistic enough to mention half an hour as the future maximum.

Now, if these measures were the only ones taken to bring about the necessary transformation, I would view it with extreme disapproval and apprehension. But from what I explained before, it is clear that the factory has to offer these men positive advantages to keep them from throwing up their jobs and going home. Great efforts have to be made to convince them that they will be better off working than idling about in their mud huts.

The factory at Kayseri was itself a pleasant place, very light, well-aired, and with all modern conveniences: shower baths, cloak-rooms, canteens with well-cooked, cheap food. The men had an eight-hour day, comparatively good wages, judged by Turkish standards; the plans for a workers' housing estate large enough to give accommodation to begin with for seven hundred families were already completed and were to be executed as soon as the building of the factory was finished. But the cause of my sincerest admiration was the enormous sports ground, an exact copy of the stadium at Cologne as they proudly told me. There were football fields, tennis-courts, a swimming-pool, riding grounds, a gymnasium, and so on. And they were so ingeniously worked into the factory grounds that the men could hardly avoid falling into the swimming-pool when they walked towards the exit to go home from work.

But even these things would not alone have satisfied me. A sports ground can be a sports ground, but it can also be a barrack yard, set up to turn the workers into submissive soldiers of industry. Somehow, I thought, the men will have to pay for it. I discussed my scruples with the director of the Kayseri

factory. He explained that the aim was to turn these men neither into robots nor into a class-conscious proletariat, but into self-respecting citizens who would be aware of the fact that the factory was owned by the State, and therefore was their property, and that the better they worked, the better they would live themselves. This factory was not merely an industrial enterprise, but a model school, and would not, therefore, be a paying proposition for quite a time. The men were not only being educated unconsciously by their surroundings and the mode of work, but also in special classes, by collective activities such as social and educational clubs, by various sports, by a co-operative which they would work themselves, and so on. Seventy of the foremen had had a year's training in Russia, where they had been taught the technical side of their work, and had also learnt how to deal with their men and how to encourage them. They were going to try out Russian educational experiments, and he said that if I came back in five years' time I might judge of the result for myself. The director was confident that things would move in the right direction.

From what I saw in these classes, on the sports grounds, and among the younger people, I have as yet no reason to doubt the justification of his optimism. It is quite true that judgment has to be reserved for a later date. I ought to add that strikes and lock-outs are forbidden, but this law is as yet of no topical interest.

So much for the men. Now, a factory of this kind is largely dependent on the labour of women. If the men leave their homes and go to work hundreds of miles away, this can as a rule not be expected of the women. The factory has therefore to rely on the women in the neighbourhood. I have already mentioned that the women in Kayseri are still heavily veiled, and you can from that fact draw certain conclusions as to their *Weltanschauung*. I had the honour of being invited to a wedding at Kayseri. It was a rich house, in which the women still had a whole wing to themselves. The wedding was celebrated during a whole week (it is sometimes a costly business to keep up tradition), and that afternoon the women were invited. Hidden away in a room at the side, a band of three men was playing. The women had taken off their veils, and admired the bridal outfit, which was arranged in the hall—dresses, underwear, a suit, a coat, nightdresses, bed linen, in a mixture of 1913 with cheap, but for Turkey expensive, 1928. The bride was a girl

of fifteen who was going to marry a cousin of eighteen to whom she had been promised when she was a mere toddler. Thus, conveniently, the money remained in the same family. The mother told proudly that the bridegroom had not been allowed to see the bride's face for the last three years, *i.e.*, since she was wearing the veil. "Thus he will desire her more," she said. The bride, a nice though rather plain-looking girl, seemed pleased, and assured me that she was glad that she would remain her husband's only wife, since the Government had forbidden polygamy. When I asked her why she accepted the new time in one way and rejected it in another, for instance by still sticking to the veil, she shrugged her shoulders. She had never thought about it. It might be interesting for the scientist to find out in how far all of us live in two contradictory worlds, and at what moment we become conscious of the fact and draw conclusions.

In order to avoid a wrong impression, I ought perhaps to point out again that Kayseri is especially backward. Very cleverly Atatürk avoided forbidding the veil as he forbade the fez. Men might submit to the orders of their national hero, but the adoration of a woman is turned into revolt if a law tries to interfere with her customs. (Or am I mistaken, and would the men have revolted if the veil had been torn away?) There is, however, a provision which entitles provincial governors to declare the prohibition of the veil if enough women in their vilayet have already abandoned it. In some parts of the country I travelled for a week without seeing a single veil. Once I walked with a pretty girl of sixteen (who, by the way, was drum-major of the Girl Guides) through the streets of Malatya, when she pointed laughingly at a young man on the other side of the road. She had been promised to him by her busybody of a mother, but flatly refused to become engaged. She was preparing for her matriculation, and wanted to study medicine at Istanbul.

At Kayseri the women refused to work in the same room or on the same premises with men. Yet a number of young girls had broken away from their families and offered their services. There were others from the surrounding villages, and the director thought that once the first hundred or two hundred were earning regular wages, others would want to follow them. Here, too, a carefully planned education was being carried out. The girls shared certain outdoor sports with the boys and had proper lessons—reading and writing, of course, but also technical lessons connected with their work, and those under industrial age, *i.e.*,

younger than fourteen, were kept in a kind of kindergarten. The director had written to Russia for two forewomen under whose special care these young girls would be; they would have a doctor to supervise their health, and the older ones could, if they wanted, get a room in a large boarding-house which was to be erected close to the factory grounds. A similar house was to be built for the boys. My fears as to the advisability of this neighbourhood were waved aside. "We will plant them straight into a healthy, active life, taking the whole stride at once. As to the result, we have to hope for the best."

I do not wish to deal extensively with the position of women. Hundreds of articles have been written, hundreds of lectures given about it, and from what I said you will be able to paint the picture for yourself. You know that all professions are open to women, that there are judges, lawyers, doctors, teachers, deputies, and that everywhere the principle of equal pay for equal work has been recognised. The women are among the most active and progressive members of the community, so much so that in certain quarters the men are already beginning to grumble, and, to my mind, jealousy of this kind is the sincerest compliment.

I have so far almost exclusively spoken of the workers at Kayseri. But there is another group of men of equal importance and with problems of their own—the engineers. The majority of them are young men between twenty-five and forty. They have studied abroad, chiefly in Central or Western Europe during those years when the whole life of these countries underwent far-reaching changes. No longer could they, as perhaps their fathers before them, adopt the European mode of living and bring it back with them to their own country, surrounding themselves with it as with a garden all their own. These young Turks have become critical of Western civilisation at the same time at which they have developed a pride in their own country. They no longer find an admired model in the West, and merely acquire its technique which they try to use in their own country. But in this attempt they very soon discover that they are fighting against odds which often go far beyond their individual strength. The two worlds have not yet formed a new harmony, either in their minds or in reality. The mental strain is not to be underestimated. I remember the case of a student who told his German professor at the Istanbul University (in 1933 a great number of German scientists were called upon to reorganise the

Istanbul University): "You teach me all these theories, and then I go home to work at them and come to some clearer understanding. But there is my family around me, still carrying on the life of a Turkish family as much as possible in the old style, with their unchanged mentality, only outwardly somehow Europeanised. They do not understand or respect what I am trying to do, they force me to live in two realities—the world of clear Western thought, and the world of Turkey. I cannot do it." Thus suddenly we are made to realise how much more is needed for intellectual development than schools and libraries. Scientific work cannot blossom in a vacuum. It needs sympathetic surroundings in which it is at least respected as a valid occupation.

The German professors themselves complain that *der Unterbau* (the foundations) are missing. "The students are like eager parrots. They take down every word we speak and repeat it literally at the examination without understanding a single word. They are materially minded, without the least appreciation of pure science. What is the immediate use of it? That seems to be their only thought."

You might therefore frequently find that Western technique is adopted, but that soon something goes wrong with it. These young men, especially those who have studied abroad, return to their country and take on jobs with the idea that they will show the old people what they have learned and how things are done. They know that their country needs them; the great desire is to get rid of foreign experts as soon as possible. The young Turks have seen men of their own generation being called to important positions, and they complain of being treated unjustly if, at the age of thirty, they have not yet been made director of a bank or factory. In their haste to climb, they stumble often over their own feet. They lose touch with those of their fellow-men whom they ought to lead, and are really hanging completely in the air.

At Kayseri the director—himself a man of less than forty, but with a wide experience and quite exceptional qualities—had to rebuke his engineers again and again because they thought themselves too great to carry out his orders and usurped responsibilities which were his. He had, somewhat on Russian lines, arranged weekly tea-parties for the foremen and the engineers to bring about a close collaboration, but he had to give them up because the engineers declared that, as a result, they would find it impossible to establish their authority.

There is another problem to which as a rule much too little attention is being paid. Abroad, these young men have experienced a very free sexual life. Returning, they are suddenly again confronted with a very strict moral code. The women have legally, economically, and politically gained equal rights, but they are far from being what is occasionally called "free and easy." They still live with their families, and they have so much to do to keep pace with developments that they are not inclined to experiment at the same time with their most private lives. They are excited about the great possibilities of a career of their own, and they feel a little contempt for men. After all, what would they gain by marrying? Salaries are very low, especially, of course, for the young men; they would have to follow their husbands wherever the Government sent them; they would have themselves to take on all kinds of obligations; and through all this they would lose the new freedom of which they are as yet so proud.

But even supposing a girl would like to marry, the young man would probably find little to his taste in her. He has known European women, and the women of his own country seem dull and unintelligent compared with them. If, however, he brings home a wife from abroad, the Government, who in nine out of ten cases will be his future employer, views with displeasure his choice of a foreigner, anticipating further problems. The modern Turkish girl, on her part, finds little attraction in a man who has only breathed the air of his native town. Thus the progressive and active men and women in Turkey have not yet found the way to each other. At present many of the men find their consolation in *raki*, the national brandy. Brooding and drinking, they sit in those far, out-of-the-way places to which the Government has sent them to build railways or factories or to teach the young or to look after the health of the people. I have talked to many of them, and I can only hope that a way out will be found if serious consequences are to be avoided.

A fourth group of men at the Kayseri factory were the foreign engineers. I have mentioned the young German, but the main body of foreigners were Russians. The factory, or the *Kombinat* as it was called, using the Russian word, was, as I mentioned earlier, the first great enterprise carried out with Turkish–Russian collaboration. The Russians had designed the plans, supervised the building, equipped the whole place with its

machinery on a twenty years' interest-free credit, trained the foremen, and sent men of their own to help set the factory in motion. The two hundred Russians kept chiefly to themselves, but I was assured that that was mainly due to the language difficulty.

The Russian influence was to be felt wherever I went. The way in which the training of the men was tackled, the attempts at establishing comradeship, the experiments with clubs, the encouragement of criticism in works' newspapers and wall-posters, the plan to have a cinema which was to be run by the men themselves, the fact that a co-operative was to be established, and so on. Everywhere the Russian influence, except in one field, politics.

I am in no position to give any definite information about the extent of Communist feeling in the country. I have reason to believe, however, that it is confined to rather limited groups of students and intellectuals, and that not merely because anyone who confesses his love for Communism too openly would soon find himself in prison, as for instance the young poet and dramatist Nazim Hikmet, who has recently been re-arrested. None the less, his poems are sold in every book and paper shop, and his plays are performed by the Istanbul Municipal Theatre—without the revolutionary speeches, of course.

Why do I believe that Communism has not as yet, and probably will not have in the near future, any influence on Turkey, in spite of excellent neighbourly relations to Russia, in spite of the many young Turks sent to be trained in Russia as workers, engineers and pilots, in spite of the enthusiastic reception given to groups of Soviet Russian artists, who from time to time tour the country, and in spite of the interest which certain young people show for their neighbours' political creed? Because I think that, at present, neither social conditions nor the state of mind of the people make it possible for it to succeed. What are these social conditions?

I have mentioned the absence of a Turkish capitalist class. You might almost speak of the absence of a bourgeoisie in our European sense. Neither has Turkey an industrial proletariat. Those workers whom I described have so far not even become conscious of themselves, much less of their social position. The moment they awake, they will find the promise of advance tempting them forward.

The essential fact about Turkey is that its social system is

not frozen. It has always held open the doors to military or governmental success even to its humbler sons. If during the last twenty years before the Great War, chiefly under foreign influence, a certain rigidity of the social system developed, the breakdown of the Empire has once again set the stream in motion. Education has been declared compulsory, though for lack of schools the law cannot yet be fully applied, and is completely free of charge. In a country where poverty is everyone's lot, money cannot be made the condition of success. With one political party in supreme command, eagerness and obedience to this party pave the way to a rise, an even quicker rise since Turkey is anxiously waiting for her young men to grow up and fill the vacant positions.

It is clear from these observations that the civil servant and not the capitalist is the master, a master who cannot unduly exploit his position, since his rights are well defined by those above him jealous of their own powers. One might speak of a " capitalism of the civil servants " which in many ways resembles the mercantilism of the eighteenth century. It can develop towards a free capitalism, but it is just as likely that in time it will slowly be turned into some kind of Communism. The interesting feature about Turkey is its flexibility. But, as far as one can judge to-day, any change will be brought about through forces working inside the Government and the only existing party, the Republican People's Party, and not through the attacks of an opposition, because there is little chance for any considerable body to grow outside and run against the wheels of the established machinery.

There have always been complaints that the Turkish bureaucracy is corrupt, from the Cabinet Minister down to the policeman. Well, it all depends upon how you look at corruption. In a country where salaries are extremely low, a bribe paid might not be of greater importance than a tip you give to a London waiter to help the owner of the restaurant pay the man's wages. It might also be the premium you pay for a certain risk the man is running in granting you a favour. It would certainly be safer for him to refuse it. I will not say that you have to look at things from this angle, but you can. People who know both the old Turkey and the new, an advantage of which I cannot boast, assure me that things have vastly improved. During my five months' trip I have moved from place to place, and everywhere been treated with great courtesy without ever paying a bribe. I am convinced that in this field, too, things

will improve. I have full confidence in the young generation, whose attitude is as idealistic as you can wish.

Before I deal more fully with the source of their idealism, nationalism, let me say a few words about the two remaining groups of the community, the army and the peasants, the latter still comprising some 80 per cent. of the 16·2 million inhabitants and, since Turkey has adopted conscription, naturally to a large extent identical with the army.

It is no longer possible for any young man fortunate enough to have influential parents to buy himself free from military service. He might postpone it so as not to interrupt his studies, but no pardon is granted when he is nearing thirty. A Turkish friend of mine, who had spent many years abroad and was then called to an influential position in the Ministry of Labour, is serving now, deprived of all dignity, rather roughly treated, and addressed as " thou," which in this case has no friendly familiar meaning.

The Turks, like the Prussians, are a soldier nation, and the army is the great school of the country. You can see the conscripts arriving, a group of young men, ragged, dazed, grinning or frightened, a bundle of shapeless humanity. Within a few months they have learnt to keep themselves clean, have gained a sense of time and order (an officer told me that the men could not understand that a command had to be carried out quickly, they abhorred the very thought of haste), begun to read and write, and, such is a soldier's duty, to shoot. At the same time they are trained to handle modern machinery and learn certain elementary rules of more advanced methods of cultivation. Passing through a village, one is often able to tell from the state of a house or a farm which of the men have served their term of conscription. The soldiers themselves at the end of their two years' term are certainly not recognisable as the same men who once arrived timid and awkward, walking hand in hand.

Changes in regard to the military service, apart from the stricter application of general conscription and the introduction of educational and agricultural subjects into the curriculum, are the shortening of its duration and the thorough modernisation of the whole army. An Air arm is slowly being built up with great sacrifices. During the time of my stay civil servants were called upon to forgo " voluntarily " 2 per cent. of their salary for the benefit of the Air Force, but I do not know whether this was only done during a single month or carried out during a longer period.

The new régime has, of course, brought a great many changes for the peasants. The programme of the Republican People's Party declares that " it is one of the principal aims of our Party to make each Turkish farmer the owner of sufficient land. It is necessary to enact special laws of appropriation in order to distribute land to farmers without land."

Where could the necessary land come from? Under the old régime there were three groups of big landowners, private owners, religious bodies, and the State. The private owners often, in order to remove their land out of the sphere of influence of the State, made it over to the religious bodies, stipulating that their direct descendants should enjoy the usufruct. When the Republic was founded in 1923, the State took over all land owned or administered by the religious bodies. As to the private landowners, a bill was discussed and, as far as I know, passed, which limited the size of private estates and demanded that the estate owners should hand over to the State all land beyond a fixed number of acres.

The law has never been enforced. In a case which I know personally, the landowner, a rich cotton farmer in the south, divided his estate during his life-time between his four sons, and thus saved his property. One of the reasons for the State's leniency in the matter is the fact that there is no lack of cultivable land. There are only fifty-four souls living per square mile, as compared to four hundred and sixty-eight in Great Britain. Much of the land, of course, consists of dry plateaux which can only be used for the grazing of sheep; other parts can only be cultivated after proper irrigation; but there is also land waiting for nothing but hard work and the plough. Near Malatya, for instance, in the Euphrates valley, the Government offered the peasants as much land as they wanted, under the only condition that the land was to be cultivated within the next three years.

In my opinion the problem for the Turkish peasant is not so much to have sufficient land (perhaps I ought to mention in this context that the average size of the farms in 1927, according to the census taken at that time, was between two and a half and twelve and a half acres), but to cultivate it properly. Two kinds of difficulties have to be faced, material ones and psychological ones. Both can only be overcome with the active help of the State.

I was often shocked by the inertia of the peasants, which seemed to me almost incredible. The one place in the village which was always crowded was the coffee-house, where the men

spent endless hours, leaving it to their women to scrape the food together as best they could. The sad experience of the past had led them to ask why they should slave merely to make the landowner and the tax collector rich. So often had they been called to arms that they did not quite believe that they could settle down at last to the work of peace, and they still had the air of men who enjoy the hours of sweet forgetfulness, since they might soon have to return to battle. Besides, had not Allah in his wisdom told them not to worry, not to hurry, but to take the days as they came, good-humouredly and in patience?

Against such sentiments the Government has started a relentless war. The peasants had to be reassured, to be taught, to be freed from the influence of the reactionary and ignorant *imams* and *hocas*, village priests and religious teachers. Little by little, as far as the means of the country permit, schools are being established, and here, in the army, in the People's Houses, a kind of adult school and cultural centre, in public meetings and so on, people are made to listen to the voice of reason and progress. Very important in this connection was, of course, the change from the Arabic to the Latin alphabet, which is ten times more simple and was adopted for the Turkish language by Atatürk himself. It is only since 1928 that the education of the people could be taken in hand on a large scale. The reverse side of the medal is that soon no one will be able to read any books and papers printed before 1928, which means that the people are completely cut off from their own past. The more important works will certainly be reprinted in the new types, but only in so far as the Government approves of them, directly or indirectly. Thousands of books are already lying useless in the cellars of public libraries.

Of course, it is not sufficient to teach a man to read and write, to enlighten him, to make him willing to work and lead him to a piece of land, telling him to start. He must be encouraged in more material ways. One of the first things the Government did was to abolish the tithe and to make the peasants feel that they were no longer the slaves of individuals. Unfortunately, a great deal of the advantage thus gained was lost by heavy taxation, from which the peasants suffer as much as the rest of the population, especially since the bulk of the State's income is based on indirect taxation.

In the first years of the new régime the more enthusiastic of the young Republicans saw the whole agriculture of the country revolutionised by the use of modern machinery. As in

Russia, so in Turkey, the tractor appeared suddenly like the symbol of liberation, able to turn miserable peasants into proud and godlike masters of the soil. Give every peasant a tractor, and two years hence poverty will be turned into plenty. To encourage the use of machinery, it was exempted from import duty, and the petrol was offered at the lowest possible price, free of taxation. Well, the experiment soon came to an end, and not only because the Government taxed the petrol again. A more realistic attitude obtained which took the condition and the possibilities of the country into consideration. The tractors were abandoned (in 1935 I saw a broken-down one being dragged along by two resigned-looking buffaloes), and efforts are now concentrated on a more gradual advance, for instance on replacing the slow, and in the long run wasteful, buffaloes, oxen and donkeys by horses. As to the camels, the Minister of Agriculture promised me that a few would be left as a prey for the snap-shooting tourists.

To buy implements the peasant needs money, and he is being helped to get it by the agricultural credit co-operatives which with the aid of the State are organised in all parts of the country. The Government assists him further by giving him good seeds in exchange for his bad ones, by lending him free of charge pure-bred stallions, bulls, donkeys, rams, for breeding purposes, by giving him free advice through State-owned model farms, agricultural schools, or the village departments of the People's Houses, which work hand in hand with the People's Party. Agricultural experts employed by the Government visit his village to assist him. The *valis* (provincial governors) are almost continuously on tours of inspection to urge improvements. A growing number of grain elevators and warehouses are being set up by the Ministry of Agriculture, which buys the wheat at a guaranteed price and thereby keeps the price stable. The peasants themselves are forced to build roads to link their village with the nearest Government road, so that they can take their products to the market.

Thus, in a hundred ways, progress is encouraged and *enforced*. You cannot leave it to the poorest and most ignorant members of the community to decide whether they want to advance. It is one of the characteristics of poor and ignorant men to resent change and effort. People tired of the blessings of civilisation defend the opinion that men are happiest when left to themselves, even if that means that they will have to live for ever in mud huts, half starve on bread and olives, and suffer from

malaria or other contagious diseases. Whatever you think of this philosophy, it cannot be that of the State whose foremost duty it is to organise progress. Full of good intentions, Turkey has set to work. Wherever you go, you find positive results of the Government's efforts. For the sake of these results, I am even prepared to condone two major sins—dictatorship and nationalism.

It is outside the scope of my paper to discuss Turkey's political structure. But I think I may be permitted to say a few words upon it. The dynamic factor in Turkey's transformation was the army officer who belonged, not, as usually elsewhere, to the most reactionary, but to the more enlightened section of the population. Mustafa Kemal, now called Atatürk, General and victorious hero of the War of Independence, after his election as President of the Republic, founded the Republican People's Party to serve him as instrument for the modernisation and westernisation of the country. Wherever I went in Turkey, I found the members of the Party to be the most progressive and educated of the community, often hard and unselfishly at work to help and to educate the primitive majority. In 1931 Atatürk himself encouraged the formation of an opposition party, an attempt which failed because the party quickly became the rallying ground for all reactionary elements. The country was not yet developed sufficiently to handle the complicated machinery of democracy, which has suffered heavy damage in the hands of more experienced nations.

Unfortunately, as is so often the case, a tendency which up to a certain limit is justifiable outgrows those limits, and thereby becomes a harmful influence. I felt much less prepared to defend the Turkish system of government when in 1936 an even closer union was brought about between party and State by a number of important laws, one of them, for instance, providing that the *valis* were to be automatically presidents of the provincial sections of the Party. Up to then these presidents had been elected. One of the deputies of the Grand National Assembly pointed to these laws as another step towards the realisation of the totalitarian character of Kemalism.

I do not know if Atatürk himself was pleased with this statement; I suppose he had no objections to raise. Little by little he has made himself the sole master of the country, and is taking, like too many other people, a growing pleasure in inaugurating his own monument. Nationalism, from the very outset a limit-

ing force, is further narrowed and slowly being focussed on one man alone. During my stay in 1935 it was still a means to a definite end. The Empire had broken down. The Sultan, successor of Osman and Shadow of Allah on Earth, was gone, and with him Allah himself. Moslem religion, for a great number of Turks, no longer had a fundamental significance, it had become a daily routine void of metaphysical meaning, a burden gladly thrown off, at least by the younger people. The Turks, unemotional and material-minded, offered no resistance when the Government deprived the mosque of its worldly powers and limited its sphere of action to caring for souls. Only thus could the State break away from outworn fetters.

But a new battle-cry was needed to unify the nation, and nothing was more natural—especially after the War of Independence—than that nationalism should become this guiding star. The peasant was as selfish and self-centred as peasants are in every part of the world. He had to be made conscious of the fact that even though everything was changed, he was still a member of a large family to which he had certain responsibilities. In this context it is significant that Kemal Pasha assumed the name of Atatürk—father of the Turks.

Every means of propaganda which the impoverished country could afford was used to preach the new creed. In the name of the nation the peasant was called upon to learn to read and write, to build roads, a school, a bridge, to pay his taxes, to make sacrifices for the defence of the country. And here I come to a crucial point. As in other countries, so in Turkey a growing part of the people's money is being spent on armaments. Looking at the present state of the world, the re-fortification of the Dardanelles might be a political necessity, but it is none the less regrettable that heavy sacrifices have to be made for it which might be used to turn Asia Minor once again into the fertile, flourishing country which it once was.

However, Turkey cannot be expected to act differently from more powerful nations from which, after all, she has to take her cue. On the whole, and not only in the field of foreign politics, Turkey has shown soberness and moderation. Travelling through the country, I was impressed time and again by the eagerness of the people to learn and make up for the time lost in past centuries. If left to work in peace, it is not impossible that they might succeed in building up a modern State in which European civilisation is enlivened by bold experiments and East and West are welded into a new whole.

Summary of Discussion.

A MEMBER wished for more information upon the birth-rate i Turkey. The lecturer had said that the lack of sympathy betwee the young women and young men in Turkey which prevented marriage would have serious consequences, and he asked for amplification c this statement.

FRÄULEIN LINKE replied that she was referring only to wha might be called "the upper class," which was no longer an economi distinction, but comprised those boys and girls who had succeeded i passing their examinations and going to the university. The mas of the people was very happy producing dozens of children, and th Turkish birth-rate was the highest in Europe after the Russian. Th two great censuses had been in 1927 and 1935, and the birth-rate ha increased from 14·8 to 16·2 per 1,000. The group to which sh had alluded during the lecture was a comparatively small one although important.

CAPT. G. F. GRACEY considered that they had listened to a exceptionally interesting and informative lecture. He himself ha known and lived in pre-War and post-War Turkey, and was therefor deeply interested in the advance which the present Turkish Governmen were making.

The first point on which he would like more information was the child-care work known as "Himayei Etfal." When in Ankara a few years ago, he was very greatly surprised and deeply interested in the advance which the Turkish Government had made in child welfare. One of the streets in Ankara was named "Chojuk Sokhaga" (The Street of The Child), where the children were looked after, which he thought was a happy inspiration, for it seemed that the new Turkey had realised that its future greatness depended not so much upon the great men of the past as upon the child of to-day. In this street were the headquarters of this organisation, and the building was known to the people as "Chojuk Serai" (Children's Palace). It controlled 450 stations all over Turkey, each carrying on child welfare work (child feeding, crêches, medical clinics, dentistry, pre- and post-natal work for women, playgrounds, etc.). Pamphlets were issued for parents and children, dealing with health, education, etc., and lectures and cinema shows were given to mothers on how to deal with children. On one occasion he went to one of these lectures, which was timed for 8 a.m.; with a Turkish deputy he arrived at 7.30, and found that the Turkish women had been queueing up since 6 o'clock. The attention and interest which these women displayed at this lecture were quite impressive.

Secondly, he wished to know if there were any kind of religious awakening. They all knew that, at the time of the "emancipation," as Atatürk called it, the Turks felt that they had to get rid of Allah and the power of the religious hierarchy. In Constantinople he

had noticed many people going to the Mosque on a Friday, and commented on this fact to a " hoja " friend of his, who replied : " Ah, yes, again they are knocking at God's door."

He would like the lecturer's opinion on these points.

FRÄULEIN LINKE replied to the first question that wherever she went she found the greatest care being taken of children, even though the means might sometimes be inappropriate. The Turks had realised that they could only become a strong nation if they had healthy and strong children. They had to fight against a great deal of resistance, chiefly on religious grounds. She had been to the anti-malaria district with a doctor. There were five great centres in Turkey where malaria had been very severe, and the Government were organising an anti-malaria campaign. The doctor explained that some years previously, round about 1926, he had been stoned by the villagers for wanting to interfere, because Allah had made these people ill and it was wicked of man to try to do anything against such an illness. He wanted chiefly to deal with the children, and he won the peasants over in the following manner. He said : " If you see a dog attacking your child, don't you pick up a stick to chase it away? " " Yes," said these people. " Well, now, malaria is really nothing but millions of very, very small dogs which I want to chase away." They could not believe what he said, so he continued : " You heathenish unbelievers ! Don't you think Allah can make dogs so small that you can't even see them? " This slowly convinced them, and at the time of the lecturer's visit children, just as much as the rest of the population, were being regularly examined against malaria. Some of the mothers even brought the children twice a day to be quite sure. This was part of the child-welfare work which was very flourishing in Turkey.

As regards religion, the speaker said she had spoken chiefly with young people, and had found no religious desires in them. She was convinced that for the majority of the youth of Turkey, nationalism was the only religion. Atatürk had taken the place of Allah for them. She did not know if the older people had a longing to return to religion or not. But it must be emphasised that everyone was free to practise religion if they chose. She had only once seen a young soldier entering a mosque during the whole of her five months' travels. The Moslem religion was identified with the old order in people's minds. She did not think that a woman who had taken off her veil, for instance, would want to go back to the old ways. She had seen older people praying in the streets, and there was no sort of religious persecution. It was simply that the young people had so much else to do and think of that there was no room left for religion in their lives. What was in the people's hearts she could not of course say.

MR. A. C. EDWARDS referred to the industrialisation of Turkey and compared it with that of Persia. He was familiar with both

countries, and both were trying to solve the economic problem in much the same way. There was little private capital available, so that the only way to form an industrial community was through a form of State capitalism. In both countries a number of banks had been established. The capital of these banks was largely subscribed by the State itself. Then the banks proceeded to lend money to groups of individuals, who started factories. In other words, the banks were investing their capital and that of their depositors in highly problematical industries. What was going to happen in the long run to banks operated in such an unorthodox manner? The first thing that a banker must look after was the liquidity of his investors' capital. Sooner or later, it seemed to him, most of these industries, which were managed by persons without experience, would come to grief, and the banks would find themselves in deep water. What would happen to the financial structure of a country built up on foundations of this kind?

FRÄULEIN LINKE replied that she did not take such a gloomy view of the financial future. She thought the system could be made to work if it were carried out logically and without interference from outside. Serious difficulties might arise if they introduced a certain amount of foreign capital in conjunction with the State capital, but as long as they succeeded in keeping foreign capital out, she thought the system would work. The people themselves were prepared to make sacrifices. She had seen capitalist society break down in her own country with a crash which could not be exceeded by anything that might happen in Turkey. She had no especial confidence in any of the present financial régimes. The whole economic system of the world was in such confusion that we could not look at any one country and say it would collapse because of its internal financial system. She did not think that a small country like Turkey had any choice taking into consideration their whole mental outlook and their experience in the past. They were building up something, and it might last. So far they had done without foreign loans by desire, and they were especially keen to build the railways without foreign help; but later they might accept foreign loans, especially if another World Economic Conference brought all the promised blessings. But she did not think we ought to look at Turkey with special eyes. All these countries were in danger, and Turkey was in no more and no less danger than the rest of the world.

A MEMBER asked if there were any national youth organisation in Turkey such as existed in so many other European countries. Would youth take things into its own hands, and not merely disagree with the older generation but perhaps violently attack them?

She also wished to know if the Turkish Government were taking any steps to prevent all the students drifting into the "black-coated

worker" class, instead of going in for agricultural or technical work. The Turkish Government must be aware of the danger.

FRÄULEIN LINKE replied to the last question first, and said that in Turkey there was no danger of this kind. On the contrary, they were anxiously waiting for teachers, and young students were almost torn out of the schools before they were ready because there was such a lack of doctors, engineers and all those people who in other countries constituted the black-coated worker class. At present there was more need of teachers than of agricultural workers. They encouraged the sons of farmers with land of their own to go to the agricultural colleges, and then return, but even amongst them there was a tendency towards becoming government officials.

As regards young people, it had been made compulsory for young girls and boys of secondary schools to join the Girl Guides and Boy Scouts Associations, which were run on the same lines as in other countries, except that the Turkish organisations were not international; they had friendly relations with organisations in other countries, but they took orders from their own people only. They relied on the leadership of older people to a large extent, but from what she had seen of the boys and girls she thought they would soon push forward and be able to lead their own organisations. Little by little there would grow up antagonism between the young people and the older ones, if the old placed themselves in the way of the young. But the Turks were quiet people, and not much given to maternal or paternal outbursts, and she thought they would leave their children pretty free, especially as they had a real love for Atatürk as their victorious leader in the War of Independence, and what he said was to be done they would consider right. She did not think parents and children fought as vigorously as in other countries.

A MEMBER asked if Kemal Atatürk did away with religion because he was a convinced atheist, or because the religious bodies had gained so much territory and riches for themselves. She also asked what was being done with the Mosque of St. Sofia now.

FRÄULEIN LINKE replied that Atatürk was first trained as a priest and then ran away and joined the Military Academy. He had seen what a great fetter the Moslem religion was, or, rather, not so much the religion itself as the Imams and Hocas. They had tremendous worldly power, and there was no chance of doing anything so long as they were there. It was a choice between leaving things as they were and improving the condition of the country. But there was no fight against religion.

St. Sofia had been turned into a museum, the Turks saying that it was "a crown-jewel of humanity," and should therefore not be tied to any particular religious creed. Foreign experts were at work

discovering wonderful mosaics, and it was open to all the art-lovers of the world.

A MEMBER asked if there was any movement in modern Turkey clamouring for the return of Turkey's former possessions in Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordania and the rest, similar to the movement in Germany which clamoured for a return of Germany's former colonies.

FRÄULEIN LINKE replied that there was no such movement, and that one of the reasons why she admired the Turks was their sober foreign policy. She had asked the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs: "Now tell me on the quiet, you want to have all this back, don't you?" And he had replied: "O mon Dieu! Nothing of the kind! In 1923 when we settled down here we said, 'Thank God! At last *en famille.*' Turks, Turks, Turks around us. Let the Turks and the Moslems come back from Roumania and from Greece. Let us make an exchange of populations. But we do not want anything back."

This same exchange of populations was one of the most admirable things that had ever been done. They had got rid of the Armenians in the past. The present Government could not be made responsible for that. The Armenians who remained were now Turks.

She considered this sober policy of Atatürk's a laurel on his brow. What he had done, he had done in a very appropriate manner. The talk of whole regiments being sent down to the Syrian border was all newspaper bluff. None of the present-day Turks had any thought of getting back their former possessions, because they had so much to do at home. And this exchange of populations was a splendid scheme for avoiding future friction. It was a noble chapter in the history of modern Turkey.

A MEMBER asked if there were any racial minorities in Turkey, and how they were faring under the nationalist steam-roller.

FRÄULEIN LINKE replied that there were a few Jews in Istanbul, and there was even a Jew in the Grand National Assembly. They had the same rights which applied to Turks. When the Hocas were forbidden to wear their religious garments in the street, the Rabbis were also forbidden, and so on. They had to adopt a Turkish family-name. Quite a number of the Armenians would now have to adopt a Turkish family-name. All this was being done with a view to abolishing outward signs of difference and with a view to unification. Whether you prayed to Allah or to God was your own affair, however.

A MEMBER referred to the well-known book on Kemal Atatürk, *Grey Wolf*, in which it was stated that the sole driving-force behind the progress which had been made in Turkey was Atatürk himself.

Apparently all the administrators and politicians were overshadowed by the President. He wished to know if there were now a central administration with sufficient driving-force to carry things on when the President disappeared in course of time.

FRÄULEIN LINKE replied that while *Grey Wolf* was excellent in parts, in other parts it was biassed. Access to the sources of the author's information enabled her to assess the accuracy of the book.

There certainly was a growing tendency on the part of Atatürk to usurp more and more power, whereas in 1923 there were still a number of constitutional restrictions. But this was probably less dangerous than it was in other countries, firstly because he really was an outstanding and an educated man; and secondly because there were still a number of men of ability and influence around him, such as the Prime Minister. She thought the machine had now so much weight, and was gaining strength every day, that it might continue even after the death of Atatürk, although it was difficult to say; he was less dangerous as a dictator than were some other people, but, of course, there was no question of democracy.

SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARCTIC

NEW INDUSTRIES AND STRATEGICAL POSSIBILITIES[1]

By H. P. Smolka

We usually think of the Polar Region as a very inhospitable part of the world, as a desert of snow and ice, a waste, where nothing can grow, and where men, except for a few explorers who risk their lives for the benefit of science, cannot live.

This conception is quite wrong. What I saw when I visited the Siberian Arctic last summer was entirely different. I found towns, theatres and factories; and they work not only in the summer, but all the year round. I found ports by the mouths of the large rivers, air-bases, and air-lines operating regularly between settlements which lie very far from one another. I found cinemas, vegetable gardens, flowers and agricultural plantations.

"But why," it may be asked, "do the Russian Government choose the Arctic out of all their provinces for such efforts? Do they want to open up new land for surplus population?" Of course not. The Russians have plenty of good land in more temperate regions. The reasons why they spend so much money and energy on developing the northern regions are many and various.

First of all, they believe that the treasures of Siberia can only be made accessible to the world by sea transport. Siberia, if I may say so, is a geographical freak. It is probably one of the richest regions of the world in metals and timber, and there is plenty of land that can be brought under the plough. But at the same time it is one of the least accessible parts of the globe. It is the backyard of Asia. It has been a colony of Russia for more than three hundred years, and throughout this period very little, apart from agricultural goods, like butter, cheese, eggs, cattle and wheat, were produced.

I should say it is almost impossible, though, to link the many centres of industry which the Russians are building all over Siberia by railways alone. The rivers of Siberia, which would

[1] Paper delivered at Chatham House on February 18th, 1937; Mr. G. E. Hubbard in the Chair.

make excellent means of communication, all flow into the Arctic Sea, which is ice-bound for more than eight months of the year. The scheme of developing the Arctic upon which the Russian Government have embarked is based upon organising navigation on these rivers; they are building ports near the estuaries, where raw materials can be turned into industrial products, and during the three months of the year in which it is possible, by the help of ice-breakers, to bring ships from the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to the Siberian coast, they are shipping these goods off to other parts of Russia, to Europe and America. The Russians believe that as soon as such transport is fully organised, industry in Siberia will receive a great impetus, the inhabitants will find it much easier to live—for these regions are still largely dependent on food supplies from Europe—and the exchange of goods between Siberia and the rest of the world will prove a profitable business. This can hardly be the case as long as the railways are the only means, and bulky raw material such as timber and minerals the only objects, of transport.

The provision of foodstuffs for the pioneers is another very important part of the scheme. They can bring macaroni and potatoes, tinned meat and tinned vegetables. But in the long run Europeans in the Arctic cannot live on preserved food alone. The natives are used to eating raw meat and frozen fish; but such a menu is impossible for white men. The Russians therefore are trying to raise vegetables and other produce in their new Polar towns. Again I must make it clear that there is no intention of growing greenstuffs in the Arctic in order to extend the vegetable fields of Russia. The aim is only to relieve the local population of its fear that, through transport breakdown or natural catastrophe, they may be cut off from other regions and exposed to scurvy, that dreaded disease which for three or four hundred years has been the bolt with which the Arctic has barricaded its door, to prevent man from penetrating it and dwelling there.

Russia's scheme of development comprises, then, navigation, industrialisation, agriculture and, fourthly, aviation. The building of roads in Siberia meets with tremendous difficulties; the northern tundra is covered with snow and ice for nine months of the year, and for the other three months it is almost continuous swamp. Aeroplanes are essential, therefore, to link the new towns with each other, and also with the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The development of navigation, with which I should like to deal first, has a dual purpose: to relieve Siberia itself of its goods

and to bring goods to it, and also (a point on which I will touch later) it may have a considerable strategical value.

Navigation is organised in this way: A chain of radio-stations has been established all along the coast in the last two or three years, and there are now fifty-seven of them. They operate throughout the twelve months of the year, and provide the Central Administration of the Northern Sea Route, the organisation mainly responsible for the scheme of Polar colonisation, with information as to ice-conditions, climatic changes and meteorological circumstances in the Polar Basin. The work is done mostly by young people who spend a year or two on the stations. During that time they are, except for the radio and occasional calls by aeroplanes and expedition ships, completely isolated from the world.

The most difficult passages of this Arctic sea-route are the straits of Novaya Zemlya in the Kara Sea, the Vilkitski straits, then the East Siberian Archipelago and the Behring Straits. These straits are often blocked by ice even during summer, and ice-breakers are employed to blast a route for caravans of ships. The ice-breakers are assisted by "ice-watch aeroplanes," which fly in advance over their route, and give them information on the condition of the ice ahead. When gallant Captain Wiggins made his attempt to navigate these seas in the nineteenth century he lost much time looking for openings in the ice, often without finding them for weeks on end. Nowadays an aeroplane sets out from the shore, surveys three to four hundred square miles of ice, and sends information by radio to the ice-breaker; then it flies to the ship and drops by parachute a map which the observer has drawn during the flight showing the places where the ice is thickest and where there is a clear channel; then the route is mapped out on board ship.

Up to the present time river transport has been organised on the Obi, the Yenisei and the Lena. Further attempts are being made to navigate on the Kolyma, the Indigirka and the Anadyr. The Obi provides a very good means of communication from the Arctic Ocean almost to the Kuznetzk basin, where great coal, iron and steel industries are situated. The Yenisei links the Kara Sea with Karasnoyarsk, which the Russians hope will become a large industrial town within a few years' time. The Lena will link the Far East with the Arctic.

I must make it clear throughout that we must differentiate between what has already been achieved and what has been set out in programme. The Russians are optimistic, and in many

cases I found that the time limit they had set themselves for the attainment of their aims was rather too short. That is probably essential, however, to stimulate the activity of the Russian working population.

Ports have been built on the mouths of these rivers. The main port, which has already been working for over five years and now has a population of fourteen thousand, is Port Igarka.

One point upon which many people were anxious that I should make inquiries was the use of convict labour in the Arctic and Northern Siberia, particularly in the timber camps there. When I was in Port Igarka, in the summer and autumn of 1936, I found conditions to be very different from what we had heard they were in 1932 and 1933. I cannot say whether at that time the reports were exaggerated, or whether conditions have improved since. In Igarka, among a population of fourteen thousand, I found four thousand kulaks, exiled peasants who in 1930 and 1931 had resisted the collectivisation campaign. They receive normal wages for their work, are free to move about the town, and their children study side by side with the children of free workers. The kulaks themselves are employed in the harbour and the factories and on the Polar farm. The only point where they differed from free workers was that they had no access to political meetings and were not allowed to take part in voting and discussion. Of course, they cannot leave Igarka. After a few years, when they show interest in industrial work and factory production, when they have proved themselves to be what the Russians call "de-kulakised," they are restored to civil rights and are allowed to return to their homes.

I spoke to one who had already got his passport; but he said he would not think of going back to his former village. He said: "I have got used to the people here, and can get on with them all right; if I went home and saw my farm being run by my former servants I am not sure I could remain at peace with the régime for long."

The children of these kulaks are definitely absorbed into the new society. When they reach the age of sixteen or eighteen they are allowed to join the Communist organisations, and as long as they go to school many of them are members of the "Pioneers" (the Red Scouts' Organisation). I spoke with many of these children. They are writing a book, in collaboration with the children of office-workers, on life in the Arctic.

The main industry along the Yenisei and in Igarka is lumbering and timber-sawing. Siberia possesses some of the finest timber

in the world. The trees are felled all along the banks of the rivers, and in summer are rafted downstream. In Igarka they are stored over the winter in steam-heated pools, from where the sawmills are fed, and in the following summer the timber, now sawn into planks, is shipped to Europe. Of the forty-five vessels which put in at Igarka last summer, thirty-five were British tramp-steamers.

Last year five hundred thousand trees were cut up for export; five hundred thousand would be enough to line each side of a road from London to Baghdad. But that is only one per cent. of the timber that could be cut in Siberia each year; for the annual growth is fifty million trees. That is to say, fifty million trees could be felled each year, without reafforestation becoming necessary. The Russians, who are very keen on statistics, asked me to work out how much fifty million trees was, and I calculated that by laying fifty million trees end to end, in two lines, you could build a footbridge from the earth to the moon. Their answer was: "We could do that each year in Siberia. That shows you how rich we are." They are very proud of their timber wealth.

On the whole, life at Igarka does not differ much from that in other Soviet pioneering towns, many of which have sprung up since the Five Year Plan started the country moving. Generally speaking, the population is well safeguarded against the harshness of the climate. It would be no use for me to enter into the question of wages in the Arctic, because, as you know, the value of the rouble cannot easily be translated. It must suffice to say that the people there get enough food to live on, that their clothing for the winter is sufficient, but that luxuries such as some of the well-to-do workers in England can afford are still beyond their means. On the other hand, of course, there is no unemployment; people only go there under contract, and are safeguarded as long as they stay.

I have mentioned the mineral resources of the country. On this point, again, it is impossible for a foreigner who goes there for a short period to check up on all the information that is supplied. If we are to believe the information that the Northern Sea Route Administration is giving out, exploring and opening up the Arctic is definitely a paying proposition. And even if the mines (gold mines, nickel mines, copper, platinum, lead, tin and coal mines) which, they assure us, have been found, and which are still to be found all over Northern Siberia, were not as rich and as numerous as they are said to be, the enterprise would still be justified. As far as mines are concerned, I saw the coal and nickel districts of Norilsk and Dudinka.

Igarka lies four hundred miles up the Yenisei. It is rather strange to think of a port lying four hundred miles inland—as far as the centre of Czechoslovakia is from the mouth of the Elbe. Dudinka lies a hundred and ten miles farther north. The Norilsk mining district is situated seventy miles inland, east of the Yenisei. Previously the only means of linking it with the river and the sea was to travel down the river into the Kara Sea along the west coast of Taimir and up the Piasina and Norilka Rivers, a journey of fifteen hundred miles and only possible in the two months of summer. Now, however, a railway is being built from Norilsk to Dudinka, and all the coal from Norilsk will be exported in future from that port.

The mine is worked entirely by convicts. I was told there were no political prisoners among them. One of them came up to me, begging for bread, and I said: "Why do you beg? Don't you get enough food?" He replied: "Only if I work. I am not working to-day, because I want to have a rest." So I said: "Why did you come here?" And he answered: "I am a kulak, an exiled peasant." At this, one of the G.P.U. men there put in: "Why do you tell this foreigner you are a kulak? You know you are a murderer, and have killed three people." The man said: "Well, I thought it would sound nicer." To this the G.P.U. man replied: "You are wrong, citizen. A criminal is a victim of capitalist society. A kulak is its exponent."

The only political prisoners in Norilsk were two Japanese and a German spy. They were not shown to me.

The nickel mines at Norilsk are very important for Russia, because nickel is one of the few metals in which Russia is rather poor. If they can mine all the nickel they need in the Arctic, the Russians are probably quite justified in going to the great expense of sinking the mines there, for then they will not be dependent on foreign supplies.

Now, all industrial activities, and the settlement of Europeans in these areas, is dependent on provisions of fresh food. In Igarka I saw tomatoes growing in hothouses, and cabbages and potatoes, even wheat, growing in the open air. In September the wheat was only standing a foot high; but the potatoes were quite good, we ate them. The tomatoes were perfectly sound, and the cabbages larger than any you could find in London. The reason for this is that the Arctic sun shines twenty-four hours a day for two and a half months on end, so that the growth of the leaves, which depends on the amount of sunshine, is not arrested

over-night. All the same, the Russians are not proposing to transfer all cabbage-culture to the North. On the Polar stations in the open sea, much farther north, are only subterranean hot-houses. There cucumbers and salad-stuffs are grown in what look like window-boxes, only they are set on tables. The hot-house is protected from the ice and frozen earth that surround it by wooden walls and fur. Heat is supplied by electrical central heating and light by three-hundred-candle-power bulbs. The power used to generate the electric current is produced by wind-mills, and when the first of these little greenhouses was opened, the Russian newspapers came out with: "ARCTIC STORM GROWS GREEN VEGETABLES." In Igarka vegetables are already grown in sufficient quantity to supply not only the town, but some of the Polar Stations as well.

From the point of view of its agriculture, the Arctic may be divided into three zones: the North, comprising the coastline and the islands, where nothing grows in the open air at all; the second zone, reaching down to about lat. 67, where such things as potatoes and onions can be grown in the open; and the third zone, the sub-Arctic region, where it is hoped in the course of the next five years to cultivate wheat. It has been tried successfully in similar parts of Canada, and, where the climate is favourable, it may also prove possible in the Siberian Arctic.

One problem is to find plants that mature early enough to give time for transport farther north, up to the northernmost settlements where nothing will grow. Those plants are very rare. Vegetables which are strong enough to resist the August frosts, and are content with a warm season lasting two or three months, will probably mature only at the end or the middle of October, when the sea is already frozen. Then they are stored in carbon monoxide over the winter.

The pioneers believe, however, that they will be able to grow wheat as far north as Igarka, at lat. 67, by the process of "Jacovization." The seeds are saturated with water and, as soon as germination sets in, are stored for a period varying between five and thirty days in a temperature of 32° to 50° F.; then the seeds are put in the soil. Growth by this method is speeded up, and the long hours of sunlight compensate for the shortness of the growing season. In Igarka I saw some grass-seeds being sown. Next day the grass was about an inch high. The same evening it stood eight inches high. Everything in the Arctic grows ten times as fast as it grows with us, the main problem is to find or develop plants strong enough to resist occasional mid-August frosts.

The ground there is tundra, soil which has not completely thawed for more than sixty thousand years. The two or three months of summer are not enough to soften the earth for more than six or eight feet down. Below that depth is continually frozen earth and ice. During the summer months the rain-water cannot drain off, and the ground turns into swamp and marsh. Mosquitoes abound everywhere.

Laying railway-tracks, making roads and building houses are all very difficult problems. Roads are made by laying logs across the tundra, filling the gaps between the logs with sawdust, and then nailing polished beams on top to form a kind of parquet-floor. Along these roads motor-cars, lorries, horse-drawn vehicles and automatic timber-carriers circulate freely. Walking in heavy boots along these parquet-roads makes the wooden walls of the town re-echo, almost as if with gunfire.

The houses have to be built with particular care. When they were first put up, the heat from the brick-stoves thawed the ground in which the foundations were set. Supporting pillars sank into the soil, one wall fell in, or perhaps two: sometimes the centre rooms also collapsed. Now enough space is left between the ground-floor and the earth-level to allow air to circulate; this isolates the ground from the warmth of the stove-heated houses above it.

Aviation is another problem. I have said already that aeroplanes are essential to link the centres of life and to transport passengers; but they are also needed to guide ice-breakers through the Arctic Ocean, and to assist in surveying forest-land, territory which is very difficult to penetrate. Aerial observers can judge if the trees in a forest over which they are flying contain timber good enough to justify saw-mills and a settlement being built there. They can judge the quality of the timber from the air, and calculate the height of the trees by noting the length of the shadows they cast. The airmen also assist the seal-fishers. Aeroplanes scout over the sea, and when a shoal of seals has been sighted report its position to the vessels.

The Russians believe that in the future the Arctic will become one of the main highways of the world's air traffic. All the most important centres lie in the Northern Hemisphere: New York, London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, Tokyo, Peiping, Shanghai. Now, communication between these cities is definitely shorter when made over the top of the world, over the Arctic, than round the waist of the globe. It is shorter to fly from London to Tokyo via Northern Siberia than to make the journey in a latitude nearer

the Equator. The same holds good for journeys from Moscow to San Francisco and from New York to Shanghai.

The Russians speak of Arctic air transport as if it were a thing that could be accomplished to-morrow. I spoke to the pilot who will attempt a flight across the North Pole this summer. The plan is this: First a scouting party will be sent; three or four aeroplanes carrying radio equipment, building materials and food supplies. The airmen and cargo will be dropped above the North Pole by parachute or land on an ice-floe. They will then make meteorological observations and clear a landing-ground, and the pilot will fly from Moscow to San Francisco, using the station at the Pole as a radio beam. This exploit may be brought off by courageous men, but passenger transport will not be possible for the next few years.[1]

Several interesting attempts to fly from Russia to America via the Arctic coastline of Asia were made last summer. This route may prove of considerable strategical importance. One other very important Arctic flight has been completed, and I think escaped the notice of the English public last July. Three Russians, flying a new machine, left Moscow for Franz Joseph Land, which is only as far from the North Pole as London is from Glasgow—they went on to Nordoyk, and the mouth of the Lena river, crossed the mountain ranges of Yakutia and reached Petropavlovsk, Russia's outpost on the Northern Pacific. This was a journey of nearly seven thousand miles and they completed it in fifty-six hours. The time taken was, naturally, shorter than if they had followed the track of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

It has established the possibility of taking military aircraft to the Far East by a route completely out of the reach of any enemy. No enemy aeroplane could penetrate these regions; the pilots would not have the necessary experience, and radio stations to supply them with information would not be at their disposal. It would therefore be possible, in the case of a Japanese attack on Russia, for Russian aeroplanes to fall upon the rear of the Japanese. There is also another possibility. Along this northern route the Russians could also carry in dirigibles fifty or a hundred pilots to America, and these pilots could pick up aeroplanes and provisions. They would not be strong enough to carry any considerable quantities of ammunition, but they could bring war supplies to the Far East; and it would be difficult for the Japanese to interfere with them on that route.

[1] The station on the pole was actually put up three months after this paper was delivered at Chatham House.

European and Far Eastern centres of industry can also be linked by the new Arctic shipping route. Goods can be brought to Murmansk and down the Yenisei to Central Siberia, almost as far as Yakutsk. They can be brought on ships sailing up the west coast of America, through the Behring Straits, and along the northern sea route to any of the great Siberian rivers, and even as far as Europe. Again a very difficult route for foreign ships to interfere with.

It must be borne in mind, however, that this shipping route is only possible for three months in the year. The Russians say: "Since we have the great drawback that our ports can be blockaded on the very first day of a war, we have to take what precautions we can." Attempts were made during the last war to bring goods to Siberia and Russia along this northern route. A Norwegian, who now lives in London, tried to bring a cargo from America, over Iceland, round the North Cape to the mouths of the Obi and the Yenisei. He was stopped at Archangel, however, and his goods were confiscated, for by that time the Revolution had broken out.

Commercial traffic on the Kara Sea is now established as far as the Obi and the Yenisei, and timber trade through the Kara Sea has been a regular feature of the international timber market for over five years. At present the Russians take no foreign ships beyond the Obi and the Yenisei, as they think there are always risks in bringing them through the Vilkitski Straits. In the last three hundred years, up to 1935, only eleven vessels had been through those Straits altogether. Last summer, however, fourteen modern cargo-steamers negotiated this passage simultaneously. The Russians are now building ice-breakers which can also carry aircraft for reconnaissance on the Arctic Ocean. Four of them are to be put into service this year.

They say they spend two hundred and fifty million roubles a year on developing this route, which works out at about one hundred million pounds. But a really considered judgment on the economic value of the enterprise is almost impossible. Every economic activity in Russia is controlled and regulated by the State, and the Russians believe that even if only part of the scheme proves profitable, the scheme as a whole will help to set off some of the geographical disadvantages of their country and will thereby increase the total wealth of the nation. There is no doubt that it will enrich Russia; and it will also add to the knowledge of mankind on scientific conditions in and commercial possibilities of the Arctic.

As regards the future, the Russians hope that the natives of Northern Siberia will become the trustees and administrators of industries and towns in these regions. From centuries of acclimatisation they are better suited physically to the country. At present a hundred and sixty thousand natives, divided into twenty-six different tribes, live at an extremely primitive level. They are nomads, live in tents, and drive reindeer sledges in the winter. Their main activities are fishing and fur-trapping. Now, however, their life is being organised by the Russians. Trading outposts have been set up at the most outlying points in the tundra. They are equipped with radio and serve as bases for education and medical work. During the summer motor-boats come down the rivers carrying provisions for the natives. This saves them journeys of about a thousand miles, which had to be made by them formerly each year in order to buy flour and tea and exchange their furs. These little motor-boats, travelling like " Stop Me and Buy One " carts, ply up and down the river; the natives attract the pilots' attention, and with the money they get for their goods they are enabled to make purchases in other regions the following year.

The attempt to socialise these nomads is an enterprise on which it is impossible at present to form a decision. All the same, it is probably less difficult to socialise these nomads than to socialise modern industrialised countries. They live in tribal communities, and their communal lives are ordered by tribal councils, which the Russians were easily able to turn into " Soviets."

The Russians have also sent Red missionaries who teach them to read and write and advise them in hygiene and veterinary knowledge. After a time they succeed in winning the confidence of the natives, and can persuade them that the socialisation of their reindeer herds is not only a social and political step, but also one possessing immediate economic advantages. For a herd of twenty thousand reindeer belonging to the whole tribe can be looked after by a small number of herdsmen, who travel north with the reindeer during the summer, while the rest of the community can remain down south, the women devoting their time to making clothes and mending fishing-nets, the men to catching fish in the rivers and the children to study at the new " culture bases." The wealth and level of civilisation of the tribes can definitely gain from this system.

The native children, as far as their parents allow it, are already being left at the trading-stations during the winter, where schools have been established. There they are taught to read and write,

using a new alphabet which Russian scientists have constructed for them, based on Latin script, to avoid being charged with denationalising and "russifying" the native minorities. They never had any writing of their own.

I am conscious of the fact that this short outline can hardly do full credit to such a vast and complicated scheme, nor put before you a complete and scientific picture of what is being done. I shall be content to know that I have told you a few new facts based on personal observation, and for that reason perhaps somewhat more valuable than volumes of official publications.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. G. E. HUBBARD (in the Chair) said that Herr Smolka had gone to the Arctic as the result of a challenge from Captain Schmidt, the well-known Russian Arctic navigator, given in front of thirty other journalists at a dinner in London, to go with him to get for himself the information he had rather sceptically asked for. The keynote of all the Arctic development was challenge; the challenge from nature, "Thus far and no farther"; the challenge to space in the discovery of new and enormously shortened routes across the top of the world; and, as Herr Smolka had said in a recent address to the Royal Geographical Society, there was also a potential challenge to peace.

The connection between the Russian Arctic regions and international affairs might seem rather slight, but actually it had been surprisingly close in the past. In the sixteenth century the northern coast of Russia had first come into prominence because Great Britain was competing with Spain for routes to the East, and the British and Dutch were forced to look for routes which would be safe from attack. In 1551 the first British expedition, under Sir Hugh Willoughby, set out to find the North-East Passage, but was caught in the ice, and he and all his men died of scurvy or freezing. One member of the expedition, Richard Chancellor, who was in a separate ship, got through to the White Sea, travelled overland to Moscow, and initiated the first commercial relations between Great Britain and Russia. He also made arrangements for the opening of the overland route to India through Persia and Moscow, and on his return founded the Association of Merchant Adventurers. The Muscovite Government then put a stop to all navigation by the northern route because it objected to ships going to ports in the East without paying fees to Moscow. For three hundred years nothing more was attempted, then in 1860 or 1862 Captain Wiggins sailed as far as the mouth of the Obi River. A few years later he penetrated to the Yenisei, and in about 1879 the North-East Passage was first fully accomplished. From that time until after the Russian Revolution there were only two successful attempts (according to a paper given by the Russian Delegates at the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations), one in 1915 by a Russian

ship, and one in 1918, when the great Norwegian explorer, Amundsen, sailed from Europe to the Pacific via the North-East Passage.

With regard to the situation between Russia and Japan, there had been an inclination to think of Russia's Far Eastern territories as a long projection into the Pacific, having a very attenuated connection with European Russia, a very easy thing for Japan to bite off, if she had the military power to do it. As long as there was only a single line of railway that, obviously, was the situation. The Russians, however, were building a railway farther north and developing important goldfields. Perhaps Herr Smolka would say how far the strategical position of the Far Eastern territories had changed as a result of the mining development and the colonisation.

HERR SMOLKA said that the goldfields on the Kolyma were not yet a great industrial centre, but were considered to be most important, and the Russians believed that in a few years they would be the first gold-producing country in the world. There were also large oilfields on the northern coast which would not only be able to supply shipping with fuel, but would also supply aeroplanes in the case of war in the Far East. Except in the matter of transport, Arctic exploration and development had not yet changed the strategical situation.

QUESTION: Was all the wood in the Arctic soft wood?

HERR SMOLKA replied that it was a very hard quality of soft wood and was suitable for building purposes.

QUESTIONS: How far were the rivers of Central Siberia navigable southwards? What quantity of nickel was available or could be produced in the new nickel mines? If similar progress was being made in that as in the gold industry, which it was hoped in the Soviet Union would exceed the gold production in South Africa by 1938, it would have far-reaching importance for the future of the world.

HERR SMOLKA said that the rivers were navigable for large river steamers as far down as Krasnoyarsk on the Yenisei, Yakutsk on the Lena, and Novosibirsk on the Obi. Ocean-going vessels went as far as Igarka on the Yenisei, Port Tiksi on the Lena, and Novy Port on the Obi. The river-craft seemed rather primitive, dating back to 1906 or 1899, but new craft were being built which would be driven partly by oil and partly by coal. They were rather flat, with a draught of about three or three and a half feet.

The Russians themselves did not know exactly how much nickel there would prove to be, but it was thought that Arctic Siberia was, from the point of view of minerals, very similar to Canada.

QUESTION: What was used for lighting in the dark months?

HERR SMOLKA replied that electricity was used. The town was floodlit throughout the winter. In Igarka it was produced with wood, at Norilsk with coal, on the Polar stations partly with oil and partly

with windmills. There was electricity throughout the region and also telephones.

QUESTION : How far did language present a difficulty, since the natives were illiterate and spoke various dialects? Had they received any instruction?

HERR SMOLKA replied that the schools for the natives used the native languages, but also taught Russian, as the tribes did not understand each other. The majority of the teachers were still Russian, but a number of young natives were sent to the Institute of the Peoples of the North at Leningrad to study history, geography, pedagogy and technical sciences, and the policy was to have the natives educated by natives in the long run.

QUESTION : Were a series of aerodromes going to be built along the northern route, and if so, would it be possible to use them all the year round, and for what type of aircraft? If aircraft were to be sent to the Far East for strategical purposes, they would have to have a very long range and a large capacity for fuel and bombs, or a series of aerodromes en route to refuel at comparatively short stages. The fact that Russia purchased about ten thousand tons of nickel a year from Canada, and had tried in the last year to get twenty thousand tons, indicated that Russia was desperately short of nickel and far behind her Plan.

HERR SMOLKA said that hydroplanes were used exclusively on the northern route and the rivers were used as aerodromes. The aircraft flew continuously above the rivers, as the territory was not yet mapped minutely enough to allow of going far from the course of the streams. They could not land on the tundra. In winter the floats were changed for skis. Fuelling bases were in the bays of the rivers at distances of about three hundred miles.

QUESTION : Did the northern forests suffer from devastating forest fires like Canada, and if so, what means were used to deal with them?

HERR SMOLKA replied that there were few fires because there was not the same great drought and heat in the summer. There were aerial fire brigades and aeroplanes dropped smoke-bombs on the fires to isolate them. That was part of the work done by the "Forest Watch."

QUESTION : Were the inhabitants interested in politics, and were there any political discussions?

HERR SMOLKA said that he had found them more interested in politics than were people in some of the towns nearer civilisation, possibly because they were so isolated and because those who went there were the more intelligent people. They had regular political meetings. He had attended a "Fraternisation" evening between the inhabitants of Igarka and the foreign settlers. There was a great deal of propaganda postered in English, but no slogans inciting

foreigners against their governments. He had been asked many questions on foreign affairs, among them, "How is it possible for Sir Samuel Hoare and Mr. Eden to sit in the same Cabinet together after pursuing different policies in the Abyssinian conflict?" A newspaper was published daily, and when foreign sailors were there, half a page was in English.

QUESTION: Was there any Stakhanovism?

HERR SMOLKA replied that there were interesting examples of it. There had been a competition in Igarka between two gangs of stevedores loading boats, one gang working in three shifts of eight hours and the other four shifts of six hours, and the latter had won. The kulaks also were drawn into the Stakhanovist movement and paid higher wages as soon as they achieved greater output.

QUESTION: How many Communists were there?

HERR SMOLKA said that there were many members of the Young Communist League among the pioneers. On the Polar stations there was not such a large percentage, as it was less a question of political orthodoxy than of scientific efficiency.

QUESTION: What was the percentage of males and females in the population?

HERR SMOLKA said that at Nordoyk there were to be five hundred and twenty men to eighty women in the first year. In Igarka the number of men and women was almost equal. In new settlements the women were only admitted in the first year if they did active work. The simple housewives might follow in the second year, when there was more accommodation. On the Polar station on Dickson Island there were a hundred and twenty-five people, of whom twenty-five were women. The women took an active part, and were very efficient at scientific work. Most of the radio operators were women. The Air Ambulance in Igarka had a woman chief.

A MEMBER asked for information about the recreations, including the chess championships.

HERR SMOLKA said that the Polar stations played chess with each other by wireless. They took one day for each move. Such a collective game generally took two months. In the winter months, when the radio was not so overburdened with work for navigators, the radio operators played chess among themselves.

In the winter, once a month the workers' families were assembled in Moscow, and each family was allowed to speak one hundred words to the relative in the North. They were allowed fifty words by telegram free of charge each month to communicate with their families. They had news bulletins on the Polar stations twice a day. There were study circles for languages. In the towns there were cinemas and football, and they played with the British sailors.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF POLAND [1]

PROFESSOR ROMAN DYBOSKI

I

WHEN, in the course of the World War, it began to become apparent that the historical wrong committed upon Poland by her neighbours in the eighteenth century would be righted, and a free Polish State would once more appear on the map, the natural enthusiasm of the nation over the prospect of deliverance and reunion was apt to make little of the economic difficulties by which such a great change in the conditions of national life was likely to be attended. It was vaguely assumed that any economic advantages that might have been derived by the three several sectors of the country from their inclusion in three large Empires would be amply compensated by the reconstruction of a more than middle-sized State, with a fairly capacious home market of its own. It was realised that Poland was agriculturally more than self-supporting; also that she possessed considerable quantities of certain mineral raw materials, which, so it was imagined, could serve as a basis for vigorous industrial development. The sum of requirements for prosperous economic existence seemed to be attained when, on the one hand, Poland regained access to the sea, and, on the other, came into possession of the Upper Silesian coal-mining basin, with its thoroughly modern equipment and well-developed industrial undertakings.

It was realised only after some time had elapsed that the effects of more than a century of abnormal national existence could not be effaced quickly or easily. Poland, as a well-disposed post-War French visitor put it plainly, had lost nothing less than the whole nineteenth century of history—the century of industrial democracy, of the growth of huge urban centres, of world-wide international trade and of far-flung colonial expansion.

[1] Address given at Chatham House on May 27th, 1937; Mr. Geoffrey Drage in the Chair.

The author is indebted to his colleague Dr. W. Ormicki, Lecturer on Economic Geography in the University of Cracow, for valuable assistance both in the form of useful bibliographical advice, as well as of a special memorandum on the problems discussed in the present paper.

In the course of the nineteenth century the three sections of the divided Poland had, in fact, participated to some extent in modern economic developments within each of the three partitioning Empires. But they were each of them in the position of border provinces, situated on the fringe of the several Empires, and therefore exposed to the risk of loss; they were, besides, foreign in national tradition to the body of each of those Empires, and were necessarily animated by resistance to complete incorporation and assimilation, economic as well as political. In consequence of all this, the Polish provinces never shared in the fullness of the economic life of the respective Empires. Austria and Prussia had already started on the road of modern industrial development when they annexed their portions of Poland; finding them still in a predominantly agricultural condition, they saw that it was to their interest to keep them in that condition, so as to serve as granaries for the industrial regions of the interior and as markets for their manufactures. Only under Prussia did this result in a considerable measure of prosperity among the agricultural population of the Polish province; Austrian Poland, even after the grant of self-government, remained one of the poorest provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Under Russia, which was industrially still undeveloped, considerable industrial developments did indeed take place in the new Polish province in the early nineteenth century, and it became, for a time, the reservoir of certain industrial products, particularly textiles and metal wares, for the vast spaces of the whole Russian Empire; but towards the end of the century Russia began to develop industrial centres of her own in the interior, and a policy of discrimination in railway tariffs checked the further progress of the Russian-Polish industrial area.

The structure of rural society at the time of the old Poland's fall had still been characterised by the prevalence of large estates, belonging to great nobles and cultivated by peasant labour in a state of serfdom. In the course of the nineteenth century the emancipation of the peasantry from serfdom took place at different times and under different conditions in the three sections of the country; in all of them, however, it resulted—somewhat like the abolition of Negro slavery in the Southern States of America—in the rise of a new class of landless rural proletariat with all its problems. The rapid multiplication of the extremely prolific Polish peasant stock produced conditions of congestion and distress: and the slow and gradual purchase of land by peasants, as well as the industrialisation of certain

parts of the country, went but a little way to remedy the growing evil. A more drastic remedy was sought in emigration on a large scale. The need of America's growing industries for masses of labour provided a particularly large outlet, and emigration to the United States became one of the most marked features of pre-War Poland's social and economic life. In consequence of this, a population of some four million Polish peasants, transformed into industrial workers, accumulated in the industrial cities of the United States from Philadelphia to Chicago and from Pittsburgh to Providence; and the Jewish proletariat of Poland's towns had a large share in the movement, peopling the tenement blocks of such urban districts of America as the East Side of New York.

Besides this permanent type of emigration, another type developed in consequence of the constant diminution of peasant farms through subdivision among numerous children: the farms becoming too small in size to provide a living for the family, the expedient of temporary emigration for the harvest season was increasingly resorted to; masses of hired Polish labour made their appearance at harvest time in the rural areas of North-Eastern Germany, and later also in Denmark and in Eastern France.

Altogether, before the War, an average of over a quarter of a million permanent emigrants, and nearly half a million seasonal emigrants, left Poland annually; permanent emigration absorbed one-half of the natural increase of the population. The savings of those who remained abroad, and the earnings of those who returned after the harvest, of course, constituted substantial contributions to the income of Poland's rural population. On the eve of the World War, two-thirds of Poland's arable land had actually been bought up by peasants out of the large estates: no doubt emigrant savings accounted for a large portion of that amount.

II

Such were the outlines of the economic condition in which the Great War found the divided Polish territories. What were the economic consequences of the War for the reunited country?

The new Polish State emerged from the War with a comparatively clean slate in the matter of national debt, but alas, also with an almost entirely clean slate in the matter of national capital. The devastations of the War were enormous, and they were spread over a wider area than either in Serbia or in France; they were of longer duration, too, since Roland after the Armistice

continued for another three years in a state of war with Soviet Russia, and had two-thirds of her territory swept by a huge Bolshevik invasion in 1920.

The huge task of reconstruction was undertaken with the help of inflated paper money, that inheritance of war-time, used for the same purposes in many countries of post-War Europe. It was inflation which ate up almost all the nation's accumulated reserves of financial capital, and when the new Polish currency was established in 1924, and one unit of it was declared equal to 1,800,000 units of the old, the country woke up to the consciousness of deep impoverishment. The artificial boom fostered by inflation gave way to an inevitable slump, and the too high level at which the rate of exchange of the new currency had been fixed (the unit was to be equal to the Swiss gold franc) had a destructive effect on the international trade relations which Poland had begun to develop. The persistent notion of complete economic self-sufficiency and the diffidence of a newly-delivered people towards foreign influences led the Polish Government of the time to refrain from carrying out fully the recommendations of Sir Edward Hilton Young (now Lord Kennet), who had been called in as financial adviser in 1924. But, in 1927, a loan from the United States amounting to 62 million dollars plus 2 million pounds sterling, and another 20 million dollars in reserve credits (the largest loan the new Poland ever obtained) was accepted on the conditions laid down by the creditors, and the recommendations of the American financial expert, Professor Kemmerer, were carried out under the supervision of Mr. Charles Dewey, who spent several years in Warsaw as financial adviser to the Bank of Poland.

The share of foreign private capital in industrial enterprise on Polish soil was considerable before the War, and even overwhelmingly predominant in such branches as the oil industry. Since the War, substantial influxes of foreign capital have also occurred in certain industrial domains; but diffidence towards foreign control has in a number of cases prompted the Poles to decline large offers of foreign investment. It was perhaps under the impression of an unfavourable experience with an American firm, which undertook to provide some of the towns of former Russian Poland with sewerage systems, that the Polish Government did not conclude a projected agreement with the Harriman concern for the establishment of electric power supply over a large area of the country. And in recent years, for cogent reasons into which it is impossible to enter here, the shares of

three large undertakings almost completely controlled by foreign capital, namely those of the textile works of Żyradów near Warsaw, of the Municipal Electric Works of the city of Warsaw, and of the group of mines and iron-works known by the name of *Interessengemeinschaft* in Upper Silesia, have been bought from their foreign holders.

The upshot of such developments is that the general proportion of foreign capital invested in Poland's industries on January 1st, 1937, amounted to 42·4 per cent. of the total, when in former years it had risen to as much as 47·2 per cent. The distribution of foreign capital over the different branches of industry is illustrated by the following figures: of the entire capital invested in Poland's oil industry, as much as 87·3 per cent.; in electric works the percentage is also very high, being 85 per cent.; in electrical undertakings it is 56·1 per cent.; in mining and metallurgy it is now only 53·6 per cent., having been as high as 73·9 per cent. before the acquisition of the *Interessengemeinschaft*; and in the chemical industries it is 48·2 per cent. As regards the national origin of the foreign capital now invested in Poland, at present 27·1 per cent. of the total is French, 19·2 per cent. is American, 13·8 per cent. is German, 12·5 per cent. is Belgian, 7·2 per cent. is Swiss, and 5·5 per cent. is British; other States, such as Austria, Holland, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia, are represented by small fractions, each between 2 and 4 per cent. of the whole.

Having these important facts in our minds, let us return to the general outlines of the new Poland's economic history. After the great difficulties of the earlier years, a definite change for the better came about in 1926. It was due to both political and economic factors. To begin with, the assumption of power by Marshal Pilsudski in May 1926 inaugurated a prolonged period of political stability after the shifting coalitions of parties and frequent Cabinet changes of the preceding years. In the second place, the beginning of the rapid development of the new Polish harbour of Gdynia in the same year (1926) opened up new vistas for Polish commerce, which now became, in increasing proportion, sea-borne commerce, with considerable exports into countries hardly touched by Polish trade before.

In consequence of all this, the years 1927 to 1929 became a period of relative prosperity for the new Poland. An end was put to this by the coming of the world crisis towards the close of 1929. With the disasters of inflation still fresh in everybody's memory, the Polish Government, in its financial policy throughout

the period of the crisis, rigidly adhered to principles of deflation, and did not abandon the gold standard even when it was being given up by nation after nation in the West of Europe. This policy, intelligible enough under Poland's peculiar circumstances, entailed great additional privations and sufferings upon the people, over and above those already produced by widespread unemployment in consequence of the stagnation of trade and industry, and by famine conditions in the countryside in consequence of the low market prices of agricultural produce. It was in 1935 that Poland at last was obliged to introduce strict control over transactions in foreign currencies, as a substitute for the currency devaluation resorted to elsewhere. By that time the crisis had worked havoc with the promising beginnings of Poland's foreign trade.

It was, however, not the world crisis alone, but the general trend of post-War economic developments which had this adverse effect. A touch of tragic irony in Poland's historical destinies would have it that she should rise into new political life again at a time when the liberal, free-trade principles of the nineteenth century, so favourable to joint and universal economic progress, are being abandoned in favour of self-contained, national and imperial, economic programmes. The new Poland, in spite of the heavy inheritance of political antagonisms from the past, had at first done a good deal of profitable business with her sometime oppressors, Russia and Germany. Soviet Russia had drawn largely on Poland for industrial products: even in the years of the crisis the ironworks of Silesia had been largely kept going through Soviet orders in connection with the Five Years' Plan. But that plan having been carried out, and new Russian industries established on a gigantic scale, Russia ceased to be the good customer she was. Germany, again, had been the largest purchaser of Poland's agricultural produce: but the policy of a revival of German agriculture, strenuously pursued by the Hitler Government, has recently brought agricultural exports to Germany down to 40 per cent. of their previous total. After the creation of the port of Gdynia, Great Britain had rapidly risen to a place even above Germany on the list of export markets for Polish agricultural produce, particularly bacon, eggs, and butter; but Great Britain, like Germany, has recently adopted a policy of reviving her own agriculture, and her preferential relations with the British Dominions since the Ottawa Agreement have also led to a reduction of her trade with partners outside the Empire As a result, her trade with Poland has

recently, like Germany's, fallen to 40 per cent. of its former volume. To complete the record of such losses, it may be mentioned that the swamping of the world's markets with cheap Soviet timber a few years ago had a ruinous effect on Poland's large timber export bill, and the position which Poland had created for herself as an exporter of coal to the Scandinavian countries by way of Gdynia has recently become considerably impaired through treaties concluded between these countries and Great Britain. Altogether, Poland's exports in the years of the crisis down to 1934 shrank to 60 per cent. of the figures of 1928.

To keep exports at the level required by the economic needs of the State, the device of bonuses to exporters had to be resorted to in many cases. Such bonuses had, in particular, been paid out of the Treasury on exported grain. Of Poland's grain harvest during the last five years, 75 per cent. has been consumed by the country population, 17 per cent. by the towns, and 8 per cent. has been available for export. Lately, the first symptoms of recovery after the crisis occurred in the shape of a rise in the prices of agricultural produce. Unfortunately, they were at once attended by the danger of profiteering and an undue dearth of people living in towns; and the Government, which reduced the bonuses to grain exporters a year ago, has recently found it necessary to stop all grain exports from Poland entirely, in the interest of keeping domestic prices at a reasonable level.

With regard to another very important article of Poland's exports of food, viz. sugar, it may be briefly stated here that its exports between the years 1928 and 1935 fell from 186,000 to 108,000 tons in volume, and to about one-eighth of the original price in value. How far these consequences of the international sugar crisis will be remedied by the London sugar convention of the present year, remains to be seen; a certain increase in Poland's export quota has been agreed to.

The remedy to Poland's more crying economic evils which was constituted by emigration before the War, soon began to be applied again in the post-War period. France, with her devastated mining and industrial areas and her depopulated countryside, welcomed Polish immigrant labour in large numbers during the early years after the War: between 1918 and 1931 she absorbed half a million of them, and the joke was current that " the North of France was rapidly becoming Polish, while the South of France was becoming Italian." Germany, which had closed her frontiers to Polish immigrants in the first post-War years, opened them

again in 1926, and emigration for the harvest season, to the tune of nearly 400,000 people a year, once more became the rule. On the American continent the South American countries, which even before the War had played a considerable part in the Polish emigration movement, became appreciably more important after the War: more and more is heard of large Polish agricultural settlements in the Argentine and in Brazil, and, to a lesser extent, in Peru and Paraguay. Finally, the Jewish National Home in Palestine attracted a rapidly increasing number of Polish Jews: the number of emigrants from Poland to Palestine between the years 1922 and 1935 rose from 2000 to 25,000, and the annual emigration of Jews from Poland came to be equal to more than one-half of the natural increase of the Jewish element in Poland. Concurrently with this, Polish trade with Palestine developed quickly, rising in 1935 to five times the volume of five years before: commercial relations with Palestine grew up, even during the crisis, into an important item in Poland's foreign trade.

The total number of emigrants from the new Poland reached, by 1929, one-half of the annual natural increase of the population, thereby reaching to the pre-War proportion. However, setbacks to this economic relief from emigration soon occurred, and these setbacks became stronger as the world crisis developed, just at the time when the relief was most needed. The fatal blow dealt to Poland's emigration opportunities by the anti-immigration laws of the United States after the War was followed up by similar measures in the British Dominions, particularly in Canada, which had become a population outlet of some importance to Poland. France, having reached saturation point, ceased to offer opportunities to Polish emigrants, and even repatriated considerable numbers of them in recent years. Finally, the turbulent events in Palestine closed its doors to Polish Jews for the time being. Altogether, emigration, which absorbed one-half of the natural increase of population in 1929, absorbed only one-tenth in 1935. And it must be added, that such emigration as still remains possible does not result in financial advantage to the country, as did emigration before the War; for, while at that time emigrants enriched Poland by their savings, now the laws of many countries require them to bring stated amounts of capital with them, and thus drain Poland of resources.

What makes the situation still less favourable is that the return of emigrants from abroad to Poland in increasing numbers begins to add to her economic difficulties. There was such a wave in the early post-War years, when hundreds of thousands of pre-

War emigrants and war-time exiles returned to Poland from Russia, escaping from the hell of Bolshevism with their bare lives, and adding to the seething mass of post-War destitution and distress in the new State. Another and more prolonged influx of emigrants made its appearance in the years of the world crisis, and the year 1931, which marks a turning point, for the first time saw a surplus of 10,000 immigrants over the number of emigrants, which in 1932 rose to 17,000. An average annual surplus of 9,000 emigrants over immigrants has, indeed, been re-established since, but the emigration figures have never yet returned to a level at which they could afford appreciable relief to the economic situation of Poland. And this critical condition with regard to emigration prevails at a time when the population problem in Poland is visibly becoming acute and is being recognised as a main factor in her economic difficulties.

III

One of the wisest men of our time, the philosopher-president of Czechoslovakia, Thomas Masaryk, once said that if we probed economic and other post-War troubles anywhere in Europe to the bottom, we were sure to reach bed-rock in coming to population problems. This is particularly true of Poland.

The Polish peasantry, which constitutes between two-thirds and three-fourths of the nation, has always had a very high birth-rate. This had its comforting aspects : at the height of Prussia's anti-Polish policy before the War, Prince Bülow confessed himself beaten by what he called the " rabbit policy " (*Kaninchenpolitik*) of the Polish element in Prussia. And even after the War, the growing strength of numbers inspired confidence in the future : the fact that Poland, which covers three-fourths of the area of France, will very soon be her equal in population, and that she may, within little more than a generation, become the equal of Germany, obviously means growing international importance for the State.

Of late, however, certain very serious economic aspects of this growth of population have begun to loom more important than its possible political advantages. Poland is rapidly becoming over-populated from the economic point of view : that is to say, she is becoming burdened with more population than her actual economic resources and structure can endure.

From slightly over 27 millions in 1921, the population of Poland had risen to over 34 millions in 1937, which means a net average increase of nearly half a million a year. The absolute figures of

that increase are larger than those of any other country in Europe Poland, being the sixth State in Europe, and the eleventh in the world, *in population*, stands fourth among the States of the world in the rate of increase of that population, while it ranks only sixth in Europe, and twenty-sixth in the world, in area. Of that population, only 27 per cent. live in towns, and 73 per cent. in rural areas. It is the rural areas, accordingly, which feel the weight of over-population: the general density of population over the whole country is considerably inferior to that of such highly industrialised countries as Belgium and England, since the relative density of arable land in the rural districts reaches the very high figure of 36, and it compares most unfavourably with Germany's 20 and Czechoslovakia's 24. There are over 2000 peasant farms of less than 12 acres in Poland: they constitute nearly two-thirds of the total number of farms, while their area is only a little over one-sixth of the total. And this proportion is not likely to improve, as long as continued subdivision of these farms among numerous children is a necessity, because the surplus children of the village population cannot be provided for in other ways. Constant lowering of the standard of life in the village is the unavoidable consequence. There was, indeed, a fall in the rate of increase of the population during the years 1933 to 1935, but this turned out to be due entirely to the economic crisis, and even such a slight economic improvement as was noticeable in 1935 and 1936 at once raised the net increase during 1936 by 4000 over that of 1935.

Birth control of any kind is still hardly known to the masses of Poland's village population; and besides being opposed by the Roman Catholic Church, which has great power over the minds of the people, it is looked at doubtfully not only by those who have Poland's military strength at heart, a very important consideration in Poland's exposed and unsafe geographical position, but also by those who know that the experience of Western European nations shows birth control to be a two-edged weapon, and one easily set in motion but very difficult to stop at the proper time.

What, then, is actually being done in Poland, in the way of economic policy, *in order to cope with this population problem*, and how far can these domestic measures be described as adequate?

In order to be able to keep increasing numbers of the peasant population on the land, Poland, like most other States of Central and Eastern Europe, resorted at the very beginning of her new existence to a scheme of agrarian reform, under which the large estates were to be parcelled up and a low maximum of individual

landownership, fixed at 450 acres as a general rule, was to be gradually established, while the peasantry were to have facilities for the purchase of the land so rendered available. The scheme, amended in 1925, has been in operation during the whole period of Poland's new independent existence; it fell indeed into stagnation during the crisis, when agriculture became too unremunerative to make land purchase tempting, capital was lacking and credit was dear. At present, agrarian reform is once more being very vigorously promoted by the Government. According to the statistical figures of 1936, the operation of the scheme since 1919 has resulted altogether in the creation of 135,000 new farms, 63,000 suburban allotments and small holdings, and 432,000 small lots of land used for the augmentation of existing small farms; the scheme has created permanent opportunities for work on the land for about 800,000 people. In addition to this, the integration of scattered strips of peasant land has been conducted systematically, and the reclamation of land through the abolition of rights of way has also been helpful as a source of more arable land. Finally, a plan for reclaiming vast stretches of marshland in the centre of Poland's eastern border and of turning them into cultivable land is well under way.

All these efforts taken together, however, cannot in any case be sufficient to remove Poland's great population difficulty. The highest estimate of the reserves in land still available in Poland amounts to about nine million acres, while three times that amount would be required to satisfy the existing population of landless peasants at the rate of 15 acres per family, to say nothing of the prospective new surplus of landless country-dwellers in the next generation. Even the complete drainage of the large Eastern marshes, it has been calculated, would not make room for more than a quarter of a million people on the land. At present, something between eight and nine million people in the Polish countryside are landless, and the gradual disappearance of the large estates only diminishes their immediate opportunities for making a living as hired labour. Rural unemployment escapes registration, but is estimated at one million, and it is known that a stream of about a quarter of a million people flows into the towns of Poland annually in search of work.

The economic development of Poland's towns, under such circumstances, appears as a vital and most urgent task. Owing to peculiar historical conditions, it was only in the Prussian sector of the divided Poland in the nineteenth century that a strong Polish middle class of artisans and small shopkeepers grew up.

Under Russia trade in the towns remained the monopoly of the old-established Jewish communities, and became increasingly so when Russia, excluding Jews from the interior of her Empire, thrust a surplus population of hundreds of thousands of Russian Jews upon the Polish border provinces. Under Austria, for reasons of more strictly economic order, Jews also remained in the ascendant among the commercial population of the towns. The Jewish population of Poland now amounts to over three million people, or more than 10 per cent. of the total number of inhabitants. Of these Jews, 40 per cent. live on small trade; and of the total of Poland's traders, 70 per cent. are Jews. Recently, the economic necessities of the Polish village have resulted in strong pressure on the part of its population in the direction of commerce in the towns; this has even given occasion for local conflicts between peasants and Jews, but in view of the peasants' lack of capital, it has not so far produced any marked change in the general social situation; and it will no doubt be a long time before town commerce provides any appreciable outlet for the Polish element: only considerable Jewish emigration to Palestine or elsewhere can accelerate this desirable and vitally necessary development.

An issue of much more capital importance for Poland than the slow growth of a commercial town element of peasant origin is constituted by the problem of industrialisation. Great industries in Poland, if properly developed, could absorb large masses of the surplus village population, and at once relieve the population pressure in the countryside. Industries, accordingly, are a supreme necessity for Poland, not on the ground of any Utopian programme of complete economic self-sufficiency, but for simple reasons of population policy. This has always been recognised by successive Polish Governments; and a member of the present Government, Finance Minister Kwiatkowski, who was the real founder of the port of Gdynia, has undertaken the huge task of creating an "industrial triangle" in the very centre of the country, round about the town of Sandomierz, which is to be devoted to industries of paramount importance for the State.

IV

It is when we approach this vital problem of industrialisation that we find ourselves confronted by that other great difficulty which, together with that of population growth, is a main source of Poland's economic troubles: viz. the difficulty of obtaining the raw materials necessary for Poland's industrial development.

The resources of Poland in raw materials are neither so abundant nor so comprehensive as to provide a complete basis for industrial organisation. Poland produces 2·7 per cent. of the world's coal, 2·9 per cent. of its zinc, 0·3 per cent. of its oil, 0·5 per cent. of its lead, 4·4 per cent. of its flax, and 3·1 per cent. of its hemp. Of some of these, considerable surpluses are available for export. The country's exports, in fact, very largely consist of raw materials: 50 per cent. of them are composed of agricultural produce; another 15 to 20 per cent. of coal; and such outstanding items as timber, petroleum, potash, lead and zinc make up the greater part of the rest. But the large export of such raw materials as coal and timber is due to the impossibility of their fuller utilisation in the country itself, because of the lack of certain other raw materials equally important for industry. Poland, to begin with, is wanting in high-grade iron ore, producing altogether only 0·2 per cent. of the world's iron; she also lacks such other metals as copper and aluminium; she experiences an increasing deficiency of jute and of the kind of wool required for her textile factories. Cotton and rubber must of course be imported entirely, and it is becoming more and more difficult for Poland to provide the necessary quantities required, particularly of cotton.

The result of these grave deficiencies is that, even in the present still undeveloped state of Poland's industries, one-half of her total imports have to consist of raw materials, which leaves very little margin for the importation of the necessary mechanical equipment for industrial undertakings. As much as 13½ per cent. of what Poland spends on imports has to be spent on metals, and as much as 30 per cent. on raw materials for the textile industries. This considerable proportion has tended to become even larger lately, with the rapid rise of the prices of certain raw materials, especially metals, in the international market in connection with the world-wide increase in armaments. This additional factor has rendered the difficulties of the situation of States like Poland particularly acute in the last two years.

It is at this point that the irony of the fact that Poland should have regained her freedom in a period of closed frontiers and of restrictions on international trade again becomes apparent, as it did in the case of her population problems. It has justly been observed that the difficulty about raw materials in the present day is not their lack; for do we not live in the age of plenty? The difficulty lies in finding the wherewithal to pay for them, when those who hold them happen to have no need of

what you can offer for export, and when the foreign currencies for cash payment become as difficult to obtain as they have become under the present transfer conditions. The inexorable fact is that five great colonial empires—the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Republics, France, and Holland—between them have practically monopolised four-fifths of the world's supply of essential raw materials, including, of course, all the raw materials of colonial origin; and the same " Big Five " happen to hold the largest part of the world's gold. Confronted by this situation, Poland, with all the initial advantages of her territorial configuration and all her available quantities of export articles, finds herself placed in the category of the " have-nots " among the States of to-day, as contrasted with the " haves " in the telling phrase now generally adopted. Of the recent shrinkage of Poland's exports, and of its particular causes, I have spoken before. Here let me add that dumping, under the circumstances, is not a perfidious policy, but a painful necessity: to get " cheap rubber " and " cheap cotton " from the colonies, Poland is obliged to sell her sugar abroad eight times cheaper, and her coal three times cheaper than at home; and it is partly due to this that sugar is literally a luxury in most of the villages of a country rich in vast sugar-beet plantations.

Here, obviously, is a problem which cannot be dismissed as a domestic one, but which has its wide international bearings. A State of thirty-four million people, occupying what Napoleon recognised as a " key position " in the geographical system of Europe, cannot be left economically in a blind alley without grave danger to the balance and the stability of that system.

V

What, then, are the international remedies which might be applied with better effect than the domestic remedies used with such imperfect success by Poland and other States? Well, these international remedies are being widely and eagerly discussed in Europe to-day. The restoration of freedom of migration, and of at least a certain amount of freedom of international trade, is being advocated by some of the most enlightened economic experts and the most far-sighted statesmen of to-day. But we seem very far still, alas, from any definite steps towards the realisation of such counsels of perfection. As things stand, we hear of new restrictions on immigration and of new tariff barriers every day. Some economists, indeed, say that the increase of

a world-wide demand for raw materials after the recovery from the late crisis, and the danger of the swamping of some colonial territories by the quickly multiplying coloured races, are bound to lead in the near future to a relaxation of restrictions both on immigration and on trade; but it remains to be seen how far such predictions will be verified. As regards immigration, it can only be said that if in the near future any colonies or dominions under the menace of the tide of colour realise the need for larger white immigration, it is not the industrialised Western European communities, but the agricultural nations of Central and Eastern Europe that can supply emigrant material of the quality required for settlement on the land. In the matter of trade, for the present at any rate the widespread makeshifts of bilateral trade agreements and of compensation trade make it only more difficult for nations to acquire exactly what they need; and expedients reminiscent of war-time, such as forcible restrictions on home consumption and the manufacture of cheap substitutes for genuine articles, are being adopted by some States.

The question of facilitating access to the world's sources of raw materials, particularly to colonial raw materials, was raised, with truly statesmanlike width of outlook, by Sir Samuel Hoare on the occasion of the Abyssinian conflict in 1935; and his successor, Mr. Anthony Eden, has since declared that " His Majesty's Government have in no way withdrawn from the proposal of Sir Samuel Hoare," and that " they think that such an examination could usefully be held at Geneva " (1936). As a matter of fact, a Committee of the League of Nations is actually studying that question of raw materials with all its implications. And even before the Raw Materials Committee of the League had met, the problems of " Raw Materials and Colonies " in their present phase were made the subject of detailed discussion in one of the Information Department Papers (No. 18) of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. I need not repeat here any part of the excellent exposition of these highly complex matters in that admirable publication. I will only remind you that the principle of the " open door," in two different legal forms, only exists in the mandated territories of the so-called A and B categories, as well as in the Belgian Congo and in French Morocco among the colonies. The obvious interest of the " have-nots " among the European States of to-day lies primarily in the extension of the principle of the " open door " to a wider range of territories, as well as in the creation of international guarantees

: its observance, if effective guarantees of this kind, in the esent state of international affairs, could be devised.

But this is not all. The present distribution of gold reserves d the present conditions of international payments being what ey are, the "have-nots" among the States would soon necesrily find themselves in financial vassalage to the "haves," en if the door of all colonial territories were to be thrown open wide as anybody could wish, nay even if international trade thin Europe were to be made largely free again. It will be, cordingly, a necessary part of any scheme for the wider accessiity of raw materials to devise a mode by which the holders th of the gold and the raw materials could financially facilitate e acquisition of the latter by those who stand in need of them.

Other than purely financial possibilities suggest themselves. ie colonies and mandated territories not only produce the raw iterials called "colonial" *par excellence*, but they also contain servoirs of other raw materials which the Powers in possession these territories do not, for the present, feel any need of ploiting. It is evident that the exploitation of such resources uld, without loss to the one party concerned and with advantage the other, be entrusted to the States whose need for raw iterials is most acute.

And one other consideration which has been advanced in this scussion should not pass unmentioned. In the present state of ternational finance, one of the greatest advantages of possessing colony of one's own consists in the unity of currency between e mother country and the colony: the acquisition of colonial w materials is thereby rendered possible without having to ercome the difficulties of foreign exchange. This, quite apart m any motives of political prestige, is perhaps one of the most ighty reasons why the question of a redistribution of colonies, at least of mandated territories, has lately begun to loom in e ultimate background of all these discussions of post-War onomic troubles. In the publication of the Royal Institute of ternational Affairs referred to before, *Raw Materials and lonies*, the colonial claims and aspirations of three "dissatisfied wers," Germany, Italy, and Japan, are fully discussed in all eir aspects; and it is incidentally mentioned that "there have en signs that Poland is beginning to think in terms of colonial pansion" (p. 11, note 3). Now, there are certain things of iich enlightened public opinion in Poland renders a perfectly ar account to itself, and which make it appear a rather arduous dertaking for a State in Poland's present position to aspire to

colonial territories; and Poland is certainly prepared to welcome any plan which may be internationally devised for the relief of such post-War economic evils as over-population and a lack of raw materials, without a redistribution of territories. But it must be emphasised that the more closely we study these problems in their present phase, the more manifest does it become that it is hardly possible to separate the question of access to colonial raw materials from that of their exploitation, of the migration of labour for the purpose, and of the ways and means of financing the whole process, as well as of guaranteeing its practicability by international agreements.

As things stand at present, a return to principles of liberalism in the matter of international trade relations and of emigration would indeed be a most desirable all-round solution; such a return, however, seems not only remote from the practical possibilities of to-day and to-morrow, but the advantage of it appears the more questionable the farther the world at large moves towards a system of self-contained national economies; because a complete reversal of that process at its present stage would be attended by economic convulsions possibly calamitous. On the other hand, the farther the process advances throughout the world, the more difficult does the position of countries like Poland become. Under the circumstances, it is an obvious duty of self-preservation for such countries to raise the demand for access to colonial raw materials in the international forum; and in what form soever such access may be facilitated, its guarantees must be real and effective if dangerous international complications are to be avoided.

Now, in order to be heard and considered, such demands must be supported by an account of the necessities created by the economic and social situation of the country in question. For this reason, it will perhaps not have been useless for students of the great international problems of to-day to have placed it on record, as I have here endeavoured to do, that Poland's case for access, in some definite and well-assured form, to colonial sources of raw materials, is solidly substantiated by facts and figures, and is accordingly as strong on its merits as are any claims that are being raised in these matters by other States. Whatever their motives, we in Poland entirely subscribe to the view expressed by Sir Samuel Hoare that " the problem is economic rather than political or territorial "; and we are certainly not moved by any ambitions for political prestige, but by sheer economic and social necessity.

Summary of Discussion.

DR. W. J. ROSE pointed out that three-quarters of Poland was more than a hundred years behind the times because of the conditions under which the Polish nation lived during the nineteenth century. The town of Lodz, with half a million people, still had no sewers; this was not their fault, but because the Russians would not allow them to have any. Therefore this area could not be said to be comparable to the rest of Central Europe from the point of view of the social and cultural services of the modern world. When Polish independence came, literally everything had to be done. All that had been said by the lecturer on the material side could have been described by him also from the point of view of the cultural and spiritual needs of the people. Of course, the moment either economic or cultural questions were touched upon there arose the question of political implications. How far had the facts mentioned by the speaker affected political life in a land which had always been intensely anxious to preserve its "free institutions," as they were called in England, and notably how had rural conditions affected the peasant from the point of view of citizenship? Two main issues seemed to be: (1) that everything cultural depended largely on ways-and-means, money, and (2) that one was faced at once with the question of Minorities, and the necessity for finding a *modus vivendi* in what was on the economic side a difficult set of circumstances.

PROFESSOR DYBOSKI said that the last speaker reminded him of an occasion in 1925 when he was speaking to a Summer School at Geneva under the chairmanship of Professor Zimmern. He was speaking on the economic aspect of Poland when Paderewski arrived, and Professor Zimmern welcomed him by saying that the lecturer was going to put before them the body of Poland, while the soul of Poland had just entered the room.

When he returned from Russia in 1922 he had found Poland consumed by a hunger and thirst for more education. Flocks of students were flooding into the Universities at Cracow and elsewhere. Professor Paul Monroe of Columbia University, New York, had said that what was being done in the educational field made him think of a nation building all the floors of a house at the same time, and doing it against the obvious difficulties of the situation. Now they had almost succeeded in eliminating the illiteracy which had been rampant in the Eastern provinces as an inheritance of the Russian system. Latterly the population problem had made it impossible to provide enough schools for all the children, and there were about half a million children without such facilities. On the other hand, there were teachers with diplomas who were unemployed. This was a result of the economic situation. There was also a greater demand for higher education than could be met, and societies like the Young Men's Christian Association were doing their best to assist students. This, however, could not solve the problem of unemployment among University graduates.

With regard to the effect that economic difficulties had on political life, it was interesting to note that the peasants, instead of asking for immediate material relief through subsidies or any of the usual methods, on every occasion made political demands. They wanted fuller political self-expression, nothing else. This spoke very highly for the civic sense of the peasantry.

It would be difficult to speak of the cultural and moral aspect of Poland in a few words; but whenever there was an opportunity for displaying the cultural, scholarly and scientific effort of the nation Poland occupied no mean place at international Conferences and Exhibitions. Many papers read were written by those who had come from the ranks of the Polish peasantry. Paris would show something of Polish art this year. The Cambridge University Press was to publish a history of Poland to which Polish experts were contributing different chapters, and the speaker was to be one of the editors of that work. He wished that more English people would come to Poland to see what was being done there, and that those who had already been should come again because they would find great differences between the country in 1921 and to-day. Architecture had made great strides, especially in the capital. In his own town of Cracow, however, they had left the old stone cobbles, and there was very little in the town less than six hundred years old.

Dr. J. D. Rolleston asked how far was alcoholism prevalent among the Polish peasantry?

Professor Dyboski said that "whiskey money" had been used in England for the purpose of endowing local education, and similarly in Poland there was a spirit monopoly, and a good deal of the revenue for education had come from that monopoly. But in the last few years there had been a very marked drop in the consumption of alcohol by the peasants. They used to drink vodka to a large extent, and also beer. The crisis had made it impossible for them to buy the drink provided under the State monopoly, and consequently there had been more sobriety in the villages of late. In his youth the speaker had been worried by the amount of alcohol consumed by the Polish peasantry, but during his seven years in Russia, and his lecture tour in America in 1928–9 before Prohibition was abolished, he had been cured of that fear, as he saw what drunkenness really could be. France always urged that Poland should drink more of her wine whenever a trade treaty was negotiated, and there had been a scheme for growing vines in the south-eastern part of Poland. There were also cider presses in the northern provinces. There were temperance movements, particularly the Boy Scout Movement; but the real cause of the decrease in the consumption of liquor lay in the fact that young people were indulging more and more in sports, and therefore did not drink as much. This was so to such an extent that it would soon be necessary to think of some other monopoly to yield the money that used to come from the spirit

monopoly. They had tobacco, and quite good tobacco could now be had for pipe-smoking. This had not been available before, and might make up for the decrease in the consumption of alcohol.

Mr. Israel Cohen said that he had had the honour of discussing the Polish situation with Paderewski at the end of 1918 when he was Prime Minister, but regretted that the unfortunate reason for his presence in Warsaw had been the deplorable outbreak of anti-Jewish excesses which caused some rather unflattering attention to be directed towards the new Republic. Since then he had been a close student of the Polish situation, and travelled in Poland from time to time, and in this respect could find no change for the better. Unfortunately the treatment accorded by the Polish Government to the Jews had not been in accordance with either the Minorities Treaty or the principles of elementary justice.

The Jewish situation in Poland depended largely upon their economic conditions. As the lecturer had indicated, the Polish State was a very large employer of labour, having a multitude of industries under its control as well as the whole of the Civil Service. Probably a million officials and other employees derived an income from the State, and it was doubtful whether of this number even one-tenth per cent. could be said to be Jewish. They were on principle excluded from State service and employment. The State had at its disposal certain funds to be used for the purpose of education, religion and charity, to an equitable share of which the Jews were entitled, but the amount given to them was almost negligible. The Jews also met with obstruction in entering the professions and trades. In the universities there was a *numerus clausus*, although this was not allowed by law, and even those Jewish students who attended were exposed to the most barbarous treatment by a section of the non-Jewish students—members of the "Endek" and "Nara" parties.

The speaker had mentioned the fact that there used to be a great deal of emigration from Poland. During the last few years there had been little or no Christian emigration, but there had been steady Jewish emigration; and lately there had been systematic agitation in certain circles to increase Jewish emigration, and efforts were even made to force Jews to leave places in which they had been domiciled for hundreds of years. There had been a succession of anti-Jewish excesses during the last two years, the worst of which had been the pogrom at Brest-Litovsk on May 13th, the object being to wrest from the Jews their economic positions. It was utterly impossible to expect that the Jews of Poland, who had lived there for seven hundred years, would leave the country. They had helped to build up the country, and had as much right to live there as other Poles. Their natural increase was fifty thousand per annum, and since the end of the War their emigration had seldom exceeded twenty-five thousand per annum. It was impossible to believe that the whole of the total increase of any one year would ever leave the country, and even that would only leave the Jewish

population on the same level. Therefore the Jewish economic problem could not be solved by emigration. It could only be solved internally, and it was therefore necessary that the Polish authorities should endeavour to accord to the Jewish minority the full measure of fairness and justice which it was perfectly entitled to receive.

A MEMBER said that as the speaker had mentioned the desire of the peasantry for greater political freedom, and the question of minorities had already been put forward she would like to mention the Ruthenian or the Ukrainian minority living in Poland. The Minorities Treaties had been repudiated by Poland, but she would like to know what steps the authorities and the intelligentsia of Poland were taking in the place of those Treaties, as they had promised to do. There had been some understanding between the Government and the Ukrainians that their grievances, especially the grievance with regard to the speaking of their own language, should be given attention and redress, but quite recent happenings showed that this was not the case. Ukrainian conscripts, for instance, were punished for using their own language and also priests imprisoned for the same offence. What steps were being taken to come to some *modus vivendi* with this large, vigorous and important section of the community?

PROFESSOR DYBOSKI said that the question of the minorities was rather outside the scope of his subject, so that he could not discuss either the Jewish or the Ukrainian problem in any detail, or rectify, in all particulars, the *ex parte* statements made on these two questions by the preceding speakers.

The Jewish problem had gone through various phases. There had been a very favourable phase under the rule of Marshal Pilsudski, who had pursued a consistently liberal policy. The recent outbreaks could be attributed almost solely to the economic crisis, and it was recognised by both Poles and Jews that the Jewish problem was an economic problem. With regard to the distribution of Poles and Jews in the various walks of life, at the beginning of the new Poland trade had been almost entirely in the hands of the Jews; but with a higher standard of education they began to filter into the professions as well. It was expected for a time that there would be a reciprocal amount of Poles entering business and trade, but this was not found to be the case. This was the reason for the demand for a limitation of access to the professions to the Jews, but there was no legal bar on Jews in the Government service at any rate. He deplored with all his colleagues in the University the excesses which had taken place against the Jewish students, and the Government had taken the matter in hand at the wish of a large section of the community.

With regard to the question of emigration, this was considered necessary not only by the Poles, but by the Jews themselves, some of whom considered that in order that there should be a strong Jewish State in Palestine not emigration, but evacuation of Jews from Poland

should take place. The lecturer agreed that that was not practicable, but he would wish to emphasise the fact that it was not only Jews who were emigrating from Poland, and there was no discrimination, it was just as necessary for the landless surplus peasants to emigrate under the present conditions of lack of sufficient employment in industry or commerce. He had found himself in complete agreement with eminent representatives of Polish Jewry in promoting the emigration of Jews to Palestine. He considered that there was no general solution to the Jewish problem, but that it must be solved step by step. He had no doubt that an improvement in the economic situation would bring about a diminution of the tension. Both Poles and Jews had quite given up the idea of assimilation, neither party considering it desirable.

As regards the Ukrainians, they were not under any system of self-government, because of the mixed character of the provinces; but again attempts were being made to solve the problem from phase to phase. A good deal of material prosperity had already been achieved by the development of the flourishing Ukrainian Peasant Co-operatives. Poles and Ukrainians in the schools learned each other's language, and the Ukrainians were not only allowed to use their own language among themselves, but also in the courts of justice and other public places. In the case of the army, the recruits were naturally required to use the language of the country when addressing a commanding officer. It should be remembered, with regard to any trouble between the authorities and the Ukrainian clergy, that during the nineteenth century under Austria the clergy had become the leaders of the Ukrainian National Movement, and some of them still engaged in political activities which brought them into conflict with the Government. In no case were reprisals inflicted upon them for purely pastoral activities, and the Ukrainian problem was not in any acute state at present. The only thing that would be likely to inflame the imagination of the Polish Ukrainian peasants with the idea of a National State would be a strong Ukrainian State across the border, and as Russia was now becoming more and more nationalist, it was not likely that this contingency would arise in the near future. As in the case of the Jewish population, an alleviation of the economic situation would do much to remove any tension that there might be, although the Government was doing everything in its power to prevent abuses, and to remedy any justifiable outbreak of discontent among the Ukrainian population.

OBITUARY

LOUIS EISENMANN

Louis Eisenmann, who died rather suddenly on May 14th at the age of 67, is an irreparable loss not only to French historical scholarship, but also to intellectual co-operation between the nations. He came of one of those numerous Alsatian families which withdrew to Paris after 1870, and have given to France so many distinguished *savants*. His first published work was the section on Austro-Hungarian history in the later volumes of Lavisse and Rambaud's *Histoire Générale,* and this was followed by an elaborate monograph on *Le Compromis austro-hongrois de 1867*, which has never been surpassed in any language as a study of the constitutional and national aspects of the Dual System. He was the first foreigner to supplement the materials available in German by a serious study of Magyar, Czech, Serbo-Croat and, to a lesser degree, Polish. From 1905 to 1913 he was professor of history at Dijon University, and was then appointed to the new Chair of Hungarian Literature and Culture at the Sorbonne. During the War he was attached to the General Staff as an expert on Central Europe, and afterwards went to Prague in the suite of General Pellé, the first Chief of Staff to the new Czechoslovak army. In 1920 he succeeded Ernest Denis, the gifted historian of Hus and of Bohemia, in the Chair of Slav History and Culture at the Sorbonne, and was at the same time secretary-general of the newly-founded École des Études Slaves, chief editor of *Le Monde Slave*, and in 1926 joint editor (with Bément) of the *Revue Historique*. He was also director of the Institut Français founded in memory of Denis at Prague and this involved constant journeys between Prague and Paris and much organising work of an exacting character. His war work had earned him the confidence and friendship of Masaryk and Beneš, and he stood in close personal contact with all the leading Czech historians and writers. It is not surprising that with all the claims upon his time, he never completed his section of the monumental series *Peuples et Civilisations*, or the history of Austria-Hungary in decline which should have complemented his early work on the Ausgleich of 1867.

In recent years he had been in close contact with Chatham House, having been the French representative at the first International Studies Conference in 1928 convened by the League of Nations International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation. He then became secretary of the French committee for co-ordination of higher international studies, and was a regular attendant at each of the nine sessions of the general conference, serving as Chairman of its Executive Committee in 1935 and 1936. He was a man of wide culture, the very strictest standards of scholarship and accuracy, a fluent and readable style, ready wit and clear judgment. He never pushed himself forward, and indeed preferred the background : but he hated pedantry above all, and held that it was not only perfectly possible to apply scientific methods to the study of contemporary history, but that, for good or for ill, the historian who was out of touch with contemporary events was not likely to attain to sound estimates of remoter periods. He had many contacts in the political world and possessed a remarkable inside knowledge of the whole Central European situation : but he held aloof from active politics, and devoted his main efforts to extending cultural relations between France and Czechoslovakia, as a bulwark of democracy in the heart of Europe. But though the two Institutes of which he was the soul have already produced an admirable crop of younger scholars, it will not be easy to replace him by another of the same calibre.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London: Send Book Twenty May Journal: Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

GENERAL

1*. A HISTORY OF PEACEFUL CHANGE IN THE MODERN WORLD. By C. R. M. F. Cruttwell. 1937. (London: Humphrey Milford, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. 221 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.; to Members of the R.I.I.A., 5*s*.)

THIS book is a very good instance of the way in which a historian, working in scientific detachment upon his own field of study, can also be of practical help to men of affairs. Dr. Cruttwell has attempted "to make clear what have been the causes, objects and procedure of peaceful change in modern times." After a general introduction discussing and analysing the different types of change, the book is divided into chapters dealing with disputes about boundaries and sovereignty; examples of cession of territory; cases of the creation or extinction of sovereignty; popular consultations and plebiscites, and changes of status. Finally, in a few pages, Dr. Cruttwell sums up the conclusions to which he has been led by his study of the facts.

A work of this kind, bringing together in short compass a large number of scattered facts, is no easy matter. It may be ruined by excess of detail or by excess of generalisation. The narration of fact, as well as the conclusions, may be distorted either by prejudice or sympathy. The writer must know far more than he can put down on paper, and, if he is to give a true picture of the motives which have dictated the acts of sovereign States, he must have something of that power which Michelet called "divination."

It is enough to say that Dr. Cruttwell has shown himself fully aware of the difficulties of his task, and that his readers must envy the ease with which he has mastered these difficulties. The general effect of his book is encouraging. It is true that a great number of transactions which can be described as peaceful changes have been peaceful because, on a calculation of interest, the parties concerned did not think that they could safely use or resist force. It is also true that, in a good many cases, if one looks behind the acts themselves to the background of force and constraint, the lesson of these changes is summed up in the old saying that hypocrisy is the ultimate tribute of vice to virtue. Yet there is encouragement enough in the fact that nations have been ready to sacrifice minor interests and minor satisfactions of "honour" in order to avoid war, and that they have been ready to calculate their long-range interests in a reasonable way, and not merely to surrender to greed, or to gusts of popular excitement. It is also important to notice that there has been a steady development of the machinery of peaceful change, notably, for example, in the taking of plebiscites in areas of disputed sovereignty or allegiance. Finally, an English-speaking

reader cannot help remembering, with some pride, that the most remarkable series of peaceful adjustments of boundaries have been carried out between Great Britain and the United States. There was, indeed, more elbow-room in the New World than in Europe for the settlement of these boundary questions, and in Great Britain, at least, the disputes did not touch popular feeling at the most sensitive points. Nevertheless the agreements are a credit to the political common sense and largeness of view of the peoples concerned. E. L. WOODWARD.

2*. CHATHAM HOUSE: A brief account of the origins, purposes, and methods of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. By Stephen King-Hall. 1937. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. xii + 144 pp. 5s. net.)

IN his introduction to this attractive little book, Commander King-Hall quite frankly states that its purpose is ancillary to his efforts, as Chairman of the Endowment Committee, to secure for the Institute such further financial support as may enable it adequately to realise and develop its ideals. The author's own faith in the national value of the work carried out in Chatham House is practically demonstrated by his generous allocation to the Endowment Fund of any royalties on the sale of his book, but it is also the implication of such a volume that the Institute and its activities need only to be known to be appreciated. It is difficult to see how the subject could have been treated in a way better calculated to fulfil the writer's purpose. A pure history of Chatham House would no doubt have devoted more space to such matters as details of the preliminary discussion during the Peace Conference, leading personalities such as Mr. Lionel Curtis, and the tentative expansion of staff and function during the earlier, pre-Chatham House, years. Commander King-Hall condenses such historical matter to a single brief chapter, and concentrates rather on explaining the present activities and organisation of the Institute in all their ramifications, his object being rather to provide the busy man with a comprehensive *vade mecum* giving all the essential information in the shortest possible compass, than to cater for the general reading public. As might be expected, however, from our knowledge of the author, the book is in fact not only lucid and accurate, but also eminently readable.

A final chapter is devoted to the author's private views on the possibilities of future development, a branch of the subject likely to be as interesting to the members and executive of the Institute as to prospective external benefactors. On points of fact Commander King-Hall's accuracy is such as to leave practically no loophole for criticism. He might possibly have rather more clearly emphasised that the necessity for external support is due to the deliberate restriction of membership to a limited number of those qualified to contribute to the knowledge and discussion of international problems; but to call attention to such minor points as this is only to emphasise the remarkable trustworthiness of the work as a whole, as a guide to the origin, aims and activities of the Institute. G.M.G-H.

3*. WALKS AND TALKS ABROAD: The Diary of a Member of Parliament in 1934–6. By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P. 1936. (Oxford University Press. Demy 8vo. xxi + 292 pp. 6s.)

IT is an encouraging sign of the times that a second edition of this book was so quickly demanded; our people are readier than they have

often been to learn what "the other fellow" thinks of them and of their attitude to him in international relations. That is what Sir Arnold Wilson has been trying to elicit, in free and frank talks with all sorts and conditions of men and women across the Channel. It is mainly on German and Italian opinion that he has concentrated. His visit to Belgium was short, and his impressions of Czechoslovakia are hardly convincing; but of Fascism and Hitlerism, as new national religions, he builds up an impressive and disturbing picture. He paints in vivid colours, and obviously without exaggeration, the fervour on which they are based and the blind devotion which they command.

Sir Arnold, it is true, makes no concealment of his admiration for "the strong man armed," in preference to an ineffective League of Nations. It leads him to a lenient view or a charitable silence about the blacker side of the dictatorships—the terrors of the concentration camps, the privations which the poorer classes are suffering in Germany, the misery of constant espionage, and other features which offend our common humanity. Admitting all these, however, and condemning them more vigorously than Sir Arnold allows himself to do, we must nevertheless realise from his narrative the immense power which is being generated by the torrents of emotion now scouring through the totalitarian States. How that power is to be directed is essentially a British problem if Britain is to carry her old responsibility for leading the moral conscience of the world. We have not so far been very successful with the problem, and Sir Arnold concludes with setting out ten principles on which Britain must take her stand if peace is to prevail. They will not secure universal consent, but they deserve the closest study. MESTON.

4*. KING-HALL SURVEY, 1936. By Stephen King-Hall. 1937. (London: Newnes. 8vo. 215 pp. 6s.)

"PEMMICAN, sauce tartare" might be respectfully suggested for the sub-title of this handsome and extremely useful volume. The pemmican is the history of the year—national, imperial, international, art, sport, Abyssinia, Spain, compressed almost into tabloids, and yet eminently digestible. The tartare sauce is the author's irrepressible comments on everything from trade booms to the fashions in ladies' hats.

There should be plenty of room for this type of current history alongside the classic volumes which students and legislators study. We all want to know something that can be easily read and remembered about one or other of the many topics on which Commander King-Hall touches: and it is no small recommendation—and no mean achievement—that the book should have been on sale within a fortnight after the end of the year which it describes, and should record events up to the 12th of December.

Of necessity, simplification has in places to be pushed to the extreme: and the author apologises for it in his treatment of the economic troubles of the year. There is also a tendency to assume that the reader knows more than he always does: the "Balance of Payments," for example, is not wholly familiar to the man in the street. On the other side of the account, however, must be set an admirable time-chart and a chronology; with a number of illustrative photographs. Success and long life to this gallant new enterprise.

MESTON.

5*. LE DROIT ET L'ÉTAT DANS LA DOCTRINE NATIONAL-SOCIALISTE. By Roger Bonnard. 1936. (Paris: Librairie Générale de droit et de jurisprudence. 8vo. 179 pp.)

6*. LE DROIT NATIONAL-SOCIALISTE. Conférence Internationale, Paris, 30 novembre et 1er décembre, 1936. By various hands. 1936. (Paris: Librairie des Sciences Politiques et Sociales. 246 pp. 12 *fr.*)

PROFESSOR BONNARD has given us a scholarly and dispassionate study of Nazi law and jurisprudence. He starts with an interesting contrast between the theories of Fascism and Nazi-ism. The former continues to recognise the State as a body corporate: the Duce is a legal organ of the State: he derives his legislative power from the Parliament, and his executive authority from the King: in practice, he has eliminated both King and Parliament, but in theory the State remains the fountain of positive law and of individual rights. Nazi-ism has been more realistic. Discarding the accepted doctrines of European jurisprudence, it dethrones the State from its position as the sovereign body corporate, and regards it only as an instrument by which the *Führer* guides or leads the community. There is no positive law. Rights are derived from the spirit of the people (*Volksgeist*), and in conferring rights and making laws the *Führer* interprets the spirit of the people, as they are incapable of doing so themselves. Being both president and chancellor, he thus adds full executive authority to full legislative power.

The position which results in Germany is then developed and documented, though the author makes it clear that the official juristic theory is still in flux. The Nuremburg edicts of September 1935 defined the community in terms of "race," excluding from it all residents of "non-Aryan" blood. This in itself is indefinite enough; but the status of the community is even more indeterminate, for apparently the individual citizen has no status as such, and derives his rights solely from his membership of the community and wholly on the condition of his satisfying its interests. Law is thus fluid, and as laws are no longer made by the Parliament, but represent only the wishes of the Führer, judges have acquired the habit of guessing what his wishes would be in dealing with cases to which no law exactly applies.

Professor Bonnard proceeds to discuss the Nazi Party and its relations with the State, and finishes with a provocative summary. After all, he suggests, the Nazi theory, though poles apart from Hegel's, is not so widely different from the French or the British conception of the State. The place it assigns to representation of the people in Government is frank, but not radically new. Its suppression of Liberalism is no worse than in several of our nominal democracies. The real and irreconcilable departure from modern political theory is the destruction of the rights of the individual and his complete submersion in the community.

The second volume is a collection of speeches made at an indignation meeting in Paris about the Thaelmann case. A number of jurists from several countries vied with each other in vituperating the Nazi disregard of the ordinary canons of jurisprudence; and M. Pierre Cot, in a preface, sums up by defining Nazi-ism as a mixture of logic and lunacy.

MESTON.

7*. CHRISTIANITY AND COMMUNISM. Edited by H. Wilson Harris. 1937. (Oxford: Blackwell. Cr. 8vo. xiv + 77 pp. 2s. 6*d*.)

MR. WILSON HARRIS has done well to collect these essays and letters, originally contributed to *The Spectator* last year. They are devoted to the question of what relations are possible between Christianity and Communism. Dr. Inge and Father D'Arcy see no common ground on which the two can meet; and Mr. John Strachey, who is the only whole-hearted Marxist in the group, is so busy attacking Dr. Inge's polemic that he leaves himself with no breath to expound his own faith. Professor Barker, however, with Dr. Niebuhr's support, cannot look upon Communism as a faith, because it has no social ethic and relies on force instead of persuasion: nevertheless, it has a core of goodness in its striving for the relief of human misery. Canon Barry is equally friendly: he argues that Communism is only the latest Christian heresy, which the "moral initiative" still held by Christianity could convert to its own purposes. Dr. Needham adds an erudite paper which aims at being provocative, but succeeds only in being clever: and Dr. Edwyn Bevan corrects him with grace and ease. The best thing in the collection is Mr. Harris's own introduction, which states the issue and its implications with great fairness and lucidity. MESTON.

8*. MILLIONS OF DICTATORS. By Emil Lengyel. 1936. (London: Cassell. 8vo. xiii + 290 pp. 7s. 6*d*.)

WE sometimes mourn that our modern world produces no Julius Cæsar, no Napoleon, no great international figure; but, says our author, "we have a new hero in our midst, Mr. Average Man, a budding hero possibly on his way to true greatness." The average man is the true dictator to-day, and he exists in his millions: hence the title of this attractive book. Mr. Lengyel has a sympathetic, and evidently a first-hand, acquaintance with the Jacques Bonhomme of various lands, and makes him tell his own simple story, whether it is lived in New York, the Middle West, Provence, Paris, Munich, Cologne, Moscow, Turin or Southend: they all contribute, and signs are multiplying, says Mr. Lengyel, of their awareness that the worst of all the many scourges which afflict them is war. There are wise and shrewd sayings in the book: "logic in statecraft is only a futile effort to fill your sails with yesterday's breeze"; "public opinion is losing in depth what it is gaining in extension"; and so on. The dust-cover makes no extravagant claim when it describes the book as one of real international interest. MESTON.

9*. "WE OR THEY": Two Worlds in Conflict. By Hamilton Fish Armstrong. 1937. (New York and London: Macmillan, 8vo. 106 pp. 7s. 6*d*.; cheap edition, 3s. 6*d*.)

"WE" AND "THEY" are the democratic and the dictatorial philosophies of life; and the argument of this eager little book is that there can be no compromise between the two: their conceptions of truth, whether in politics, art, music, religion or science, are diametrically opposed to each other. Mr. Armstrong laments that the Hoare–Laval pact repelled the United States just at the time when American opinion was getting more friendly to Britain than it had been for fifteen years; and yet he feels that the three great democratic Powers left in the world must get together and resist, if necessary by force, the extinction of liberty. Isolation is impossible: the New

World dare not, for its children's sake, be indifferent to the sort of government which is to gain the mastery of the Old World.

MESTON.

10. WHAT IS AHEAD OF US? By Various Hands. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin: 8vo. 192 pp. 5s.)

THIS is described as a series of Fabian lectures, but their interest is in no way diminished by the fact that the Fabian doctrine wears thin in some of them. Mr. Cole leads off with an urgent plea for a Popular Front. Capitalism, he admits, is a "tough guy," and with its crony Fascism is steering us straight for war. Theoretic Socialism won't stop them, and we must have an immediate union of all men of goodwill, irrespective of party. Sir Arthur Salter deals convincingly with Economic Nationalism as a call upon us to think out afresh the economic problems of the world, and to plan, plan, plan. Mr. Wickham Steed sees no safeguard against the march of dictatorship unless the British people make it clear that they will not be neutral to the spread of the Nazi *Kultur* of brutality. Mr. Sidney Webb (why distress him by using his other name?) finds in the U.S.S.R. the land of Hope, if not of Glory. Professor Blackett pleads for a mutual assistance pact between England, France and Russia, to prevent the aggression of Germany in the West: she cannot, he thinks, do much harm in the East. Then there is a complete break in the argument; and Professor Hogben closes the book with a striking paper on Socialist biology. Speaking of England and Wales, he says:—

> "No further fall in mortality can arrest a continuous decline (in population), and nothing short of immortality can safeguard us against extinction unless fertility is raised by somewhat more than 15 per cent."

and then he goes on to show how we must plan for the survival of our race.

MESTON.

11. WE AREN'T SO DUMB. By Christopher Hollis. 1937. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. 191 pp. 6s.)

ADOPTING again the method he used with such effect in *Foreigners aren't Fools*, Mr. Hollis now gives us a further volume of information and opinions on international problems. It is not easy to challenge either his facts or his views. One would need to be possessed of a vast and varied knowledge to examine the accuracy of every item of information; but, so far as his limited knowledge allows him, the reviewer finds that all the statistics are exact and are presented in a manner which makes them easy to assimilate. As to the opinions, Mr. Hollis is careful to disclaim all responsibility at the beginning. All that can be said is that they are opinions held by serious and well-informed persons at the present time. Della Chiesa's comparison of Fascism, Communism and National Socialism is particularly valuable and worthy of careful attention:—

> "Fascism is civilised Communism. . . . No two men in Europe are more different from one another than Hitler and Mussolini. . . . In their very nationalism they are the opposite of one another. Mussolini's whole appeal is to the past and to tradition. . . . Hitler has no feeling for tradition."

The whole book should be read carefully, but the reviewer would single out for special attention the chapter on Fascists and Nazis, the opening discussion on Raw Materials, and "Mr. Smith's" estimates of the future world population.

EDWARD QUINN.

12*. Géographie Universelle. Edited by P. Vidal de la Blache. Tome XIII: Amérique Septentrionale—Part I, Canada, by H. Baulig. 1936. (Paris: Armand Colin. 8vo. 316 pp. 90 *frs.*)

This volume is one of the series of geographical studies edited by P. Vidal de la Blache and L. Gallois. It is the first of two parts dealing with the North American continent, and in its first section describes the general features of the whole continent. Outlines are given of the physical and geological formation; of the nature of the flora and fauna; of the historical development and present distribution of population; and of the chief political and economic divisions.

In the second section Canada, Newfoundland and Alaska are described in greater detail, with particular emphasis on the regional distribution of natural resources and on the peculiarities of the present economic situations of the various parts of these countries.

The work is a highly compressed summary of a mass of interesting information, and is made more valuable by the inclusion of bibliographies. There are many diagrams and ninety excellent photographs.

W. L. Webster.

13. Fear Came on Europe. By John T. Whitaker. 1936. (London: Hamish Hamilton. 319 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.* net.)

Mr. Whitaker was for five years a European correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune*. In the course of his work he was an eye-witness of many interesting scenes, including the Italian advance in Abyssinia, of which he gives a very graphic narrative. Other sketches include Geneva during various meetings of the League of Nations, Germany just after the "purge" of 30th June, 1934, Austria during the fighting which followed the Dollfuss murder, Yugoslavia immediately afterwards and again during the funeral of King Alexander, and Rome in 1935. Mr. Whitaker has an undeniable gift for conveying atmosphere, and he writes good, meaty journalese. He has also met most of the leading figures of European international politics, and is well informed. His book is thus well worth reading, although for most readers perhaps hardly worth buying. The spiritual autobiography which fills much of the book, showing how the author developed from an almost blind antipathy to Fascism towards a closer understanding and a more reasoned appreciation at once of its defects and of its dangers, is written with great sincerity and commands respect.

C. A. M.

14*. Political Handbook of the World, 1937. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. 1937. (New York: Harper and Brothers, for Council on Foreign Relations. 8vo. 207 pp. $2.50; 10*s.* 6*d.* To members of the Institute 9*s.*)

Owing to the warm welcome that greeted its appearance, the Council on Foreign Relations has decided to revise and re-issue this volume annually.

The current number of the *Political Handbook of the World* contains information about Parliaments, political parties and the Press "as of January 1, 1937." It is one of the handicaps of publications of this type that whereas governments come and governments go, the printed word goes on inexorably for ever. Consequently some of the data in the Handbook is inevitably out of date even before it reaches its subscribers. When allowance is made for this unavoidable difficulty,

the Handbook will be found to contain much that is not available in other volumes of the kind. The lists of newspapers with their political affiliations are particularly useful. GODFREY LIAS.

15. I.L.O.: THE UNREGARDED REVOLUTION. By Kathleen Gibberd. 1937. (London: J. M. Dent. 8vo. vi + 142 pp. 2s. 6d.)

THIS small book is written with a conscious effort to be dramatic, if not sensational, and it suffers a little as a result. The contrast of black and white is made sometimes, as in the title, where truth is perhaps of a more uniformly sombre colour. When it is said, for instance, that the Labour Commission of the Peace Conference of Paris had to build "for the future without any help from the past," we are invited to forget the long and by no means useless or unfruitful International Association for Labour Legislation, which, perhaps more than anything, prepared the way for the I.L.O., and to overlook the constantly reiterated demands and proposals of both international and national trade union or socialist conferences during the War, demands and proposals that came from both sides of the war-front. The part played by the English in bringing about the I.L.O. is also over-emphasised. But, while it would be possible to show other similar examples, this book is nevertheless a readable and useful introduction to a subject that ought never to be regarded as dull. H. R. G. GREAVES.

16*. WORLD STATISTICS OF ALIENS: A comparative study of census returns 1910–20–30. [*International Labour Office Studies and Reports, Series O. (Migration) No. 6.*] 1936. (Geneva: I.L.O.; London: P. S. King. 8vo. 251 pp. 10s. 6d.)

This report represents an endeavour to "collect and study from a critical angle the data concerning aliens contained in the results of censuses taken round about 1930 and compared with corresponding data taken about 1920 and 1910. Wherever possible the figures are based on the legal nationality of the aliens but for areas where such data are lacking the statistics used are those based on the country of origin or racial origin in the anthropological sense." It has been prepared by Dr. Imri Ferenczi.

17*. LES FURIEUX DE LA PAIX. De Wilson à Eden. Par Robert Vallery-Radot. 1936. (Grasset. Sm. 8vo. 228 pp. 12 *frs.*)

A violent, and somewhat bewildering, attack on the liberal tradition in international relations, and its culmination in the "farce of the Lake," in which Freemasonry is the chief villain of the piece.

18*. CAN CHRISTIANS BE PACIFISTS? By W. M. Watt. 1937. (London: S.C.M. Press. Sm. 8vo. 126 pp. 2s.)

The author sets out to show that the truly Christian policy must be readiness to support a world federation, even with military sanctions.

19*. "INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS" AND "THE ELIMINATION OF WAR." By Charles L. Nordon. 1937. (London: Caledonian Press. 8vo. 23 pp. 6d.)

A proposal for a re-constituted World Court of International Justice, to which nations should submit their grievances, and by whose decisions they should be bound.

20*. LIFE IN OTHER LANDS: The United States of America.
21*. LIFE IN OTHER LANDS: France. By Hebe Spaull. 1937. (London: S.C.M. Press. Sm. 8vo. 63 pp. 64 pp. 1s. 6d. each.)

These little books are readable, even if the author has not been completely successful in the difficult task of writing books for children, upon large subjects, which are both short and interesting. It is possible to

quarrel with the selection of material, particularly in the chapters of the history of the two countries, and one cannot but deplore the too liberal use of such adjectives as "sad," "foolish," or "tragic," in reference to historical events of the past, when brevity was so essential. H. G. L.

22*. LANDESVERTEIDIGUNG OHNE PROFIT. By Otto Lehmann-Russbüldt. 1936. (London: International Publishing Co. Sm. 8vo. 95 pp. Bibl. 95 pp.)

Herr Lehmann-Russbüldt discusses the technique of the armaments industry, its possibilities as a profit-making concern and the influence of the industry on the internal foreign policy of States. He is convinced that the only way to save civilisation from the catastrophe of another world war, on the road to which the new armaments race is already the first stage, is for the taxpayers of all countries, and of all political and religious persuasions, to insist that no profits shall be made out of armaments.

23*. THE MENACE FROM THE AIR. By Major-General Sir H. Thullier, K.C.B., C.M.G. 1937. (London: New Commonwealth: Series A. No. 9. 16 pp. 3*d.*)

A short summary of the air menace in any future war, and a plea for the removal of this danger by the setting up of an international police force.

24*. RENSEIGNEMENTS DOCUMENTAIRES SUR LA CONFÉRENCE POUR LA RÉDUCTION ET LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS. Par M. Aimé l'Hôte. 1936. (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle & Cie. Sm. 8vo. x + 217 pp. 25 *frs.*)

A useful list of all the important documents published by the Disarmament Conference.

25*. THE PRICE OF LIBERTY. A German on Contemporary Britain. By Adolf Löwe. [*Day to Day Pamphlets, No.* 36.] 1937. (London: The Hogarth Press. 8vo. 44 pp. 1*s.* 6*d.*)

In a series of letters to a fellow-exile, Professor Löwe (late of Kiel and Frankfurt Universities) sketches "some characteristics of English social order" which make for happiness. A spontaneous "social conformity," effected by an unwritten code of decency and fairness, is one of them; the ease with which aristocracy has adapted itself to the rise of the middle classes is another. If Europe is to be saved, as Dr. Löwe believes, by some new form of voluntary collectivism, it may well be that England will be the scene of the final decision in the clash between fascism and democracy: by which it may be presumed that he relies for that solution on the British genius for compromise. M.

26*. SOVIET COMMUNISM: Dictatorship or Democracy? October 1936. By Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 1936. (London: The Left Review. 32 pp. 3*d.*)

This pamphlet is a reprint of a chapter in the Webbs' great work with the same name. The argument here is that the U.S.S.R. is not a dictatorship, though the Bolsheviks themselves insist on calling it a "dictatorship of the Proletariat": not a democracy, though not dissimilar in its variety of free auxiliary organisations; but a new philosophy, a new code of conduct, and possibly a new civilisation. M.

27*. CONGRÈS UNIVERSEL POUR LA PAIX, BRUXELLES, 3, 4, 5, 6 Septembre 1936. Published for the "Rassemblement Universel pour la Paix." (Paris, Bruxelles: Editions "Labor." 252 pp.)

28*. THREE VIEWS OF PACIFICISM. By Alex Dimond, E. B. Storr and A. D. Belden. 1937. (London: The Epworth Press. Sm. 8vo. 47 pp. 6*d.*)

29*. INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION: Resolutions adopted by Inter-Parliamentary Conferences and Principal Decisions of the Council, 1911–1936. 1937. (Geneva: The Inter-Parliamentary Bureau. Agents: Payot. 8vo. 232 pp.)

30*. LA TECHNIQUE PARLEMENTAIRE DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES. By B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch. (Extract from *Recueil des Cours*.) 1937. (Paris: Recueil Sirey. Cr. 8vo. 83 pp.)

31*. REVUE D'HISTOIRE POLITIQUE ET CONSTITUTIONNELLE. 1st year. No. 1, Jan.–March. 1937. (Published for l'Institut International d'Histoire Constitutionnelle by Recueil Sirey, Paris. 200 pp.)

32*. ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PUBLIC. 1936. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 535 pp.)

33*. INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HISTORICAL SCIENCES. Year 1934. Edited for the International Committee of Historical Sciences, Zürich. 1936. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. 487 pp.)

ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

34*. WORLD TRADE AND ITS FUTURE. By Sir Arthur Salter. [William J. Cooper Foundation Lectures, 1936, Swarthmore College.] 1936. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. 101 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

35. IMPROVEMENT OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS: THE PROBLEM OF MONETARY STABILISATION. 1936. (Paris: Joint Committee, Carnegie Endowment, International Chamber of Commerce. 8vo. 417 pp.)

36*. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION: An Economist's and Businessmen's Survey of the Main Problems of To-day. 1936. (Paris: Joint Committee, Carnegie Endowment, International Chamber of Commerce. 8vo. 225 pp.)

37. FOREIGN TRADE. By Harold Barger. [*New Fabian Research Bureau Pamphlets*, No. 30.] 1936. (London: Gollancz, for N.F.R.B. 8vo. 39 pp. 6*d*.)

THESE four books all deal with international trade and its reconstruction. Sir Arthur Salter's consists of five lectures delivered in 1936 at Swarthmore College upon the William J. Cooper Foundation. The first lecture presents an illuminating account of world trade before the War; the second is entitled " After the War "; the third describes the period of the depression, and in the fourth Sir Arthur Salter discusses the principal factors in the present situation. The series terminated with his suggestions for a policy for world trade in the future.

Sir Arthur thinks that in some cases the 150 clearing arrangements between twenty-three countries have served a temporary purpose during the currency crisis. On the other hand, he believes that bilateral agreements have tended to the destruction of multi-lateral trade. In his final lecture he pointed out that British and Dutch Colonial policy was formerly based on a double trusteeship; first the interest of the inhabitants, and then the trade of other countries, and he regrets that Great Britain has departed from this principle. He concludes with a suggestion that we must regard " our present economic nationalism not simply as an enemy we have to slay, but as the possible parent—with proper encouragement and education—of a better system than itself."

The second book, *Improvement of Commercial Relations between Nations*, consists of thirty memoranda prepared by seventeen economists of various countries. Professor Eugen Boehler deals with the decline of world trade and its significance in economic and human terms. Lionel Robbins has a memorandum on the fundamental reasons for increased Protectionism. There are three interesting memoranda by Pasvolsky, Viner and Predohl, on the " Road to Recovery." Monetary stabilisation in its various aspects is discussed by several economists, including H. D. Henderson, Gregory, Von Mises, and Mortara, and needless to say all of these merit study by anyone interested in this international problem.

International Economic Reconstruction contains two reports: the first by Professor Ohlin on the problem of the title, and the second by Professor Gregory on " Monetary Stabilisation and the Improvement of International Commercial Relations." The book terminates with a report of the Committee of experts, of which Professor Gregory was Chairman, and the other signatories Boehler, Ohlin, Predohl and Charles Rist. They urge a substantial reduction of tariffs by successive stages. Maximum rates should be fixed by multilateral agreement, and tariffs should not be raised preparatory to bargaining. Quotas should be abolished at a not-too-distant date. States should enter into multilateral agreements, but even bilateral agreements have their uses. The whole book should receive careful study.

The last book, *Foreign Trade*, is a short pamphlet, and discusses the monetary problems which will face a Socialist State in the conduct of its foreign trade, and the attitude which such a State should adopt to foreign exchanges, foreign investments, and the problem of imports and exports. Mr. Barger poses the question for the Socialist Government to decide: " Just what goods and just how much of each is it worth while swapping for other people's, and just which goods are best imported instead of being made at home." This is indeed a poser for any government. The author thinks upon its correct answer " the success or failure of Socialism very largely depends."

BARNARD ELLINGER.

38. LE MÉCANISME DES ÉCHANGES INTERNATIONAUX ET LA POLITIQUE COMMERCIALE EN TEMPS DE CRISE. By Firmin Oulès. 1936. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 126 pp. *20 frs.*)

THE case for free trade rests on the advantages of international specialisation. Leave things to take care of themselves, and countries will settle down to do those things in which they have the greatest relative advantage. There will be a continuing process of readjustment; everyone will tend to do just those things which he is relatively best at because it pays him to do so; and wealth (and by implication, well-being) is increased all round.

And, taking this as a starting-point, M. Oulès asks the very pertinent question, is this true during periods of increasing depression as well as during periods of increasing prosperity?

Very firmly, M. Oulès answers " No." During depression the world economic system is faced with falling demand. With this general fall in demand, competition is intensified; the stronger producers seek new markets; the full force of the fall in demand is borne by the marginal producer who is now sub-marginal and being driven out of business.

The economically weaker countries feel this full force of depression; there is no alternative production in which they should justifiably specialise at the moment since demand is falling generally; they are at the mercy of events and must wait for better times. They are therefore forced to take abnormal measures—protective tariffs, currency depreciation, and so on. The case for tariffs is thus a case for the weaker countries protecting themselves from the effects of undue competition from stronger countries which, like them, are faced with falling demand. Such tariffs are inevitable and desirable, and the direct consequence of a general fall in demand which becomes concentrated on the weaker countries owing to the action of their stronger brethren. It is no use clamouring against tariffs as such; they are largely a consequence of depression and not a cause. The alternative—M. Oulès might have added had he had English conditions in mind—would be international Depressed Areas.

This is a valuable and stimulating essay. A. T. K. GRANT.

39. KAPITALBILDUNG. By J. Marschak and W. Lederer. 1936. (London: William Hodge and Co. 8vo. ix + 315 pp. 12s. 6d.)

40. INTERNATIONALE FINANZPLÄTZE: IHR WESEN UND IHRE ENTSTEHUNG UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG AMSTERDAMS. By Dr. Erwin Hellauer. 1936. (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt. 162 pp. Rm. 7.–.)

Kapitalbildung is divided into two parts, each written by one of the joint authors. The first sixty pages contain a discussion, necessarily superficial, of modern theoretical approaches to the problems of capital accumulation. This is useful for those who have not read the recent literature on the subject, but adds little that is new. Dr. Lederer's contribution, the remainder of the book, is an exhaustive and detailed analysis of the process of capital accumulation in various countries. Whatever one may think of the validity of his statistical methods—which does seem to open to criticism in some cases—one must admire the care and thoroughness with which the author has done his work. There is no index—not even a list of statistical tables—which seems a pity and detracts greatly from the value of the second part of the book.

Internationale Finanzplätze is an historical and factual survey of the origin and growth of international money markets. These are described rather than analysed, and the author's remarks on their usefulness and importance from the point of view of economic theory are, consequently, not very exhaustive. Fully half the book is devoted to a discussion of Amsterdam as an international money market. This is, of course, interesting to an English reader who knows far too little about financial centres other than his own, but one feels throughout that the presentation could have been improved if the writer had given more space to a comparison of Amsterdam with London or New York. There is a bibliography, but no index.

J. F. C.

41. CAN INDUSTRY GOVERN ITSELF? An Account of Ten Directed Economies. By O. W. Willcox. 1936. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 285 pp. 10s.)

THIS book describes the methods adopted in ten different countries for dealing with the post-War slump in the sugar industry. Mr.

Willcox describes the steps taken for "prorating" the industry, *i.e.* limiting the output according to prevailing circumstances or "congeling the *status quo* with each man confirmed in the possession of what he then has." It is not surprising either that the various methods should in general closely resemble each other, differences being mainly of detail, or that some success should generally have been achieved, sometimes with and sometimes without the aid of the legislature. Thus encouraged, the author propounds in broad outlines a general scheme in which "every basic industry in which there is supersaturation in either goods, producing capacity or labour, will be prorated."

The exception certainly proves the rule for Mr. Willcox. Few industries could be more suitable for voluntary "prorating" than that of sugar, where we have an agricultural product relatively easy to cultivate, a water-soluble compound extractable therefrom by the simplest of chemical processes, factories generally situated near the source of raw material, and a substantial and fairly steady domestic consumption only a small proportion of which serves as raw material for other industries. What more could the "prorater" desire?

An industry which depends on fluctuating prices of its raw materials and whose finished products are the raw materials of other industries (say steel or chemicals) would present a bigger problem, and the case of rubber will be remembered.

The author makes no secret of his own "ology" and "doxy" which have obviously influenced his answer to the question. He gives a clear and readable account of his subject but his views on economics are somewhat unusual. F. B. D.

42*. The A.B.C. of the Foreign Exchanges: A Practical Guide. By George Clare and Norman Crump. London: Macmillan. 1936. 8vo. xxiii + 393 pp. 5*s*.

This is the tenth edition of a standard work first published in 1892. The first half describes the mechanism of the foreign exchanges. The second half contains a very readable and comprehensive account of developments since the War, and particularly since the 1931 crisis.

43*. Economic Barriers to Peace: Addresses on the occasion of the presentation of the Woodrow Wilson Medal to the Honourable Cordell Hull, April 5, 1937. By Cordell Hull and Hamilton Fish Armstrong. 1937. (New York: Woodrow Wilson Foundation. 8vo. 14 pp.)

44*. The Economics of Isolation. Reprint of a Series of Articles in the *Manchester Guardian Commercial*, July 31, 1936 to Jan. 15, 1937. (*Pamphlet Series No.* 5.) 1937. (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science. Cr. 8vo. 54 pp. 50*c*.)

LAW

45*. The British Year Book of International Law 1936. Seventeenth Year of Issue, 1936. (London: Humphrey Milford, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 8vo. vi + 260 pp. Bibl. 16*s*.)

The seventeenth volume of the *Year Book* opens with an excellent exposition of the doctrine of vested rights in International Law by Dr. Kaeckenbeeck, the distinguished Belgian Jurist and President of the Arbitral Tribunal for Upper Silesia. He examines, in the first place, the basis and extent of this doctrine both under general legal

principles and under Municipal Law, and secondly, its place in positive International Law. The question of the protection of vested rights arose in an acute form after the Great War in many of the ceded territories by the action of some of the successor States which claimed the right to pass legislation depriving in effect many private individuals of their property. Dr. Kaeckenbeeck, whilst recognising that an alleged principle of immunity of vested rights against municipal legislation does not exist in international practice, is in favour of the recognition of the minimum standard for equitable compensation, on the ground, which would be generally approved, "that individual confiscation of property without indemnity undoubtedly falls short of the international standard of civilised society."

Mr. Fachiri, in an article on the "Local Remedies Rule in the Light of the Finnish Ships Arbitration," deals with the claim advanced in 1931 by Finland against the British Government for the use during the Great War of certain Finnish ships. The British contention, which appears weighty, was that a State is entitled to have the questions of law and of fact involved in a claim investigated and adjudicated upon by its own municipal tribunals before the claimant State can rely on an alleged breach of the principles of international law, and it is only when such means of recourse either do not exist or have been tried and found defective, that a State can resort to a diplomatic claim.

Professor Smith contributes an article on "Aircraft and Commerce in War," in which he discusses the still-unsettled principles governing the right of visit and search by military aircraft in time of war. Basing himself on the analogy of the rules adopted in the London Naval Treaty on submarines, the writer is of the opinion that what is true of the submarine must be equally true of the aircraft. His conclusion, however, that "the control of enemy commerce at sea is a maritime right which can only be exercised by ships, and aircraft may only take part in such operations as an integral part of the naval forces under the rules governing the right of capture at sea," does not take sufficiently in view the predominant part which aircraft is destined to play in any future war, and the possibility that it may act quite independently of warships, in which event it will have to be governed by its own rules.

The question of the attitude of the United States on the law of neutrality has been far from clear in the past, and Professor Garner's article on the recent neutrality legislation of that country is very welcome, more particularly as it explains clearly the present policy of the American Government. The words used in the joint resolution of Congress of 1935, rendering "unlawful the export of arms to any port of a belligerent State or to a neutral port for transhipment to or for the use of a belligerent country" are an express recognition by the United States of the doctrine of continuous voyage against which the American Government had frequently protested in the past, and especially during the Great War, whilst still a neutral Power. The legislation passed is, of course, only temporary, and it is to be hoped that it will now be substituted by a more permanent one which will take into consideration the actual position of the United States under the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

Dr. Lauterpacht, writing with his customary competence and accuracy, examines the provisions of Article 20 of the Covenant which attracted particular attention during the Italo-Abyssinian conflict.

He is of the opinion that the obligation imposed by this article on Member States not to conclude treaties inconsistent with the Covenant applies also to treaties with non-members, and that to the extent of such incapacity, any similar treaties remain inoperative.

Mr. J. G. Starke, in a rather doctrinal article entitled "Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law," analyses the three theories adumbrated by the Austrian school, and, especially, by Kelsen.

Mr. Fitzmaurice gives a very able and exhaustive review of the dispute between Canada and the United States on the sinking in 1929, by American coastguard vessels, of the *I'm Alone*, together with an acute analysis of the Commissioner's Report, which, however, left the doctrine of hot pursuit undecided.

Mr. B. A. Wortley discusses the recent changes in monetary policy and the interpretation raised by the gold clause as reflected in recent decisions of both international and municipal courts.

The question of sanctions under the Covenant is analysed by Sir John Fischer Williams, more particularly in the light of the application of Article 16 of the Covenant to the doctrine of neutrality. The theory that the League of Nations has completely abolished neutrality cannot any longer be upheld. But, as Sir John rightly puts it, it is probable that the coming generation may emphasise neutral duties rather than neutral rights, and that there may be wars where not to take sides may be impossible for any man who recognises the claims of neutrality.

Professor McNair, who possesses the gift of writing with unsurpassable brevity and clearness, deals with the question of collective security, a subject which he chose for his Inaugural Lecture as the Whewell Professor of International Law in the University of Cambridge. He concludes that collective security can only result from "an accumulation of effective pieces of collective action," and that eventually the principle will be established provided we are patient and hold firm to our declared policy, which should comprise both collective revision of the *status quo* as well as collective resistance to aggression.

C. John Colombos.

46*. L'Appartenenza della Sovranità sui Territori sotto Mandato. By Adriano Monarca. 1936. (Pisa: Giardini. 8vo. 59 pp. *Lire* 10.)

In this short monograph Dr. Monarca discusses the highly controversial question of sovereignty in mandated territories—a subject which has already attracted so much literature in the last fifteen years. In his opinion, sovereignty resides in the principal "Allied and Associated Powers" described in the Treaties of Versailles and Lausanne, although the exercise of this sovereignty has been delegated by them to single mandatory States. As a corollary to this opinion, the author vigorously sustains that it is only such "Allied and Associated Powers" which possess the exclusive right of deciding as to any changes in the existing mandates. The better view appears to be that these Powers, by granting mandates to certain specified States, have exhausted their functions under the Peace Treaties, and that consequently the sovereignty over the mandated territories now lies with the mandatory States, subject to a binding obligation on them to consider this sovereignty as held in trust for the inhabitants.

C. J. C.

47. LA COUTUME EN DROIT DES GENS D'APRÈS LA JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR PERMANENTE DE JUSTICE INTERNATIONALE. By J. Haemmerlé. 1936. (Paris: Sirey. 8vo. 236 pp. 30 *frs.*)
48. GUTACHTEN UND GUTACHTENVERFAHREN DES STÄNDIGEN INTERNATIONALEN GERICHTSHOFES. By D. J. Hoffmann. 1935. (Berlin: Franz Vahlen. 8vo. 192 pp.)

THE work of the Court has so far consisted almost exclusively in the interpretation of disputed treaty provisions. In fact, however, it was found necessary in most cases to interpret the intention of the parties by reference to general principles of international law and international custom. Dr. Haemmerlé has shown considerable industry in going not only through the Judgments and Advisory Opinions of the Court, but also through the record of the written and oral proceedings in order to ascertain on what occasions the Court or the parties relied on customary international law. The passages in question are printed in heavy type, a device which the reader will find convenient. The second part of the book is devoted to a general discussion of the part of custom in international law by reference to the work of the Court. Dr. Haemmerlé's industry will be of assistance to the student in the attempt to form a view as to the value and the tendencies of this aspect of the Court's activity.

Dr. Hoffmann's doctoral dissertation is an ambitious study in which the author covers most of the questions connected with the subject and, in addition, many others, including the distinction between legal and political disputes and the question, which seems to admit of only one answer, whether Advisory Opinions are binding. Such value as the monograph possesses is not seriously affected by political bias, although the reader must be somewhat puzzled by the motto with which Dr. Hoffmann prefaces his study. He begins with the French saying: "Qui dit société, dit droit"; and he adds his emendation: "Qui dit Société des Nations, dit-il droit?" In the author's view, Advisory Opinions are not suitable for "political" questions. He does not attempt to suggest which of the Advisory Opinions given by the Court were not "political." H. L.

49. INTERNATIONAL LAW. By K. R. R. Sastry. 1936. (Allahabad: Kitabistan. 8vo. xxxi + 472 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

The purpose of this small text-book is to condense the substance of standard works on international law into a form acceptable to Indian law students. Unfortunately, the errors are so numerous that the work cannot be recommended even as an elementary manual. H. A. S.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

50. GENEVA SCENE. By Norman Hillson. 1936. (London: Routledge. 8vo. v + 303 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

MR. HILLSON, the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in Geneva since the autumn of 1932, has written a lively and readable account of his experiences during these distressful years, which include visits to Rome at the time of the MacDonald–Simon excursion, to the Saar on the eve of the plebiscite, and to Stresa during the conference of April 1935. These experiences have given him an acid view of international affairs, and have left him with no illusions about the future of the League.

Mr. Hillson's Geneva career began in the midst of those two great

League tragedies—the Disarmament Conference and the Sino-Japanese dispute. The blame for the first he places in the main—it is an inevitable verdict for anyone who lived through those years—on the mixture of stubbornness and disingenuousness which was the French reply to the German demand for "equality." The responsibility of the second he attributes to the failure of the Powers to take action against Japan (though in other passages he appears to admit that no action was possible); and he remarks rather unfairly that, after this failure, the British drive for sanctions against Italy "can only be looked on as a mockery and an insincerity." In other respects, he takes a kind—indeed, unduly kind—view of British policy. It is, indeed, high time that there was a reaction against the unhealthy and misleading fashion of making Sir John Simon the scapegoat for everything that went wrong during these years. But there is little doubt that a firmer handling by the British Cabinet, even without any sacrifices of the British point of view, of the disarmament question could have prevented both Germany's secessions from the Conference; and if, as appears to be the case, the Cabinet decided from the first that military action against Japan was out of the question, it is a pity this was not made clear at an earlier stage.

One should not, however, seek in Mr. Hillson's pages for a serious analysis of the decline of the League. He has been content to give a panoramic picture of the past four years at Geneva, varied with effective and entertaining close-ups of some of its leading figures—the best being perhaps those of M. Matsuoka and Arthur Henderson.

E. H. CARR.

51*. THE LEAGUE FIASCO. By Victor Margueritte. 1936. (London: W. Hodge. 8vo. xiii + 284 pp. 10s. 6*d.*)

THERE is room for a book on post-War international relations, written by an artist who could see both the flow of destiny and the gnat-dance of diplomacy above the lynn. M. Margueritte seems to have meant to write such a book; but the result is different. It is an account of the League, giving the Covenant credit for good principles—except that of collective security, which is condemned—and blame for practical failure. The method is that of a commentated survey of events, up to July 1936.

A warning is necessary here. This is not a work to put into the hands of an innocent child. For the unknowledgeable mind would be corrupted by its numberless inaccuracies. Contemporary history is bound to contain mistakes, and it is pernickety to criticise wrong dates; though it seems excessive to base an argument on making the Middle Ages come before the Dark ones. But the author has a passion for detailed facts, and a large proportion of them are misreported. As the general knowledge papers say: "Correct the following passage, on the Far-Eastern dispute: 'In July 1931, a captain of the Japanese army was killed by Chinese bandits. On 18th September followers of Tchang-Hsue-Liang exploded a bomb on the railway at Payating.'"

It emerges that the author believes in Franco-German reconciliation. This motive pulls the main narrative together, and explains why his admiration of Briand is coupled so oddly with a fancy for M. Laval. As a man of the Left he also reveres M. Litvinov, which leads to difficulty over the Franco-Soviet Pact. The most confusing part of the book, however, is the story of Abyssinia. For M. Margueritte condemns Mussolini for aggression, yet accepts as true every word of

Italian propaganda. He believes Britain was solely self-interested in urging sanctions. He criticises them for incompleteness, yet disapproves of them. He concludes "It would have been far better for Britain, for the League, for the peace of the world, to find a solution in concert with the former friend of 1925 (Italy) to which the Negus would have agreed."

It is a pity that a sincere desire for peace, and some shrewd observations, should be damaged by muddled thought. The translation is in journalese, of the trite, not the lively sort; in places so slack that the French is not turned into English grammar. F. WHITE.

52*. GENÈVE CONTRE LA PAIX. By the Comte de Saint-Aulaire. 1936. (Paris: Plon. Crown 8vo. 284 pp. 15 *frs.*)

FOR an ex-Ambassador M. de Saint-Aulaire has a fine taste in vituperative journalese. In his first 200 pages he pours invective upon the League of Nations. It was a fraud from the start, not merely a "good joke," as he once heard Lord Curzon call it. It was killed at its birth, when it allowed Russia to invade Poland in 1920. It is the enemy of all religion, especially the Catholic. It owes "its infernal origin" partly to freemasonry and partly to Bolshevism, which in its turn is the work of Jewish bankers in New York. Its successes have been illusory and it devotes itself to establishing "collective insecurity." It is the cancer of Europe. M. de Saint-Aulaire takes breath occasionally, but only to attack in other directions. At one time it is the Locarno Pact, "made in Germany," and a certain menace to peace. Then it is the Russo-French Agreement, forced on France by Geneva as the Bolshevists' friend. At another time it is M. Blum, whose dogma that peace is indivisible is an "oath of allegiance to the Soviets." And so on: nobody is spared except M. Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare.

Towards the end of the book the tone gets less violent, but not much more constructive. If the League is truly to serve the cause of peace, it must drop all its dogmas—collective security, democracy, publicity, etc.—and start afresh on the basis of a public spirit, firm and enlightened, in all civilised countries. Its machinery must be an alliance of the countries which genuinely desire peace: France, Great Britain and Belgium in the first place, with Italy, Poland and the Little Entente coming into the orbit later, and perhaps even Germany in time. But there will be no room for Russia, because the only true bond of peace is Christianity. On this note ends a polemic bitter, but clearly sincere.

MESTON.

53*. LEAGUE OF NATIONS: CONFERENCE FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS: PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE. Prepared by the President, Mr. Arthur Henderson. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. la. 8vo. 206 pp. 8*s.*)

THIS report gives a chronological record of the work of the Conference, and then describes in detail its discussions, giving all the memoranda submitted by various governments, under the headings "Security," "Effectives," "Land Material," "Air Material," "Control of Manufactures," "Trade in Arms," etc. The introduction discusses the difficulties which the Conference had to face—both those inherent in the questions at issue, and those arising from the political and economic situation existing during its sessions. H. G. L.

54*. THE LEAGUE AND THE FUTURE OF THE COLLECTIVE SYSTEM. Lectures Delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations, August 1936. [*Problems of Peace*, Eleventh Series.] 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. xiii + 254 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

AT the annual session of the Geneva Institute the heretics or candid friends are always most worth hearing and reading. "1936" was no exception. While therefore the lectures by the Rt. Hon. Herbert S. Morrison and Leonard Barnes from England, M. Gaston Riou, author of *L' Europe : ma patrie*, M. Stephen Osusky, Czechoslovak Minister in Paris, and a German and a Russian say what one would expect them to say, the best fare is provided by two Irishmen and an American.

Mr. E. J. Phelan turns aside from his special subject, the International Labour Office, to wither the wishful thinkers who pretend that there is still such a thing as the collective system. "On the same principle," he says, "suicide would be termed a temporary indisposition." Continuing with "brutal frankness," he girds at the comfortable doctrine that the League is the maximum amount of international collaboration existing at any particular moment—the implication being that the League is only what the good will of the governments make it. The danger of such an interpretation if it were any national political or economic activity is surely obvious. It consecrates, so to speak, the international anarchy. No, the League as established, though not a law, was a promise or a contract, and it is as such that the peoples understood it. Hence the prodigious disillusionment of the mass of ordinary people, not with the League, but with their respective governments. Because of its *national* consequences the betrayal by the latter of their trust is the really serious thing.

Mr. R. J. P. Mortished, also of the I.L.O., states the case for Economic Nationalism as a necessary contribution to a world collective system, and states it admirably. What he commends to us is not, of course, 100 per cent. national self-sufficiency, but simply the fact that, for reasons of social utility no less than the progress of science, the twentieth century must perforce effect a shift of emphasis, with "nations basing their economy on home production instead of allowing themselves to be obsessed by foreign production and trade."

Finally, Mr. Clarence K. Streit, Geneva Correspondent for the *New York Times*, has some salutary advice to offer on the shift from Confederation to Federal State in the United States—an example that has its value for the League to-day. W. HORSFALL CARTER.

55. DER KRIEG UM GENF. By Oscar Bam. 1936. (Vienna: Reinhold Verlag.)

HERR BAM, writing in August 1936 and generalising somewhat freely from the Abyssinian conflict, predicts that every war of the future will be a "war about Geneva." As an Austrian, he sketches with fair impartiality the steps which led up to the double collapse, in the spring and summer of 1936, of the collective security system. But there is nothing strikingly original about his conclusion that "world peace to-day is in many ways only a piece of political merchandise and not everywhere recognised as the most priceless possession of mankind"; and few people will believe that the solution of the problem will be found in "making publicity for peace." The most useful feature of the book is its wealth of well-chosen quotations representing different points of view. Nearly half of it is taken up with an appendix of the principal documents. E. H. CARR.

56*. L'ADMISSION DES ÉTATS DANS LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Émile Giraud. [Extrait de la *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, Mars–Avril 1936.] 1936. (Paris: Pedone. 8vo. 15 pp.)

After a short commentary on the provisions of the Covenant with regard to the admission of States to membership of the League of Nations and on the usual procedure by means of which these principles were applied, Professor Giraud goes on to discuss the admission of Turkey, Mexico and the U.S.S.R. He comes to the conclusion that the different procedure which was followed in these three cases was perfectly correct, from the point of view of the Covenant, and was, indeed, justified by the need for strengthening the League by enlarging its membership.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

57*. LETTERS AND ESSAYS ON CURRENT IMPERIAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, 1935–6. By Arthur Berriedale Keith. 1936. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xii + 233 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS collection of letters and articles contributed to various newspapers and journals is the sequel to Professor Keith's *Letters on Imperial Relations . . . 1916–35*. It deals with the more important events in the imperial and international fields from February 1935 till September 1936.

The very rapidity with which volumes on the constitutional development of the Empire have appeared of recent years from Professor Keith's indefatigable pen witnesses to the fact that the Empire is growing and changing day by day. Rather more than half of the volume under review is devoted to imperial affairs, rather less to international; but, in truth, the two halves interlock, for intra-imperial affairs in these days are really international, and no international event of any importance can occur without affecting some portion of the widely ramifying British Empire.

The central theme in both sections is inevitably the prolonged Italo-Abyssinian Crisis. Everything that Professor Keith writes here centres on that, from the breakdown of the collective system of security itself to the doubts which the proposal to compensate Italy with a strip of "protected" territory in Somaliland awakened in the minds of West African "British-protected persons" as to the permanence of their relation to the British Crown. The aggrandisement of Fascist Italy has encouraged Nazi Germany to claim a place in the African sun, to the alarm of the Union of South Africa, whose interest in mandated South-west Africa and Tanganyika, and in the neighbouring imperial Native territories, is obvious. From the problem of the African mandates to that of Palestine is but a step, and on this vexed question Professor Keith speaks in the most downright manner. Finally, since all the issues raised in this short volume hang together, there is the problem of imperial defence, which the breakdown of the League has forced to the front. That great problem in turn gives a reality which has hitherto been lacking to the discussion of the "rights" of neutrality and secession, which the Irish Free Staters, a strong section in South Africa, and latterly Australian Labour, take for granted.

In short, this book is an admirable running commentary on the crowded events of two years. Throughout, the political commentary is as full and clear as the constitutional. Whatever the law, Professor Keith seems to say, whatever the constitutional theory, this is how the

British Empire worked during those months. The story makes grim reading; but it is full of life, and to be welcomed on that account alone. ERIC A. WALKER.

58*. CANADA. By André Siegfried. Translated by H. H. and Doris Hemmings. 1937. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 315 pp. 10s. 6d.)

M. SIEGFRIED'S latest book on Canada has caused considerable offence to all those right-thinking people in the country who model themselves upon the classes in England who were offended by his analysis of *England's Crisis*. His leading idea is a fairly obvious one, that geography makes Canada a part of the American continent, and that this north–south pull is gradually overcoming the east–west pull of history which has hitherto preserved the political connection with Britain and Europe. It is when he applies this to the question of Canadian foreign policy that he causes offence, for there is still a considerable body of opinion in Canada which objects to any frank treatment of our relations with Great Britain. M. Siegfried classifies the Canadian population into various racial and sectional groups, and points out how unlikely it is that there will be any such unanimity about participation in another British war as there was in 1914. But he believes that the filial sentiment is still strong among most English Canadians, and he concludes that Canada, like the United States, would go into any war in which British and Anglo-Saxon security seemed to be threatened. Canadian imperialists should be well content with this conclusion, even though he has remarked that Canada commits herself only when her interests are involved, and that she no longer considers herself as part of a whole, but as a distinct and independent personality.

The difference between this book and M. Siegfried's *Race Question in Canada* of 1907 is that the earlier volume came as a revelation to Canadians themselves, whereas he has nothing to say in 1937 that isn't familiar to Canadian students and that hasn't been said already by some of them. Since Canadian writers, however, are not known outside of their own country, the book may be very useful across the ocean. It should be made required reading for all English editors.

The book is mainly concerned with estimating the forces that affect the international position and policy of Canada, and its analysis seems to this reviewer to be substantially correct. But there is one aspect of the situation which M. Siegfried fails altogether to consider. He is very acute on the vertical division-lines of race, religion and geography which cut up the Canadian community, but he ignores the horizontal divisions. The unwary reader would never gather from the book that there exists a Canadian industrial working class with any organisation of its own; and the picture of the Canadian farmer as a soil-miner who spends his winters in California and Florida must have grown up in M. Siegfried's mind from interviews with mortgage-company officials rather than from any direct study of the farmer himself. It is true that in the past all protest movements of farmers or of industrial workers against our prevailing bourgeois economy have been mostly futile. But the protests have been continuous in one form or another since 1918, and it is fairly clear that new conceptions of industrial democracy are sweeping Canada as well as the United States just now. If a European war does not break out in the immediate future but is delayed for a few years, the alignment

of opinion in Canada about overseas adventures may well be a class alignment such as M. Siegfried has not thought it worth while to consider. FRANK H. UNDERHILL.

59*. THE IRISH REPUBLIC: A Documented Chronicle of the Anglo-Irish Conflict and the partitioning of Ireland, with a detailed account of the period 1916–1923. By Dorothy Macardle. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 1072 pp. 25s.)

60. UNIQUE DICTATOR: A STUDY OF EAMON DE VALERA. By Desmond Ryan. 1936. (London: Arthur Barker. 8vo. 311 pp. 10s. 6d.)

THE first duty of a reviewer of Miss Macardle's book is to endorse the statement made by President De Valera in his preface to it. "Miss Macardle has laid all future historians under a deep debt of gratitude." She has for the first time put together a very full chronicle of Irish political history during these crucial seven years, and her book will serve as a guide to the voluminous published material scattered about in official records, pamphlets and newspapers. The reviewer confesses to some disappointment that Miss Macardle has not been able to treat the unpublished material similarly. On many issues judgment must remain in suspense until historians have access to the records of the secret sessions of the Dail and to cabinet and departmental records. The latter, from the nature of the circumstances, must be fragmentary; but no inquiry into the nature of the self-recognised Irish Republic can be wholly satisfactory which does not include the closest possible study of that political body in action.

Miss Macardle, however, is more the historian of the republican idea than the student of the republic as a fact. Or rather, she starts from the assumption (emphatically stated on page 1) that the idea created the fact.

> "For the Irish people the Republic was, for a few tense years, a living reality which dominated every aspect of their lives. . . . In January 1917 a State came into being which inspired a loyalty as profound as any that the history of States can show."

From this postulate flows the whole form of the book and its detailed interpretations. From this postulate it follows inevitably that the treaty was "a treaty of surrender" and the Free State a usurping non-national body. But when did the Free State cease to be an illegal authority? When did the real authority, the Republic, pass out of existence? Miss Macardle appears to accept May 1923, the month in which the anti-treaty forces gave up the armed struggle. But for some years after this Mr. De Valera remained President of the body which called itself the Second Dail, and which claimed to be the sovereign body of the Irish Republic. As late as 1929, the Second Dail, on behalf of the Republic, congratulated the United States Government on the Kellogg Peace Pact. Has not Miss Macardle unduly narrowed her period?

In fact, it is begging the whole question to assert that in January 1919 a republican State came into existence. In that month the majority of Irish representatives declared the independence of Ireland, and in the following years they struggled to make that declaration good. To what extent did they succeed in creating a State? That is a question to be investigated. International recognition of Saorstat Eirann came only after the Treaty, and as a consequence of it. To

what extent were Dail Eirann and the cabinet which it appointed performing the functions of government before the Treaty? They had in fact ousted British authority to an impressive extent. They were trying to set up "a polity within a polity." Roughly it may be stated that a *de facto* Republic was functioning with considerable success in the departments of justice and local government. In other departments (*e.g.*, commerce, where it lacked the customs power) the Republic was hardly functioning at all. In others there were varying degrees of success. It is these *degrees* which call for scientific investigation. Unless the limitations of achievement are set beside the unlimited ideal, the Treaty controversy is prejudged to the damnation of Griffith and Collins. They must either be traitors or weaklings. But a more realistic method of inquiry, making allowance both for ideals and circumstances, will prepare the way for a charitable view of the leaders who took opposite sides in the civil war, according to their different temperaments, connections and judgments. On page 700 Miss Macardle (albeit at the expense of the English) rises to this charity. But she does not stay on the heights. She gives interpretations of events unfavourable to Collins, sometimes without citing her authorities. And the last section of her book reads very much like a sustained tract against the Cosgrave government. On the last page she expresses her hope for the coming of a new English statesmanship. The reviewer shares her hope; yet he would also wish that Miss Macardle had studied the progress already made in carrying through the Commonwealth idea. This idea need not necessarily be regarded as an answer to Irish republicanism—far from it; but an understanding of it is necessary to a just appreciation of Anglo-Irish relations, even within the period covered by the book.

So much of this review has been devoted to the limitations of the book that it is necessary to insist, once again, upon its merits. Miss Macardle may be compared to the staunch Mazzinian, writing the history of the Italian *Risorgimento*. It would be too much to expect that the Mazzinian would explain from the inside the federalists of 1848–9, or the Savoy monarchists of 1859–60, let alone the Austrians (whose administration in the North had its virtues) or the Papacy. But if his republican staunchness were fortified with great industry, the Mazzinian might produce a book which would have high value both as a chronicle of events and as a document revealing his own faith. Miss Macardle's book on the Irish national movement has this value. The reviewer hopes that it will be widely read, and regrets that the publishers put so high a price on it. The binding and make up of the book are poor.

Mr. Ryan's book is much slighter than Miss Macardle's. It is an interpretative essay which makes use of well-known published materials; its style is lively and sometimes rather slangy. But the book is much more penetrating than its journalistic title would suggest. Mr. Ryan has thoroughly digested his documents, and in addition has got behind the documents to the complex realities of the successive situations to which they have reference. There is no political dogma but a great deal of political understanding in his writing. He does not deal in sharp contrasts of black and white, of loyalty and betrayal, and in the relativity of things as he presents them there is room for a more realistic humanity. The opponents in the civil war are revealed as having their separate reasons and justifications. Mr. De Valera is

not always right. For that very reason he is a more convincing hero. Interpretations of living personalities are always disputable, but this book is the most satisfying one which has been written on the President of Saorstat Eirann. W. K. HANCOCK.

61. MODERN IRELAND. By Cicely Hamilton. 1936. (London: J. M. Dent and Son. 8vo. xiii + 239 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

THIS survey of the dominant problems, policies and attitudes in the Irish Free State to-day is a tribute to the author's impartiality and perspicacity. Ireland at the present juncture is perhaps more of a mystery to the average Englishman than ever before, nevertheless in her reporting of modern Ireland Miss Hamilton bends backwards to do justice to the many conflicting—and to her as an Englishwoman perforce uncongenial—elements in the tangled skein of Irish public life. Her analysis of President De Valera's handling of constitutional issues, of the growth of communism and of the position of the Catholic Church in Ireland, is shrewd and pertinent. Only very occasionally can even a native sleuth (such as the present reviewer) catch her out, either in facts or interpretations. Minor points upon which I do not agree with Miss Hamilton, are, for example, her theory that the Irish tolerance of assassination "may in part be a heritage from the days of the Brehon law," or her explanation of the closer kinship felt by many Irishmen to continental races than to the English. With regard to the latter point, in so far as Latin Europe is concerned (and there the Irish have always felt very much at home), surely the explanation is to be found in a similarity of temperament and religion, rather than in a common historical experience of wars and invasions, as Miss Hamilton suggests. Miss Hamilton blunders badly and ungenerously in her comments on the assassination of Sir Henry Wilson (cf. pp. 155-156). Both of the Irishmen responsible for his death grew up and were educated in England and must therefore have been perfectly familiar with the average Englishman's respect for the law. They squarely faced the almost inevitable consequences of their act.

Modern Ireland forms part of a series of works intended as guides to post-War Europe. Accurate and informative as far as it goes, it is definitely inadequate for this purpose in the case of Ireland, being solely concerned with the high spots of Irish news: the economic war; the compulsory Irish; the Sweep; the Irish hate cult; the "Black North." . . . But there are other forces in Ireland more subtle and attractive than the ranting demogogy of the self-sufficient "Gaels." This Ireland which scarcely figures in the daily Press or on the political hustings is entirely ignored by Miss Hamilton. Nevertheless, irrespective of class or creed, it has produced those writers, artists and distinguished Celtic scholars who keep the name of Ireland decently alive in Europe.

For those already familiar with the background of the Irish political scene Miss Hamilton's book will be a stimulating commentary on current events, but the journalistic approach to the subject has spoiled it as a guide for the complete stranger to Ireland. Reduced to the subject matter of the fifteen chapters of *Modern Ireland*, the country becomes a shrieking bedlam of hate and strife. There is undoubtedly no lack of such turmoil, but it is far from being the whole picture.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

EUROPE

62. DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE IM NEUNZEHNTEN JAHRHUNDERT. By Franz Schnabel. 1929–37. (Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder und Co. Verlagsbuchhandlung. 8vo. Vol. I, xi + 628 pp., *Rm.* 14·40; Vol. II, x + 414 pp., *Rm.* 9·80; Vol. III, ix + 500 pp., *Rm.* 11·40; Vol. IV, xii + 617 pp., *Rm.* 13·80.)

WITH the publication of the fourth volume Franz Schnabel's monumental history of the nineteenth century in Germany is completed. It is a work of profound erudition, wide research, and also of great length, since it runs to some 2200 pages, and therefore exceeds in mere extent that of Treitschke's famous history of the same period, though that, of course, stopped at the events of '48. While, however, Schnabel may be regarded as supplementing Germany's greatest historian since Ranke, there can be no suggestion of comparison between the two works. Treitschke's history is essentially political and aggressively nationalistic, while that of the Freiburg scholar is not only written in a suaver and more objective temper, but deals far more with men and ideas than with events and things. He claims, indeed, that his purpose has been to write a biography on broad lines of European and German personalities and to present a composite picture of European culture, and that is, within limits, what he does.

This is not a work to be reviewed in detail in the ordinary way, and the interest of readers can perhaps be best stimulated by a general survey of its contents. The first volume, covering the time from the French Revolution to the end of the Napoleonic tyranny, traces the causes which contributed to the collapse of the old German Empire and of Prussia, and also to the latter's renewal. Here justice is done to the ideas of men so different as Herder, Fichte, Kant, Baron vom Stein, W. von Humboldt, and Hardenberg, the fruition of whose influence was not merely the exaltation of nationalism, but an intellectual awakening which kept Germany for a century in the forefront of European thought.

In the second volume Schnabel surveys the years of political reaction, and in so doing he makes no attempt to cloak or extenuate the deceit practised upon many of the German peoples at that time by faithless rulers, most of them puppets in the hands of the wily, wire-pulling Metternich. But theories of divine right and parliamentary institutions are impossible yoke-fellows, and it may be claimed that Prussia would never have gained undisputed political and military primacy in Germany if her Kings and Ministers had shared power with inexperienced legislatures.

The *leit-motif* of the third volume, whose sub-title is "Empirical sciences and technics," is material as distinct from cultural progress. In dealing with Germany's transition from a predominantly agricultural to an increasingly industrial economy, Schnabel does not omit to acknowledge her debt to Great Britain for much instruction in her new career—for early inventions and processes, for machines to replace manual labour and even, for a time, men to work them—though he by no means exhausts the list of enterprises in which England, as the first in the field, gave her future rival the benefit of invaluable guidance and experience. It was also a piece of good fortune for Prussia that, at the time when Watts and his steam engine were revolutionising economic ideas, Frederick the Great followed every new foreign innovation with the keenest interest, and was ever ready to promote with advice,

encouragement and grants of money the introduction into his realm of new industries and industrial methods. The writer says truly that "if in England industry grew out of the free initiative of adventurous and clear-sighted men, and in France since 1815 was similarly developed in an atmosphere of liberty, in Germany State support was the determining factor." Yet the facility and success with which Germany adapted herself to the industrial revolution which began early in last century owed much also to the two facts that she had at command unlimited resources of skill and talent, the product of her traditional and thoroughly efficient guilds, and that Germany had already become a country of schools.

While, however, justifiably extolling his country's achievements in material directions, Schnabel is fully conscious that they have been gained at the expense of moral loss. The glories of the classical era of thought were inevitably dulled the more technical prepossessions monopolised the nation's attention. Too impartial and too balanced in judgment to be a mere *laudator temporis acti*, he frankly admits that "the synthesis of the classical and the technical age proved too difficult of attainment." Yet when and where was it otherwise?

The final volume is given to a careful and acute synopsis of the religious and ecclesiastical history of the country, and the multiplicity of his sources and the thoroughness with which they have been studied and used should justify his hope that the book will not prove "a work of reference for special investigators" but "a book to be read." In the course of over 600 pages the life and thought, the conflicts and manifold vicissitudes of the two great confessions are treated separately and at almost equal length, yet though the narrative has particular interest for the present time, it will inevitably appeal chiefly to the public at home. Here the reader is told how ecclesiastical organisations came to have in Germany a particularist basis; how the hand of the State has ever lain heavily upon the Churches; how temporal rulers and statesmen, no less obscure than half-hearted in their own doctrinal professions, have at times paralysed religious life and chilled personal piety; how the Roman Church, owing largely to its earlier and heartier recognition of social obligations and the call for more "practical Christianity," has kept a stronger hold on the labouring classes than the rival and divided Evangelical or Protestant Church; and how differently the two emerged from the struggle with rationalism and unbelief; the one with a new influx of authority, if also with a resurgence of credulity, the other weakened by a division and an indifference which only the tribulation through which it is now passing has availed to dissipate.

Looking back on the period covered by this work, one cannot fail to realise how true to itself the German nation has been throughout its history, ever repeating the past, its cycles of advance and decline, its exaltations and depressions, its ebbs and flows of high ambition and strenuous endeavour, its alternations of tumult and tranquillity; for always in the life of this gifted and variously constituted people the things that have been are those that again shall be. It is a fact worth recalling that the present-day revulsion in Germany—which political associations do not rob of seriousness—against some of the Jewish elements in the Christian religion was anticipated by rationalist theologians in the middle of last century.

When a work so compendious as this contains so much to interest and instruct, it may seem invidious to speak of omissions. Neverthe-

less, it is a fact that, whether owing to deliberate design or not, some important episodes in the history of last century have been either ignored or treated too cursorily. Thus in the last volume the great struggle between the Prussian State and the Vatican, known as the *Kulturkampf*, is hardly noticed, while Windthorst, the creator of the Clerical party and Bismarck's boldest antagonist, is only mentioned in a non-political relation. Again, while much space is given to the Catholic Socialism of Bishop Ketteler and Kolping, the rise and temporary triumph of Social Democracy are passed over, and Karl Marx and his *Kapital* might never have existed for any notice taken of them. Further, the colonial movement, which captured the national imagination and never lost hold of it, and foreign policy in general are altogether ignored. Such deficiencies may only confirm the character of the work as essentially a survey of ideas and conflicting intellectual forces, though they somewhat diminish its importance as a record of national life. That said, I would add in compensation that no work known to me emphasises so clearly and impressively the difference between a history of culture and a history of civilisation, and that in the matter of literary style Schnabel has succeeded—where so many erudite German scholars fail—in proving that even subjects the most abstruse and difficult can be expounded without obscurity of language.

WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON.

63*. GESCHICHTSUNTERRICHT ALS NATIONALPOLITISCHE ERZIEHUNG. Von Dietrich Klagges. 1936. (Frankfurt an Main: Verlag Moritz Diesterweg. 8vo. vii + 441 pp. *Rm.* 8·40.)

HERR DIETRICH KLAGGES is an old authority on National Socialism; he heralded the revolution of 1933 in Weimar days by becoming Minister of the Interior and of Education in the State of Brunswick, and was, in fact, the first Nazi ever to hold office. This book of his tells us perhaps very little that National Socialist literature has not already revealed, yet it sets out with unusual clarity the aims with which history is to be taught to the children of the Third Reich.

One of Herr Klagges' first principles, as he also announced at the Conference of Nazi history-teachers at Ulm last autumn, is that all attempts at objectivity must be banished from the history lesson. His own success in achieving this aim is undoubtedly striking. He is able, for instance, to discard the antiquated notion that civilisation travelled from the Mediterranean up to Germany. Far from acknowledging descent from ancestors who were civilised comparatively late, the Germans must make haste, he says, to appreciate that, on the contrary, all civilisation emanated *from* Germany. The great age of Greece and Rome was due to Nordic colonisation in the south, a colonisation which was successful so long as the Nordic conquerors maintained themselves as a superior caste distinct from the indigenous population. But later intermarriage set in, and " the Nordic colony, Rome, was not strong enough to carry out its biggest task, *i.e.* to make the whole world Nordic, because its racial vitality was not carefully enough preserved and was therefore prematurely extinguished." The idea that the Germans of the period of Rome's decline and fall were mere barbarians becomes, in Herr Klagges' view, an atrocity legend (*Greuelmärchen*) fabricated by clerical historians. He offers the usual emphasis upon heroism and battle (*Kampf*), and complains that the Nordic religious distinction between good and bad forces has always been lost in the south, and heroism corrupted into tolerance

and a love of peace. In view of Herr Hitler's ban pronounced last 30th January, it is, possibly, unfortunate that Herr Klagges lays so much emphasis upon the large majority of Nordic men among Nobel prize-winners. ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

64*. THE DESTINY OF FRANCE. By Alexander Werth. 1937. (London: Hamish Hamilton. 8vo. 414 pp. 10s. 6d.)
65. QUI EST LA ROCQUE? By Jacques de Lacretelle. 1937. (Paris: Flammarion. Sm. 8vo. 45 pp. 1fr. 50.)
66. ALERTE AUX FRANÇAIS. By André Tardieu. 1936. (Paris: Flammarion. 8vo. 47 pp. 1 fr.)
67. THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN CONTEMPORARY FRANCE. By Frances I. Clark. 1937. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. 259 pp. 12s. 6d.)
68*. JOUHAUX ET LA C.G.T. By Raymond Millet. 1937. (Paris: Editions Denoël et Steele. 8vo. 137 pp. 7 fr. 50.)
69. HISTOIRE DU SOCIALISME EN FRANCE. By Paul Louis. Troisième édition augmentée et illustrée de 25 portraits. (Paris: Marcel Rivière. 8vo. 438 pp. 25 frs.)

IN a capital study of the crisis of French democracy—the title of which is somewhat misleading—Mr. Alexander Werth has combined with skill two distinct themes. He is concerned, on the one hand, with the external peril resulting from the collapse of all efforts to secure the desired transition from "Versailles" to a new international order: France is now perforce "living dangerously" in the face of a lawless Europe. And, on the other hand, he provides a lively narrative, based on first-hand knowledge, of the period of internal commotion deriving from the impact on an essentially bourgeois society of the social-revolutionary doctrines of Fascism and Communism. There is a connecting link which the author does not allow us to forget: namely, that the external, *i.e.* German, menace serves continually to neutralise the other "Fascist" threat. When *la patrie* is in danger, dissensions disappear. Thus, after the dramatic days of 1934, already described in Mr. Werth's brilliant portrait-study *France in Ferment*, the Parliamentary régime retrieves its position, and the persistent discord among the forces of the Left yields to the appeal of the Front Populaire alliance. The country is certainly not yet out of the wood. But the story recounted here leaves the impression that the Fascist menace (in both senses) has been effectively countered, thanks to the immense reserves of political sense and experience on which the Republic can call. When MM. Doumergue and Tardieu began to tinker with the delicate mechanism of the Constitution, they were promptly unhorsed by the Radical-Socialists, before, actually, the anti-Fascist current had gathered momentum. Meanwhile the *sympathique* Colonel de La Rocque, raging against the Parliamentary profiteers in the name of the *anciens combattants*, was left high and dry by the unforeseen democratic surge which the egregious M. Laval evoked, and the *Croix de Feu* movement, miscalled "Fascist," has—appropriately enough (for old soldiers never die . . .)—more or less faded away into a shelter for timid Tories. The turning-point would seem to have been the Radical Congress at Nantes in 1934 when the veteran M. Henri Guernut charged M. Herriot, "You must be the sentry on the frontier of the Republic and let no one pass. . . ."

In regard to foreign policy Mr. Werth is critical, and with reason, of Anglo-French chronic disunion. The worst period, probably, was

when M. Tardieu was Prime Minister (1930–1932), when the mass of British opinion was hypnotised by the *mystique* of disarmament (divorced from its essential context of international security) and avoided the trouble of thinking by complacent charges of French ambitions for European hegemony. He comments severely on the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which explained, if it did not excuse, M. Laval's backsliding (and in this connection he reminds us of the passage in the French Note of October 18th, 1935, never contradicted, intimating that Sir Samuel Hoare had already agreed with his French colleague on September 9th—two days before his famous Geneva speech—that there should be no *military* measures against Italy: so much for the tendency in Great Britain to lay the blame on France for the failure of the sanctions experiment). On the other hand, he censures MM. Sarraut and Flandin for their hesitancy at the time of Herr Hitler's Rhineland *coup*. In Mr. Werth's opinion a deal of trouble would have been averted if the French Government had taken positive action; "the French should have known," he says, "that England will always accept a well-managed *fait accompli*." His conclusion is somewhat reassuring: that, though the enemies of democracy have achieved their primary objective of immobilising France while they play hell in Spain, they have not yet succeeded in disrupting the new unity of views of London and Paris which has attended the advent of the Government of M. Blum.

M. Jacques de Lacretelle of the *Académie Française* tries, rather late in the day, to invest the leader of the *Parti Social* with the aura of a great national figure. But he succeeds in portraying only an earnest patriot with rather more public spirit than the average individualist Frenchman. His denial that Colonel de La Rocque proposed to introduce regimentation of the mind, addressed to his fellow-intellectuals, was surely unnecessary.

The other one-franc pamphlet—M. Tardieu in a very bad temper—is quite another pair of shoes. With dialectical fervour M. Tardieu seeks to show that the conquests of the French Revolution have become Dead Sea fruit: that Frenchmen to-day are neither sovereign, nor free, nor equal, that political life in France is "one huge lie" and that the remedy lies in drastic reforms, constitutional and electoral, inspired by the superior merits of the democracies of Switzerland and the United States. He shows, for instance, that the much-vaunted universal suffrage amounts in practice to a restricted franchise of some 11½ millions (*i.e.*, 28 per cent. of Frenchmen). Women are still without the vote, though they pay taxes, and then there are the children. M. Tardieu, apparently, would have women and children voting, by some arrangement, for the family vote, *plus* vocational representation. He seems to object, too, that voting is not compulsory; and, of course, he has no use for the existing *scrutin majoritaire*. The effect of all this, he seems to argue, though the logic escapes one, is that France is run by a minority despotism of the active elements among two million *syndiqués*, an oligarchy of trade unionists and boss-syndicalists (to borrow Mr. Bernard Shaw's phrase).

Miss Clark has amassed an amazing wealth of knowledge on women's activities and the women's movement in France. She traces the development of the woman wage-earner from the wretched conditions

in the early textile industry onwards, shows how occupational groups have changed in recent years and why, and goes on to elucidate the labour laws, one of the earliest of which made provision for seats for all saleswomen in shops, and the insurance measures dating from the Act of 1928. It is on the whole matter for the specialist, and the manner of writing is somewhat wearisome. But Part IV, on Marriage and Divorce, provides an interesting insight into a structure of social life very different from our own.

The little book by M. Raymond Millet is really valuable. Here is the essential background for an appreciation of the French working-class skein, with its many strands, which is likely to be the centre of interest for a long time to come. It is an exhaustive study, revealing no particular prejudice and admirably throwing into relief the "permanent" leader, Léon Jouhaux.

For those who have abundant leisure I recommend M. Paul Louis's book. The new edition brings his story up to the summer of 1936. The interrelation of Labour (M. Millet's subject) and Socialism in its protean forms is in itself a fascinating theme.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

70*. LES SOVIETS CONTRE LA FRANCE. Par Jacques Bardoux. 1937. (Paris: Flammarion. Sm. 8vo. 45 pp. 1 *fr.* 50.)

The author asserts that a plot is afoot to set up a Red dictatorship in France and to open her frontiers to Germany.

71. LA POLITIQUE FRANÇAISE EN JUILLET 1914 D'APRÈS LES DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES FRANÇAIS. Par Pierre Renouvin. 23 pp.

72*. QUELQUES REFLEXIONS. Par Camille Bloch. 9 pp.

73*. OBSERVATIONS COMPLÉMENTAIRES SUR LES DOCUMENTS FRANÇAIS. Par Jules Isaac. 13 pp.

All Reprints from the *Revue d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale*, Janvier 1937. (Paris: Pierre Costes.)

These reprints from the *Revue d'Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale* contain speeches made at a meeting of the Société d'Histoire Moderne in November and December 1936. The speeches were in the nature of commentaries and criticisms on Volumes X and XI of the *Documents diplomatiques Français 1871–1914*, published during 1936. The writers are here concerned with points of detail and the theses they maintain are those with which students of their major works on the origins of the War are already familiar.

74*. FRANCO ET LA NOUVELLE ESPAGNE. By Georges Rotvand. 1936. (Paris: Denoël et Steele. 8vo. 85 pp. 5 *frs.*)

75. FRANCO MEANS BUSINESS. By Georges Rotvand. Translated by Reginald Dingle. 1937. (London: Paladin Press. 8vo. xviii + 64 pp. 2*s.*)

76*. THREE PICTURES OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR. Edited by Don Justo Medio. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 158 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

77. NUEVA ORIENTACION CONSTITUCIONAL ESPAÑOLA. By Oscar Diaz de Vivar. 1933. (Buenos Aires: Libreria y Casa Editora de Jesus Menendez. 8vo. 350 pp.)

M. ROTVAND'S is the first and only biographical sketch of the leader of the Spanish "Nationalist" movement. Francisco Franco Bahamonde

is revealed as a good Army type, serious, industrious and possessin; an excellent record of service in Moroccoc—certainly not the bluff uncultured political general of the national tradition. But his onl; titles to fame would appear to be his leadership of the legionaries wh(occupied the Bay of Alhucemas on behalf of the Dictator (Primo d(Rivera) in 1925 and his conduct of a non-specialist military academ; which was dissolved as being redundant in the early phase of th(Republic. What of his political ability? Though, as M. Rotvanc shows, he may count as "advanced" in social matters by comparisor with the *ancien régime* backwoodsmen among his colleagues, greate1 proof of his political sagacity is needed than that which is cited ir illustration here: namely, that upon his election to supreme leader-ship at Burgos in October last he should have insisted on the titl("Supreme Head of *the Government of* the Spanish State" (instead o1 Supreme Head of the State)—thus leaving the door open for a monarchy

A useful feature of the English edition is the reprinting of Genera Franco's two broadcast statements of October 1st, 1936 and Januar; 19th, 1937. The Foreword by Mr. Gregory MacDonald is fulsome Its author is in the full spate of reaction against nineteenth-centur; materialism, and he sees in General Franco "the paladin," th(embodiment of his own exalted aspirations.

Don Justo Medio gives the partisans, "A Democrat" and "A Francophil," their head, and then seeks to plot Spain's graph alon; that middle way which is the goal of most Englishmen, but whicl unfortunately is anathema to the great majority of Spaniards. Ir his summing-up the editor, styling himself "A Liberal," does not fai to apportion the blame where it belongs—to the Spanish character "Spaniards see everything as black and white, as essential and im-possible, as right and wrong. They cannot or will not collaborate. . . .' Which explains not the civil war, but the intensity of passions arousec and the faculty of partisans of both sides for disfiguring the fair fac(of truth.

The Case for the Government is stated by "A Democrat' moderately, soberly and, in the view of the present reviewer, accurately The Case for the Insurgents on the whole maintains the same level but descends at times to a "cheap" tone at the expense of Seño1 Azaña, for example, and contains several inaccuracies. Thus, th(writer resurrects the legend that Moorish troops were used by Seño Azaña, Prime Minister, in suppressing the Sanjurjo revolt of Augus 1932 (when the whole thing was over before there could have bee1 time for levies to reach the mainland); and he darkens counsel whe1 he suggests that those who disliked the Republic of 1931 "had sub mitted without protest to a form of government which came i1 illegally." The change of régime was legitimate enough, in accordanc(with Spanish electoral practice; and the sequence of disorders anc troubles was in fact opened by some youthful Monarchist manifestant: whose activities provoked the first spasm of church-burning (ir Malaga, especially), which stained the record of the "immaculat(Republic." He mentions, by the way, an article by an ex-Diploma' in the *Contemporary Review* of September 1936; it should be th(*Nineteenth Century*. The Case for Spain here stated, theoretically is unexceptionable. But it would require a strong and effectiv(League of Nations to make possible and control a national referendum as to the future conduct of the nation's affairs.

The study from the Argentine is a sympathetic commentary on a Constitution which, with all its paper excellencies, now would indeed seem to be " bloomin' well dead." Yet those who know Spain best do as a matter of fact see a moderate Socialist solution to be possible (assuming a Government victory) which will not entail any substantial change in the present charter of the nation.

W. HORSFALL CARTER.

78. DEFENCE OF MADRID. By Geoffrey Cox. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 221 pp. 2s. 6*d.*)

A QUIETLY written eye-witness account of recent events in Madrid. Though it is quite obvious on which side his sympathies lie, Mr. Cox indulges in no propaganda and, with one exception, avoids all horror and atrocity stories. In fact, so carefully has he tried to tell the truth and refrain from fancy that he achieves the paradox of making it difficult to appreciate the reality of the tragedy that he is describing.

He confirms that General Franco has not got the support of the majority of his countrymen and has therefore to rely on outside help. But he is ready to admit that the Government forces also include a large number of foreigners, and he gives an interesting account of the formation, numbers and composition of the International Column.

Throughout the book his main emphasis is on the international aspect of the conflict. So intrigued is he by this that he seems to have forgotten, as has the rest of the world, that fundamentally this is a Civil War, and that it is Spain that is being desolated, and that it will remain to the Spaniard to clear up the mess when the Germans, the Russians, the Italians, the Moors and the International Column have returned home.

Of the poor forgotten Spaniard he has little or nothing to say.

C. H. GUYATT.

79*. REPORT OF A RELIGIOUS DELEGATION TO SPAIN, April 1937. By The Dean of Canterbury, Professor John MacMurray, Monica Whately, M. Beer, and others. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 32 pp. 6*d.*)

80*. THE PAPACY IN POLITICS TO-DAY: Vatican Plots in Spain and Other Countries. By Joseph McCabe. 1937. (London: Watts. 8vo. xii + 196 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

81*. PORTOGALLO NUOVO. By U. Baldi-Papini. 1936. (Florence: Carlo Cya Edit. Poligrafica Universitaria. Sm. 8vo. 146 pp. *Lire* 10).

82*. PORTUGAL NOW. By Ralph Fox. 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 80 pp. 1*s.*)

BOTH these authors criticise New Portugal, but from a diametrically opposite standpoint. Signor Baldi-Papini favours the present régime and its founder, Oliveira Salazar. He acclaims Portugal as the daughter of Italy, in the vanguard of the movement that is to regenerate Europe, and vouches for Salazar's success and personal popularity. The Portuguese Constitution, however, differs in many respects from the Italian pattern, and Baldi-Papini went to Lisbon in order to compare the two systems. He obviously prefers the Fascist type, but recognises that Salazar's policy may be expedient in view of the temperament of the Portuguese people.

He first gives an account of Salazar's career and personal charac-

teristics, and of the financial and economic reforms that led up to the organisation of the New State, as proclaimed in the Constitution of March 28th, 1933. This is followed by a very clear epitome and analysis of the Constitution, and its non-totalitarian character is adversely commented on—" in contrast to the eminently aristocratic character of Fascism it embodies the democratic concept." In a subsequent chapter the Unione Nazionale is critically discussed, and indicted as being merely the instrument and military arm of the State, instead of providing it, as alleged, with a broad civil basis of government. The A.E.V. (Vanguard Students' Association) is also criticised and pronounced too scholastic to appeal to the youth of Portugal. Public opinion and political tendencies are reviewed, with a concluding note on foreign relations.

The late Mr. Ralph Fox, on the other hand, held no brief for Salazar or his administration, and is pessimistic as regards the outlook for the country. He queries the financial returns and economic conditions, and holds that " economically and politically Portugal is on the edge of an abyss," and that " Salazar is the most unpopular dictator in Europe." The Portuguese intervention in the Spanish Civil War is reported, like the rest of Mr. Fox's " random notes," with a lively and anti-Fascist pen, and his chapters give a vivid picture of current events in Portugal. FRANCES A. WELBY.

83*. BERUFLICHE GLIEDERUNG UND SOZIALE SCHICHTUNG DER DEUTSCHEN IN DER TSCHECHOSLOVAKEI. By Albin Oberschall. 1937. (Teplitz-Schönau: Wächter. 8vo. 59 pp.)

A careful and detailed statistical study, without obvious political tendency, of the professions and occupations of the Germans in Czechoslovakia.

84*. LA LEÇON D'AUTRICHE, 1919–1937. By P. T. Lux. 1937. (Neuchâtel: Attinger. 8vo. 137 pp. *Sw.fr.* 3.50; bound, 6.50.)

A book which is all too short, in view of its very exceptional merit. The author is a Swiss who has spent many years in post-War Austria, and believes that the history of that unfortunate country can furnish useful lessons to Switzerland. The first half of the book consists of an account of Austrian history since 1918; although very compressed, it is admirably lucid, accurate and fair, and constitutes quite the best thing of its kind known to the present reviewer. There follow a useful table of dates, the party programmes of the Social Democrats and the Heimwehr, a translation of a Nazi leaflet, and a letter written to the writer by a workman after the suppression of Social Democracy. Finally come the author's own observations: his analysis of the reasons for the breakdown of democracy in Austria (external causes on the one hand, and on the other the excesses of parties and of the Press and insufficient training in the true spirit of democracy), and a series of most acute observations on the nature of dictatorships and on those weak points of Swiss democracy which might give a handle to its enemies. This section is hardly less applicable to British readers than to Swiss, while the historical introduction calls for almost unreserved commendation. C. A. MACARTNEY.

85*. KRUPP: Deutschlands Kanonenkönige. By Bernhard Menne. 1936. (Zurich: Europa Verlag. 8vo. 386 pp., bibl. *Frs.* 6.)

The history of the Krupp family is here traced from the small beginnings of Anton " Krupe," born in 1688, in the making of arms, through the

culminating triumphs of the first decade of the twentieth century down to the rehabilitation of Dr. Gustave Krupp von Bohlen in 1933 through the re-armament programme of the Nazi Government.

86*. LA NOUVELLE TRIPLICE. Par E. N. Dzelepy. 1937. (Paris: Editions Fustier. Sm. 8vo. 158 pp. 6 *frs.*)

An examination of the bases of the "Italo-German Alliance," of the stages in its chequered history and of its significance for the peace of Europe. The author is convinced that an alliance of the Fascist Powers does in fact exist, and that such an alliance, since it is, so to speak, an alliance "against nature," constitutes a grave danger to peace in that it can only continue at the price of a war against the common enemies.

87*. DIE SCHUTZSTAFFEL ALS ANTIBOLSHEWISTISCHE KAMPFORGANISATION. By Heinrich Himmler. 3rd edition. 1937. (München: Zentralverlag der N.S.D.A.P. 8vo. 31 pp.)

88*. THE BROWN NETWORK: The Activities of the Nazis in Foreign Countries. Introduction by William Francis Hare, Earl of Listowel. Translated from the German. 1936. (New York: Knight Publications. Cr. 8vo. 309 pp. $3.)

89. LA POLITIQUE EXTÉRIEURE DE L'ITALIE FASCISTE. By George Christopoulos. 1936. (Paris: L. Rodstein. 8vo. 300 pp.)

THE author has followed his recent Greek treatise on Mediterranean politics [1] by this larger French account of Fascist foreign policy. After a chapter on its "principles and tendencies," which he sums up as "autonomy, equilibrium, prestige and expansion," culminating in "supremacy over the Mediterranean," he traces in detail Italy's relations with France, Britain, Germany, Russia, the small States of Central Europe and the Balkans, her attitude towards the revision of the Peace Treaties and the League of Nations, and concludes with a statement of the Fascist solution of "the problem of war and peace." The book was written before the Greek dictatorship, but the author's sympathies are obvious, though he bases many of his arguments on Fascist literature. He shows that Mussolini never liked England, quoting his signed article of 1st October, 1922, which contained the phrase: "it is in the interest of Italy to collaborate in the demolition of the English [*sic*] Empire." But he does not mention the fact, known to the reviewer, that, three weeks later, the British Ambassador on the occasion of his first official interview with the writer, who had meanwhile become Prime Minister, took this article with him and asked Mussolini whether it represented the views of the new Italian Government. The Duce made much the same reply as Gladstone, when the latter, as Premier in 1880, was asked to explain his electioneering attack on Austria: "You cannot put your finger on the map of Europe and find a place where Austria has done good." He justifies British policy in the Abyssinian question as "legally and morally perfectly correct," and remarks that Italians showed no desire to emigrate to their African colonies, preferring America and Soho. Specially important is the section on Italian relations with Yugoslavia, which the reviewer found best summarised in a cartoon of the *Travaso*. An Italian soldier had mortally wounded a decrepit two-headed eagle, which he saw sinking in the waters of the Adriatic. But, to his horror, he saw rising from the same waters a young and vigorous three-headed eagle! Should Yugoslavia cooperate with Germany, the danger for Italy would be greater, especially as Zara is isolated and its water-

[1] XV, 149.

supply and the cherry-orchards, which furnish the raw materials for its famous Maraschino, are in Yugoslav territory. For Italy the independence of Austria is essential, lest a powerful Germany become her neighbour on the Brenner and raise the question of the South Tyrol. He says little about the Dodecanese, but sets out in detail the juridical position of Italy in Albania, which the late King Alexander believed to be the real danger to Italo-Yugoslav relations. In discussing those between Italy and Hungary he might have mentioned that Mussolini's words: "the Peace Treaties are not eternal," as well as an article by Lord Rothermere, are engraved in golden letters on a monument in Budapest. Italy's attitude at Geneva is carefully analysed: she prefers "to remain and work for a modification of the Pact in a manner favourable to her interests." Fascism has become, like Bolshevism, "an article of exportation," despite Mussolini's declaration to the contrary. But *les imitations sont toujours mauvaises*. The author concludes that "Fascist policy has destroyed the wish of peace and collaboration of young Europe." This may be doubted, nor does he tell us about the financial basis of Italian foreign policy. The book is marred by numerous misprints, the more remarkable, because it was published in Paris. WILLIAM MILLER.

90*. DEUTSCHE BILANZ IN SÜDOSTEUROPA. By Lutz Korodi. 1936. (Berlin: Preussische Jahrbücher Schriftenreihe. Verlag von Georg Stilke. 8vo. 111 pp.)

Contains a short essay on Germany's political relations with the States of South-East Europe during recent years, followed by a longer section, well documented, which deals with the attitude of Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia to their German minorities, especially in the matter of education. In view of the importance attached to the operation of the German clearing agreements with these countries it is disappointing, but perhaps comprehensible, that this subject is not examined. D. B. B.

91*. BULGARIA PAST AND PRESENT. By George Clenton Logio. 1936. (Manchester: Sherrat and Hughes. Printed in Bulgaria. 8vo. 477 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS book, which professes to "enlighten the American and British public generally on Bulgarian affairs," is divided into two parts, economic and political. The political section sketches the political history of Bulgaria from the earliest times up to the end of 1935; the economic part contains a number of essays on aspects of Bulgaria's economy. Particular attention is devoted to the question of the loans issued under the auspices of the League in 1926 and 1928; indeed, the publishers state that the "disillusion and loss created by this loan [1926] has been the chief incentive" in its compilation.

Books of the type to which this purports to belong should be as free as possible from bias. Unfortunately, M. Logio suffers from a violent, even bitter, prejudice against the régime supplanted by the *coup d'état* of 1934, and this colours his whole work. An example may be taken from his central thesis, the question of the League loans. He holds that these loans were unnecessary, that the League should never have consented to their issue, and that the proceeds were often misspent. Now the facts, on the Bulgarian side, may be as M. Logio states, though he seems to ignore the point that the loans brought to Bulgaria the *Devisen* without which the economic system of the 'twenties would have been impossible. But clearly it is a matter of taste whether one accepts his general view, which almost amounts to an allegation of bad faith on the part of the League Financial Committee.

There can be little doubt that the régime of the later 'twenties left much to be desired, or even that corruption was wide-spread. But an account so obviously one-sided as this at once aroused the reader's suspicions, to say the least, as to the writer's impartiality, and even deters him from accepting statements which may be perfectly well-founded. Thus it is to be feared that M. Logio defeats his own ends.

The reader is told that his " forbearance is solicited for the numerous typographical errors . . . disseminated throughout the book, and due to the total ignorance of English of the Bulgarian printers." The warning is certainly needed. D. B. B.

92*. De autonomie van de gemeente in Nederland en in Nederlandsch-Indië. By W. P. van Oorschot. 1936. (Utrecht: Oosthoek. 8vo. 95 pp.)

Comparative study of local government in Holland and the Dutch East Indies.

93*. Chineesche Immigranten in Nederland. By F. van Heek. 1936. (Amsterdam: J. Emmering. 8vo. 113 pp. *fl.* 2.)

A detailed study of the extent of Chinese immigration into Holland, and of the social and economic condition of the immigrants.

94*. Die Juden Osteuropas in den Minderheitenverträgen. By Dr. Kurt Stillschweig. 1936. (Berlin: Joseph Jastrow. 8vo. 207 pp.)

This extremely objective study of the operation of the Minority Treaties is of great value at the present time. It was one of the most unfortunate mistakes of Jewish leaders after the War to have placed all their eggs in the basket of written legal guarantees. The result was an embitterment rather than an alleviation of the actual situation of Jewish minorities. In all post-War politics the psychological aspects of a problem have taken precedence over the juridical: national sentiment has been explosive, and has not been rendered tractable by the continuous insistence by minorities on their legal rights; an insistence which too frequently took no heed of the real difficulties in which the countries were struggling. Dr. Stillschweig examines in detail the construction of the Minority Treaties, their failures, and their limited successes in the different fields of everyday life. It is inevitably sad reading. But in that he shows the reasons for the failure, the book has a practical as well as an academic value. J. W. Parkes.

95. Poland: Human and Economic Characteristics in their Geographical Setting. By R. H. Kinvig. A Monograph in two Parts. 1936. (Issued by the Birmingham University Information Service on Slavonic Countries. 4to. 36 pp. Subscription to series of 4 Monographs, 7s.)

Continuing materials already issued since 1931, the Slavonics Department of the University of Birmingham is now publishing three pamphlets on Poland. We have here, in succinct form, a good survey of the geography of Poland, to which a Foreword has been written by Sir Charles Grant Robertson. There are maps, showing the physical features, the administrative districts, and the population and nationality distribution. In Part II we then have an essay on the Composition of Population, and one on the Economic Geography of the new State. There are more maps, showing the Partitions, the major field products, and the location of major industries. The text is well done, and the

impression the reader gets is one of clarity and exactness. The concluding pages on roads and communications are most informing. The only thing I missed was any attention to the rather important timber industry of Poland.

Two further monographs are promised : on the New Codes of Law, and on the National Income. They will be awaited with interest.

WILLIAM J. ROSE.

96. POLISH COUNTRYSIDES. By Louise A. Boyd. [*American Geographical Society, Special Publication*, No. 20.] 1937. (New York : American Geographical Society. 8vo. xi + 235 pp. Maps, illus.)

THIS book is a joy, whether to handle or to study. Half of it is letter-press, well illustrated, the other is crowded—one might say overcrowded—with pictures of rural and small-town life from one end of Poland to the other. The technique of reproduction is as good as was the skill of the camera-woman. Everything has been "caught," and for the most part in action.

Miss Boyd's title Essay reveals the experienced traveller, but not of the tourist kind. She has done much work of this kind in the Arctic, and has an eye for everything that nature affords. Moreover, she realises to the full that the earth is for the children of men *Muttererde*, and brings this out at every turn. Her general notes on roads at the beginning are worth a fortune to intending visitors to Poland : her stay there was connected with the Congress of Geographers in Warsaw in 1934.

Beginning in the north-west, she then takes us to Wilno, but brings us back duly south-west right to Silesia, and then works her way eastward along the Carpathians. Proportionately the most space is given to the Fens Area around Pinsk : and rightly, since this is primitive life at its best, and is little known. The idea of having a twenty-page essay written by a Polish expert, Dr. Stanislaw Gorzuchowski of Warsaw, on Some Aspects of Rural Poland was a good one. Both text and maps greatly enhance the value of this book. It is equally useful for those who cannot visit Poland at all, and as a companion for those who can. WILLIAM J. ROSE.

U.S.S.R.

97*. REPORT OF COURT PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE OF THE ANTI-SOVIET TROTSKYITE CENTRE. 1937. (Moscow : People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R. ; London : Collet's Bookshop. 8vo. 580 pp. 2*s*. 6*d*.)

98*. THE MOSCOW TRIAL. Compiled by W. P. Coates and Zelda K. Coates. 1937. (London : Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee. 8vo. 281 pp. 1*s*.)

No one who desires to form an opinion on the guilt or innocence of Piatakov, Radek and the other defendants who were recently convicted of high treason by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. should fail to study this verbatim report, which provides an answer to many of the questions which have been posed.

Unlike the considerably abridged report of the previous trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev, this report is a faithful transcription of every word which was spoken during the seven days the trial lasted, with the exception of one afternoon's session which was held *in camera*.

Owing, no doubt, to the speed with which it was produced—it was

on sale in England a week or so after the conclusion of the trial—the translation is rather too literal and stilted. The trial was actually conducted in more colloquial language than appears from the English text, and no attempt is made to find an English equivalent for the Russian crime of "diversion." Possibly the best rendering would have been "seditious sabotage." However, the speed of production has not affected the technical excellence of the report, which is almost completely free from printing errors.

One cannot help regretting that it was not possible—even at the cost of increasing the extremely low price charged for the book—to include in the text photographic reproductions of some of the documents which were produced at the trial. There was, for instance, Trotsky's own "Bulletin of the Opposition," numbers 36 and 37, for October 1933, which Vishinsky, the Public Prosecutor, referred to in his closing speech, and which strikingly corroborated the allegations that Trotsky was preparing for the assassination of Stalin; there were the incriminating letters from the Japanese diplomat (whose name could have been obliterated, if necessary) which were found on Knyazev when he was arrested; and there was Stroilov's diary which contained the telephone numbers of German secret service agents.

There might well have been an appendix setting out the appropriate sections of the Soviet Criminal Code (which, by the way, can be obtained from H.M. Stationery Office) and the statute establishing the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court.

The care with which the court investigates a plea of guilty is noteworthy, and goes far to meet the objections to a preliminary investigation *in camera*. It is somewhat analogous to the English practice of advising a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty. It will be observed that several of the accused availed themselves of their procedural right to intervene at any stage of the proceedings, and that in general Vishinsky, instead of putting leading questions to them, invited them to tell their own stories.

Possibly Radek's examination reveals better than that of any other defendant the motives which guided the conspirators and the objects which they had in view. The final speeches of the defendants, which are made after the close of the case for the prosecution, and which no one may interrupt or curtail, are also extremely interesting as revealing the change in the attitude of some of the defendants, and explaining why they chose to plead guilty.

The report discloses that many inaccuracies occurred in the English press reports of the trial. For example, nowhere in the verbatim report does any defendant claim responsibility for "many thousands of train wrecks," nor do Muralov and Shestov both claim the credit for the plot to assassinate Ordjonikidze; and Radek's references to torture in his final speech are made quite clear by the context.

No one who takes the trouble to read through this report, whatever his other doubts, could still believe that the whole proceedings were staged and that some playwright wrote these 580 pages in advance for the defendants to act.

The Moscow Trial is a compression of the verbatim report to one-third of its original length. All the important passages of the trial are reproduced verbatim, and much redundancy has been omitted, with the result that this book makes much easier reading than the full report. It is unfortunate that the compilers did not take advantage of the

opportunity to improve the English of the official report. An appendix contains two speeches by Stalin drawing the political conclusions from the trial and calling for increased vigilance in discovering hostile elements at work inside the Soviet Union. DUDLEY COLLARD.

99. SELECTED WORKS. By V. I. Lenin. Vol. VII: After the Seizure of Power 1917–1918. 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 520 pp. 5s.)

THE first two volumes of this English edition of *Selected Works* of Lenin were reviewed in *International Affairs* for July–August 1936. The present volume is the seventh. The intermediate ones do not appear to have been issued, though the contents of all twelve volumes are given on the dust cover. A few volumes of a comprehensive English edition of Lenin's works were published several years back, but this also remains uncompleted. We may hope that the rest at any rate of the "Selected Works" will not be unduly delayed.

The present volume contains some of Lenin's most important writings and speeches, notably the pamphlet on *The State and Revolution* written in the summer of 1917, the attack on Kautsky written during the same autumn and interrupted by the Bolshevik revolution, and his addresses to the Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party in March 1918 on the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. There is also the famous thesis of May 1918 directed against the "Left-Wing Childishness" of the opposition led at this time by Bukharin, who defended what he regarded as the "pure" doctrines of Marxism against the encroachment of State capitalism. An appendix contains copious notes which (apart from the servile attitude towards current orthodoxy which is so disagreeable a feature of Soviet scholarship) serve their purpose excellently. The volume, like its predecessors, has been well and accurately printed in the Soviet Union. E. H. CARR.

100*. LA GUERRE CIVILE EN RUSSIE, 1918–1920. By G. Welter. 1936. (Paris: Payot. 8vo. 200 pp. 15 *frs.*)

THIS book forms part of the "Collection of Memoirs, Studies and Documents useful for the History of the World War," published in Paris. Its author has shown his qualification for his task by his previous publication *Histoire de la Russie Communiste*.

His analysis of the causes which led up to the Russian Revolution is concise and impartial. The Bolsheviks were in their first efforts aided by war weariness, a naïve belief in universal pacifism and the land hunger of the peasantry (p. 41). They themselves did not believe in the durability of their success, but the lack of cohesion among their opponents, principally officers of the old Army, and the absence of an energetic middle class assisted them, whilst among the factory workers and peasants they had "the majority of souls on their side," for in civil strife "the word is more powerful than the gun" (p. 173).

The author justly says that it is impossible to write a chronological account of the civil war which ensued, but he gives sufficiently clear descriptions of the various encounters between the "Whites" and the "Reds," and explains the causes of the former's failures and the final success of the latter.

Quite rightly he repudiates the accusation used in Bolshevik propaganda that the suffering of the people was due to a blockade by the Allies (p. 75).

Significant is the remark that the Russian peasant is now reduced to the mournful status of a land labourer (p. 182).

In his description of events in the Far East the author is less fortunate. The Far Eastern Republic was not one of the so-called "Governments" in opposition to Moscow, but a creation of Moscow itself facilitating its policy *vis-à-vis* China and Japan.

Ossendowsky's story cuts a queer figure as a source consulted for the history of this region (p. 160).

The book is a useful addition for the study of Russian affairs.

W. J. OUDENDYK.

101*. INTERVENTION, CIVIL WAR AND COMMUNISM IN RUSSIA, APRIL–DECEMBER 1918: Documents and Materials. By James Bunyan. 1936. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. Oxford University Press. 8vo. 610 pp. 21s.)

THIS volume is a continuation of *The Bolshevik Revolution* reviewed in the issue of *International Affairs* for March–April 1935. It covers the period April to December 1918, and follows the same method as its predecessor, presenting history in the form of documents with a short running commentary to connect them. The subjects treated include Austro-German intervention in South Russia, the clash with the Czechoslovaks, the beginnings of Allied intervention, and the first steps towards the organisation of the Soviet State. The selection of documents, which includes important press articles as well as official pronouncements, seems to have been well made, and space is gained by presenting many of them in extracts. The volume will be useful to those who read no Russian, and also to those who read Russian but have not at their disposal the sometimes rather inaccessible sources from which these documents are taken. Use has been made of the valuable original material collected by the Hoover War Library.

E. H. CARR.

102. SCENES FROM SOVIET LIFE. By W. P. and Zelda K. Coates. 1936. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. xiv + 295 pp. 5s.)

THIS book, written by the Secretary of the Anglo-Russian Committee and his wife, describes a tour to the U.S.S.R., undertaken in the summer of 1935 and covering one of the usual tourist routes, by sea to Leningrad, through Moscow and Kharkov to Rostov and Stalingrad, and back along the Volga to Gorki, before returning to Moscow. The authors have the advantage of knowing the Russian language, and therefore of being able to conduct interviews without the intervention of an interpreter. They are also painstaking and conscientious diarists, as is evidenced by the detailed descriptions given of the factories, collective farms and other institutions which they visited, descriptions supplemented by numerous photographs. Having visited the U.S.S.R. on previous occasions, they are able to compare their earlier impressions with the situation as they saw it in 1935. The book can be recommended as an admirable photographic record of places and persons seen, if not as a balanced description of life in Soviet Russia to-day. The authors' obvious predilection in favour of the Soviet system hampers them in giving an objective picture of a country in which economic rehabilitation has only recently imposed upon the population immense sacrifices in comfort and even in health, and where political dissension has lately produced a spectacular public trial.

MARGARET MILLER.

103*. THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN THE U.S.S.R. By G. N. Serebrennikov. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 288 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*)

THE Soviet Government has always given a prominent place to its policy of emancipating women and encouraging their entry into social and economic life on a basis of complete equality with men. This is certainly a highly significant development, and information on it deserves a warm welcome. Unfortunately, the information contained in this book, although commendably complete, is clothed in unattractive form, and even a reader with the keenest interest in the subject will find it dreary work wading through masses of statistics and chapter after chapter of uncritical eulogy of Government policy.

A striking fact which emerges from the author's array of figures is the immense volume of economic capacity which exists among the masses of working women, and which has been released by this policy of emancipation. Industrial skill, organising capacity, inventiveness, are secured in rich measure for the benefit of the State, all or much of which is lost in countries which actively discourage the work of women outside their homes or which adopt a policy of passive resistance towards their entry into economic life. Soviet policy has forged for the country a weapon which is of obvious benefit in times of peace and which might, one feels, be of decisive importance in case of war.

But the real interest of this social revolution lies in the future. So far, Soviet women have been absorbed in acquiring the skill and education needed to fit them for their new freedom. So far, also, their new freedom has been utilised in exact accordance with the desires of the Government, that is, in the service of economic expansion. The true significance of present changes will only become apparent when women begin to make independent use of their new powers and to decide for themselves how they shall be used. MARGARET MILLER.

NEAR EAST

104*. THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY. By Sir Harry Luke. 1936. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. viii + 246 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

THE evolution of Turkey, like Cæsar's Gaul, may be divided into three parts. In his latest book, Sir Harry Luke, Lieutenant-Governor of Malta, who knows his Near East well, traces the transition from Constantinople to Angora. In the course of three centuries an obscure Siberian tribe, impelled first by the desire to spread Islam, later by the desire to plunder, and still later by the necessity to find employment for a restless army in distant lands, succeeded by military preponderance in establishing an empire from Baghdad to the walls of Vienna. "Their military and naval organisation was so highly reputed that men of enterprise from many countries were impelled to learn warfare under the banner of the Crescent." The Corps of Janissaries was first and foremost in that military machine, and its history is traced from its formation to its destruction by Mahmud II in 1826. Then came decline. The Treaty of Carlowitz marks the beginning of recession; the Treaty of Lausanne established the present frontiers of Turkey and created out of the burning of Smyrna a homogeneous State by liquidating the problem of minorities.

The author says, "There is no Turkish equivalent of the word 'interesting,' for the reason that the Turk has not an interested mind. He accepts things, he can understand them, but he does not take an interest in them in the Western sense of the words." This sentence

provides an important key to the study of foreign policy; it is possible to interpret Turkish relations with foreign States and the minorities, the treatment of the Christian races in the Empire forming a part of, and later having a definite influence in the shaping of, Turkish foreign policy. The decline may be traced to that static quality. Capitulations to foreigners and security of tenure to vassal races were due to that lack of interest. The author speaks with sympathy of the era of the Tanzimat and its sequel the Hatt-i-Humayoun, brilliant in conception, but lacking in execution. The corrupt atmosphere of the pre-War Constantinople is aptly described, wherein flourished "the indigenous informer and blackmailer and less reputable European speculator," engaged in his Sisyphean task of propelling his petitions up the tortuous alleyways of the Ministries.

The first decade of the nineteenth century marked the beginning of the end. The last of the Sultans was sent to the villa Allatini to be succeeded by three *Rois fainéants.* At the end of the War Mustapha Kemal formed a new administration, suppressed the Khalifate, proclaimed an atheist State and, realising the demoralising influence of Constantinople, moved the capital to Angora; the hat replaced the fez (fezes were temporarily shorn after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908; Austria was the main country of supply); women were emancipated, and the Swiss code, ready-made and off-the-peg, became the law of the country; the Republic was proclaimed in a speech of six days occupying 500 odd pages of script; perhaps only a few would wish it were longer. The story of the Khalifate, amply treated in a previous chapter, reaches a sad climax when the last of the Khalifs "repaired unobtrusively on board H.M.S. *Malaya*, which conveyed him to Malta." Yet time will show whether or no the new racial fanaticism will prove a more effective influence than the deeper religious emotion suited to a primitive race like the bucolic Anatolian peasant.

The author denies any intention of writing history; yet his learned account of the reforms of the law and language, his comparison of the Pan-Touranic movement to the Nationalist aims and his description of the administrative machinery of the Christian races are deep and discerning. A criticism might perhaps be made whether the description of the administrative façade has not overshadowed the deeper human issues involved. Not all specialists will agree with the author's dynastic arguments of succession; the influence of Orchan's marriage to a Byzantine Princess may be doubted if examined against the background of the then-ruling conditions; the mothers of subsequent Sultans were mostly slaves.

Sir Harry Luke has written with sympathy and understanding; relations with Great Britain, now cordial, varied from age to age; Turkish foreign policy was influenced by men like Stratford-Canning, Layard and Elliot. The author, in helping towards an understanding of the new régime, may promote friendlier relations.

H. M. BOSTANDJIS.

105. MUSTAPHA KEMAL, DICTATEUR. Par Philippe de Zara. 1936. (Paris: Fernand Sorlat. 8vo. 371 pp. 75 *frs.*)

THE scope of this book exceeds its title. The first 242 pages deal with pre-War and post-War Turkey up to the Treaty of Sèvres, with a casual reference to the subject of the book; perhaps in vindication of the author's statement that isolation is necessary to dictators. After

p. 242 Mustapha Kemal, in dominating Turkish policy, dominates his own biography.

The author is silent on the changes wrought by the new régime; his residence in pre-War Turkey should have enabled him to make a learned and discerning comparison with pre-War conditions. He speaks sympathetically of some subject races, especially the Armenians; he speaks well and, perhaps, on the whole, justly of the governor of Smyrna during the War, who made the best of both worlds and now lives in opulent retirement in France; but few of the prisoners who survived Turkish camps would wish to remember their "excellent" treatment in Anatolia.

There are many statements which call for comment; to wit, on p. 76 Cretan deputies did come to the Parliament in Athens; the author does not mention that they were excluded by force by Veniselos, already Prime Minister of Greece; on p. 119 Veniselos appears as member for Crete; M. Veniselos never represented Crete in the Hellenic Parliament. On p. 171 Veniselos appears in the pay of England; on p. 219 Feisal was subsidised by England to the tune of two million sterling per month to stir a revolt against the French in Syria. Where does the author base his allegations? Such fiction is dangerous.

The book lacks objectivity. The author might have written it to stimulate Latin propaganda. There are many misprints, and if Sir Basil Zaharoff had been a baronet, Debrett would have known it.

To the student of foreign policy the value of this book lies in its stimulus to consult frequently proven authorities.

H. M. BOSTANDJIS.

106*. THY NEIGHBOUR. By Lord Melchett. 1936. (London: Frederick Muller. 8vo. 286 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

THIS study by Lord Melchett is an apologia for Jewish colonisation in Palestine. The author begins with a brief survey of Jewish history leading up to the growth of the Zionist Movement. The greater part of the book is given to the study of the actual Palestinian situation. A good many people will disagree with the author's very generous estimate of the number of Jews which Palestine could contain. On the other hand, it is well to bring before British readers the extent of the Jewish problem in Eastern Europe, whether Palestine is to be the solution or not. The present trend in Polish politics has brought the question of Jewish migration to the fore. The book is also valuable for reminding the people that the Palestinian problem is not merely a political one. The claim of the Jews to recognition in Palestine does not rest upon their political success—which has been slight—but on their social and economic work, which has been magnificent. J. W. PARKES.

THE FAR EAST

107*. THE FAR EAST IN WORLD POLITICS: A Study in Recent History. By G. F. Hudson. 1937. (Oxford University Press. 8vo. vi + 276 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

THIS small and compact volume is "an attempt to provide a short historical introduction to the present international situation in the Far East." It fulfils its purpose admirably.

The author surveys Far Eastern developments from "the opening of the gates" at the beginning of the nineteenth century up to 1931

(from which point onwards he credits the reader with sufficient knowledge of what is taking place). He ends with a short conclusion, in which he describes Japan's future as depending on her ability to keep the command of north-western Pacific waters, and foresees that in doing this she is destined to be challenged by the United States.

The art of writing a study of this sort within a strictly limited compass lies in being able to select, over a given period of history, those changes and events which form the essential starting-points of the present-day situation. There is also the difficulty of deciding what share of importance to give to the several countries which enter into the picture. On this question of right proportion opinion is sure to differ, but some readers may think that, in apportioning his space between China and Japan, Mr. Hudson is too much inclined to subordinate the latter to the former, whose international affairs he has dealt with considerably more fully than those of the Japanese. When all is said and done, Japan is the active, China the passive, element in the situation with which we are faced, and what we particularly want is to understand the impulses which are urging Japan along her present path.

Though the book takes the form of condensed history, it is far from a mere chronicle. The record of events is accompanied by much illuminating comment, and there are interesting lines of approach to many important historical landmarks, such as, for instance, the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Shantung Settlement in 1919 in its relation to the refusal of the United States to enter the League of Nations.

In so short a work it is easy, of course, to point to "obvious omissions." Those which have struck the present reviewer more particularly are the disposal in two short sentences of the "Twenty-One Demands," which, in a sense, was the seed from which Manchukuo has sprung, and the slight treatment accorded to Japanese grievances in Manchuria, the roots of which went deeper, and which date farther back in time than the book would seem to suggest. The scholarship of the work is, it need not be said, beyond question, and a careful search has been needed to find a mistake to pounce on. When found, it was not very serious, but in the cause of strict accuracy it is perhaps worth while to point out that the control of municipal affairs in the French Concession at Shanghai lies not in the hands of an electorate of foreign ratepayers, as is intimated on page 21, but is exercised (pretty autocratically !) by the French Consul-General, assisted merely by an advisory council whose foreign members are official appointees. Democratic control based on property rating, is confined to its neighbour, the International Settlement. G. E. HUBBARD.

108. THE BIRTH OF CHINA : A SURVEY OF THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF CHINESE CIVILISATION. By H. G. Creel, Instructor in Chinese History and Language in the University of Chicago. 1936. (London : Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 396 pp. 15*s*.)

THE problem of the origins of Chinese civilisation has long baffled scholars and produced a number of conflicting theories. But it is certain that we are now much nearer to its solution than ever before as a result of new knowledge coming mainly from three sources : (*a*) the examination and reinterpretation of early Chinese historical records by modern scientifically trained Chinese historians; (*b*) the comparative study of early cultures and their relationships by the

scholars of many countries and, above all, (*c*) systematic archæological excavations in China itself. The last has been frequently hindered by troubled conditions, but the special protection and assistance given to excavations by the Nanking Government in the critical region of Honan have enabled excellent progress to be made during the last two or three years, and the results are of the greatest significance and interest. Professor Creel, the author of this fascinating work, has an intimate knowledge of the excavations and their interpretation, and the first portion of his book is devoted to a lucid discussion of them, which must appeal to all who are interested in the Chinese people and their very distinctive culture. He is particularly concerned with the wonderful discoveries at Anyang, not only of the now-famous Oracle Bones and the conclusions to be deduced from the earliest known Chinese writing on them, but of the great wealth of early bronzes and sculptures. Very much has come to light during the last two years, and this is the first full account of its true meaning available to Western students. We have here revealed the rich civilisation in the second millennium B.C. of the " Great City Shang," *i.e.* of Anyang, the capital of the Shang or Yin dynasty, situated on the loess in the drier western portion of the Plain of North China.

Of equal, although more technical interest, is the relationship of this early historic civilisation to the Late Neolithic civilisation of North China, and also the extent of its indebtedness to influences drifting through the oases of the Tarim Basin from the old centres of civilisation in Western Asia. To the latter source may very probably be due the introduction of wheat and the initial knowledge of casting in bronze, and possibly the first idea of hieroglyphic writing. But one of the most important conclusions that emerges from these studies is the strength of the evidence for direct continuity from the " Black Pottery " culture of the Late Neolithic of Honan to the historic Shang civilisation in the same region, and for the rapid assimilation into the very distinctive Chinese complex of whatever early influences came in from the West. North China stands revealed as one of the most important of the world's early nuclei of creativeness and individuality, the achievement of a people of a " single, general racial type " ancestral to the modern Chinese.

The later part (Book 3) of Professor Creel's book describes the conquest of the Shang State by the Chous, initially at a much lower cultural level, but infusing new vigour into the civilisation which they quickly absorbed and which, under their dynasty, was spread over a much wider area. This civilisation, which developed into the so-called Classical Period of Chinese history, is discussed in all its principal aspects (literature, society, law and government), with a great wealth of illuminating quotations from the Book of Poetry and other selections from the historical books. Of particular interest is the analysis of the causes which led to the early importance of the official non-military class, which came so sharply to distinguish Chinese society from that of other agricultural empires, and of the closely connected evolution of the conception of the Emperor's function as that of " a public servant," who could legitimately be displaced if he " exhausted the Mandate of Heaven."

Altogether this is a highly significant book. There are some excellent illustrations of the Anyang Oracle Bones and of Shang and Chou bronzes. P. M. ROXBY.

109*. CHINA'S NEW CURRENCY SYSTEM. By T'ang Leang-Li. 1936. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. 8vo. ix + 138 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

THE first hundred pages of this book give a clear and concise account of the condition of Chinese currency prior to November 1935 and of the change which then took place. The remaining thirty pages consist of useful Tables and Appendices.

There is also a sketch of Chinese monetary history from the earliest times. In China, as in some other parts of the world, the first-known money consisted of cowrie shells which circulated there 4000 years ago, and were officially forbidden about 400 B.C. The author gives a very illuminating account of the past and present modern and native banking systems of China, and describes the arrangements made in 1935 whereby the banknotes of the Central Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the Bank of Communications were made full legal tender, while the use of silver for currency became illegal.

The changes which have taken place in the monetary systems of Europe and the United States, the lapse from gold, the growth of the sterling area, and the devaluation of the currencies of the United States, France and other countries, have all presented serious difficulties, but the alterations were effected from a basis of an unified currency and banking system. (On page 52, in describing the British lapse from gold in September 1931, the author talks as if a new value for the pound sterling had been fixed by the British Government which may prove rather misleading to some students.) But China had to start from chaos. Mr. T'ang Leang-li describes on page 35 that, apart from the native banks (quite unintegrated), the modern Chinese banks (without direct connection with the native banks), the foreign banks (completely independent of Chinese control), and the provincial banks (mostly in the hands of local officials or militarists), there were tens of thousands of commercial institutions, money exchange shops, pawnshops, and so on, carrying on banking business in addition to their ordinary trade. Currency was completely chaotic. Silver formed the basis of currency for large transactions, while copper remained the currency of the poor. There were various kinds of silver dollars of different values: up to 1928 the silver tael still survived in Shanghai, Tientsin and Hankow, while the fictitious Haikwan tael was used for the purpose of the Chinese maritime customs. Exchange rates between "small money," 10, 20 cents, and "big dollar" were constantly changing, while the rates of exchange between the various kinds of copper and silver and notes fluctuated from day to day.

The Chinese Government hopes that the reforms of 1935 have brought all this to an end. Up to now, as the author claims, the results have been excellent, but the Central Reserve Bank has not yet commenced, and it is doubtful to what extent new currency is really replacing the old.

The book has some interesting tables, which show very clearly the effect on China of the United States silver policy, and the tables on "Purchasing Power and Silver," and "Industrial and Agricultural Prices" are useful and instructive. BARNARD ELLINGER.

110. LA CHINE PASSÉ ET PRÉSENT. By Jean Escarra. 1936. (Paris: Armand Colin. sm. 8vo. 213 pp. 13 *frs.*)

A short and objective resumé of Chinese history, civilisation and present-day developments by a French jurist who has served for a number

of years as legal adviser to the Government of China and is a leading authority on Chinese law. The book will be useful to the general reader who wishes for an unprejudiced introduction to the problems of modern China within the smallest possible compass. G. E. H.

111*. KIAOCHOW LEASED TERRITORY. By Ralph A. Norem. (Cambridge University Press; University of California Press. 8vo. 150 pp. Maps. 7s.)

112*. LE STATUT POLITIQUE ET INTERNATIONAL DU LAOS FRANÇAIS. By François Iché. 1935. (Paris: Rousseau et Cie. 8vo. 219 pp.)

THESE two monographs both deal with difficult questions of political status affecting Far Eastern territories, and each illustrates a distinct method of approach to the problem. Mr. Norem's study adopts the familiar method of American research into problems of political status, being amply documented and containing an exhaustive bibliography and a large-scale map, besides two smaller ones. The available evidence of status is put first, and from it certain conclusions are deduced. Dr. Iché's work, on the other hand, defends a thesis, and although he has consulted the relevant authorities (a full bibliography is appended), that is only incidental to his argument.

When Germany took over Kiaochow in 1897, an awkward problem arose in relation to its status. It was termed a "leased territory." What significance could be attached to this, and what was its significance from the standpoint of German constitutional law? German jurists were by no means united on the point. Mr. Norem regards the status of Kiaochow from 1898 until 1915 as a public international lease, and adds (p. 86) "Territory over which the lessee State retains territorial right while at the same time it surrenders jurisdictional right to the lessee State, constitutes a public international lease." This may be true for Kiaochow, but it is doubtful whether it exactly covers other leases of Chinese territory by foreign Powers. Indeed, the meaning of "lease" as applied to Chinese territory is elusive, and has changed more than once since its first application. It depends, in fact, for its real significance upon political factors. However, Mr. Norem plainly shows how quickly the German administrators worked in the limited time at their disposal; they were interrupted, in fact, just at the moment when Shantung seemed to be passing under their domination.

Dr. Iché's study is concerned with the nature of France's dominion over a little-known part of Indo-China which, before the French occupation, was periodically overrun by Siam. The author gives a rapid sketch of the events which led to the French occupation, and then devotes himself to a consideration of the problem whether Laos, from the standpoint of French law, may be considered to be a colony or a protectorate. Both views have been advanced at different times, and the author's own conclusion is that, with regard to the Kingdom of Luang-Prabang, the term protectorate is the most appropriate, whilst the other territories of Laos can be regarded simply as colonies.

For the English reader, the most interesting feature of Dr. Iché's work is his account of the relations of the French Government with the kingdom of Luang-Prabang, for the relationship seems strikingly similar to that existing between the Crown and the Indian princes. It is apparent, however, that the term "protectorate" in French means something a good deal more precise than it does in English, whilst Dr. Iché's theory that, in such a protectorate, what has been

preserved is the religious (as distinct from the political) element of sovereignty, which therefore becomes the focus for the preservation of racial culture, is ingenious, if not altogether convincing.

G. W. KEETON.

113. EYES ON JAPAN. By Victor A. Yakhontoff. 1936. (New York: Coward-McCann Inc. 8vo. xvii + 329 pp. Illus. $3·50.)

114*. MILITARISM AND FOREIGN POLICY IN JAPAN. By E. E. N. Causton. 1936. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 207 pp. Map. 7s. 6d.)

GENERAL YAKHONTOFF, who has already published two books about the Far East, was, we are told, Military Attaché at the Imperial Russian Embassy at Tokyo, and was in charge of the Russian translation of the official Japanese history of the Russo-Japanese War. It is clear that he knows his subject well. His attitude is critical but friendly towards the Japanese and tolerant towards the Soviet Union. He writes primarily for an American audience. His book, which is just one degree nearer to good journalism than it is to profound study, is both readable and instructive. It is a kind of easy-going encyclopædia, reviewing the general outline and the outstanding features in the Japanese landscape. "It is designed to offer the general reader a book answering without minor details most of the questions arising from reading the daily press." This is a modest and reasonable claim. And the book, which is on the whole accurate and well-balanced, will leave "the general reader" with a mixed bag of useful knowledge about Japan. One third of it is devoted to a rather helter-skelter historical sketch; one third to economic and social conditions; and one third to present-day problems, and to relations with foreign Powers, especially China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. The author calls special attention to the following points:—

(i) The old conception of Japan as a small island country is no longer correct; she is a great colonial Power controlling a territory larger than that of Germany, France and England combined, with a population already exceeding that of the United States.

(ii) War between Japan and the Soviet Union is not unavoidable; the Soviet has immense military strength, its industry is "already far ahead of Japan's," and it can draw on incomparably larger and wealthier resources.

(iii) The assertion that the United States has no particular interest in Asia in general, and in China in particular, is not warranted by facts.

As regards Great Britain, General Yakhontoff has come to the conclusion that in the circumstances created by Japan, Great Britain can keep only as much of her old position in East Asia as Japan permits; she has therefore come to a decision on no account to antagonise Japan. The book is illustrated by about twenty-five agreeable photographs of the usual Japanese type and two cartoons by Low.

Mr. Causton's book is of a different character. It was written in the form of an essay for the degree of Master of Arts at Yale University. The author is an intelligent student of Japan, but he is "without an intimate knowledge of its language, its people and its customs." The facts, however, are so well arranged, the exposition is so clearly and

logically developed, and the study holds so closely to its terms of reference, that to any one wishing to concentrate on the influence which Japanese militarism has had on foreign policy in recent times, we can warmly recommend this essay as a safe and useful guide. The book is quite objective, and not in the least Japanophobe. In the first half it studies the religious, cultural and historical foundation of Japanese militarism, and the weakness of representative democracy in Japan as limited by Ito's constitution. It then traces the development of "expansionism" as revived by the teachings of Yoshida Shoin, but held in check by the "peace party" until 1894. "The China War . . . revived the inherent chauvinism of the people. . . . It made chauvinism more than a temporary state of mind." Unexpectedly, Mr. Causton acquits the "military party" of close connection with the Twenty-One Demands of 1915, which seem to him to be based on commercial rather than on chauvinistic ambition. But throughout his study of the pre-1931 period he fails to bring out the importance of Manchuria as the special stage of military diplomacy and of Russia represented as the national enemy. The "peace party" regained influence in Japan after the Great War. Surely the weakness of Russia was one of the principal factors in the decline of military influence? In 1929, the military power of Russia was recovering, and at the end of that year a Russian army invaded North Manchuria. Mr. Causton misses this event altogether, though he grasps the significance to Japan of the impending Disarmament Conference at Geneva. The two events taken together explain why the Japanese Army leaders judged that their crisis was one of life or death. The economic crash in the United States gave them their opportunity, and growing distress in Japan itself drove them on. Mr. Causton gets a part, but not the whole of this picture. He misses the revolutionary character of the Japanese atmosphere in 1931–32. But he gives very clearly the great trial of strength between democracy and militarism over the ratification of the London Naval Treaty in 1930. "Never before had the Cabinet taken matters of national defence into its own hands." The Navy and Army chiefs were *roulés*, but since 1931 they have had their revenge.

Mr. Causton takes us as far as the propaganda of General Araki, and to about the end of 1934. He does not reach the outbreak of February 1936, with its reaction, still so difficult to assess, on the military ascendancy. He forbears from all prophecy, but he sums up as follows :—

> "The Japanese military have occupied a supremely independent position. . . . Their prestige has been high in the estimation of the people. . . . The forces opposed to them have been weak. The events of the last forty years prove that they have used that position to launch their country upon a particular course of action rather than advise its adoption, and to formulate and direct, rather than enforce, the policy of the Government."

P. J.

115*. Gods of To-Morrow. By William Teeling. 1936. (London: Lovat Dickson. 8vo. xii + 372 pp., illus. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

As a representative of the Overseas League, the author attended the Melbourne Centenary celebrations in October 1934. On his way out, he stayed a few days in Ceylon and a fortnight in Singapore. He toured extensively throughout Australia, visited New Zealand, passed on to Fiji and New Guinea, and then went to Saigon, Hong Kong and the Philippines. He travelled far into the interior of Southern China, saw a great deal of Japan, visited the Northern Islands of Hokkaido

and Karafuto (formerly Saghalien), and then went south to Formosa. Thence he went to Shanghai, and completed a tour of nineteen months by returning to England *via* Siberia and Russia. Armed with sheaves of excellent letters of introduction, he stayed with Governors, and interviewed Premiers and leading men everywhere. There is a delightful account of a sixteen-days' yachting trip with Sir Hubert Murray on a gubernatorial tour of inspection of some islands of East Papua.

Everywhere he talked to everyone who could be made to talk; and, especially in the English-speaking countries, we hear what the young men think of their elders, and what the people out there have to say about the people in England. One gains the impression of the writer's tremendous energy, of a fight against time in the ceaseless journeying, and of youthful determination to find out the problems of every country. Naturally, we meet familiar friends such as the British manufacturer, who does not consider the local requirements, the unqualified commercial traveller, and the London director, who has much to learn from his estate-assistant. Time after time people "out there" told him that the leading men from home should pay them frequent visits to study the problems and to set up contact: they forget that, whatever these people may think and say in the local environment, they see things quite differently again after they have re-crossed the "salt estranging sea" and returned to their seats in their London offices. The field of vision is different: it always must be so; but a Government subsidy to make wireless telephone conversation better and cheaper would do much to remove an undoubted barrier to imperial and international understanding.

Governors and Cabinet Ministers were amazingly frank with him, and he is equally candid. Meeting a group of thirty-two Australian Ministers and ex-Ministers at an official luncheon party, he was surprised by the lack of international knowledge of almost all of them (page 115). A well-known politician, mentioned by name on the same page, admitted to him a complete lack of knowledge of all foreign countries. Concerning Japan's policy towards Australia, with its vast undeveloped areas, with its policy of regarding uninhabited spaces as "a white man's country," and its complete lack of defence against attack, a former Japanese ambassador assured him that he personally did not believe in "all this talk about dividing up colonies and the world's raw materials," and that what Japan wanted was "more markets for the finished goods." The point that, if Japan did not get the market, it might take the territory, was apparently not mentioned. In a chapter on the goldfields of New Guinea (6,000 feet up in the mountains of the interior, and accessible only by aeroplanes, which have transported all the heavy machinery of enormous dredges and carry all the food supplies), Mr. Teeling (on page 190) concludes with a series of thumping questions: How does Japan view this tempting country and its neighbour Dutch New Guinea? Can the Dutch hold their East Indies without British support? What will happen when the United States leaves the Philippines? Would it be wise to let Germany have her former colony back again? Wisely, he leaves it at that.

The outward thrust of nations is taking Australia northwards, and bringing Japan southwards: between them lies nothing but the sea and fat, defenceless islands—Formosa, the Philippines, Borneo, Macassar and New Guinea.

Japan's success as a cheap producer is due to the cheap cost of living—a very different thing from a low standard of living—and to superlative organisation. In a mine, which employed 10,000 men directly and another 5,000 indirectly, Mr. Teeling found that the men got about £5 a month. They live rent-free, however, with free hospital attendance and many excellent social amenities. They save about £1 a month, and, on an average, each man has £30 in the bank. The brains behind the business combination have perhaps as much to do with the cheap cost of production as the low cost of living. The Dutch, in their East Indies, welcome the cheap Japanese articles (page 206) because they help to keep down the cost of living.

The book is really interesting: it would have been more valuable if it had been written less hurriedly and less patchily, and if the author had had time to pull it all together. There is a ridiculous mistake on page 136, regarding the cost of a Malayan leper asylum. The index is very poor, and the only map is the style of thing that shows sea-monsters. GEORGE MAXWELL.

116. RIP TIDE IN THE SOUTH SEAS. By Willard Price. 1936. (London: Heinemann. 8vo. xiv + 323 pp. 15s.)

MR. WILLARD PRICE has done what the League of Nations Mandates Commission found it so hard to do—namely, get at the facts about Japan's administration of her Pacific Mandate. He has explored on the spot the vexed questions of the fortification of the islands and of the treatment of the natives.

On both counts his report is favourable to Japan. He acquits her of secret fortification—while pointing out that Nature has saved her the trouble in the provision of naval harbours at all events—and as regards her behaviour towards the natives he gives her a comparatively clean sheet. "It would seem," he says, "that, making allowance for the dislike of human beings for any control over their actions, the rule of Japan is as satisfactory as any could be." To satisfy the primitive Kanakas seems, as a matter of fact, a fairly easy business. When Mr. Price asked whether they preferred the Japanese to the Germans, the answer was that Japanese rule was best, inasmuch as under the Germans the fine for getting drunk was twenty-five yen, while the Japanese magistrate lets you off with five!

The author visited about a dozen of the islands, travelling, as he tells us, 7300 miles through Japanese waters. He writes of them in the rather breezy American style of the *National Geographic*, whose high standard in the matter of illustrations he likewise emulates. Without going deeply below the surface, he gives one a very living impression both of the Islanders and of the Japanese settlers. The latter are pouring in (this is the "rip tide" of the title) at the rate of over 10,000 a year, and already outnumber the natives who bid fair to become a vanishing race. What, Mr. Price pertinently asks, becomes of a League Mandate if the population ceases to be native to the soil?

We have had our attention fixed since 1931 on Japan's expansive efforts on the Asiatic mainland, but her southern march, which affects the British Empire more closely, has been veiled from foreign observation by the practical difficulties of access, enhanced by the stringent restrictions which the Japanese have placed on visitors to the islands. Mr. Price, according to his own account, bluffed his way through these restrictions, and enjoyed comparative freedom in his tour of inspection. There are nevertheless indications of a certain amount of shepherding

even in his case, and there seems to be little doubt that inquisitiveness into strategic matters by more expert investigators has been, to say the least, heavily discouraged. In any case, we have from Mr. Price an interesting first-hand account of Japan's progress in the South Seas and of her vigorous development of steamship and air-lines in that region.

Such an enjoyable travel-book need not be scrutinised too closely for minor mistakes, but there is one statement by Mr. Price which one cannot easily pass over, reflecting, as it does, a widespread and quite serious misapprehension of the facts. After speaking of the islands as a possible Japanese stepping-stone on the way to Australia, he writes, "The Japanese are intensely interested in the theory of the re-distribution of territory, suggested by Colonel House *and endorsed in principle by Sir Samuel Hoare.*" The italics are the reviewer's.

G. E. HUBBARD.

117*. ONZE DEFENSIE-POLITIEK EN DE WEERMACHT IN NEDERLANDSCH-INDIE. By P. F. Hoeksema de Groot. (*Publicatie No. 2 van de Vereeniging tot Studie van den Staat.*) 1937. (Bussum: van Dishoeck. 8vo. 47 pp. 75 *cent.*)

A short study of political and strategic questions of the Far East, with special reference to the defence of the Dutch East Indies.

118. JAPAN IN WORLD ECONOMICS. By Emil Lederer. (Reprinted from the February 1937 issue of *Social Research*, published by the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research, New York.) 32 pp. 25*c.*

119. THE ABROGATION OF THE GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT. (*Harvard Phi Beta Kappa Prize Essay.*) By Rodman W. Paul. 1936. (Cambridge, Mass.: Oxford University Press. Sm. 8vo. 117 pp. 6*s.*)

A useful and well-documented monograph dealing with one particular aspect of the Immigration Act of 1924 from a purely American standpoint, without reference to the international implications of the Act.

120. PACIFIC POLITICS. By Joseph Ralston Hayden. [*Day and Hour Series*, University of Minnesota, No. 16.] March 1937. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 8vo. 28 pp. 25*c.*)

A thoughtful analysis of the fundamental aspects of the Far Eastern situation by a former Vice-Governor of the Philippines and Far Eastern correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor.* The section dealing with the Philippine Islands and their political outlook is of particular interest.

G. E. H.

LATIN AMERICA

121*. LA CONSTITUCION URUGUAYA DE 1934. By Oscar Díaz de Vivar. 1935. (Buenos Aires: J. Menéndez. 8vo. 74 pp.)

Brief commentary.

122*. EL REGIMEN MUNICIPAL DE SANTA FE. By Oscar Díaz de Vivar. 1934. (Buenos Aires: J. Menéndez. 8vo. 63 pp.)

Brief commentary.

CORRESPONDENCE

To The Editor
International Affairs.

Dear Sir,

As " The Spanish Situation Reviewed," in the May–June issue of International Affairs, has endeavoured to present an impartial summing up, comments, based on Chatham House meetings, may be permissible.

(1) The name which it gives to the case for trial, *The Spanish Republic* v. *General Franco and others*, requires enlargement. For the addition, *and others*, is required in the case of the plaintiff also. If Germany and Italy have given help to the Nationalists, Russia " and other sources " (French) have performed the same office for the Madrid Government.

(2) The article suggests that the Nationalists derive their Spanish support from army officers and the rich. Visitors from General Franco's army report otherwise. For it is said to contain a great number of Spanish volunteers, many of them from the working classes, such as peasants. They are fighting to prevent Spain becoming "red," as they believe in patriotism as opposed to Communist internationalism.

(3) It is asserted that Germany and Italy are the only Powers in Europe with " militarist ideals and expansionist aims." This statement overlooks Russia, with the largest army in the world, with her domination of Mongolia and Sinkiang, and the continued activity of her Komintern, which seeks to establish in other countries Communism by revolution, as in Spain.

(4) It is asserted that " a ' red ' Spain, with all its horrors, may well be less of a danger to ourselves and the outside world than the only apparent alternative." Now, among these horrors will be the loss of the £40,000,000 of British capital invested in Spain. I argue from the analogy of "red" Russia. Also the activities of the Komintern will receive an encouragement and an impetus. Such a prospect will be viewed by Communists with gratification, but otherwise by anyone desirous of maintaining his country's integrity and constitution.

(5) " The only apparent alternative," the victory of the Nationalists with German and Italian help, need not alarm us. For the domination of the Spanish peninsula and possessions is primarily a naval question, and England and France together can still challenge Europe on the sea. Also there is safety in numbers. A joint domination by Germany and Italy is impossible. For these two countries are too dissimilar and have too many points of difference. Thirdly, General Franco has repeatedly and emphatically asserted the Nationalist resolution to maintain the independence of Spain. These considerations are all the more satisfactory as a Nationalist victory seems to be probable.

Yours faithfully,
J. C. French.

East India United Service Club,
16 *St. James's Square,*
*London S.W.*1.
8th May 1937.

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The Institute, as such, is precluded by its rules from expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs. Any opinions expressed in the papers, discussions, or reviews printed in this Journal are, therefore, purely individual.

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THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE[1]

MR. H. V. HODSON

ALTHOUGH the recent Imperial Conference produced, in the public eye, scarcely any tangible results at all, I believe it to have been an essentially constructive meeting.

Before considering, however, the main items on its agenda, let us take note of certain minor questions relating to the permanent machinery of co-operation in the Commonwealth.

The Conference approved the functioning of the Imperial Economic Committee, the Imperial Shipping Committee and one or two other organs of permanent co-operation in the Commonwealth, and provided for their continuance. It rejected an Australian proposal for the establishment of an Empire Agricultural Council on the ground that the task of such a body could be quite well fulfilled by the Imperial Economic Committee or, if necessary, by *ad hoc* bodies set up to consider special questions.

This would seem to suggest that the existing machinery for permanent co-operation in the Commonwealth was working smoothly and well, and needed no improvement. I wonder if that is true? Take two of the questions on which the Conference appointed special sub-committees: shipping and civil aviation. The committee on shipping declared "that the maintenance of adequate British shipping is a matter of common concern to the countries of the Commonwealth." Yet one hardly gets the impression that the existing means of translating that principle into practice are all that can be desired. For many years the problem of foreign subsidised competition, particularly on the Pacific routes, has been growing more and more desperate, until one British steamship line has been actually driven off the ocean. Yet the manner in which that problem has been handed back and forth, from *ad hoc* governmental consideration to the Imperial Shipping Committee, and from the Imperial Shipping Committee to the Imperial Conference, which still did not manage to bring its discussions to finality, suggests that the existing machinery for

[1] Address given at Chatham House on July 6th, 1937; the Rt. Hon. Sir Leslie Wilson, G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., in the Chair.

co-operation in this field is perhaps better adapted for procrastination than for prompt decision.

As for civil aviation, the absence of suitable permanent machinery of co-operation has notoriously caused difficulties in the past. There was, for instance, the long-drawn-out dispute between the United Kingdom and Australia about the terms on which the air-mail flying-boat system should be started; indeed, whether it should be started at all, on the basis planned in this country. There was, again, the danger, obvious at one time, that local interests, and not in any sense Commonwealth interests, would determine the development of air-mail services across the Pacific and Atlantic, where co-operation with foreign countries was a vital factor. The Imperial Conference implicitly recognised these difficulties in laying down certain principles to guide future developments in civil aviation, notably the principle that any member of the Commonwealth, when negotiating with foreign countries, should consult beforehand with any other members of the Commonwealth that might be concerned. These principles are undoubtedly sound, but I personally believe that there ought to be something more, some kind of permanent Commonwealth Air Council, to keep developments in international flying constantly under review, and to advise the governments—secretly if need be—on any specific question that might arise.

The reluctance to establish new permanent machinery of co-operation seems to be fundamentally due to the half-conscious belief in some of the Dominions, or in some sections of Dominion opinion, that by taking part in such a system they would be somehow signing away their independence. I believe that that fear has been losing ground lately, largely owing to its being obviously disproved in actual practice. Significantly enough, this is the one aspect of the Commonwealth connection that Mr. de Valera still cherishes. But the fear of losing initiative and independence still remains as a handicap to strengthening the permanent machinery for round-table discussion of common problems in the Commonwealth.

That same fear certainly accounts for some of the hesitations that are apparent in the field of co-operation in foreign policy and defence, hesitations that have revealed themselves again at this Imperial Conference. Now, these are matters that are vital to the life of any nation, and I do not think we ought to grudge any Dominion its caution in committing itself on such issues. On questions of life and death, peace and war, as these may be, inter-

national co-operation must be based on national interests, at once real and realised by the people they concern, if such co-operation is to be of lasting value. And that principle applies as much to co-operation within the Commonwealth as to co-operation outside it. For if Commonwealth co-operation is not based on what each member believes to be its vital interests, then it will be only a façade, which will fall to the ground as soon as it is shaken by any practical crisis.

Therefore, in the pursuit of co-operation in the Commonwealth, we have to look first to the national interests of its member nations, including, of course, those interests that derive from the racial divisions of their peoples, and not forgetting the vital interest that each member of the Commonwealth may see in the integrity of the Commonwealth itself. Such national interests vary. Canada's, for instance, are very different from those of Australia. Hence the degree and character of co-operation that can be securely based on them will likewise vary, and it would be foolish in practice to seek too complete a uniformity of foreign policies and defence arrangements throughout the whole Commonwealth. What can be made uniform must be founded on what is common to all, the highest common factor of interest and outlook, which is not always very high.

Failure to appreciate these facts seems to me to account for a good deal of the disappointment with which the alleged indecisiveness of the Imperial Conference report has been received. What is more, failure adequately to express that fact accounts for the actual indecisiveness of the report. The reader of it is left with the difficult task of separating for himself the uniformities from the differences, and the general effect is to obscure from public appreciation both the points of unanimous agreement and the points on which agreement and co-operation are closer among some of the Commonwealth countries than among others. The differences have been allowed to dilute and weaken the impressiveness of the uniformities. At the same time, the search for uniformity has allowed some of the possibilities of bilateral or group co-operation to pass without the emphasis that they deserve.

Of course, uniformity has a value for its own sake in foreign affairs which it does not possess to the same extent in other branches of public life. It is dangerous to advertise differences of outlook or interest which other countries may seize upon and exaggerate for their own purposes. It is essential that the Commonwealth nations should follow common principles of foreign policy, so that when a crisis comes, however much they

may have differed on details, on fundamentals they will be at one. And it is essential, moreover, that this fact should be known abroad.

Therefore, Mr. Mackenzie King's speech in Paris the other day was of the very highest importance, when he said, "We like to manage our own affairs, but any threat to England would immediately bring Canada to her side."[1] That was a very remarkable statement coming from Mr. Mackenzie King. It is a statement which places a limit upon the degree of divergence that we can allow ourselves, or that other countries may count upon.

Nevertheless we ought not to be lulled by such phrases into an attitude of complacency about Commonwealth co-operation in foreign policy. "Any threat to England would immediately bring Canada to her side"—but what constitutes a threat to England? Into the answer to that question could be compressed the whole content of a foreign policy. The members of the Imperial Conference declared unanimously that their first object was the preservation of peace, that their policies would be based on the aims and ideals of the League of Nations, that their armaments would never be used for purposes of aggression or for purposes inconsistent with the Covenant or the Kellogg Pact. But what are the aims of the League of Nations, and what is the meaning of the Covenant in the world of to-day?

The various governments of the Commonwealth give widely different answers to those questions. A footnote to the Imperial Conference report expressly reserves the right of the signatories to advocate and support the statements of policy which they respectively made at the League Assembly last September, when some were for one course in the development of the League's future and some were for the very opposite.

In spite of this reservation, which leaves unresolved perhaps the most critical issue of all in general foreign policy, the Imperial Conference did record a distinct trend in the foreign policies of the member nations of the Commonwealth, a trend away from the conception of a coercive League, and towards the conclusion of agreements with various Powers, whether within the League or outside it, on the basis of national diplomatic interests. We may

[1] This was the version reported in the United Kingdom press on the authority of *Reuter*. The Canadian press report, which I had not seen when this address was delivered, ran: "We like to manage our own affairs. We co-operate with other parts of the British Empire in discussing questions of British interest. The fact that we have our own representation in other countries is evidence of that liberty and freedom which above all we prize and, were it imperilled from any source whatever, would bring us together again in preservation of it." H. V. H.

applaud that trend or deplore it, but I think it is a fact, and I want to draw attention to five separate factors which encourage me to believe it to be a fact.

First of all, there is the unanimous agreement on the separation of the Covenant from the Treaties of Peace, with the express purpose of enlarging the membership of the League. This can surely only refer to bringing Germany into the League, and Germany has expressed her firm opposition to the principle of universal collective security.

Secondly, the Conference expressed the opinion that in methods of co-operation, joint inquiry and conciliation, and not in recourse to the use of force between nation and nation, will the fullest guarantee be found for the improvement of international relations and respect for mutual engagements. This puts collective security into the second rank of League purposes.

Thirdly, the members of the Conference went out of their way to register a view that differences of political creed should be no obstacle to friendly relations between governments and countries. That applies to Soviet Russia no less than to the fascist dictatorships, but in existing circumstances could anybody regard it as anything but a tentative overture to Germany?

Fourthly, the members of the Conference endorsed the idea of regional agreements which could be made to contribute to the cause of peace, provided they *did not conflict* with the League Covenant. That, I think, is definitely a weaker condition than saying that they must be *within the framework* of the Covenant.

Finally, the Conference particularised this regional idea in respect of the Australian proposal for a pact of non-aggression and regional understanding in the Pacific region.

Now, it may be wondered why I class the proposal for a Pacific pact as one of the straws in the wind that blows away from general collective security and towards an attitude of *Realpolitik* in foreign policy. Perhaps I am doing more than justice to what some people have regarded as a half-baked political pie.

Yet one cannot help remembering that a considerable body of Australian opinion has always been uneasy about the Washington system, and the League of Nations system, in the Far East, which replaced the old system based on the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In 1921, it will be recalled, it was Canadian opinion which overrode Australian opinion in convincing Great Britain to move into line with the American view of the necessary post-War settlement in the Pacific area, a settlement that involved giving up our special relations with Japan. Many Australians still hanker after

the idea of an Anglo-Japanese reinsurance agreement, which they feel would give them more real security than a policy which has tended to make the United States and the countries of the Commonwealth regard Japan as a dangerous and potentially hostile country.

Now, it may be that I am quite wrong in giving this twist to Mr. Lyons' proposal. I hope I am wrong, at least to this extent, that if it is a matter of exchanging our present cordial relations with the United States for better relations with Japan, I am not sure it would be a good bargain. But of course it need not amount to that, and in any case the proposal seems to have been greeted with a good deal of reserve. I need not apologise for following that side-track, because it has an important bearing on the second of the main fields of Commonwealth co-operation that the Conference explored, defence.

On the question of defence the uniformities of outlook definitely yield pride of place to the differences. The summary report of the Conference's proceedings contains little more than a recitation of national defence policies, rounded off with a few generalities. We are told that the Conference found general agreement among its members—only general agreement—that the security of each of their countries can be increased by co-operation in such matters as exchange of technical information, the continuance of arrangements for concerting the scale and the defence of ports, and measures for co-operation in the defence of communications and other common interests. At the same time, some members of the Commonwealth were anxious to go much further than such general agreement. We read in the report that " as affecting the whole field of defence, great importance was attached by the Australian delegates to the development of co-operation in defence matters between the several parts of the British Commonwealth," and that this was endorsed by His Majesty's Government in New Zealand. I think that if those two countries were the only two Dominions in the Empire they would have subscribed to something much closer in the way of co-operation. Reading between the lines, one can see a good deal of progress, on paths that diverge from strict uniformity for the whole Commonwealth, in certain directions of defence co-operation and understanding.

The function of the Singapore base in the co-operative defence of Commonwealth interests and territories in the Far East and the Pacific has been more clearly defined. So, I believe, has been the relation of the Royal Australian Navy to the Royal Navy in the

event of war in that area. Then, undoubtedly there is a clearer understanding and a closer mutuality over the strategy of the Cape route to Australia and the East, having regard to the vulnerability of the Mediterranean route. There is apparent, too, a trend towards still closer co-operation in the technique of defence, including similar training and uniformity of munitions. The purpose of this co-operation has been admirably defined in a sentence of the summary report :

> " Each of the Commonwealth countries would thus be enabled to ensure more effectively its own security, and *if it so desired*, to co-operate with other countries of the Commonwealth with the least possible delay."

Note the renewed stress on the absence of commitment in this particular form of co-operation.

Again, I think there has emerged a much clearer understanding regarding the part to be played by the air in imperial strategy, and the way in which the different countries of the Commonwealth are to co-operate in this arm, especially in the matter of air bases and fuelling stations. I see here perhaps the most vital of all fields for future Commonwealth co-operation in defence. The provision of air bases and fuelling stations provides a unique opportunity for Commonwealth co-operation which will fulfil the principles that have been from time to time laid down and have been repeated by this Conference.

Finally, the Conference opened up the urgent question of co-operation in the economics of strategy, a question that has two main aspects : how Great Britain is to be supplied with foodstuffs and raw materials in the event of war, and how the Dominions are to supply themselves with munitions, aeroplanes, and other manufactured goods necessary to the prosecution of a war. Here the nations of the Commonwealth are in a dilemma. For the obvious answer to those questions involves a move towards greater self-sufficiency all round. Yet the Commonwealth nations are perfectly well aware that the pursuit of self-sufficiency is itself one of the inner causes that create the conditions in which wars are bred. This fact is acknowledged in more than one passage of the report of the Conference, and several of the more striking statements in the opening speeches of the Conference referred to the need for economic appeasement in the cause of world peace.

Many people have voiced serious disappointment at the lack of concrete results from the Conference in the field of economic policy. But surely it would have been unwise to pitch our hopes

too high. For one thing, the agenda of the Conference itself did not extend beyond a general review of the problems of Empire trade and questions arising therefrom. The report expressly stated that there was no discussion on matters of detail affecting trade between the different parts of the British Commonwealth. In the second place, one does not have to be particularly cynical to realise that, in such affairs, general professions come more easily than specific performance. The Conference declared " that the healthy growth of international trade accompanied by an improvement in the general state of the standard of living is an essential step towards political appeasement." Yet, when it came to considering how to translate this principle into practice, it was perfectly plain that unilateral lowering of tariffs was not at all what the Commonwealth nations had in mind.

By common consent, the proposal for an Anglo-American trade agreement has been regarded as a test case. It is safe to say, I think, that in principle every government in the Commonwealth is anxious to have such an agreement concluded on as far-reaching a basis as possible. I would not like to rank the different governments in the order of their anxiety in that respect. Certainly, it is quite false to picture, as some people have in this country, a reluctant and hide-bound Great Britain egged on by eager and enlightened Dominions. Unless I am seriously misinformed, when certain American proposals were laid before the Dominions, involving some encroachment on their existing privileges in the British market, they one and all replied by expounding the compensating advantages they would want in exchange, either in this market or in the United States. Curiously enough, it seems to have been the two countries whose spokesmen made the most notable references to general economic appeasement, Canada and Australia, that insisted most keenly on the need for a counterbalance to any concessions they might be invited to make in favour of the United States : Canada, because her trade with her neighbour is so important to her, and because she has already concluded trade agreements both with the United States and with Great Britain which she regards as part of a balanced system, to be modified in one part if it is disturbed in the other; Australia, because, to be frank, the Government has to face a general election in a few months time, and also because Australia is in the midst of a trade dispute with the United States which has aroused a good deal of scepticism in Australian minds about the reputed American desire to make an unselfish contribution to freer world trade.

The problem of the Anglo-American trade agreement is just one example of the way in which the introduction of a concrete proposal at once transforms the clear elixir of liberal principle into a muddy precipitate of bilateral bargaining.

It is exactly the same with the trade relations between the Commonwealth countries themselves. The Ottawa Conference erected a formidable structure of bilateral bargains, linked only by the fact that the United Kingdom gives the same preferential terms to all parts of the Empire. But the Ottawa Conference failed to establish, to my mind, any principle or series of principles whereby future changes of policy might be guided and tested, or whereby we might escape from bilateralism altogether on a path of progressive advance towards freer trade all round. This want of permanent principles was all too apparent at the Imperial Conference and in the discussions round its fringes. Yet I am not sure that the quest for such principles was not actually begun in earnest at this Conference. Doubt is the beginning of wisdom, and there is evidence on many hands of growing doubt whether our present plan of Empire trade agreements is the best that it can be made in the service of the general aim of promoting international trade and raising the standard of living.

Indeed, the second half of that aim—raising the standard of living—is itself an important innovation in Commonwealth thinking on international trade questions. We owe to Australian spokesmen the recognition that freer world trade is by itself too vague an ambition to overcome the obstacles of vested interest and political prejudice that obstruct it. Higher standards of health and nutrition are an objective much more easily seized upon by peoples and governments. I have no doubt that this idea was cultivated at the Imperial Conference, but it has only reached the seminal stage so far, and the actual results of the Conference show only the smallest of green shoots above the ground.

I have left till the last the problem of nationality, because it is on a rather different plane from the high politics of defence and foreign affairs and preferences, and not in the least because it is unimportant. Indeed, lawyers' problem though it may be, it is in many ways the key problem in Commonwealth affairs, since it involves the relation of the citizen to the community of which he is a member. The problem of nationality in the Commonwealth is closely bound up with the problem of the Crown, since historically the idea of national status is identified with the idea of personal

allegiance, and even now the underlying theory of British subjecthood, which is the basic concept in the code of Commonwealth nationality, is the individual's attachment to the dominions of the Crown. But whereas the significance of the Crown in our constitution, apart from its great personal value, is now largely symbolic, and symbolism is capable of infinite variations without much direct effect on ordinary practical life, nationality has a very serious practical import for the ordinary citizen, both within his nation and beyond it. Even if it is only a question of the words written in his passport, it comes very close to home.

What is the basic problem of nationality in the British Commonwealth? It is the existence of two different kinds of nationality, overlapping each other. Commonwealth unity, handed down to us by history, has decreed that the single, all-Commonwealth nationality, British subjecthood, should remain in being, at least as a sub-stratum of common status, and this is still the only kind of British nationality recognised by the law of the United Kingdom, as is proper for the metropolis of a Commonwealth. At the same time, Dominion independence has decreed that every Dominion should determine whom it regards as its own citizens and what rights and duties it lays upon them.

Not all the Dominions have followed the same path in this matter. The Irish Free State has taken the most extreme and, be it said, the most logical course, in establishing an exclusive Irish nationality, denying to its citizens any other nationality, and declaring nationals of all other countries to be aliens, although if they are British they are not treated as aliens in practice. The Union of South Africa has created Union nationality, exclusive as far as local rights and duties are concerned, but nevertheless recognising the continued existence of the common status of British subjects. Canada has established the class of Canadian citizens, which is professedly only local in its significance. Australia and New Zealand retain the concept, as we do, of a single nationality, British subjecthood, but in practice they discriminate in a good many ways between those whom they regard as Australians or New Zealanders and other British subjects, white or coloured.

Now, I need not describe in detail the various practical difficulties to which this confusion gives rise—the fact that some Dominion citizens are not British subjects, the fact that some British subjects are citizens of two or more different parts of the Commonwealth. Nor need I go, I think, at length into the suggestions put forward by the constitutional committee of the

Imperial Conference for remedying such anomalies. For the fact is that the committee grasped the problem only to drop it like a hot brick. The report tells us that " it was in no way suggested that any change should be made in the existing position regarding the common status . . . described by the term ' British subject.' " One rather wonders, if that was so, what all the agitation was about in South Africa when this problem was first raised by General Hertzog. However, we can only believe the report, from which it appears that the committee did not begin to tackle what seem to me to be the fundamental questions in regard to Commonwealth nationality, namely,

1. Who confers the common status? There may be a single status, but there are seven different governments and seven systems of law, each competent to deal with this question of nationality.

2. What does the common status mean, in practical terms of rights and duties of the citizen in and towards any country of the Commonwealth other than his own? Does it mean, for instance, that a Union national who is a British subject and is in this country in war-time is liable to conscription? This question of what the common status means has obviously a special significance for Indians, or wherever questions of race or colour discrimination arise.

3. Is the common status or the local citizenship the basis of nationality for international purposes? I need hardly point out how intimately this question is bound up with that of the diplomatic and consular machinery whereby citizens are helped and protected in their travels or dealings abroad. The consular and diplomatic machinery is far from having been brought into line with the formal constitutional position of equal countries, each conducting its foreign relations for itself, because apart from a few ministers and consulates the whole diplomatic and consular machinery is organised and paid for by the United Kingdom.

These questions were left unanswered and they will have to be answered sometime. I think that the omission of any attempt to answer them is itself significant. There is to-day no disposition among the governments of the Commonwealth, other than that of the Irish Free State, to raise profound constitutional questions. There is a growing tendency to rest content with practical compromises and to see how things work out under the flexible system of self-determination that has been constructed by previous Imperial Conferences.

It was General Hertzog, that seasoned nationalist, who said in his opening speech to this last Conference that as far as the constitution of the Commonwealth was concerned the principles on which it was founded would last, and would not require, at any

rate not for very many years, any further amendment. I cannot help feeling that this sense of satisfaction with the present constitutional system was profoundly strengthened by the practical testing that it had in the abdication crisis. Even since the abdication, in such matters as the Regency Act and the revised Coronation Oath, the principles of the Statute of Westminster and the Balfour Report have been silently at work reconstructing the detailed fabric of the Commonwealth constitution.

This absence of grave constitutional issues at once deprived the Conference of the opportunity of producing spectacular formal results such as those of 1926 (the Balfour Report) or 1930 (the Statute of Westminster), and at the same time enabled it to tackle more vigorously and realistically its practical task of making the British Commonwealth the strongest possible instrument of world peace. But there was another and perhaps still more potent contrast with earlier post-War Conferences. They met at periods when faith in the continuance of, on the whole, a peaceful world did not seem misplaced, when a general formula, scarcely analysed in its implications, was a safe and easy substitute for a foreign policy, at least for countries situated as are the Dominions. Those conditions no longer hold good. The Conference met in a world of open anarchy and threats of war. In foreign affairs and defence it had to grasp detailed facts rather than general formulas, and even though this process reveals more nakedly our differences of national interest and outlook, it also increases the strength and unanimity of our main international purpose.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. W. F. WENTWORTH-SHIELDS drew attention to a remark made by the lecturer that it was over-optimistic to expect too great a uniformity in matters of defence and foreign policy. This was undoubtedly true, yet on the other hand it seemed a pity that the Imperial Conference had not been able to go a little farther than it did in those matters. At the close of the last year Mr. Eden had made a speech at Leamington defining Great Britain's foreign policy, which definition had been warmly received in practically every part of the Empire. For one reason they were very glad to know in definite terms what British foreign policy was. For another, they thought the definition, while reasonably comprehensive, was not so comprehensive as to make people at the other end of the world feel that British policy had gone a hundred per cent. European. Would it not have been possible for the Imperial Conference to formulate a resolution saying that British foreign policy as laid down at the end of last year by Mr. Eden received their general assent and approbation? Without in any way renouncing

their sovereignty, or committing themselves to any line of action in a time of crisis, they would have given a definite pronouncement to the world, which would have made a much greater impression on Germany, Italy, and Soviet Russia than anything the Conference had done.

In the same way the resolutions dealing with defence seemed to be weakened by the emphasis laid upon the fact that nothing could be settled in advance, and no Dominion could commit itself without the consent of its parliament. It was open to question whether, in future years, there would be complete unity in the Commonwealth on matters of defence and foreign policy. In this case would it not be better to face the fact, and definitely realise that there were certain parts of the Commonwealth which did not wish to draw very close to British policy in these matters, and, on the other hand, to welcome such proposals as those made by Australia and New Zealand who did wish to draw closer to the Mother country, and to enable them to do so? The speaker felt that this idea had motivated Mr. Lyons' suggestion about a Pacific Pact. It would help to consolidate the unity of the Commonwealth if, when points of disagreement arose, they were faced and not always glossed over with formulæ which obscured the real position.

MR. J. T. WALTON NEWBOLD said that the lecturer had said that the Premier of Australia had perhaps been influenced by the fact that in the next few months he would be facing a General Election. Did he not then also think that the President of the Irish Free State might have been influenced in his actions by the fact that he was going to face an election even more rapidly?

It was time that people began to consider the reaction of the overwhelming Catholic population of Ireland, the very large Catholic population of Canada, and the Catholic population of Australia. The Labour Party in Australia was quite dependent upon the Catholic vote, as was the Labour Party in Great Britain. Transport House was under no illusions as to why no elections had been won recently. Sir Walter Citrine, who came from Merseyside, knew quite well that the Transport Workers' Union would have to beat a retreat from Liverpool just as they had done from Waterford, from Cork, and from Dublin when they had thought they would sympathise with the Government in Madrid. The Catholics were not averse to defending peace, but they would not defend that which they deemed to be Anti-Christ.

MR. T. DUNBABIN said that the Imperial Conference had been a meeting of the British Empire, and the trouble was that it was neither British nor an Empire. The latter fact had been legally established now, but most people in Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand forgot that it was not British. If you called South Africa British something soon happened. Canada was less than two-thirds British, largely French and partly American.

The Conference had been very interesting, a tragedy to those who felt, and a comedy to those who thought. It had been largely con-

ditioned by elections. The Australian elections had probably been responsible for what had been called the half-baked proposal for a Pacific Pact. No one seemed to want it. Australia had put it in and got the credit for it, while rather leaving it to Mr. Eden to implement it. The Japanese had sent their ambassador hot-foot to Mr. Lyons to see what it was all about, and he went away not much wiser. It had gone very well with the people most closely associated with Australia, and to whom she must look for the future defence and security of the Pacific, the Soviet Government. As to the remark made that those who wished to co-operate more closely in defence than others should be allowed to do so, unfortunately Canada and South Africa had not wanted to co-operate, but they had not wanted others to do so either. South Africa said that Mr. Pirow had settled the matter and that was why he did not come over, and they had no more to say. Canada, having built two small destroyers, stood out with a side-glance towards Washington.

One important result had been obtained, but had not received much publicity. (The way in which the British press had reported the Conference made one despair; most of the remarks had been ill-informed and some dangerous.) But Australia, New Zealand and India had come to an agreement resulting in a good deal of co-operation should there be trouble in the Pacific. Australia should make munitions, and New Zealand had agreed to send over her officers to be instructed.

The one instance in which the Conference had shown an utter lack of imagination was with regard to economic appeasement and trade relations, possibly owing to the coming elections. Everything had gone smoothly until it came to the lists showing the things on which the Americans wished to have reduced quotas, and the British wished to see reductions. It was not a matter of so many pounds of butter and so much canned fruit, however important these things might be—more was at stake. It was vitally necessary for the Commonwealth and Great Britain to be united more closely with the United States.

MR. E. J. TARR said that reference had been made to Mr. Mackenzie King's speech in Paris.[1] He had discussed the reported statement with other Canadians and, like himself, they had been amazed, and did not understand the cause of the Premier's remarks. They thought that probably he was not quite aware of the wording of the phrases he used. He would almost certainly be made aware of it when he returned to Canada, and would probably furnish an explanation which would modify the apparent meaning of his phrases. The occurrence had been most unfortunate because it seemed inconsistent with the statements he had been careful to make in the House of Commons at home and at the Imperial Conference itself, and it might cause misunderstanding because most people were apt to hear and to believe

[1] See footnote on p. 662.

those things which coincided with their own point of view, and therefore it was possible that in the opinion of many these remarks would be regarded as the crowning achievement of the whole Imperial Conference. In this case it would be the cause of most unfortunate misunderstanding.

The speaker would like to emphasise the lecturer's remark concerning the desirability throughout the whole realm of Commonwealth relations of following to the limit the possibilities of co-operation where common interests between a group of two or more countries made that possible. Why should Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain not have gone as far as they wanted in London at the Imperial Conference? Why should they be held back by a desire for this uniformity, which as the lecturer had said was only a surface uniformity, which did not represent genuine unity? It was not until such a policy was clearly and consistently followed that machinery for co-operation, such as had been mentioned, would begin to appear.

MR. W. P. MORRELL said that he did not think it in the ultimate interests of the British Commonwealth there should be inner and outer groups within it, either in matters of trade or matters of defence. In the first place, people in Great Britain would inevitably begin to regard the inner and outer groups as groups of greater and lesser importance to the Commonwealth. This would be a mistake, because the positions taken by the different Dominions were determined for them by the racial composition of their population, their geographical situation, and similar factors. The more one understood the particular Dominions the more it was apparent how necessary it was for each one to take the position that it did take. He thought too clear-cut a division would be misunderstood by public opinion, and then some mischief-makers or intellectuals might begin to suggest leaving the outer group alone entirely, and from this there would come serious risk of separation. A good deal had been said during the evening to explain away formulæ and rather involved decisions on the part of the Conference concerning defence and foreign policy. But this vagueness was due to the fact that the Dominion governments probably did not and could not know what their people would do in certain circumstances. This was a possible explanation of Mr. Mackenzie King's remarks in Paris. While in the House of Commons and at the Imperial Conference he had been careful to put forward the general Canadian point of view, but when speaking informally he had perhaps given his personal opinion as to what would happen in the circumstances he mentioned. If vague generalities were thought to hamper Imperial policy, would specific commitments that aroused considerable disagreement help the situation? Those who criticised the Dominion Prime Ministers for not specifically committing their countries should remember that Sir Edward Grey had been in exactly the same position with regard to British public opinion before the Great War, and had therefore been unable to commit the British Cabinet to any definite line of action.

MR. J. McL. HAIG agreed that more would be accomplished if people in the Mother country and in the Dominions were helped to know and understand each other better. Great Britain's policy was naturally dictated by her proximity to Europe, while Canada's policy must be dictated by her geographical, cultural and economic proximity to the United States. The speaker had been in England for three months, and considered that American and Canadian visitors, film stars and wealthy tourists, were given a great welcome. But he had just seen sixteen Canadian boys off to Canada. They had been in England trying to find work, therefore not mixing with the well-to-do or the upper classes. They were returning with the impression that, generally speaking, people in England were not pleasantly inclined towards the United States. They were going back feeling very pro-American, which was good in itself, but harmful if it had to be at the expense of British loyalty. So it would be a good thing if there were more understanding of the good that was being done in America, less emphasis on the gangster and more on the G-man. The world was getting smaller, and it was necessary, when speaking in terms of the Dominions, to think also in world terms, internationally, and to try to understand the ways of those who seemed a long way off. This type of thought would best serve both the cause of Empire unity and the cause of world peace.

MR. M. ZVEGINTZOV remarked that the lecturer had said that although there had been no mention at the Imperial Conference of detail with regard to trade, the subject was raised in principle : had the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause been mentioned? Because it was this clause which had made it impossible for the Ottawa agreements, which were a system of a low-tariff group, to become a basis for a broader world system on similar lines. This was an important point if the Empire was to be regarded as the starting-point for a revival of world trade and raising of the standard of living. In short, at the Conference had the trend for the Empire been towards greater exclusiveness or towards greater universality and greater co-operation with other nations?

MR. H. V. HODSON said that the published report made no reference to the most-favoured-nation clause, but he thought that it must have come into the discussions. He could sympathise with the view of the last speaker that the clause hindered the formation of a low-tariff group. It must be remembered, however, that this clause was a key point in the American economic programme.

The lecturer was grateful to Mr. Tarr for his remarks concerning Mr. Mackenzie King's speech in Paris. He had himself said in his address that it could not be considered as a reason for complacency with regard to British foreign policy. In so far as it represented a Canadian attitude, however, he thought it imposed a limitation upon the degree of difference that could be allowed between the policies of the

two countries. If too wide divergences were allowed to grow up, a split between the component parts of the Empire might be replaced by a split within one of the countries of the Empire (especially in a country where there was a large non-British minority and considerable difference of opinion), and it was difficult to say which would be the more dangerous.

To this extent the lecturer could agree with Mr. Morrell, but was he not confusing appearance with reality? "Inner and outer groups" was a bad description, but in a sense such groups already existed. Oddly enough, they did not always coincide with popular belief on the subject. In many ways, for instance, the degree of co-operation between South Africa and the United Kingdom with regard to defence was a model for the whole Commonwealth; for as far as it went it was clear-cut and decisive.

He agreed absolutely with the proposal that those Dominions who wished to draw closer to the United Kingdom should be allowed to do so, and that necessary machinery for enabling them to do so should be set up, with the proviso that this should not absolve us from seeking the necessary minimum of uniformity in foreign policy. But in actual practice things were done in Commonwealth relations which were not always put into White Papers. For instance, everyone knew that there was close naval co-operation with Australia but none with Canada, who had no navy worth the name. But there seemed to him to be a little conflict between this point made by the first speaker and the suggestion that Mr. Eden's Leamington speech might be taken as a basis for a uniform Commonwealth foreign policy. The memorable part of that speech was a list of British commitments, mentioning Iraq and other interests that did not in the least concern Canada, for instance. It would, he agreed, be a good starting-point for a discussion upon foreign policy, but the Dominions could not be expected to subscribe to detailed British commitments.

MR. WENTWORTH SHIELDS said that he had meant merely that a resolution might be passed expressing the agreement of the Dominions in this policy of Great Britain without committing themselves, and simply as a pointer to foreign nations.

MR. HODSON said that this was undoubtedly a more reasonable suggestion—that the policy should be approved in the same way as the Locarno agreement had been accepted by the Dominions as a contribution to peace, without their committing themselves in any way toit.

CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS[1]

Mr. E. J. Tarr, K.C., LL.D.

Before considering Canada's position in world affairs it may be well, at the risk of labouring the obvious, to say something about the country and its people. This will be a search for facts which may reasonably be expected to influence foreign policy.

Canada has four populated regions, no two adjoining, but separated by extensive barriers of rock and waste. André Siegfried, in his recent work *Canada*, says :

> "Each of these regions, rich or poor, empty or populated, corresponds to an adjoining region in the United States, of which it is merely an extension. For this reason the Maritime Provinces are irresistibly attracted towards New England, the Valley of the St. Lawrence towards New York, the Prairies towards the American West, and British Columbia towards the American Pacific Coast."

Each of these four sections has economic interests distinctly its own, and the central portion, comprising Ontario and Quebec, has more than half our population and, consequently, a majority of the members of parliament. Wealth is largely concentrated in these provinces, and while the other sections are by no means united, each has, or thinks it has, great grievances resulting from federal policies.

Nature demands north and south relationships, but Confederation is trying, with indifferent success, to reject that demand by creating a long, ribbon-like strip stretching from east to west. J. W. Dafoe, in *Canada : An American Nation*, has well said :

> "More than any country in the world, Canada is the result of political, not economic, forces."

In spite of artificial barriers, we trade much more with the United States than with any other country, and Canadians cross the international border more frequently than they storm the dividing barriers between their own populated areas. Canadians,

[1] Address given at Chatham House on June 15th, 1937; Mr. Clement Jones, C B, in the Chair.

by the hundreds of thousands, have emigrated to the south, and they, with their recent descendants, constitute a group which, in size, is very substantial in relation to the present population of Canada.

Siegfried describes the result by saying :

" There is the same material structure in both Canada and the United States, their customs are the same in every way, the same methods of work in factories and offices, and the same amusements. Canadians like the American cinema, the American radio, American sports, and American papers, and could not do without them. . . .

" Because of the common material level of existence, the Canadians are riveted, economically and socially, to the United States. They would never be willing to link up with Europe at a lower level, and there you have an argument against which neither sentiment nor politics will prevail. . . .

" All the vexations in the world are not enough to enable politics to set up an effective barrier between the two countries. In daily life each of the Canadian provinces carries on closer relations with its neighbouring state across the border than it does with either England or even with the other Canadian provinces. There is a natural affiliation that is quite independent of the flag. . . .

" An American is one of themselves and less of a stranger than an Englishman."

There are reasons, historical and economic, why the general attitude in Canada towards the outside world should differ from that of the people of the United States. Canadians do not, to the same extent as do Americans, suffer from an anti-European complex. History partially explains this. The American Colonies fought a war to free themselves, and thereby achieved nationhood. Canada, through a process of peaceful evolution, arrived at nationhood without breaking her trans-Atlantic ties.

The economic factor, which naturally makes for a differing attitude on the part of Canadians, is the dependence of Canada upon export trade. This dependence is relatively much greater than that of the United States, and will continue so because of less diversification of climate. Under no possible stretch of the imagination could Canada ever achieve an autonomous economy. Even North American autonomy would be crushing in its effect upon our western plains. The Prairie Provinces, while farthest from the sea, are, more than any other section of Canada, directly dependent on non-American foreign markets, and consequently these Provinces are more world-conscious than any other portion of Canada. Eastern industry's need of Western purchasing power is an indirect dependence upon world markets, and thus not so

powerful in the formation of opinion. Eastern exports go more largely to the United States than do those of the Prairies.

We have viewed the house, or, rather, the four-room flat, in which eleven million Canadians reside, and have taken a glimpse at their neighbours. Do the occupants of this structure comprise a normal national family?

Thirty per cent. of our people are French; twenty per cent. are from other non-British stocks; one-half are of British birth or descent, including those who have come from the United States. The British percentage is decreasing because of the higher birth-rates of the non-British groups. Immigration is at a low ebb now, and its recovery would not reverse the trend. Times of heavy immigration to Canada have usually coincided with emigration to the United States. The recurrence of these conditions would probably still further lower the proportion of the British element in Canada. Canada is no longer, and will never again become, racially British, and to-day is probably less so than the United States. Professor W. B. Hurd has calculated that, on the basis of current birth-rates in Canada, the French stock would exceed the British in thirty-four years and each would constitute less than forty per cent. This calculation is not a prophecy, and disregards immigration and emigration, the effect of which, however, on the racial percentages is usually exaggerated.

The French are in every sense the most homogeneous and compact group. They possess a love of country greater than that of most other Canadians, but unfortunately it is not a love of Canada, but of French Canada. The French Canadian from Quebec when in Toronto or Winnipeg feels himself on foreign soil, just as if he were in Buffalo or Minneapolis. He is not a materialist. Religious and cultural values are real to him.

Jean Bruchesi, until recently of Montreal University, is an able French Canadian of moderate views who is constantly striving for better understanding between the races. The following are extracts from his article in *Maclean's Magazine* of June 15th, 1937. In speaking with approval of the attitude of the French Canadians he says:

"There is only one country in the world which has the right to demand all his efforts, all his sacrifices, even of life itself, and that country is neither France nor Great Britain, it is Canada. . . . As to the external policy of Great Britain and of the Empire, he holds to the supremacy of the interests of Canada over those of England or of

any other British nation. History has taught him that Great Britain regards only her own interests and that she has always in the past, and always will, fight for those interests first. . . . Great Britain is looking after her own interests, and she is right; but Canada is also right when she wants to look after her own interests, which are not, save in very few instances, those of Great Britain."

The same author, in a recent article "A French Canadian View of Canada's Foreign Policy," says:

"We are an American nation, and it is this indubitable fact which should inspire at least our external policy."

The judgment of André Siegfried, a non-Canadian authority, is of value. In *Canada*, he says:

"What is the real national sentiment of the French Canadians? If I can rely on what they have themselves told me, their only instinctive feeling of patriotism is towards their province, not towards Canada as a whole. French Canada, to them, is the only reality. . . . The average French Canadian of the Province of Quebec, especially the peasant, looks upon Canada merely as a cold, legal entity, to which he need not always be strictly loyal. . . .

"The French Canadians consider themselves among the oldest inhabitants of America, and they feel that their destinies lie in the New World. When they see old Europe plunging into an abyss of quarrels that menace her very existence, they stiffen up with bitter brutality and refuse to be implicated. Thus, as Americans, they deny any close relationship with either France or Europe. . . .

"The French Canadians accept the British régime because it guarantees them the essentials of religion and language; in other words, it allows them to remain distinct."

In comment on this last sentence of Dr. Siegfried it may be stated that there has in recent years been a growing recognition in Quebec that the British Parliament would not resist the demands of Canada merely because of Quebec's dissent. There has resulted a growth of opinion in favour of taking over control in Canada of the British North America Act with rigid provisions protecting language and religion. When this is accomplished, as it surely will be, the French Canadian will no longer look to Westminster for protection against the rest of Canada.

The majority of Canadians of other non-British stocks have come to us since the turn of the century. They are of many races, and it is dangerous to generalise regarding opinion and sentiment. It may be said, however, that the large majority are appreciative of what Canada has meant to them in providing opportunity in a material sense. One may say that they are

loyal to Canada, but it would be idle to contend that they have yet developed a deep love of country or attachment to the soil. They are not anti-British, but naturally they have little or no Empire or Commonwealth sentiment. A safe prophecy is that they will become more and more thoroughly Canadian, and will continue to adjust their attitudes towards all other countries on the basis of Canadian interests, and Canadian interests alone, except in occasional instances where loyalties to countries of origin may struggle for recognition.

Peculiar as it may seem, Canadians of British stock are the least united of the three groups regarding their attitude to other countries. We have Canadians who are definitely English before they are Canadian. Some of these know it and acknowledge it with pride; others are unconscious of the fact. We have those whose Canadianism is so extreme that it amounts almost to fanaticism and leads to an isolationist attitude, with almost a total blindness not only to the duties but also to the benefits of international co-operation. Between these two extremes the majority of English-speaking Canadians are to be found, but with widely varying shades of view. A classification under such headings as Imperialists, Collectivists, Isolationists, North Americans, would require various sub-divisions and still leave some in no-man's-land. There is a constant shifting, as the result of economic changes, international conditions, and factors of sentiment. It is understandable that most observers over-estimate the strength of the so-called Imperialist element because it is over-represented in big business, finance, government and church. The different schools react on each other in innumerable ways; for example, the Imperialism of the Imperialist intensifies the Isolationism of the Isolationist, and the reverse is equally true. Attachment in British North America to Great Britain may well have been a decisive factor in the middle of the last century in making it possible for Canada to be born. There can be little doubt, however, that in the recent past this attachment has prevented us from achieving a greater degree of national unity. The French call us "Anglais" and think they are the only Canadians.

While geographical, economic and racial divisions are the most important, our lack of religious homogeneity might become a matter of prime significance in this world of conflicting ideologies. Canada is forty per cent. Roman Catholic, and the Protestant majority is not closely knit.

We are exceedingly young. In looking back over the years

one recognises that the realisation of Canadian nationhood has come to Canadians gradually. Our participation in the War brought it to some, and it first came to others by reason of Canada's becoming a member of the League of Nations in her own right. To many others the realisation did not come until after the 1926 Imperial Conference. It is largely true that the Conference merely defined the constitutional development which had already taken place, but those Canadians who were most vigorous in insisting that this was the case were those who had consistently opposed the growth and refused to admit its significance until it had been officially defined. It was such incidents, however, that radiated a national atmosphere and thus modified the attitude of the many who are dependent for their views upon the air they breathe, rather than upon the functioning of the mind.

Canada, nevertheless, is not yet a nation as is England, or France, or even Switzerland. We have too many conflicting loyalties. Our sources of tradition are too diverse. Our sectional differences, racial, economic and geographical, are too pronounced. The loyalty of French Canadians is concentrated too narrowly and that of many English Canadians is spread too broadly. The achieving of national unity, the development of a unified national spirit based on a common love of country will take time. A disturbing thought is that time may not be given us.

The Canadian who puts England first does not realise the extent to which he is rendering England a disservice. It should be apparent that in the Canada which we have been putting under the microscope national unity can never be achieved except on the basis of putting Canada first, not only in national policies, but also in the hearts of her people. Canada can never become a dependable associate for Great Britain or any other nation until conditions are such as to develop unequivocally clear policies which carry with them the general support of her people.

In view of Canada's geographical position, the composition of her people and her economic needs, what would be the natural policy for her to follow in the world as it is to-day, if the Commonwealth relationship did not exist? As with any other nation, the purpose of Canada's foreign policy would be to seek security as the first essential and, with it, the maximum of economic advantages consistent with a policy assuring security.

There is no conceivable alliance which could be made which

would protect us against the United States if that country decided upon a policy of aggression. Therefore, the keystone of our policy would be the maintenance of friendship with the United States. This would result in the exercise of great care not to form any association that might involve us in disputes in which the United States were not involved. We would take reasonable measures within our means to protect ourselves from possible attack by a non-American nation, not necessarily to the extent of being able to maintain ourselves against all comers, but to enable us at least to resist sporadic raids. Sir Arthur Willert, in *The Empire in the World*, says :

> " Were the Empire to break up and Canada to be thrown on her own resources, the United States would resist her invasion from across either ocean as firmly and for the same defensive reason as we have always opposed the conquest by some ambitious Power of the shores of the continent over against our island."

Canada, like France and Belgium, has advantages as well as disadvantages arising out of her geographical position. Our natural policy, therefore, would be to accept to the maximum consistent with self-respect the benefits provided by geography.

In the realm of external trade the United States are also the greatest factor in our life. We trade with them more than with any other country. They buy about as much from us as does Great Britain, and we purchase very much more from them than from any other source. Our purchases from them are also more essential to our economic life, including much raw material and foodstuffs. This is all in spite of artificial barriers aimed at forcing trade into Commonwealth channels. Our economic dependence upon our neighbours appears even more pronounced when " invisible " items, such as tourist traffic, are taken into account. We have, however, important exports, such as wheat, for which we cannot hope to obtain an adequate market in the United States, and therefore in the economic field our relations with Great Britain are exceedingly important, ranking second only to those with our neighbour. Three-quarters of our trade is with these two countries. Hence our natural policy, while dominatingly North American, would be to develop the closest possible relations with Great Britain in particular and, in general, to further international trade.

But the Commonwealth relationship does exist, with all that it means in tradition and in close association with other nations with similar institutions and, broadly speaking, common pur-

poses. To what extent, if any, should it cause Canada to diverge from what, unquestionably, is its natural policy with respect to the outside world? That is a question to which Canadians give a wide variety of answers, with no one predominating.

Progress towards unity has been made in recent years to the extent that the vast majority of Canadians now think they want our policy based essentially on Canada's interests, although, with some, sentiment may prejudice judgment. Even amongst those of calm judgment there is no general agreement. As already stated, some believe the League of Nations should still be central, some the Commonwealth, others North America, and others contend for a thorough-going policy of isolation. The various schools shade into each other, and there are some whose views are not readily classified. It is significant that many have deep conviction, and will not be passive in attitude if a policy be adopted which irrevocably abandons their cherished objectives.

Canada, then, is a nation more than usually dependent upon international trade, divided vertically into several physical parts with widely varying economic interests, and with horizontal psychological and emotional divisions. This nation is a member of the League of Nations, a member of the Commonwealth, and is situated on the North American Continent immediately adjoining the United States. The task of shaping foreign policy becomes a phase of the problem of building national unity. This cannot be emphasised too strongly, and it is scarcely necessary to mention that no nation, except at its peril, can adopt a foreign policy involving war commitments, moral or legal, if based merely on majority opinion. General support is essential, and in Canada the distribution of the majority among the different sections is a matter of prime concern.

It remains to review present Canadian foreign policy, to note any recent change in emphasis, and to speculate regarding the future.

Escott Reid gives an analysis of present policy in a recent article in *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*. This followed an article in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, from which the Premier quoted in the House of Commons Defence debate last February. The following are Mr. King's words from Hansard:

"Let me quote from an article which appeared in the *University of Toronto Quarterly* of last month; it is written by Mr. Escott Reid. It deals with Canada's Foreign Policy. I cite it because it gives in a concise form certain phases of that policy. Mr. Reid has based

what he has written very largely upon what has been said in this House of Commons. He says:

"'Mr. King's foreign policy, as deduced from his statements and actions since his reassuming office on October 23rd, 1935, can be summed up as follows:

1. The guiding principle in the formulation of Canada's foreign policy should be the maintenance of the unity of Canada as a nation.

2. Canada's foreign policy is, in the main, not a matter of Canada's relations to the League, but of Canada's relations to the United Kingdom and the United States.

3. Canada should, as a general rule, occupy a back seat at Geneva or elsewhere when European or Asiatic problems are being discussed.

4. Canada is under no *obligation* to participate in the military sanctions of the League or in the defence of any other part of the Commonwealth.

5. Canada is under no *obligation* to participate in the economic sanctions of the League.

6. Before the Canadian Government agrees in future to participate in military or economic sanctions or in war, the approval of the parliament or people of Canada will be secured.

7. Canada is willing to participate in international inquiries into international economic grievances.'

"That, I think, is a very good statement of some of the features of Canada's foreign policy. Possibly it stresses too much what has to do with possible wars and participation in war, and it does not emphasise enough, in my opinion, what has been done in the way of trade policies and removal of causes of friction between this and other countries. But it does point out certain features that have a direct bearing on these estimates. . . .

"In the course of this debate it has been necessary at different times from this side of the House to repeat that what we are doing we are doing for Canada, and for Canada alone. That has been necessary for the reason that an impression has been created that what we were doing had relation to some expeditionary force which would be sent overseas. When we say that what we are doing we are doing for Canada alone, we mean that what we are doing is for the defence of our country within the territorial waters of the coasts of our country and within Canada itself for the defence of Canada. But I hope it will not be thought that because we have laid emphasis on the fact that what we are doing we are doing for Canada, we are not thereby making some contribution towards the defence of the British Commonwealth of Nations as a whole, or that we are not making some contribution towards the defence of all English-speaking communities, that we are not making some contribution towards the defence of all democracies, that we are not making some contribution

towards the defence of all those countries that may some day necessarily associate themselves together for the purpose of preserving their liberties and freedom against an aggressor, come from wherever he may. I say that while we are doing what we are doing for Canada, we believe that in this way we can make the most effective contribution towards the security of all countries that may have like institutions, like ideals, and principles of freedom similar to our own."

The outline as quoted by the Premier and as qualified by his increased emphasis upon economic co-operation (an emphasis which was clearly underlined by him at this year's Imperial Conference) may be taken as an authoritative summary of Canada's present foreign policy. Its most significant features are the clear renunciation of the League of Nations as being central and the careful avoidance of choice between the Commonwealth and North America. When Mr. King assumed office he adopted the League policy which he inherited from his predecessor. On October 29th, 1935, he made a statement acknowledging that in accepting the conclusion that Italy had resorted to war in violation of its obligations under Article 12 of the Covenant, the nations so doing were considered thereby to have accepted the obligation of applying against Italy sanctions as provided under Article 16. The pronounced lessening of League emphasis in the declared present policy, and in particular with respect to sanctions, is therefore in effect an acknowledgment of recent change in attitude. Clearly this resulted from the Abyssinian affair, which also caused modification of policy in other countries. Mr. King, however, while retreating from the League, has been careful not to advance on any other front, and in his words last quoted gave comfort in turn to the Isolationist, to the Imperialist, and to the North American.

This is not necessarily an adverse criticism of the Premier's position. His guiding principle of Canadian unity is surely fundamental. The constructive task of Canadian statesmanship to-day is to avoid a serious cleavage through the making of an unmistakable choice between North America and the Commonwealth. On this issue the Isolationist is with the North American, as the difference between them is largely one of degree. Events may force a sudden choice, and therein lies the national danger I shudder to contemplate. In the meantime, some critics will say that Canada's policy is to have no policy.

As one reads the speech above quoted, there comes to mind the juggler who, with great dexterity, keeps several balls in the air. The balls are Isolationism, North Americanism, Imperialism

and Collectivism. One sees them going up and coming down with rhythmic regularity, and suddenly they are lost in the polished phrases of a platitudinous peroration—the magician's handkerchief. And yet it is statesmanship honestly striving for national unity.

Mr. Reid in one of his articles quoted Mr. Harold Nicolson as saying, in another connection, that " the essence of a good foreign policy is certitude," and though " an uncertain policy is always bad," yet " on the other hand, parliamentary and press opposition is less likely to concentrate against an elastic foreign policy than against one which is precise. It is thus a grave temptation for a Foreign Minister under the democratic system to prefer an idealistic formula, which raises only intellectual criticism, to a concrete formula which is open to popular attack."

Canadian policy to-day cannot meet the test of " certitude," not because our Foreign Minister has yielded to temptation, but rather because he has bowed to national necessity. This is admittedly unsatisfactory to those nations with whom Canada is associated, and only sympathetic understanding will avoid annoyance.

As to the future, my purpose is not to make an argument, but rather to endeavour to draw conclusions. These carry no authority except as representing the judgment of one first-generation Canadian who loves his country and has a warm attachment to this land of his father.

Canada is not a united nation. We have one of those vicious circles which abound in the world to-day. A positive policy of undeviating Canadian nationalism based unreservedly on Canadian interests is essential to unity, and yet lack of unity seems to make such a policy impossible. The circle must be broken, and this can be done only by irresistible natural forces against which prejudices and sentiment cannot prevail. These forces arise out of our North American position, which is the underlying controlling factor in Canada's life. Ultimately all other interests must be subordinated to it. Any other policy would be artificial, internally disrupting, and would finally collapse in its contest with reality. Commonwealth relations as intimate as consistent with such North Americanism are feasible and highly desirable for Canada if agreeable to her British associates.

A law-abiding world is of primary interest to Canada, apart from all other reasons, because of her dependence upon trade. The removal of apprehension of being drawn into conflicts not

vital to Canadian interests will make possible a more wholehearted co-operation in the development, when the opportunity comes, of a world order based on law and equity.

This is not the occasion to discuss the reasons for the League's failure, to which Canada contributed. The fact is, however, that the greatly lowered prestige of the League, and the removal of it from the dominatingly central position in the policies of the British nations, have deprived Canada of the only possibility of avoiding the necessity of making either the Commonwealth or North America central in her policy. A general collective system steadily strengthening its position in the world would have made unnecessary a regional or group choice by providing the basis for a practically possible external policy. Thus the failure of the League to live up to expectations, with our consequent retreat from it, increases the difficulties of Canadian leadership in shaping foreign policy. The common ground is no longer available, and the clamouring for a choice between the Commonwealth and North America may be expected to increase. A chart of the curve of North Americanism would show that it has been rising, intermittently perhaps, but substantially.

While the choice could not be irrevocably made at present without serious cleavage, wise leadership in Canada should be on the alert to achieve in Canadian foreign policy a definite and clear-cut North Americanism. To move too slowly or too rapidly in relation to public opinion would be equally threatening to national unity. To adopt the right pace will require statesmanship of high quality, characterised partially, it is true, by leadership which follows rather than leads, but requiring vision and courage to ensure steady progress.

In this way certitude in policy may be attained, and the result would be a North American nation with a strong pro-British bias. If the destination is not reached by the evolutionary process, but as the result of sharp internal conflict, the danger is that we may become a North American nation without a pro-British bias, or perhaps having an anti-British sentiment, with resulting great loss to the richness of our national life and, you may think, with detriment to Great Britain and the other nations of the Commonwealth. If it should happen, as it possibly may, that a choice be made rejecting North Americanism, natural forces would inevitably lead to reaction reversing the decision and bringing the evils resulting from clash rather than the benefits of natural growth.

Canadian Imperialists, realising that time works against the

adoption of the policy upon which their hearts are set, will doubtless endeavour to take advantage of any situation which may temporarily strengthen Commonwealth sentiment. Temporary success in having this expressed in an Imperialist policy would not avoid ultimate defeat, and might mean the breaking of the Commonwealth ties in an atmosphere of antagonism. The part of good statesmanship on both sides of the Atlantic is to moderate Imperialist sentiment in Canada so that it will not tend to lead to policies not containing the requisites of permanence.

It would be wise to abandon figures of speech denoting differences of status, but, if one clings to the family metaphor in describing the Commonwealth, he should remember that nature and events have married Canada, a daughter, to the North American continent; and there is no divorce law. A daughter's marriage results in a readjustment of interests and responsibilities, but happily does not necessitate the breaking of the family ties. Canada's foreign policy will not be clear, consistent and dependable until Canadians, by a more general recognition of fundamental factors, make it politically possible for a Canadian Government to banish evasion from its Foreign Office. Progress towards that end ought not to be regretted by the other members of the Commonwealth, but welcomed as an approach to a soundly based relationship with elements of permanence. Surely it is better for Great Britain to have Canada's close friendship and co-operation as a North American nation within the Commonwealth rather than as a member of the Commonwealth in, but not of, North America. The former may be permanent; the latter could not be. Moreover, even if the latter relationship were possible, it would be much less beneficial to Great Britain, because Canada, first a North American nation and, as such, a member of the Commonwealth, can surely make its most effective contribution in the field of Anglo-American relations, so fundamental in British policy and to world peace.

It is interesting to consider other Dominions in order to ascertain whether or not the underlying natural policy is in each case the same as a policy which gives the central place to Commonwealth co-operation.

Australia and New Zealand would, no doubt, co-operate closely with each other and together look for a strong naval ally as protection against possible aggression from the north. Theoretically there would be two possibilities, but practically one only. The absence of American interests in the area and the general attitude in the United States towards outside commitments

would make Great Britain the obvious choice. Not only would the objective of security lead to Great Britain, but in the economic realm close relations with that country would be the most beneficial because of her being the greatest potential market for raw materials and foodstuffs. Thus with these two Dominions, having homogeneous populations of British stock, Sentiment, Security and Economic Welfare pull together as a team. These countries would also be interested in co-operation with South Africa, because of the strategic position of the latter on the alternative route to their naval ally and principal market.

South Africa's security would seem to depend upon the non-establishment in the southern half of the continent of a potentially hostile Power, and protection against a possible attack founded upon sea power. Great Britain, because of her present African interests and naval strength, is the one Power which might meet the need. Owing to the place of gold in its economy, South Africa is not relatively so dependent upon raw material exports as are Australia and New Zealand, nevertheless, Great Britain is her greatest potential market. The team is not quite so well mated, but Security and Economic Welfare pull together, although Sentiment may drag a little.

While going through the phase of transition from Empire to Commonwealth it was natural to think of the Dominions as a group and the problem as that of readjusting the relations of the group with Great Britain. The task now is the attainment of the maximum of mutually beneficial co-operation. In this phase the Dominions are no longer a group, but rather Great Britain and these other nations are individuals, independent sovereign States, no two with the same interests. The range of common interest between Great Britain and Canada is not the same as that between Great Britain and Australia, or between Great Britain and any other member of the Commonwealth. Similarly, the common interests of any two of the Dominions do not coincide with those of any other two. The cause of Commonwealth unity would be advanced by a lessened striving for uniformity. We need a technique making possible, without any element of recrimination, varying degrees of co-operation and obligation in keeping with varying common interests and responsibilities.

As the Empire grew into the Commonwealth many had grave doubts as to the wisdom of the development, but now all unite in regarding it as an achievement and welcome the Commonwealth as a group of co-operating sovereign States. The emphasis in thinking, however, has been upon status, and we must move

on to facilitate functioning. Sovereign status is merely a means to an end; namely, the welfare of the people of the nation. The purpose of the development has been to enable each national unit to conduct its affairs, domestic and external, in what it believes to be its own best interests. As these interests vary among the nations, varying policies must result, and the continuance of association as a British group will be dependent no longer upon the constitutional right to adopt desired national policies, but upon the possibility of instituting such policies to the accompaniment of general understanding and goodwill among the British nations.

I may be accused of over-simplification in my dealing with Canada and its place in world affairs. Anticipating the charge, I plead guilty, but only in a narrow and technical sense. To follow in turn each of the innumerable Canadian currents and cross-currents would be hopelessly confusing, and my purpose has been to visualise with you the peacefully flowing stream in which they may all unite if Nature has her way. My hope is that I have been sufficiently objective to be thought-provoking and sufficiently provocative to stimulate a frank and penetrating discussion.

Summary of the Discussion.

THE HON T. A. CRERAR said that he agreed that the lecturer's treatment of the subject would provoke discussion. With regard to some aspects of his remarks he did not feel quite so pessimistic as the lecturer appeared to be. Nevertheless he had stressed some of the problems to be dealt with in Canada during the next twenty-five or fifty years. In spite of the diversity of races in Canada there was a growing understanding of the nature and value of British institutions. The great contribution that Great Britain had made to the world had been the spread of the doctrine of freedom, representative government, liberty and human advancement. In that road there might be some dark patches, but the facts that the North American continent, the Australasian continent, a good part of Asia, much of South Africa spoke the English language and had the British ideals of freedom and justice were among the really significant things in the world to-day.

COMMANDER ROSS said that although he had never been to Canada, he was of Canadian origin, and his great-grandfather, Robert Baldwin, had been responsible for achieving responsible self-government for Canada. One battle he had waged with friend and foe had been to preserve the political and religious rights of the French Canadians against the threat to them from the predominant British, who wished to submerge them. The fact that they now had their own religion

and language had seemed to the lecturer to be a bar to their taking their place in a proper national life, making them a peculiar race in Canada. Were these really his convictions? Also, to what extent did he think that the Roman Catholic Church and the religiosity of the French-Canadian community were a bar to their adopting a wider view of nationhood?

The lecturer had sketched Canada's attitude towards the League of Nations, saying that she felt she had no obligations to do various things under the Covenant; and yet he had said that the League's failure over Abyssinia had robbed Canada of the League as a focus and left her to choose between being a Commonwealth nation or a North American nation. Had it not been Canada in 1922 who had led the "Flight from Sanctions"? That had been a very natural process for them; but it had been an ultimately disastrous process that culminated in Abyssinia. If Canada did not recognise her obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant, why did she leave her signature on that document? If in 1922 she had given notice to leave the League, Great Britain's policy might not have been continually compromised in the way it had been; anyway, the Commonwealth, especially Canada's attitude, had been used constantly as an excuse by British Governments.

British policy might have been more honourable and more courageous than it had been, if that excuse had not existed; in that case the League might not have been destroyed, and Canada would not have been robbed of that focus of loyalty to the League of which the lecturer had spoken.

Mr. Tarr said that he did not think that he had given the impression that it was hopeless to build the French Canadians into a Canadian national life. He had simply wished to make clear that this must be based on a unity which was essentially national and not international, not imperialist. It was the fear of complications, associations apart from Canada herself, that would be a deterring factor. He had not felt his address to be pessimistic, but had thought it rather optimistic, in that it had pointed the way in which Canada might achieve unity. Quite naturally the Church had endeavoured to keep the French people apart, because through the language bar, for instance, it was able to assume a more complete direction of the lives of the people. The Church's influence had been towards a separatism in that sense. At the moment there was an intensification of French nationalism in the province of Quebec, taking the form of being definitely anti-English-Canadian. It was largely a phase of the depression, because it was quite clear that the major accumulations of wealth were in the hands of English-speaking Canadians in that province rather than among French-speaking people. This would doubtless subside with the return of better times.

With regard to the League, the lecturer had stated in his address that the failure of the League was one to which Canada had con-

tributed. Canadian policy in this respect had not been a policy he himself would have favoured. But his task had been to define the present policy, and to say where that present policy plus underlying factors in Canada would lead in the future.

PROFESSOR ZIMMERN said that as the address did not seem to have provoked the audience to any great extent, he intended to be still a little more provocative.

Most of the unpalatable things that the lecturer had put before them had already been brought out at the British Commonwealth Relations Conference in 1933. So it had been no surprise to hear that Canada was a North American nation, must look after her own interests, and that the Empire must necessarily take second place. It followed from this that the idea of an Empire foreign policy must be abandoned. Just as Canada had her own foreign policy, so had Australia and so had Great Britain, and the latter should conduct hers without too much reference to what the other Dominions might think. If anything happened in the East of Europe she would have to make a decision, and it would not be much good asking Mr. King to help in the making of that decision. This meant a reorientation of outlook to which the British public had not yet become accustomed. Some of those present at the British Commonwealth Relations Conference had tried to gloss over the differences of opinion by bringing in the League as a kind of special providence. Various meanings were, however, attached to the term "collective system," and the differences had not been sufficiently analysed. But it was already evident then that if the League broke down there would be pulls in different directions from the Dominions, and that it would be difficult to unify Empire foreign policy. This had now happened, and the resulting situation had to be faced.

It seemed, from the lecturer's brilliant analysis, that Canada must be the most difficult country in the world to govern, firstly for geographical reasons, secondly because of its racial composition, thirdly because Canada had been plunged into international affairs before she had achieved her own national unity, fourthly because she found herself in the League of Nations without the United States of America. In these circumstances he did not feel disposed to sneer at the conjuring tricks of Canadian statesmen; the complexity of their problem ought to be sympathetically understood in Great Britain.

The lecturer had mentioned the growing isolationism of Canada and the waning of the sentiment which he called Imperialism, but he had not mentioned one of the chief reasons for this, which was the enormous sacrifices Canada had made in the Great War. Her losses had been staggering, particularly when compared with those of the great country to the south. It was natural that her people should desire not to become embroiled again in a distant conflict. Great Britain might regret this, but she should be grateful for what Canada

had done in 1914–18—surely one of the most remarkable exhibition of public spirit in history.

Was there any positive policy that could be adopted in the ver difficult present position? The speaker thought that there was. Th lecturer had mentioned that the most world-minded part of Canad was the Prairie, and that each region was linked with a correspondin region to the south. It would seem therefore that Kansas City an Minneapolis were potentially the most world-minded parts of th United States: for they, too, needed to sell their produce in the worl market. Did that not indicate that there was some possibility o recovering on the economic side the losses in international collaboratio suffered on the political side? Could not the Geneva nucleus b temporarily replaced by an economic nucleus which might begin wit some arrangement between Canada, the United States of Americ and Great Britain?

MR. J. H. HARLEY said that with regard to Commonwealth rela tions it had usually been understood that the Crown was the unifyin factor. The lecturer had not mentioned this fact in his address, o considered it as a modifying influence in the future. Was it possibl that this was less so?

Secondly a rather disquieting article had appeared in *The Time* saying that there was a movement in Canada towards the corporat State, and conveying the impression that such a movement migh eventuate into something like a Fascist State in Canada. Did th lecturer think this at all serious?

MR. TARR replied that the latter state of affairs was entirely con fined to Quebec, and was a phase of the anti-English-Canadian move ment that he had described. But the Fascist feature was in no wa important from a national point of view. When the economic situatio improved it might be expected to disappear.

With regard to the Crown, the lecturer had taken for granted th fact of its being the common factor in Commonwealth relations. H hoped that he had not given the impression that there was any sub stantial body of opinion anywhere in Canada that wished to dis sociate itself from the Commonwealth, and therefore from the Crown Such was not the case. The developments he had outlined had bee with a view to indicating a permanent basis for that association He hoped that developments necessary because of Canada's nationa interests might be achieved with the goodwill and understanding o Great Britain and the other Commonwealth nations. If in the achieve ment of such a position as he had outlined a status of internationall recognised neutrality were necessary for Canada, then there woul have to be a change in the legal position with regard to the Crown.

MR. J. T. WALTON NEWBOLD asked what was the proportion among English-speaking Canadians, of Irish, the Ulster minority

Scotch and English? Was it at all likely that the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Canada would have, as it was having in Ireland, an effect in any unification of the country?

MR. TARR replied that he had not the figures concerning the different British racial stocks in Canada, but he thought that the English and Scotch were about equal, with the Irish very much less than either.

There was no reason to suppose that Canadian unity would be founded upon the Roman Catholic Church.

DR. W. J. ROSE said that the address to which he had just listened had reminded him of Goldwyn Smith's view that Canada was destined by nature one day to become one people with the United States of America.

He had studied the French Canadian question as a social scientist, and if there was one thing the French Canadian liked less than the British Ontario arrangement, it was the possibility of secularisation or conquest threatening him from the United States. This was the biggest single force that would keep the French Canadian, even though dominated by Catholicist corporativism, staunchly Canadian, because the French Canadians who had emigrated to New England had been lost to this corporativism which they wanted so much to keep. Also the United States of America would never allow any third Power, if Canada herself were helpless, to dominate the region south of the St. Lawrence.

MR. ANDREW CAIRNS said that despite economic recovery there was still a good deal of unemployment in Canada. The policy of both left- and right-wing governments almost throughout the world was tending towards a planned economy, which tendency might very well lead to a diminution in the volume of international trade. When the next depression arrived was there not likely to be a movement in Canada in support of a national economic plan to provide work, and, if so, was such a plan not likely to lead in practice to greater self-sufficiency, more diversified exports and less reliance on a few key products such as wheat, minerals and lumber? There was at present a great deal of talk about easing the barriers against international trade, but the hard fact remained that more and more countries were becoming less and less dependent upon other countries for goods, especially foodstuffs and manufactures. If this tendency continued, what effect would it have on Canada's external policy?

Would the relatively higher standard of living which American farmers were likely to enjoy in the next decade not lead to a movement in Canada for a national plan to control and regulate agriculture along lines similar to those being followed in the United States? New measures, strongly supported by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, were submitted to Congress a few weeks ago which involved a complete

system of agricultural control. If some such measures were adopted in Canada, would they not tend to reduce the conflict of interests which the lecturer had described? In his opinion Canada would probably be disillusioned in her present hopes regarding freer trade with respect to wheat and perhaps other commodities as well. There could be no doubt that the enormous crop losses suffered by the United States of America in 1934 and 1936 had greatly eased economic conditions and therefore political tensions existing in Central Europe. The Danubian countries had just enjoyed a year of large cereal exports and, thanks to the American drought, had obtained remunerative prices for most agricultural exports, particularly wheat and maize. But the economic recovery of these areas, like the much smaller recovery in Western Canada, was temporary and accidental, and both areas were likely to relapse into depression with two normal world wheat crops. But in the case of the Danubian countries there were special political reasons why they were likely to encounter less difficulty than Canada in finding markets for their grain exports. If Canada found she could not obtain adequate outlets for her wheat and other exports, was she not likely to follow the example of many other countries, and try to map out for herself a planned, better balanced and more stabilised economy? If so, would this not tend to diminish the political and economic differences of the East and West, and would this in turn not lead to more uniformity of thinking regarding external affairs?

MR. TARR replied that he thought that when any particular community was suffering severely from a depression it became aggrieved, and this intensified sectional feeling; later when, as a result of government action or natural recovery, this state of things ceased, feeling accordingly became more moderate. A planned autonomous economy for Canada would be a policy of despair.

MR. JOHN H. HUMPHREYS said that the address had made him reflect on possible future developments. It had been said that Canada must be one of the most difficult countries to govern. But surely South Africa had a greater task; her internal problems were more complex and, in addition, she already had serious external problems to meet. Whatever her internal difficulties, Canada, secure in the support of her southern neighbour, could, without molestation from the outside, proceed towards finding appropriate solutions.

The chief internal problem was the unification of Canada. The lecturer had directed attention to the forces making for disunion. Some of these had been given, in the Parliament at Ottawa, an exaggerated expression. Quebec returned sixty-five representatives, usually an almost solid block of French-speaking Catholic Liberals. Ontario in the past had returned a block, not quite so solid, of representatives of an opposite type. Canada could with advantage take steps to revise those electoral and constitutional provisions that made

more rigid the forces tending to disunion. By taking thought, unification could be promoted.

As to external affairs, the address was disquieting. Each of the Dominions had separate interests, and in consequence took different attitudes in respect of foreign policy. Canada, we were told, must necessarily look, first of all, to her own interests. Were these interests promoted by ignoring events in the outer world? Every event in the world affects Great Britain, and it is doubtful whether to-day any event leaves the position of America untouched. Canada's attitude towards the situation which confronted many of the English-speaking nations needed more discussion and elucidation.

MR. H. L. BROWN said that in some remarks heard during the discussion it seemed, continuing the analogy of a family, that some disappointment was felt at the child's having grown up. But surely this should also be a cause for pride. In Canada they looked to the old country and said that the "old girl" was still galloping around a bit, perhaps galloping a bit too much in Europe, and some rather thought she ought to stay at home a bit more. But if she got into trouble, not through any fault of her own, then it might be safely said that the sons and daughters would be there. That might be a sentimental viewpoint, but did not the lecturer feel that such was the case, or did he feel that Canada was more academic than sentimental?

MR. TARR said that in his address he had purposely avoided mentioning the possibility of an early war, because he felt that it would cloud the real issue. War was one of those things which might force Canada to make a choice before she was ready to do so. Any person's guess as to what she would do in such a situation was as good as another's. Personally he thought that, in spite of strong opposition, she would probably go in as soon as it was apparent that Great Britain was seriously threatened, because of the probable apparent merit of the cause, and the effect of modern propaganda. Others thought quite differently. A great deal depended upon the actual circumstances at the time. This short-term view could not helpfully be considered at present; what should be considered was the possibility of a common Commonwealth policy, whether this was desirable or the reverse. In the case of Canada, he did not think it would be to anyone's advantage, nor would it be possible, for her to be part of a unified system. The cause of co-operation with the other British nations could best be served, and could only be served, by a recognition in an atmosphere of goodwill of the reasons which made certain courses inevitable for her because of fundamental factors to which he had referred in his address. He did not feel pessimistic as to the future. He wished the Government would move a little more rapidly, but he acknowledged that they were in a position where they must to some extent follow rather than lead, although the element of positive leadership might be

increased to advantage. National security did not make the country easier to govern, but, on the contrary, more difficult, because of the absence of the unifying influence of danger from without.

QUESTION: What reaction, if any, had the present international war in Spain had upon the Canadian people, especially among the French with reference to their religion?

MR. TARR replied that the French in Quebec were strongly pro-Rebel, while public sentiment in the rest of Canada was strongly pro-Government.

PROFESSOR B. S. KIERSTEAD said that he would like to return to the possibility raised by the second speaker in the discussion as to economic co-operation between Canada and others in which that Dominion might assist the reorganisation of trade agreements making for peaceful adjustments of international disputes. It appeared that the suggestion had been that Canada should assist primarily by bringing Great Britain and the United States of America together, but after listening to the address, he wondered how far Canada had any economic policy. Sectionalism in that country was not only geographic, racial and political, but also, and very definitely, economic. This must be settled before foreign policy, either political or economic, could be considered. One further important cause of this sectionalism, to which another speaker had referred, was the difference between French and Irish Canadians, Roman Catholics, and the Protestant Canadians. For instance, the former were sympathetic towards General Franco and Italian Fascism. They disapproved strongly of labour movements, which they deemed Communistic. British Canada, as the lecturer had said, preferred Liberal and social democracy. This had intensified the historical and economic division. Was it not the lecturer's opinion that domestic policy must be formulated before foreign political or economic policy could be considered?

MR. TARR said that he would not make the division so rigid. He thought home and foreign policy could be developed gradually together.

AUSTRALIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS

THE HON. R. G. CASEY, D.S.O., M.C., M.P.[1]

I MUST first give some picture of internal affairs in Australia in so far as they affect external affairs. We are six and three-quarter million people, considerably less than the population of London, scattered over a vast country. The centres of population, the six centres of thought and opinion, are very widely spaced, probably on the average five or six hundred miles apart, and only loosely joined by wireless and the Press. It is always surprising to me that we achieve such a large measure of uniformity of thought and opinion throughout Australia. I expect our uniformity of thought is helped by the uniformity of population, which is almost a hundred per cent. British.

Now may I interpret to you in personal terms something that I hope will give you a picture of the shortness of time that white people have been in Australia? When my grandfather went to Australia in 1833, there were only a hundred thousand people in the whole of Australia. When my father was born in 1850, there were under half a million people there. When I was born there were three million people in Australia, and to-day there are six and three-quarter million. We doubled our population every thirty-five years for the first hundred years or so; but now, owing to phenomena that are universal throughout the world, our population increase is slowing off quickly. I merely give these figures to show that in a remarkably short space of time, literally in about a hundred years of active development, a mere handful of people has developed Australia from a black-fellows' country to the state that it is to-day. In that time there has been created something like four to five thousand million pounds' worth of wealth. We have had no land frontiers with any foreign peoples; we have been very much divorced from the great centres of population in the world; and we have grown up somewhat introspectively, rather in a world of our own, and with very few contacts with other peoples. We have had the very big job of looking after the development and exploitation of this great

[1] Address given at Chatham House on April 20th, 1937; Sir Philip Game in the Chair.

land, which is considerably bigger than Europe, and as big as the United States. This was a formidable task, and it has taken all our energies and all our thought; and the result has been that we have developed on lines that have not caused us to have very much concern with what is going on in the rest of the world.

We know of the antipathies and jealousies, the hopes and fears that have developed in Europe over the centuries, but these things do not mean very much to us out there—they do not enter into our feelings and our imaginations. We read in the Press about the troubles in Europe, but we find it extremely difficult to take it all at face value. I was myself for six years, from 1924 to 1930, intimately concerned with foreign affairs; I was here in London in active and daily contact with the Foreign Office, and I went back to Australia at the end of 1930 reasonably well equipped to be able to follow from Australia what was going on in the world. I found, I admit greatly to my surprise, that when I had been back in Australia for six months, the reality of things on this side of the world began to fade very rapidly indeed. I read the Press, I got letters from my friends about what was going on, and yet the whole European stage seemed to be behind a veil, rather misty and unreal. Now, if that could happen to somebody who had had six years of active contact with foreign affairs, how much more so must it be the case as regards the average Australian, ninety-five per cent. of whom has never been outside the shores of Australia, and only reads about these things in the Press. I want to stress the fact that these things which are close to you, and naturally very real to you, seem very much less real to people who are half the world away.

There are many misconceptions about Australia, and I think one of the most important of them is connected with a much-used phrase "Australia's vast open spaces." Certainly there are "vast open spaces" in Australia that are very sparsely populated indeed—and I think there always will be. This fact is interpreted on this side of the world, certainly by many foreigners, to mean that we have millions of acres of fertile land which, if we had the goodwill, we could throw open to the people of the more closely populated countries. That is a complete misconception. Two-thirds of Australia will probably never carry any appreciable increase in the present population. Certainly, the well-watered parts of Australia and the coastal areas on the east and south-east will in course of time carry a greater population, but only as a result of the increase of scientific knowledge and of the influx of considerably more capital than is

available to us in Australia to-day. I believe a great deal of harm has been done by this slogan of our " vast open spaces," which has led people to think we are adopting a dog-in-the-manger policy. Australia at the moment, and so far as our knowledge and financial resources go, is probably fully populated. That situation will alter as the years go on, but it will be a slow and gradual process. We could not in Australia take any big increase in population over a fairly short period and still maintain anything like our present standard of living.

To sum up very briefly at this stage, I believe that we Australians are an optimistic, sanguine people, living in a bright sunny climate, much concerned with our own affairs, without many foreign contacts, and in consequence a little intolerant of foreigners. We are an essentially conservative people, although a number of people on this side of the world have summed us up entirely differently, as a people rather given to extreme radical tendencies. Quite the contrary is true; we have actually developed a series of checks and safeguards against radical quick-change political or social action.

I would now like to speak about our position in the Empire. Before 1914 we were a pleasant backwater in the world's affairs. We were little more than a geographical expression in the minds of the vast majority of people. Then came the Great War, in which, as you know, we played our part. Then came the separate representation of Australia and the other Dominions at the Peace Conference, after which we became separate signatories of the Peace Treaty. And then there were the series of Imperial Conferences in 1923, 1926 and 1930. In those post-War years there was a very determined effort on the part of some of the Dominions to throw off what was called the " dominance of Whitehall," or " the overlordship of the Parliament of Westminster." I need not go into the details of that movement, except to say that it was a determined movement and a movement in which Australia took little or no part. Australia has never had any doubts or fears or inhibitions about her status. We believe that we are no more free since 1926 than we were before. We are no great believers in forms of words or technicalities in Australia. We have never suffered from any sense of disability. We have never been under any practical restraint that we could recognise, or under any dominance by the Parliament of Westminster, and we were perfectly content to let things go on as they were. We never sought the Statute

of Westminster; it was sought elsewhere. We feel that it is difficult to put in the compass of a written document the respective spheres of a Dominion like Australia, and of Great Britain, and to do it with precision and elasticity in a way that will cope with all possible circumstances that may arise in the future. The Statute of Westminster was, at our instance, made not to apply to Australia until we had adopted it in our Federal Parliament. It was passed here in 1931; we have not yet adopted it. There is a Bill now before our Parliament to adopt the Statute, but that is only to ensure uniformity throughout the Empire, and I venture to think that when it passes into law with us the event will have no great significance for us, or for you. In all important instances, the situation will be exactly as it was before.

The great majority of people in Australia are completely loyal to the Crown and to the Imperial idea; and that is not qualified by membership of one or other political party, though there is, of course, a noisy minority in Australia. I personally had experience of that sense of loyalty at the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930. I was an officer, first of all with Mr. Bruce, and subsequently with Mr. Scullin. At those two Imperial Conferences there was no discernible difference in the attitude of the two Prime Ministers of Australia, one Nationalist and the other Labour, towards Great Britain, or the Crown or the Empire. It is a remarkable thing to me that although ninety-five per cent. of Australians have never seen their Sovereign, and will never see these shores, we all still speak of this country as " home."

The geographical position of Australia is of some significance to the subject-matter of this talk. Australia consists, of course, not only of the mainland itself. We have Papua, the south-eastern part of New Guinea. Since the War we have received the Mandate for the late German New Guinea. We also share with Great Britain and New Zealand the Mandate for the phosphate island of Nauru. We have a series of islands scattered round the Australian coast, and we also have jurisdiction over one-third of the coastline and the continent of the Antarctic, which may have some importance for us in the years ahead. As some romantically-minded individual has said, Australia's sphere now runs from the equator to the Pole.

Apart from New Zealand, our nearest neighbours are the great umbrella of islands to our north, the Netherlands East Indies, and the French in New Caledonia, and our relations with

these two Powers are so good that we are largely unconscious of having any foreign Powers in our vicinity at all. Then, across the Southern Pacific, we face the Latin-American Republics of South America. We have no contact, no traffic, and no trade with them worth speaking about. We meet them at Geneva from time to time, and then we have furtively to lick our thumbs, and turn up our atlas to find their exact geographical position, and I am sure they have to do the same with regard to us.

Then in the northern Pacific Ocean we have the United States of America and Canada on the one side, and Japan and China on the other. So far as concerns the troubles that arise from time to time in North-Eastern Asia, all I can say is that I am afraid we look through the wrong end of the telescope, and the troubles there do not appear to mean as much to us as possibly they do to you. They are so far away, and we are largely unconscious, by reason of the effect of distance, of any great importance that those troubles may have.

With regard to the Philippines, up to the present we have been barely conscious of their existence. As you know, within the next eight or nine years the Philippines will achieve independence, and so long as they remain independent, and maintain themselves so, I do not suppose we shall be any more conscious of them than we are to-day. But if they were to lose their independence to any other Power, or if their independence were threatened, we would begin to be interested.

With regard to Japan, I have found in the few weeks that I have been here that people on this side of the world appear to believe that we live in constant fear of aggression from Japan at some time in the near future. Well, I can only assure you that that fear is tremendously exaggerated. We hope and believe that we can live on perfectly peaceful and friendly terms with the great Empire of Japan, and, so far as we are concerned, we propose to do everything in our power to do so.

I believe that on the fundamentals of foreign policy Australian thought is completely in line with thought in Great Britain. If I were speaking more formally, I should say that we would wish to preserve our democratic institutions intact in a peaceful world, and that we do not want to interfere with the ideologies or the actions of any other country, but in more simple terms I think, as Mr. Eden has put it, we believe in "live and let live," and I think that is the essential outlook of the Australian people. We do not want to bother anybody else and we do not want to be bothered.

We have a tremendous regard for the high moral purpos that lay behind the great efforts of Great Britain since the Wa to give, by precept and example, a great impetus to limitation o armaments. That effort failed through no fault of your own, an now you are going to make a tremendous effort in rearmament which I can assure you has won the respect of all the people o Australia, and, I personally believe, of the greater part of th peoples of the world. But we believe that the moral effect c your great effort at disarmament in the post-War years has nc been lost on the world. We believe it pressed a lesson home o the world just as what you are doing now is pressing a lesson home by trying to re-establish the benevolent authority that we believ with you that Great Britain should possess.

I am frequently asked what the attitude of Australia is, as more or less typical Dominion, towards European politics, an the part that Great Britain inevitably has to play in Europe It is very difficult to reply. The only thing that I can usefull say is that I believe there has always been, since the end of th War, a great desire that Britain should not embroil herself i Europe again. I am not expressing Government opinion ; w do individually hope and pray that you will not get embroile in European affairs to anything more than the minimum exten you believe to be necessary. This feeling is largely unspoker because after all it is your affair, and you know much more abou it than we do, but I believe the unspoken thought throughou the whole of the Empire has been to try to pull you away fror Europe. We all realise that you have got to have a certain interes in European affairs, but we do hope very much that you will nc be embroiled in Europe to any greater extent than can possibl be avoided.

With regard to the League of Nations, I can say no more tha that we hope and believe that it is possible to reform the Leagu on the basis of regional responsibility, which will give it som chance of being revived as an active force in the world in the year ahead.

We also believe, although we have not the least idea ho it can be brought about, that Great Britain and the Unite States could and should get together for the world's good. W believe in Australia that the United States represents a tremendou moral force for good, and that probably Britain is the only countr in the world that can, in the course of time, unlock that store c moral force. We are very conscious of the United States acros the Pacific, and we hope and believe that the English-speakin

countries will eventually be able to get together to enforce—I think it is not too strong a word—peace upon the world.

Now, in Australia we have our own special interests that are not shared by you people in Great Britain. Our interests first and foremost are in the Pacific Ocean. We are also very interested in the lines of communication with Britain through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Actually, the direct route through the Suez Canal is not absolutely essential to us in Australia, as the distance round the Cape is only a very few hundred miles longer than the Suez route, but we realise quite well that the Suez route is essential for quick contact between Britain and Singapore and the Far East, and in consequence we are very much interested. Our Press always features any references that may constitute a threat to that route. So that Gibraltar, Malta and the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, are an important interest of Australia. I need not mention Singapore, which, of course, is a tremendous focus of strength and is of great importance to us. Our policy generally, and in the simplest possible terms, is based on the belief that the British fleet, or some appreciable portion of it, will be able to move freely eastwards in case we in Australia get into trouble in our part of the world. And I think one can sum it up by saying that any world movement that appears to threaten the ability of the British fleet to move freely eastwards would be of great concern to us in Australia.

On the economic side Australia has, as you know, for many generations produced a great deal more wool and wheat than we need for our own purpose, and we have for a long time been great exporters of these products. In the last generation we have developed a number of other lines of primary production in the form of dairy products, and metals, dried fruits and the rest, which have made us, on a *per capita* basis, one of the great exporting nations of the world. The population of Australia is divided approximately equally between town and country, between primary producing interests and secondary producing interests. We are still in the developmental stage, although I believe we are in the transition stage between extensive development and intensive development, by closer efforts to produce more from the fertile coastal areas. Nauru, I might mention in this connection, is of great importance to us, because it is the source of the phosphate rock which has been responsible for the great increase in our wheat crop in the last fifteen or twenty years.

Now, in order to develop our country faster we were in the habit, before the depression, of borrowing overseas something like £25 million a year, largely in Great Britain. The depression came to us in great measure through the abrupt cutting off of that loan money, as well as in the catastrophic decline in the prices of our exported products. The years 1929–30 made us realise what world markets meant to us; I have noticed very much greater interest in world affairs and world markets, a greater anxiety to learn what is going on in the world, since the depression than before. In the heyday (which was 1925–26) we earned from our exports £160 million; this export income shrank to £80 million in 1931–32, and at the same time the overseas loan money stopped. Our unemployment figures went up to great heights. Early in 1932 thirty per cent. of our active population were unemployed. The position has been improving each year, until we are now down to an unemployed percentage of under ten per cent. again. Our physical production is increasing annually, and we are now able more satisfactorily to exploit and develop our country districts. This means that we are producing primary products at a rate that is considerably more than Britain, our greatest individual market, can absorb, and we are obliged to look to foreign countries to find new markets. We have done that through the placing of trade commissioners abroad, and we have also concluded trade treaties with a number of foreign countries. We are obliged to seek markets outside the Empire, because, with all good will, Great Britain will not be able to absorb the increasing primary products that we shall produce in the years ahead. But you are by far our best individual market, absorbing just about half our exported primary products; and we are for you, next to India and South Africa, your best individual market.

I find there is some misconception and a certain amount of irritation in Great Britain by reason of our efforts in Australia to build up our secondary industries. The reason why we are trying to do this is linked up, amongst other matters, with our unfavourable balance of payments with this country. I will deal with this matter in the first place from a Treasury point of view. We cannot assume that to-day's prices for our exported products are going to be the average prices for the years ahead. We believe to-day's prices to be high prices. If you take something below to-day's prices as an average for the years ahead, we cannot continue to import goods into Australia at the rate that we are importing them to-day if we wish to maintain some-

thing like a balance in our balance of payments with the world. We have to face this complex—the imports into Australia, the exports out of Australia, our interest payments overseas, our exchange rate, and what we call our " London funds." We have to build up a body of money in London as a shock-absorber against a bad season or a series of bad seasons in Australia. We can only build up those London funds if we have a favourable balance of payments with the world. At the present moment we only get a favourable balance with the world in good seasons. We are not likely to get continuous good seasons; therefore we cannot afford to keep on importing at the present rate into Australia. Therefore, we hope that our secondary industries in Australia will develop, so that we may manufacture for ourselves, to help satisfy local demand, some few million pounds' worth more of the goods that we are now importing. Therefore our imports, we believe, must drop slightly. By our policy of the last twelve months we are trying to ensure that Great Britain is not adversely affected in that process. This is the financial aspect of the matter; but there are many other considerations.

There are considerations, in the first place, of defence. The last War found us very unprepared from the point of view of secondary industries; we were extremely short of manufactured goods. A modern war depends on much more than the three fighting services: it depends on the whole body of industry in the country. And we are at the present building up a body of secondary industries in Australia which will enable us to cope more effectively with a war in our vicinity if by great bad fortune it should come about.

There is also the question of population. We cannot look to primary industries to support much more population, because it is becoming more efficient and more mechanised. We are trying to build up a balanced population as between primary and secondary industries. Those are, very briefly stated, the main reasons why we are attempting to build up our secondary industries to-day. We believe that by so doing we can build up a stronger Australia, and we believe that one of the best contributions that we can make to the Empire is as strong an Australia as we can build.

I would like to speak for a moment about the methods we employ for keeping contact with the rest of the world. As you know, there are two schools of thought in the Empire, or, to use the new term, in the British Commonwealth of Nations, with

regard to political and diplomatic contacts. There is a school of thought in some Dominions which desires, and has actually built up, diplomatic services of their own, and there is the school of thought to which Australia and New Zealand adhere, which thinks that we can best keep contact with the world through the medium of existing British Government instrumentalities. Australia has not a separate diplomatic service in the real sense, we have no diplomatic posts abroad. Canada, South Africa, and the Irish Free State have their own separate diplomatic services, and they all have numerous posts abroad. I am making no criticism of the policy of these countries. We believe we can best serve our purpose of keeping in active touch with the world, and at the same time serve the common Imperial purpose, by making our world contacts through your British Diplomatic Service. To this extent we help to maintain a common Empire diplomatic front. We maintain an External Affairs Department which has a branch office in London which I had the privilege of inaugurating in 1924. By this means we keep in daily touch with all the diplomatic incidents and happenings in all parts of the world and we are in constant touch with London by telegraph and despatch and telephone. I believe that we are at least as well informed on world affairs as any other Dominion. We are now extending that service by sending an officer from our External Affairs Department to serve as an Australian Counsellor in the British Embassy in Washington, and in course of time we may seek to extend that principle to more of the key diplomatic posts in the world.

On the commercial side we work differently, and necessarily so, in that we keep our own direct contacts with foreign countries. It would be embarrassing for us and for you if we were to work through your commercial diplomatic service in respect of the conclusion of trade treaties with other countries. We engage in trade discussions direct with the Consul-General in Australia of the foreign country concerned, or by sending an Australian Minister abroad to negotiate trade treaties.

I have tried in a relatively short space to give some sort of a picture of Australia in so far as our external relations are concerned. We now have a great many more overseas and foreign contacts than we ever had in the years preceding the Great War. In those years it was a rarity for Australian Government representatives to go overseas in any representative capacity to international conferences. To-day there is of necessity a constant stream of Australian representatives going overseas to attend

political, commercial and technical conferences of a wide variety of kinds.

Finally, let me repeat that we are an intensely loyal people. There is no doubt whatever of that, and do not be misled by the fact that neither Australia nor any other Dominion has shown itself, up to the present, willing to engage itself in any literal sense in respect of the foreign commitments of Great Britain. It is quite impossible, I believe, for any Dominion to do that; but that does not betoken any lack of loyalty to the imperial idea so far as Australia is concerned. We were not committed in 1914, and I think you can assume that for the future we will be no more backward in any real emergency than we were at that time. It is difficult to paint a picture of a country so far away, one that must be practically unknown to the vast mass of people in this country, at any rate by personal contact, but you need have no fear about us in Australia. I believe Australia to be a safe country. I believe that the relations that have existed between Australia and this country throughout the generations have been ideal, relations unmarred by any untoward incidents of any consequence, right from the first early colonial days, through the days of partial self-government up to the conditions of to-day when we are completely in control of our own affairs.

The distance between Australia and Great Britain is half the world. There have been tremendous modern improvements in communications, telephones, telegraphs, speeding-up of air mails, and the like. All those things are very much to the good, but they do not take the place of face-to-face contacts between yourselves and ourselves. Those personal face-to-face contacts must go on if we are to maintain first-class relations with each other and to avoid misunderstandings. And that is personally why I welcome such opportunities as this, when one comes home for a few months and meets a wide variety of people here in the Government, in your departments, and at such meetings as this, when one can criticise and be criticised and hammer out ideas that must eventually come tc a common form.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. WENTWORTH SHEILDS said that the statement that Australia attached great importance to a community of policy between Great Britain and the United States of America, seemed to him to involve the following consideration. If the foreign policy of Great Britain

were to be increasingly diverted from the continent of Europe, it was imperative for the British Government to know that in so far as they limited their commitments in Europe, they would be fully backed up by the Governments of the Empire. Failing such assurances, it seemed to him necessary for the British Government to concentrate its foreign policy upon Europe.

MR. CASEY repeated that the Dominions would not enter into definite commitments in regard to the continent of Europe. This did not spring from any lack of loyalty, but it was difficult for political reasons for any Dominion to commit itself to send troops overseas in some given circumstances. This need cause no dismay.

Mr. Eden's statement at Leamington in November last had been warmly welcomed in Australia. It had been the first simple, clear-cut exposition of British policy in Europe they had had. It appeared to them to be the type of limitation of commitments in Europe which the rest of the Empire as well as Australia had been hoping for. Sir Edward Grigg's book (*The Faith of an Englishman*) had found a reflection in many minds, and Mr. Eden's speech, coming as it did on top of that book, had given a great deal of satisfaction.

MR. THOMAS DUNBABIN considered that the population problem was a long-range problem, which was not receiving the attention it needed. Sir John Seeley was one of the first to direct real attention to the Dominions, and the growth of the British Empire overseas. He had said that the White population of the British Empire and overseas would be over one hundred million in fifty years. Those fifty years had passed, and the White population of the Empire at home and overseas was seventy-five million. It was not more than two-thirds of the White population of the United States; it was little more than half the White population of Soviet Russia. Unfortunately the White population of Australia, as well as of Britain, was tending to increase at a declining rate, and it was generally thought that in Britain it would stop increasing altogether about the year 1945 (some stretched it to 1960). That was a very serious thing. The proportion of people under fifty was growing smaller every year in Australia also. This was serious for Australia. Moreover, the decline in the population of Great Britain would mean the lessening of the market Great Britain afforded to Australian goods, and this would mean that Australia would turn more and more to foreign countries.

He personally had but little faith in "Hands Across the Pacific" for Australia, and the idea that the United States would save them from all dangers, including the Japanese, although he believed in cultivating the friendship of the United States. They were a great people, and might be a useful people.

As regards Australian relations with the South American Republics, he himself could remember the time when a considerable amount of business was done with these countries. Apples had been sold to

Montevideo and Rio, but the Commonwealth had brought in a Navigation Act which stopped vessels from coming to Hobart, and this trade ceased. Commonwealth policy in that instance was responsible for cutting off a rather important contact.

As far as opinion was articulate at all in Australia on the subject of foreign policy, it was in favour of pulling Britain out of Europe. He himself thought that Britain was just as much concerned with what happened in Czechoslovakia or the Balkans as with what happened overseas, and he did not believe Britain could pull out of Europe. How far would the Dominions join? That was the crucial question. He thought they might refuse to support a war designed to protect the frontiers of Czechoslovakia, although he himself thought they would be wrong, for, in his view, the frontiers of Czechoslovakia were of great importance to Australia. The frontiers of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia were certainly of great importance to her.

SIR ALAN ANDERSON said that he had paid his first visit to Australia in 1885, and had seen the country grow as his business had been there. He was delighted at the recovery in the country's prosperity shown lately. He remembered speaking to an Australian pastoralist at Ottawa who told him at that time that if he killed a sheep he could not sell the sheep, nor the tallow from the sheep when boiled down, nor the skin, and was forced simply to make a bonfire of it. This situation was now happily in the past.

Those who had not seen Australia grow up and traded with her for a long time were rather inclined to think she should not do things for herself, that she should employ British ships and buy British goods only. On the contrary, he thought it most important for people in Britain to realise that the more Australia prospered, the better it was for us. What went wrong in the depression was not that Australia developed her own industries, but that she tried to run before she could walk. She embarrassed herself by relying on heavy tariffs and allowing her local costs to rise above world level. If she had had a prosperous secondary industry at world costs that would have been all to the good. There would have been disturbances in her trade with us, but the total trade would have been increased. There were now more people employed in secondary industries in Australia than in primary production. We in Great Britain wanted the people in Australia, and the people in other new countries, to climb up the ladder of civilisation. The higher they were, the better for us in Great Britain who traded with them.

A German with whom he had recently discussed the question of access to raw materials had said: "You will have to alter your Ottawa Agreements." "What has that got to do with raw materials?" the present speaker asked him. The reply was: "You can sell your manufactured goods to Australia and other Dominions, and get raw materials from them, but we can't because the tariff favours you." The present speaker countered: "Has that anything to do with wool,

really? It is not because we buy Australia's wool that we get these advantages. The Australians can sell their wool and their wheat and their metals anywhere in the world without any help from us. What they can't do is to sell other things; we are the one market for the whole of their butter and fruit and meal, and everything but just those commodities which you desire. Now, if you in Germany would open the market to the produce of the British Dominions, you would have a very good reason for asking to be allowed to pay in manufactures, and as far as I am concerned, I should favour your being allowed to sell your manufactures. And in that way the trade of the world would be encouraged to grow again."

He hoped that was one of the directions in which advance would be made, because it seemed to him most important to get out of this stagnation, and he did not see how we in Great Britain with a shrinking population were going to consume all the supplies that the British countries overseas could produce if the world bought their goods and enabled them to enlarge their population.

MR. CASEY said that it was extremely difficult for Australia to trade with countries like Germany and Italy. This was generally attributed to the Ottawa policy, but personally he believed that the difficulty was more connected with the exchange rates. He did not think they would be able to increase their trade with Italy or Germany appreciably even if Ottawa did not exist.

MR. JOSEPH NISSIM referred to the disabilities which British Indians were subject to in Australia, and which had affected even a very distinguished Indian statesman some thirty years ago when he was invited to pay a visit to the Commonwealth by the Governor-General. There ought to be far closer relations between Australia and India. The Australian population seemed not likely to increase very much, whereas the population of India was increasing at the rate of three millions a year. India was a wonderful market for Australia. He himself looked forward to the day when British Indians could be settled in some uninhabited region of Australia, however small. This would be of the greatest assistance to the cohesion of those two great Dominions.

PROFESSOR K. H. BAILEY, referring to the lecturer's remarks on the Statute of Westminster, said that he had perhaps misled people by suggesting that the Australian was no believer in written Constitutions; in the present speaker's view, the Australian was a fanatical believer in written Constitutions, as was proved by his repeated refusals to amend the one he had. The lecturer had been right in his previous statement that the people of Australia had set up an elaborate and apparently effective system of checks upon the exercise of Governmental authority. This had been done by means of a *written* Constitution.

In defence of the Statute of Westminster, the speaker said that in some of its sections it abolished legal rules which were obsolete

which nobody wanted to retain, and which only an Act of the Imperial Parliament could abolish. The operation of one of these old rules could be illustrated from an incident which had occurred some thirteen or fourteen years previously, when the Master of a British vessel was invited by the responsible officials in an Australian port to comply (under Australian law) with certain formalities as to the engagement and discharge of seamen, including the form which had to be filled in and the fees which had to be paid. The Master had refused to comply, saying (as the High Court held rightly) that an Imperial Act laid down other formalities and that the Australian law was void. But formalities of this kind were just the sort of thing that ought to be in the discretion of a more or less responsible people, and nobody in Great Britain, he thought, would wish to retain a rule which frustrated Australian legislation dealing with Australian affairs. That was an example of the sort of instance in which the Statute of Westminster had done useful work, and the speaker was glad the Commonwealth of Australia was now by way of adopting it. As a believer in the Liberal doctrine of Empire, which might be called the doctrine of Commonwealth, he also appreciated the spirit in which the Statute was being adopted by the Government, not as a means for climbing some new pinnacle among the nations of the world, or of expressing any militant nationalism in opposition to Great Britain, but merely as a useful means of clearing away obsolete machinery.

He would like to have more information upon Australia's Defence projects. Australia's attitude to the rest of the world used to be a defensive one, as a place from which migrants might wish to come. Now she was looking to the rest of the world appealingly, as a place in which markets for her produce might be found. In particular, she looked towards the countries of the Northern and the Eastern Pacific. It was curious that Australia did not look even more towards these regions: perhaps that was owing to the news agencies that supplied the Australian Press. It had a great deal of foreign news, but it was almost exclusively European. In spite of this strangled European interest, there was certainly little inclination in Australia to participate in European commitments and many Australians in the last year or two had been turning their primary attention to the problem of security in the Pacific. They had become anxious at the tension between the British Empire and a great North Sea Power, a great Mediterranean Power and a great Pacific Power. Hitherto, they had mainly relied on naval defence in co-operation with Great Britain, but they now began to wonder if under the new conditions the force available in the Pacific would always be adequate. There was controversy as to the relative weight which should be given in the immediate future to naval defence on the one hand, and a mechanised army and air force, on the other.

MR. CASEY, in reply to Mr. Nissim, said that there were now no disabilities whatsoever to prevent Indian gentlemen of consequence

entering Australia. He himself hoped there would shortly be a larger interchange of trade between Australia and India.

Replying to Professor Bailey, he agreed that the Statute of Westminster would clear away a number of existing technical anomalies and was on these grounds to be welcomed. He thought much of the Australian reluctance to adopt it came from the fear that it would savour of an attempt at separatism.

With regard to defence, the lecturer said that Australia had doubled her defence expenditure in the last three or four years. The Defence Ministry set out to control the three fighting services and look after coast defence and the munitions supply. Hitherto the navy had had the lion's share of the expenditure, receiving about forty per cent of the total, while the rest was fairly equally divided between the other two services. The idea had been growing that there was some peculiar merit in air forces for the defence of a country such as Australia but he considered the present allocation of money was a good compromise. The air was going to be increasingly useful, although he considered it was not yet proven that it could take the place of fixed gun defence or naval defences to any appreciable extent.

Sir Philip Game (in the Chair), did not take so gloomy a view of the population problem as other speakers. He agreed with a previous speaker that the prosperity of any one particular country must eventually prove advantageous to all the rest. He himself looked forward to a rising standard of living among the rapidly increasing population of South-Eastern Asia. Taking the long view, such a market would be at Australia's front door. Once Australia got markets she would get population, because her climate was so favourable.

NEW ZEALAND AND WORLD AFFAIRS

W. B. Sutch

What kind of people are the New Zealanders? To begin with, there is a higher percentage of British people in New Zealand than in the United Kingdom. Particularly in the south, there is a strong Scottish element—but the Caledonian sports meeting is a popular occasion in both Islands. The people are more nineteenth than twentieth century in their attitudes; there is a definite strain of Puritanism, perhaps due to the church settlements of last century. The New Zealanders are a serious people, conservative in outlook, and opportunist in practice. Property ownership and post-office savings-bank accounts are more widely diffused than in most other countries, and democracy is more real. Members of Parliament are readily accessible to their constituents, and Cabinet Ministers perhaps even more so. Parliament contains more farmers and tradesmen than professional men.

The native population is small but increasing, and there is no native problem as it is known in other English-speaking countries. There is more of the feeling of trusteeship towards the Maoris than of overlordship. The New Zealanders are conscious that it was only a century ago that the Maoris were in full ownership and occupation of the country.

Compared with other countries, the newspapers are good; in form they are modelled on the London *Times*, and there is still the lurking idea that news columns are supposed to give the news free from policy bias, while the leader page only may contain the editorial viewpoint. These desiderata are not achieved, but the New Zealand newspapers do give a balanced though conservative view of world events, so much so that the average New Zealander knows more about the world and about English and European politics than does the average reader of the big English dailies.

New Zealand is an isolated country looking out on the world and following the progress of John Lewis, of Franklin Roosevelt, of Chiang Kai-shek, of Jack Lang, of Stanley Baldwin, of Léon Blum and of Maxim Litvinov. It watches Japan in Manchuria, it sends nurses to Spain, and it knows who represents Ross and Cromarty in the British House of Commons.

New Zealand's nearest neighbour is Australia, 1200 miles away, 2½ to 3 days of ocean travel; the central city, Wellington, is about the same latitude as is Gibraltar. The combination of position, topography, rainfall, temperature and soil makes New Zealand an amazingly productive country. The usual cereals are grown for domestic requirements, but it is in pastoral production that she excels. Two farm animals, the cow and the sheep, are the basis of New Zealand's economy, so much so that it supplies half of the United Kingdom's import requirements in mutton and lamb, two-thirds of her cheese imports, and one-third of her butter imports. (Incidentally it might be mentioned that New Zealand is an important element in the economy of the United Kingdom; costs, in the shape of wages, are kept low by supplying high-quality foodstuffs at low prices.) To complete the list, New Zealand is fourth among the world's wool producers and first in the world in the export of mutton and lamb. The above figures do not prove very much in themselves, but when it is realised that New Zealand's population is little more than one and a half million people, it will be seen how highly productive New Zealand is.

The majority of New Zealand imports are British, and although New Zealand can manufacture high-quality products, the manufacturers sometimes deem it desirable to omit the New Zealand label. The New Zealand attitude to the English is largely a sentimental one. Most of them do not know England at first hand—they do not know its slums and its industrialism.

At this stage it is relevant to draw attention to some factors which have tended partly to destroy this attitude to England. One factor is the type of immigrant forming a portion of those who came to New Zealand in the nineteen-twenties, some of whom, being used to a lower material standard of living, tended to compete for jobs by accepting lower wages. This cause of resentment is disappearing as the new-comers tend to take on the patterns of the new country. A second factor is the deep suspicion that many farmers and working trades-people have of the City of London. This attitude is a product of the depression. Another element of uneasiness is the policy of the British Government towards home agriculture and towards imported agricultural products. A fourth factor is the bewilderment caused by the negative attitude of England to the invasion of Manchuria, of Abyssinia, and of Spain respectively. These factors have resulted in a feeling of disappointment in New Zealand, but, even so, the New Zealanders are still romantically English.

While New Zealanders are conservative and traditional in their outlook, this tradition includes a measure of State activity which has led outside commentators to describe New Zealand as a socialist country. From about 1890 onwards there was a wave of social-economic legislation, the product of the liberal ideas of John Ballance and William Pember Reeves and the practical politics of Richard John Seddon. From before the Great War until December 1935, New Zealand has had conservative governments, but the social and economic legislation of the 'nineties still remains as the background.

There are active State life, accident, and fire-insurance departments; there is a Public Trust Office, which as executor and trustee administers estates and businesses worth many millions of pounds; the State is the biggest farm and home mortgagee in the country; there are State coal mines and State forests; the State is a shareholder in and has a majority on the directorate of the Bank of New Zealand, which handles nearly half of New Zealand's banking business; there have been old-age and widows' pensions for many years; the State owns and controls the railways and the post and telegraph and broadcasting systems; the schools are State schools; the hospitals are public hospitals; there are free dental clinics for children, and a very enlightened system of clinics connected with motherhood and infant welfare; but there is no State church. In the last decade or so there have been added family allowances, a State hydro-electricity system administered through local power boards, a State-owned and controlled central bank, State road transport on a State highways system, and State housing projects with State joinery factories, while two-fifths of New Zealand's exports, namely, butter and cheese, are bought by the Government and marketed in the United Kingdom by a State marketing department.

Most New Zealanders are not socialists—Groucho Marx is more known than Karl Marx. But, by the same token of disinterestedness, neither are they capitalists. Among what are generally described as intellectuals there are, apart from conservatives, the usual schools of thought common to the English-speaking democracies—liberals, Fabians, revolutionary socialists, Stalinists, Trotskyists (in the older sense), and followers of Henry George; left thought in the main is left of the British Labour Party. Most of the electorate, however, have no political theories. If an abuse exists, if there is an emergency, the Government is expected to step in and do something about it.

The slogan " Less business in Government " is as likely to appeal as " Less Government in business."

At the present time, and probably for some years to come, Labour is in office in New Zealand. While the Labour Party membership card contains the objective, " The socialisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange," this does not necessarily mean " Socialism in our time." In Europe the New Zealand Labour Party would probably be called Social Democratic, though it has not quite the same theoretical basis or industrial background. The main aim and achievement is to improve social conditions and the standard of living of the mass of the people generally. It is here worth recording that the Labour Government places no ban on the importation of political literature.

There is not a strong development of militant trade unionism, mainly because New Zealand workers have since the end of the last century largely relied on compulsory arbitration for the settlement of industrial disputes. The Arbitration Court is not looked on with favour by a section of the labour movement, but apparently it was an institution too strongly rooted for the Labour Government to find immediately an adequate substitute for protecting wages, hours and working conditions. For example, the Court has been used to bring in the shorter working week. It was directed to make forty hours the maximum working week for industry unless it was " impracticable to carry on efficiently in the industry if the hours of work are so limited." With some curious exceptions, this has been done.[1]

The New Zealand people's attitude to money and banking is more radical than its general attitude to competitive profit-making industry. This is partly due to the severe depression from which New Zealand is now recovering, and partly to New Zealand's financial institutions themselves. Of New Zealand's six commercial banks, five have head offices in London; of the fourteen life-assurance companies, only three are purely New Zealand institutions; in fire insurance, fourteen out of forty-three have head offices in New Zealand; in accident insurance

[1] The opposition to the shorter working week was not great in New Zealand; it was even in the pre-election programme of the defeated National Party. Nevertheless the New Zealand employers' representative at the International Labour Conference, 1937, opposed the convention for a 40-hour week in the textile industry because it would make binding a position for which the New Zealand legislation provided a loophole (*i.e.* the " impracticable " clause), and because it might limit the competing power of British export trade, the reason being that New Zealand's export prices depended on a prosperous United Kingdom.

twenty-four out of fifty-eight have offices registered in New Zealand; there is a similar position with regard to the powerful stock and station companies. These firms are a characteristic feature of New Zealand. They are chiefly concerned with selling on a commission basis all farm products, with the exception of butter and cheese; they also supply farmers with stock, seed, fertiliser, machinery and farm requisites generally, and in addition provide short-term credit for farm operations; they often conduct their own foreign-exchange business. It will be clear that they occupy a key position in New Zealand, a position which is resented by many, especially small farmers who feel that ownership of the shares of a stock firm is a better proposition than owning and working a farm.

The effect of falling prices on New Zealand's overseas debt also tended to create a feeling of distrust for financial institutions, even though the causes of falling prices lay elsewhere. In the financial year 1928–1929, 14½ per cent. of New Zealand's exports were required to meet the interest payments on the overseas public debt. After prices fell, in the year 1931–1932, 26 per cent. of the exports were required to meet interest payments, notwithstanding the fact that the debt had been reduced in the meantime. By 1932–1933, New Zealand's annual interest payments had in four years been reduced by one-eighth in terms of sterling, but the amount of butter required to pay this reduced debt had doubled, and the amount of wool had trebled.

The setting up of a Reserve Bank, the transfer of the gold of the trading banks to the central institution, the introduction of a New Zealand coinage, the substitution of one note issue for six, the depreciation of the external value of the currency by the banks and later by decision of the Government, the compulsory reduction in interest rates, the conversion of the internal debt, have all graphically drawn attention to the money and credit system and its susceptibility to man-made controls.

The effect of the factors discussed in the foregoing paragraphs has been to make the ordinary man in New Zealand anxiously watch the activities of Tooley Street, the place of business of the agents handling New Zealand dairy produce; it has made him distrustful of banks and financial institutions, and especially of the City of London; it has made him oppose the idea of supplying New Zealand's further capital requirements from outside sources. These attitudes are natural enough when it is realised that almost 100 per cent. of New Zealand's dairy produce and meat, and most of its wool, are sold to the United Kingdom,

a market which acts like a world market, in that it is extremely sensitive to alterations or prospective alterations in demand or supply.

The rapid price changes to which New Zealand's export products have been subject in the past have had a disturbing effect on New Zealand's unbalanced economy. Sixty-five per cent. of the total production is represented by the sheep and dairy industry. New Zealand's land tenure is mainly freehold; its land transfer system is probably as efficient as any in the world. With an active market for farm properties, the tendency is for the debts against a farm to be always a little more than the farmer can meet without lowering living standards. The result is the continued existence of over-valued and over-mortgaged land, again with reactions against lending institutions, rather than against the more basic defects in the system.

That brings me to New Zealand's general farm position. The larger and generally more prosperous farms are the sheep-farms. The small farmer is generally a dairy-farmer. On the producer's side this industry is almost 100 per cent. co-operative, the farmers owning and controlling modern factories which manufacture their milk or cream into cheese or butter. The New Zealand farmer is often at one and the same time the owner and worker combined. In times of rising prices he is an owner with property; in times of falling prices he is a worker who must be rewarded for his labour. Whether as owner or worker he has utilised the best of science and machinery; seed and stock selection, the use of fertiliser, milking machines, cream separators, power-driven shearing machines, scientific grading, are normal to New Zealand farming.

The dairy industry shows the amazing productivity resulting. Before the War there were about 700,000 cows in New Zealand with an annual average yield of 140 pounds of butter fat per cow. Now there are 2,000,000 cows with an average yield of 220 pounds. In 1901 dairy produce accounted for 9 per cent. of the total value of exports; now it is 40 per cent. In 1928 New Zealand produced about 100,000 tons of butter. In 1936 it approximated 170,000 tons, despite, or perhaps because of falling prices, and this spectacular increase was achieved with less farm labour than in 1928.

The production of meat and wool is not expanding at this great rate, but it is expanding. And that is why New Zealand's future is bound up with the policy of the United Kingdom Government towards agriculture. Already New Zealand has

been compelled, because of English beef quotas, to turn meat into meat meal for animals or to boil it down for fertiliser and other by-products; in one year thousands of newly-born calves were destroyed because of the meat-quota restrictions in the United Kingdom.

If British policy includes either an import tax or quantitative restriction of meat or dairy produce, it will react more disastrously on New Zealand than on any other country. The reason is that meat accounts for nearly 30 per cent. of the exports, and dairy produce for 40 per cent. With a small population the effects of an import levy would be especially burdensome, while quantitative restriction would mean the re-orientation of New Zealand's whole economy. Already New Zealand is producing her increased quantities of farm produce with less workers than formerly. If her most natural and efficient type of production is stifled in its growth, the only possible alternative, assuming that other and adequate markets cannot be found, is to organise her secondary industries as efficiently as possible and produce some of the articles now imported, thus hoping to absorb the workers who cannot be profitably occupied on the land.

For the last five or six years more people have left New Zealand than have arrived there. It is a characteristic of New Zealand that her better trained and educated young people look abroad for the opportunities they cannot see at home; every year scholars, scientists, engineers, journalists, doctors and dentists leave New Zealand, and many do not come back.

There is nothing inherently desirable in increased population in itself, but from all points of view a larger population would benefit New Zealand, if work could be found for the increased numbers. New Zealand has railways, harbours, roads, hydro-electric power stations, which could serve a much greater population. The increased numbers would lighten the burden of national debt. Culturally New Zealand would benefit; the larger market would also reduce manufacturing costs and tend to raise living standards, that is, if the distributing trades did not absorb the increased number of workers. But how to do all this is a different question.

Most authorities estimate that the population of the United Kingdom is due to decline, thus making English emigration less likely; at the same time the natural increase in New Zealand is causing grave disquiet. If present tendencies remain as they

are, New Zealand is facing "a stationary and even a declining population." [1]

"The nominal natural increase of the past year (7·91 per 1,000 of mean population in 1935) gives the impression of a still substantial margin of increase in the population. While this is correct it yet obscures the more important aspect, which is that the proportions at reproductive ages are not being maintained. Based on expectation of life figures calculated for 1931, an 'equilibrium' birth-rate of over 15 per 1000 of mean population is required to maintain even a stationary population, and should the death-rate increase a higher birth-rate would be necessary. It is clear that the margin of increase is precariously low, and will vanish in a few years if the present trend continues. With the lifting of the depression some improvement may be anticipated."

The death-rate in New Zealand has been for many years the lowest in the world, and as the age composition of the population alters it is likely to rise rather than to fall. If immigration be ruled out, the only hope for an increasing population is that security of living standards, or an alteration in social habits will increase the birth-rate. If immigration is considered, and it should be considered, there are prospects in New Zealand for skilled artisans; but apart from these, the immigration of any considerable number of people will require a good deal of planning, to fit in with a planned increase in production; for there are still some thousands of men unemployed in New Zealand, and the continued and automatic expansion of export industries can no longer be taken for granted.

This, then, is New Zealand. How does New Zealand regard the Empire and foreign affairs? Some of her attitudes have already been described, for example, the intense attachment to England, and this is the clue to New Zealand's ideas on the Commonwealth of Nations and the Empire. In the last War, New Zealanders died at Gallipoli and in France—New Zealand in proportion to her population suffered more losses in men than did any other country. Forty per cent. of the adult males between the ages of twenty and forty-five went abroad on active service. Whatever England may have been fighting for, the New Zealanders were fighting for England. It was not just a matter of Empire defence.

New Zealand tends to look at the Empire through English eyes—it is English history that has been important and the parts of the world generally coloured red. The adult New Zea-

[1] The quotations are from the *New Zealand Official Year Book*, 1937, p. 833.

lander knows more of Charles I, of Robert Clive, of Francis Drake and the rest than he does of the Treaty of Waitangi or William Pember Reeves. But despite this and Rudyard Kipling, there is a consciousness that in the Boer War right and justice were not on the side of the English, that the population of India has still a very miserable standard of living and no real voice in government, and that, as has been mentioned earlier, New Zealand's own native people no longer own the country. Consequently the New Zealanders are opposed not only to the territorial extension of the Empire without the consent of the peoples of the territory absorbed, but to compulsions of any kind placed on weaker countries by the stronger countries of the world.

The New Zealanders have no doubts that they are a self-governing community, and they are jealous of this right. They know that the Governor-General somehow connects them with the United Kingdom, but the details are irrelevant. The Statute of Westminster has not been adopted by New Zealand, not necessarily because the New Zealand Government did not desire it, but because the New Zealanders themselves were not interested. However, there is now a growing feeling that it might be as well if the Statute of Westminster were definitely adopted.

The Cook Islands and some other Pacific Islands are part of the territory of New Zealand, while the Governor-General is also Governor of the Ross Dependency in the Antarctic. This territory, including its adjacent islands, is uninhabited. New Zealand holds with the United Kingdom and Australia the League's mandate over the Island of Nauru. New Zealand's important mandate, however, is that over Western Samoa. Here the sincerity and zeal of the New Zealand Government's administration cannot be doubted, especially in health, education and public works; but on occasions there has been discontent largely owing to the suppression of the Samoan organisation known as the *Mau*. Recently one of the Labour Ministers visited Western Samoa. As a result of the visit the *Mau* was recognised and other concessions made to popular feeling.

Although New Zealand's future interests will probably be more and more in the Pacific basin, the people of New Zealand have not developed definite views in the matter, possibly because their main export market is in the United Kingdom. Even so, apart from the United Kingdom the main suppliers of New Zealand imports are Pacific countries—the United States, Australia, Canada, Dutch East Indies and Japan.

The main concern of New Zealand has been the preservation

of lines of communication, especially the fastest routes to the United Kingdom, that is, the Panama route, and the North America route. The competition of the subsidised and faster vessels of the Matson shipping line has already caused the withdrawal of two British vessels from the Pacific—and now the shipping line connecting Canada with Australia and New Zealand is threatened. It is understood that the recent Imperial Conference considered taking steps to preserve British interests here.

The United States since 1900 has treated Honolulu as a coastal port, hence New Zealand services to San Francisco could not take passengers or cargo from the latter port to the former. The New Zealand Government have taken the power by Act of Parliament to provide that cargo and passengers arriving at New Zealand ports from Australia must be carried in British ships. The Australian Government have introduced somewhat similar legislation. If this power were used, it would certainly cut out the Matson line from the purely trans-Tasman trade.

New Zealand is also interested in the projected trans-Tasman air service, which will link up with the Imperial Airways route to Australia. For the trans-Pacific service Pan-American Airways have concluded an agreement with the right to land at Auckland—this service will be the air link joining New Zealand to the North American continent.

New Zealand still regards Japan and China as the Far East, although they are comparatively near and to the north. Cheap Japanese goods have brought a small amount of inspired anti-Japanese propaganda. But this has not engendered a real fear of aggression by Japan. There is a strong belief in New Zealand that population pressure in Japan is not such as to cause extensive immigration; nor are the Japanese considered to be happy in settling in foreign countries; moreover, it is generally believed that Japan is more interested in the continent of Asia and will want to move towards India rather than towards New Zealand. There has not been any strain between the Japanese and the New Zealand Governments respectively, and trade has developed quietly to the mutual advantage of each country.

It is not known what the official attitude was to the recently mooted Pacific Pact. It was a new idea to New Zealand, which is in general opposed to regional pacts, believing that they will develop into the old system of alliances. If the idea was supported at all, it would probably be on a basis of collective security, with perhaps regional responsibility for the application of military sanctions if these proved finally necessary.

In any Empire defence scheme, New Zealand will play its part, though this does not necessarily mean automatic support in all cases. With regard to this there are two views which have crystallised during the last two or three years of covenant-breaking: one is that the New Zealand people will refuse to send their men to another war in Europe; the second is that, even if troopships were sent, they would never reach their destination. These views are based on the supposition of a war between the Great Powers, and not on a situation where the principles of collective security are effectively practised.

New Zealand contributed to the Singapore base and also maintains the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy. In addition, there is a Naval Reserve Force "officered by and recruited from volunteers who do not follow the sea as a profession." The Naval Defence Act of 1913 provides that whenever Great Britain is at war the Naval Forces of New Zealand pass automatically under the control of the Government of the United Kingdom. "In October 1935, because of representations made to the New Zealand Government by Great Britain relating to the international situation consequent on the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, H.M.S. *Diomede* was placed under the control of the Imperial authorities for service on the East Indies Station."[1]

New Zealand is strengthening her air defence forces, but the compulsory military training has been eliminated, both as an economy measure, and, under the Labour Government, as a matter of policy. The Prime Minister has also promised that the Government will not introduce conscription. Military training in New Zealand is not popular.

New Zealand was elected to a seat on the Council of the League of Nations in 1936 at a time when the principles of collective security were being jettisoned by the leaders at the League. Before the advent of the Labour Government, New Zealand had always taken the same line in foreign affairs as the British Government. The Labour Party election manifesto, however, contained the promise that the Party if elected would "support the Covenant of the League of Nations for the avoidance of war and the maintenance of peace." And now that the Labour Government is in power it has taken up that position.

In discussing the possible improvement of the Covenant at the League meeting in September 1936, the New Zealand Government considered that it should be strengthened rather than weakened; stated that they were prepared to join in the collective

[1] *New Zealand Official Year Book*, 1937, p. 168.

application of force against any future aggressor; that sanctions should be immediate and automatic and a complete boycott; that they were prepared to agree that the Covenant of the League should be separated from the Peace Treaties as a first step to the reconsideration of the Covenant; that a definite proportion of the armed forces of League members, or, if desired, the whole of those forces, should be an international force under the control of the League; that a tribunal should be set up to rectify international grievances; that a survey should be made of the effect of economic conditions on world peace; that there should be held immediately national plebiscites rather than government decisions, on the question of sanctions and force; and that appropriate proceedings and discussions of the League should be broadcast.

The speech on Abyssinia and the League by Mr. W. J. Jordan, New Zealand's representative to the League, on September 29th, 1936, is also worthy of study in judging the attitude of New Zealand to foreign affairs. The following extracts are particularly relevant :—

"The Covenant as written and voluntarily accepted has never been applied, and it cannot with any degree of logic or justice, be characterised as an ineffective instrument until it has been tried in full. . . .

"An undoubted breach of the Covenant, and indeed of other international obligations, has been committed. The territory of a member of the League has been invaded. . . .

"Fifty nations of the world . . . allowed themselves to be deterred from their plain duty. That is the short and sorry tale. . . .

"In fact, is it worth our while coming here at all, unless the Geneva system of understanding and of collective security is made effective? . .

"Believing as we do, that the League's failures have been due to the vacillation of Governments rather than to the indecision of peoples we suggest that all Governments should take a national plebiscite, in order to ascertain the views of their people."

As with Abyssinia so with Spain, New Zealand has been concerned at the non-application of the Covenant. On May 28th, 1937, Mr. Jordan, speaking on the Spanish situation at the Council of the League, said :—

"Authoritative evidence . . . shows that the military forces of outside Powers are operating in Spain. Is it the determination of those Powers to operate in opposition to the fundamental principles which the League was established to uphold? . . . The only action taken so far by any Power associated with the League appears to be the imposition of an embargo which has handicapped the (Spanish)

Government and strengthened the hands of the aggressors. I ask, Mr. President, what are we definitely going to do?"

New Zealand has certainly made her position clear in foreign affairs. A study of the speeches of her representative at the League will show that New Zealand considered that the sanctions imposed against Italy were not complete enough and even when imposed were not effectively operated, that the so-called Non-Intervention Committee was not the appropriate body to deal with an invasion of Spain by foreign Powers, and that the Committee was by its operations assisting the aggressors. Judging by the statements of its representatives, New Zealand's policy at the League is quite definitely not that of the National Government in the United Kingdom.

At the International Labour Conference in 1937 New Zealand's policy in regard to labour conditions was defined by Mr. H. T. Armstrong, New Zealand's Minister of Labour. Mr. Armstrong made it clear that New Zealand, both as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and of the International Labour Conference, was aware of her share of the responsibility for improving the working conditions of peoples less favourably situated than those in the advanced democracies. Formerly New Zealand had been content to ignore the conventions of the International Labour Office on the score that New Zealand's labour legislation was in advance of these conventions. Now there is a more responsible policy. By ratifying as many conventions as possible, it should be possible in some degree "to encourage the others," and this is the genuine wish of New Zealand.

The type of international rivalry that New Zealand is interested in was summed up by Mr. Armstrong at the recent Conference. He said:

"New Zealand once held the proud position of leading the world in social reform, and we shall not be satisfied until we regain that position."[1]

It can be said without cant that New Zealand will continue to do everything possible to achieve economic security for her own people. Yet, because of her dependence on world trade, she will continue to be at the mercy of outside forces over which she has little or no control, even though she is the nation farthest removed from imperial or international conflicts.

[1] *International Labour Conference, Provisional Record*, No. 14, page 269.

SOUTH AFRICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS[1]

SENATOR THE RT. HON. F. S. MALAN

I APPROACH my task with diffidence. I seem to hear the remarks, "What can a country like the Union of South Africa have to contribute to our store of world information? And of what assistance can it be to the solution of world problems? We in Europe are concerned with powerful neighbours practically at our doors, while South Africa is six thousand miles away from the storm-centre. No wonder the Union of South Africa is able to take a more detached view of the troubles of the old world than we." Whatever truth there may be in this criticism, distance gives to students of world affairs in South Africa a distinct advantage, in that they see world events in better perspective than those who are in danger of seeing the trees without perceiving the forest. But I also claim for South Africa the advantage of youth, of being one of the young nations of the new world. These nations have their own outlook on world affairs differing from that of the parent nations of Europe. This difference may be formulated as follows: While the older nations of Europe are accustomed to think in terms of history and to assume that things will always happen in a certain way, the younger nations of the new world are inspired by the love of adventure, and are always trying to go forward to something new. This distinction, I venture to think, is fundamental. And we shall inevitably fail to understand the outlook of the younger nations unless it is clearly visualised and constantly borne in mind. It arises from the very nature of youth.

Another reason why the young nations like the United States of America, Canada and South Africa are differently minded from the older European nations, is the fact that their national stock comes from several European countries. The United States of America, with their teeming millions drawn from practically all the nations of Europe, cannot share the national fears and prejudices of the individual parent States. Their national outlook cuts right across such fears and prejudices.

[1] Meeting held at Chatham House on Thursday, May 6th, with Sir Roderick Jones, K.B.E., in the Chair.

The Canadian nation, composed largely of descendants of French and British settlers, must of necessity exercise a great measure of tolerance and develop the art of compromise which, in John Morley's sense, is the secret of true statesmanship. The Union of South Africa has a white population of two million, consisting of an almost equal proportion of English and Africaans-speaking South Africans, and a German element in the mandated territory of South-West Africa. In addition, she has six and a half million natives or bantus, seven hundred and fifty thousand coloureds and two hundred and fifty thousand Indians. The government of such a heterogeneous population presents problems to its rulers which are unknown to the homogeneous nations, and are calculated to bring out methods of administration which may well prove to be of service to other parts of the world. Please do not interpret this statement as an assertion that we in South Africa have already found a satisfactory solution to all our racial problems. No, the social, industrial, economic and political issues that are involved are incapable of a cut-and-dried solution. But the Union is experimenting, trying out different ideas, gathering experience and I hope wisdom in meting out equal justice to all sections of the community.

Again, South Africa is a country with wide-open plains; torrential rain-areas, where the rushing waters carry fertile soil into the sea unless conserved in expensive irrigation works; a country with vast mineral resources, partly undiscovered, partly now being exploited; and it has its peculiar demands. For the fulfilment of its destiny and the development of its heritage, the young South African nation requires, above all, world peace, ample capital, sufficient labour and open markets. While such conditions are of advantage to all nations, to South Africa they are essential.

With this background of a partially undeveloped country inhabited by a heterogeneous population six thousand miles away in the Southern Hemisphere, the young South African nation views world affairs. And what do we see in present day Europe? Governments anxiously striving to restore and uphold the antiquated order of international relations which, less than a generation ago, brought about the sacrificial fires of the World War; the advance in the knowledge of the laws of nature, intended for the benefit of man, being prostituted for the destruction of humanity; intellectual and material development progressing rapidly, while the moral and religious conception and sanctions of past generations are apparently no longer able to control and

restrain the destructive forces threatening the existence of Western civilisation. What, then, has become of the new world order, the advent of which quickened such high hopes in the distracted soul of man that the sacrifices and wholesale bloodshed of the World War would not be in vain? This new order was to have been based on the rule of law, and not on the law of the jungle. An appeal to reason, and not to brute force, was to have been the normal way of settling international disputes. Machinery was to have been provided for conciliation and peaceful change, while collective defence would minimise, if not render useless, costly national armaments. These were the ideas embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Perhaps it is as well to remind ourselves that this Covenant was forced on the reluctant and hesitating nations of the old world by the young nations of the new world. But for the initiative and pressure of President Woodrow Wilson, ably assisted by General Smuts of the Union of South Africa, coupled with the whole-hearted support of Lord Cecil, it is safe to assert that the Covenant would never have seen the light.[1] As is well known, the objection of France to the inclusion of the Covenant in the Peace Treaty of Versailles was only overcome by the guarantee of her security by the Tripartite Pact between England, the United States of America and France, and when this pact fell to the ground, and the Peace Treaty failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority of the Senate in Washington, France felt that she had been let down badly, and immediately reverted to the old policy of security by armaments. Thus the collective security scheme set up by the Covenant was seriously injured even before it could be tested. In this connection, it is important to remember that General Botha, then Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa, who represented the Union at Versailles, refused to be a party to this tripartite agreement, and was satisfied only by the insertion into the terms of the pact, at the suggestion of Mr. Lloyd George, of the clause stipulating that no Dominion

[1] While it is true that "President Wilson's Peace Note of December 1916 first brought the question of a League of Nations before the belligerent statesmen as a real issue" (*History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. II, p. 25), a study of American, as well as of English, accounts of the origins of the League of Nations does not altogether bear out the account in the text. An influential group under the leadership of Lord Bryce was working in England from the early months of 1915 and was in close touch with the American movement, while the report of a committee (the Phillimore Committee) set up by the Foreign Office in October 1917 to examine the question, and memoranda prepared later in the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, were used by General Smuts in drawing up his plan. *Ed.*

should be bound by the agreement unless its own Parliament should decide to be so bound. He not only objected to give a blank cheque to be filled in by others under circumstances over which he would have no control, he also regarded such a pact as contrary to the very spirit of the League of Nations Covenant. This clause was subsequently repeated in the Locarno Treaty, and has become an accepted principle of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The Union of South Africa, with hardly a dissentient voice, welcomed the Covenant, and felt proud of the part her representatives at Versailles had taken in establishing the League of Nations. With the active co-operation of the United States of America, the greatest of the young nations of the new world, who was so largely responsible for the inception of the Covenant, it was hoped that the League of Nations would justify the high expectations of a world broken and disillusioned by the loss and folly of the Great War, and that a new era of world affairs would bring relief to suffering humanity. It was therefore with the deepest disappointment and concern that the Union learned that the Covenant had failed to pass the Senate in Washington. This was almost a fatal blow to the League. It meant the weakening of the League, not only by the abstention of a powerful nation outside Europe, but also by the absence from its councils of the influence which could have done so much to assist the European nations to forget their quarrels and to guide them over their prejudices and hatreds. And so the bantling—the League of Nations—was left to the care of its rather unsympathetic stepmothers. With President Wilson out of the picture and General Smuts back in the Union of South Africa, the influence of the young nations of the new world became almost negligible in League circles. Lord Cecil, who represented the Union of South Africa in the first meeting of the Assembly of the League, backed by a powerful British League of Nations Union, has done yeoman service for the Covenant, but unfortunately he had to do it without the assistance of the father of the bantling.

The history of the vicissitudes of the League is so recent that I need not give a detailed account of it. Suffice it to point out that the resignation of Japan automatically converted the League into more of a European conclave than it had been before. The failure of the Disarmament Conference to give effect to the limitation of armaments clauses of the Peace Treaty, followed by the retirement of Germany from the League, came as no surprise to those who followed the course of events. The Manchurian

episode, and still more the Abyssinian fiasco, seriously injured the prestige of the League, and so to-day we see the race to arms in full gallop. In 1932 the annual arms bill was approximately £1000 million per annum. To-day the total is little less than £3000 million, three times as much in five years time.

As a member of the League of Nations, the Union of South Africa watched this gradual slipping back into the pre-War atmosphere with profound misgivings. The dominant feeling of the average citizen of the Union undoubtedly is to get away from the storm-centres as far as possible, and to have nothing to do with the endless intrigues and ineradicable suspicions, the fears and jealousies of the nations within the European cockpit. Why continue to support an institution for collective security when all the nations are feverishly busy preparing for national security behind a barrage of armaments for the preservation of peace? General Smuts, in addressing a gathering of university students not far from Cape Town recently on "Whither Europe?", said: "The League has failed. How will it be able to secure peace with the world going back to the old system of alliances?" and, "It will not be strong enough to solve the question of Germany's insistence on colonies." Yet he says: "I do not despair of the future. I see in the armaments of to-day a possible peace. I agree the position is most critical, but I see a way out in just this fact, that arming will prevent war. Such a situation of armed peace existed from 1870 to 1914, and I do not see why it cannot happen again." What a different picture this is from the one that the General was able to paint in such glowing colours but a few years ago! Then it was: "Collective security"; now it is "Armed peace." Then it was "Peace by the removal of the causes of war"; now it is "Peace until the greater war."

As a free and equal partner in the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of South Africa is naturally profoundly interested in what is going on in the United Kingdom. Since the League's Abyssinian surrender, the British Government has announced a colossal scheme of rearmament. Notwithstanding the assurance that this is only a defensive measure, the Union feels uneasy and anxious about it. While armaments are a requisite of national security, they are also, of course, instruments of war. And therefore the question is asked: "What are these arms really for? Is Great Britain arming the law? Is she equipping her people to make good their obligations under the Covenant? Is she strengthening the only system which holds out any hope to a frightened world, the friendly settlement of

disputes, peaceful change, collective defence? In view of the emphasis and repetition with which the British Government has declared its support of a full League policy, we take it that these questions can only be answered in the affirmative.

It would be futile, however, to close our eyes to the fact that this rearmament scheme has serious repercussions in a not inconsiderable section of the South African community. These people argue that the Union is in imminent danger of being drawn into another world cataclysm with Great Britain. They therefore insist on the Union's right to neutrality, and watch with suspicion any move to link up the defence system of the Union with that of Great Britain. I do not think these people sufficiently realise the advantage of mutual assistance and collaboration in time of common danger. The Union cannot isolate herself from the rest of the world. The economic life of the Union largely depends on her extensive and expanding external trade with countries of the Northern Hemisphere. The security of her ocean trade routes is therefore of vital importance to her prosperity and development. And in a world becoming more contracted and more interdependent than ever before, in consequence of improved means of communication, it would indeed be foolish to sacrifice the friendship and help of a strong elder brother and the rest of the family for the uncertain advantages of a neutrality which, at its best, would be at the mercy of every rapacious or aggrieved nation with a powerful fleet. But, at the same time, it will be wise to remember the stand made by the late General Botha with regard to the blank cheque and the abortive Tripartite Treaty. The Union of South Africa is watching world and Commonwealth affairs critically, and the extent of her participation in any conflict outside her own borders will depend on her own judgment of the merits of the case as expressed by her own Parliament.

Coming now to the causes of unrest in Europe which directly concern us in the Union, I would mention first "over-population and the necessity of room for expansion." We find it somewhat difficult to appreciate this demand, in view of the statistics regarding the constant decline in the birth-rate of the nations concerned and the frantic efforts of their rulers to stimulate the natural increase of their populations. In this connection, I would draw attention to the speech delivered by the German Minister of the Labour Front to a gathering of twenty thousand in the *Deutschlandhalle*. He said: "Why, in spite of repeated demands for the increase of children, is there so little response?" The first reason, he said, is that the Germans to-day are a people

without space. Germans should pay no attention to suggestions from abroad that they should reduce their population in accordance with the size of their territory. . . . On the contrary, every German father and all German parents who had the blessing of numerous children must be the bearers of this idea and hammer it ever again into the people, "We will have territory." Thus, according to this Minister, it is not territory for the people; it is people for the territory that is wanted. But, further, we feel that the interests of the people already inhabiting the parts of the world selected for the supposed overflow population of Europe deserve consideration. It was said some little time ago of a certain European nation that she must either expand or "bust." Well, why should it not be "bust"? As for the argument that wars are necessary to keep down surplus populations, it would seem to be rather out of date, in view of the life statistics of the majority of the European nations, not to mention the extreme folly of killing the young manhood for the benefit of the inefficients and decrepits! May we not regard the fall in the birth-rate as the subconscious protest of the motherhood of humanity against the mad, inhuman policy of the warmongers, and as its very effective contribution towards the solution of the over-population problem? Mothers will not produce children to be tenderly cared for and expensively educated merely to increase the supply of cannon-fodder!

I now come to another cause of unrest in Europe: the desire for colonies on the part of the so-called Have-Not nations. As has been shown over and over again, the material advantages of the possession of colonies are often exaggerated, or are not supported by the facts. The considerations of prestige and national sentiment stand, however, on a different footing. Now, the Union of South Africa holds the mandate over South-West Africa, which she administers, under the Covenant, as an integral part of her own territory. The Prime Minister of the Union, General Hertzog, has repeatedly declared that the Union does not intend to relinquish her mandate and will do all in her power faithfully to discharge her obligations. In view of this fact the Union is hardly in a position to give an unbiased opinion on the German demand for colonies. I would, however, venture to suggest that this difficult question of colonies should not be tackled as a separate problem, standing by itself, but should be considered together with other unsolved international questions as part of a general scheme of adjustment. The obvious advantage of this suggestion is that it gives ample scope for accommodation and

compromise. A Conference should be called for this purpose, but of course not without adequate preparation to ensure that it will meet in an atmosphere of goodwill and friendliness. I know it will be said that this suggestion is altogether too Utopian; that it is so contrary to the present-day temper of the rulers of Europe that no practical result can be expected from such a conference. My answer is that the situation is so desperately serious that something must be attempted to relieve the strain. Is it not worth while to give the spirit of goodwill a chance to return to the chancellories of Europe? And what is the alternative? The continuation of the strain until the breaking-point is reached! Do not our minds refuse to contemplate the consequence of another Armageddon, more savage and more destructive than the world has ever known?

Lastly, I come to the question of the League of Nations. If the League of Nations has failed in Europe, as General Smuts and others declare, should it be dissolved? I sincerely trust not. On the contrary, it should be extended and more loyally supported than hitherto. If for no other reason, it deserves to be continued for the quiet, solid, necessary work it is doing in various fields of world affairs, which, not having the same news value as its activities in the political sphere, is left almost unnoticed by the daily press. I do consider it advisable, however, that the linking up of the greatest young nation of the new world with the League should be facilitated. To this end I would suggest that the United States of America be approached, to ascertain the conditions upon which she would be prepared to enter the League. The advantage of securing the presence of the United States of America on the councils of the League need not be stressed. It will go a long way to remove the imputation that the League is too much dominated by a few big European Powers. The United States Government has already shown in various ways that it is not unwilling to co-operate in world affairs. I need only remind you of the promotion of the Kellogg–Briand Treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy; the sending of observers to the League meetings in Geneva to keep in close touch with what was happening there; and the joining of the International Labour Organisation instituted under the Covenant of the League. The difficulties raised by the Senate in Washington when the acceptance of the Covenant failed by a few votes only to secure the required two-thirds majority do not seem to be insurmountable, and should be met even by agreeing to amend the Covenant if necessary. To me it seems

much more important to have the great young nation of the West in the League, than to retain in the Covenant provisions which will hardly ever be applied with the League constituted as at present, and never in the case of any big Power. The noble and inspiring message of President Roosevelt to the Pan-American Congress at Buenos Aires a few weeks ago was also an appeal to the rest of the world for co-operation and peace. I feel convinced that we can rely on his support in bringing the greatest democracy of the new world to take its rightful place in the councils of the League, constituted under the provisions of the Covenant, revised if necessary in accordance with the knowledge and experience gained in trying out the new international system which his great predecessor did so much to inaugurate.

Should this attempt to revise and strengthen the League of Nations fail, or should the League, so strengthened, not succeed in stemming the tide of reaction now sweeping over Europe, the outlook will be dark indeed. It may mean that the torch of civilisation, so long held on high by the great ones in Western Europe, will grow dim, or may even be extinguished; but even if that be the destiny of Western civilisation, I believe that the light which has been kindled elsewhere, in the new world, will continue to lead humanity on the path of progress and peace.

I cannot but close my address on a note of optimism and faith. As a Christian, I believe in the guidance of God Almighty. His Divine Plan with the human race is gradually being consummated. His directing hand may be traced throughout the chequered history of mankind, and we have the absolute assurance that He wills the good of humanity.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. GEOFFREY MANDER asked if Senator Malan contemplated the League of Nations including the United States without sanctions, with Article 16 left out. He thought such a League hardly worth having, and suggested that the best way to bring the United States in would be for the members of the League, particularly the powerful nations, to make it clear that they intended loyally and effectively to carry out their obligations in practice. The United States would then very soon be, not a member of the League, but actively co-operating, and doing, in fact, all that she would really do if she were a member. An example of this had been seen when the United States took her seat at the Council table during the Manchurian dispute.

He also asked what the attitude of the South African Government was with regard to native territories and their possible incorporation in the Union.

SENATOR MALAN replied that he had not definitely said that he was in favour of removing Article 16 from the Covenant. He suggested that the United States should be asked if there were any amendments of the Covenant which she would like to see. In 1919, when the Covenant was discussed, the American Senate considered that it contained clauses which would bind the United States, and which were contrary to the Monroe Doctrine. It would have been better then to have called America's bluff and accepted her amendments. It would have been better to have had her in the League than to have a partial League which lacked the power to use the clauses of the Covenant as they stood. He was all for Article 16 if it could be strengthened and carried out, especially against a Great Power like Japan in Manchuria or Italy in Abyssinia; but what good was it maintaining a thing like a scarecrow of which no one was afraid?

The Union Government was strongly in favour of taking over the three Protectorates of Swaziland, Basutoland and Bechuanaland, and did not think that there was any great danger in acceding to that request, because the conditions under which they could be taken over were clearly laid down in the Act of Union, and were agreed to at the time by Lord Selborne and the Imperial Government. There seemed to be ample safeguards; but there were, no doubt, differences of opinion on the question. The incorporation of the territories was clearly contemplated at the time of the Union.

DR. W. J. ROSE asked if the Union of South Africa, as one of the lands facing the Indian Ocean, was likely to find herself in difficulties in respect of changes in India or in the Pacific Basin. Might she perhaps find herself called upon to face such questions as a semi-independent people rather than as part of the British Commonwealth?

SENATOR MALAN said that he was in favour of maintaining the now voluntary association of the Union with the other Dominions, including Great Britain, in the British Commonwealth of Nations, and whether it faced north, east or west made no difference. If any difficulty arose between South Africa and India, no doubt an Imperial Conference would be called and matters would be adjusted. The chief contribution of the British Commonwealth of Nations to the world would be to demonstrate that when difficulties of that kind arose, instead of going to war over them, they could be discussed at a round-table conference and settled by common consent.

MR. T. B. MARTIN was surprised at the Senator's apparent condemnation of the policy of the British Government concerning armaments. The Senator had suggested that those in Great Britain were too near the trees to see the wood; but in dealing with the subjects which were the trees in Europe, he had displayed something of the same blindness. He apparently disagreed with the policy of the British Government, which, after leading the rest of Europe for many

years along the path of disarmament, had eventually turned to armaments; but the moment he dealt with South Africa *vis-à-vis* a dictator, he had betrayed the same indignation and readiness to fight which he deplored in the mother country. Expansion and the desire for colonies might be sheer " spoof," but Great Britain was nearer to the dictators who were proclaiming them and was mainly responsible for the defence of all the members of the British Commonwealth.

Was the attitude of South Africa to the alien question and immigration, as expressed in recent legislation, a result of the influx of those persecuted by the Nazi régime in Germany, or was it purely anti-alien, not anti-Semitic, a desire to be a self-contained people?

Those who had attended the Empire Parliamentary Conference would recall that people from other parts of the Empire had expressed surprise that the British Minister of Agriculture should declare the intention of following a policy of increasing Great Britain's agriculture, when they wanted a better market for their own products. Surely if there were a desire to understand why Great Britain had been forced into the existing position, there would come less strenuous opposition to her policy than the Senator had expressed.

SENATOR MALAN hoped that he had made it plain that a certain section of the community in South Africa was very hostile to any idea of the Union being drawn by Great Britain into a war, and they insisted on the right of neutrality. If they did not approve of the reason for Great Britain's going to war, they would take no part in the war nor would they assist Great Britain in any way. They would refuse harbour to British ships. This view was held by a very vocal and not inconsiderable section, but he did not know how large it was.

His own attitude was that if Great Britain's rearmament was for the maintenance of peace, he would certainly not object, and the majority of the people in the Union would welcome it. But armaments built up for peace gave a country an instrument for war and, unless Great Britain's objectives were very clearly stated, those armaments might be misused. The British Government had repeatedly declared itself in favour of the maintenance of collective security, and he was prepared to accept that declaration.

The question of immigration was hardly germane to the subject. The Union had the same right as any other country to decide what the composition of its population should be, and it had exercised that right. During the abnormal conditions prevailing in parts of Europe, certain classes of people were being pressed out and were storming South Africa, which was discriminating in its acceptance of them. If they were good people they were welcome.

MR. ISRAEL COHEN considered that the position of South Africa in world affairs would largely depend upon her preserving a high standard of political sanity and political righteousness. The expressions of political wisdom and high idealism which had come from South African

statesmen might suggest that there was little need for doubt in that respect, but there were some political leaders who had shown a hankering after the doctrines of political philosophy manufactured in Nazi Germany. In recent years there had been a considerable movement of racial intolerance, in almost all parts of South Africa, directed solely against the small Jewish community which had rendered very considerable services both in commerce and industry to the upbuilding of the fortunes of the country. It was not confined to the Grey Shirt organisation, which received its propaganda literature and its funds from Nazi Germany; it was openly espoused by a recognised political party, which even set up the demand that Nordic characteristics should be sought for in any immigrant desiring admission to South Africa. The South African Government was opposed, of course, to such crazy ideas; but it had nevertheless been obliged, owing to agitations in all parts of the country, to pass a Bill intended to restrict the immigration of aliens. It was based ostensibly upon social and economic considerations, for which there was no justification, and did not mention Jewish immigrants, so was easily adopted in view of the Opposition demand for a more reactionary measure openly directed against the Jews. Many Jewish victims of persecution in Germany and other parts of Europe had thus been prevented from entering South Africa, and some had run the risk of being deported from it.

SENATOR MALAN said that there were two aspects of the question, one relating to the Jews already in the Union, the other to those coming in from outside. Mr. Cohen was mistaken in thinking that there was a serious anti-Jewish propaganda in South Africa against the Jews who were already there; the movement which did exist exercised no great influence. With regard to the inflow from outside, there were abnormal conditions, and the Union could not be blamed for saying that future entrants into the country should be of such a nature that they would assimilate with the population already in the country. That was the policy of the Bill which had been passed during the last session of Parliament.

MR. A. G. LIAS referred back to the question of the United States and the League, and said that he was convinced that there was not the slightest chance of the United States joining within any measurable time. Her whole business, politically speaking, was to keep clear until Europe's major political problems were out of the way. No amendment of the Covenant would bring her in unless every political function of the League were dropped. And even if the United States was prepared to co-operate in Europe, matters would not be much better, because under the American Constitution the Senate had great powers over foreign policy, and no American delegate could commit the American Government to any line of policy.

When there was any question which concerned the United States, for example, in the Far East, Americans would co-operate with the

League if she were convinced that the League really meant to take action. Nobody at the moment could be sure that the League was going to take any action anywhere. In the meantime one must be content with American co-operation in the social and humanitarian and some of the economic and financial work of the League.

With regard to economic co-operation, to what extent were the Dominions, and particularly South Africa, ready to meet the American case for the alteration of the Ottawa Agreements to enable the United States to sign an economic treaty with Great Britain and the Dominions? The one thing which the Americans did not like was the idea that the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause should permit certain States of the Commonwealth to get preferential treatment which the United States did not get. Were they prepared to say that they would wipe out British preference in their markets and give the United States the same footing as Great Britain?

SENATOR MALAN said that with regard to the United States and the League, his suggestion was that she should be asked to state her conditions. That might at least be tried.

The question of economic and fiscal relations between the United States and the British Commonwealth had nothing to do with the League, but was one of international treaties and must be discussed on its merits.

LADY STEWART referred to the dissatisfaction felt in India with regard to the treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa. The feeling that they did not get a fair deal would grow stronger as India approached more fully to self-government. It was to be hoped that a solution might be found in Imperial Conference discussions, as the Senator had suggested.

She did not think that smaller families were the result of a fear that children would become cannon-fodder. Poor people realised that they could not afford to have large families, and they wanted to give their children a better chance. With those who were better off it was just unfashionable to have large families; they were expensive to educate, which meant going without a car and so on.

SENATOR MALAN suggested that it was a subconscious reaction of the motherhood of civilisation. It was the aftermath of war which had upset the economic position in Europe. Nature was solving the problem of over-population.

The two hundred and fifty thousand Indians in the Union were mostly confined to Natal and the Transvaal. In the Free State there were none, and a negligible number in the Cape. During the current session of Parliament one Bill had been introduced to prohibit marriages between Europeans and Indians, and another Bill to prohibit Indians employing unmarried white girls. Both were opposed by the Indian community, and after reference to a Select Committee, the Bills were

dropped on the Indians undertaking voluntarily to set their faces against any abuses in regard to those two matters.

SIR JOHN POWER pointed out that the idea that a war could only originate in Europe was far from being correct. There was just as much chance of war originating from the action or inaction of one of the Dominions. For instance, if Great Britain were forced into a war by any of the three great dictator Powers, whose complaint was that they had not enough territory for their large populations, was it reasonable to suppose that they would attack Great Britain in order to accommodate their surplus population in her crowded country with six hundred and seventy-two inhabitants to the square mile? Was it not more probable that they would hope to capture the Dominions? South and South-West Africa had a white population of just under two million in an area of seven hundred and ninety thousand square miles. South Africa had a magnificent climate, quite suitable for Europeans and where the Japanese would flourish like the green bay tree. The Germans had recently addressed a very strong note to the Union Government, which they went so far as to characterise as a "warning." What sort of a note might they have sent if it had not been for the existence of the Royal Navy?

How could South Africa dissociate herself from the troubles of a troubled world? It was useless to rely on a policy of collective security when experience showed that in a crisis Great Britain got no help. As Sir Samuel Hoare had said in the House of Commons in regard to the Italian–Abyssinian crisis: "Not another member of the League moved a man, a gun, a ship or a machine to help us." What material steps had South Africa taken to uphold and maintain the policy of collective security? When Senator Malan talked of neutrality and the possibility of South Africa standing out of any war in which the Commonwealth was involved, did he think that an aggressor nation would accept such an equivocal position? What would become of South Africa's sea-borne trade, since it had not a single ship to protect it? South Africa offered the greatest attraction to a potential aggressor. Both the Dominions and Great Britain had a right to demand that every member of the Commonwealth should do its duty as far as lay within its competence. Would Senator Malan explain exactly what the Union was doing to fulfil the responsibilities which went with the privilege of self-government within the British Commonwealth of Nations?

SENATOR MALAN thought perhaps Sir John was confounding him with Dr. Malan, whose party was very insistent on neutrality. The Government and the majority of the people agreed that it was out of the question for the Union to try to isolate itself, and stood four-square for remaining in the British Commonwealth of Nations.

SIR EDWARD GRIGG said that the effect produced upon him by Senator Malan's address, for which he expressed the thanks of the

audience, must be familiar to those who had travelled much in the Dominions. They were accustomed to feel unworthy of the younger nations of the Commonwealth, and to hear that they were wandering benighted, while the younger nations had somehow struggled through to a new dawn. Racial bitterness, which was causing such difficulties in benighted parts of Europe, did not yet seem to be extinguished in South Africa, and problems of justice towards subject peoples were causing as much difficulty in South Africa as in Europe. But the beams in European eyes were not removed by pointing to the motes which might be discoverable in the eyes of the younger peoples from overseas. There were, however, one or two points with regard to the South African approach to European difficulties which might be put forward.

Senator Malan had spoken eloquently of the importance of arming the law, and had asked whether Great Britain was arming the law. But he had appeared inconsistent in congratulating General Botha on having insisted that South Africa should keep the question of supporting the law entirely in her own discretion. (SENATOR MALAN said he had only meant in regard to the Tripartite Agreement, not in regard to the Covenant.) If South Africa was prepared to intervene in support of the Covenant at the decision of the majority of the members of the League, whatever the cost to herself and the risk to herself, she was going to make a very great contribution to the peace of the world. But there had been no evidence of that in the Abyssinian crisis; the practical part of that task was to have been carried out by Great Britain, urged on by the younger nations overseas and by practically all the other members of the League. Great Britain was not likely to forget that experience, and was a little cynical, asking from others something more than perorations about arming the law and supporting the League.

He had not understood why, if Senator Malan believed so strongly in arming the law, he had objected to Great Britain's rearmament. Did he really believe that there was any body of men in Great Britain who would be likely to foment a war for other purposes than self-defence or the support of some cause sacred under the Covenant? Any Government attempting to make a war of that kind would be thrown from power immediately. A straight answer to the question was really needed, as there was a great deal of rhetoric on the subject which seemed grossly unfair to British democracy and dangerous to the peace of the world.

Senator Malan had suggested that in spite of the leadership of the younger peoples and their exhortations, Europe might refuse to correct its errors, and might end in destroying itself. This was indeed possible, but if that happened would there be any hope for Western civilisation in any other part of the world? It might just be possible on the American continent, but he did not think even that was certain. The collapse of European civilisation would mean the collapse of the markets on which the newer countries depended, and would lead

directly to upheaval in them, and it would mean an immense increase of power for the Asiatic peoples. In that case had not the time come when, instead of insisting so much upon the older and the younger point of view, they should realise that they had a common cause? It was always being said that the young and the old could not work and think together, and this, which was untruly said of the nation within itself, was being said of relations between nations themselves, taking the world as a whole. He begged Senator Malan to realise that there was not that fundamental difference which he appeared to assume between the views of the older world, at any rate in Great Britain, and the bright younger world which he represented. Both really wanted the same things. If the younger nations would believe that, it would be possible to maintain peace, but if they would not believe it, the world was in sight of a very dangerous era.

SENATOR MALAN said that he much appreciated the remarks just made. He had not expected that his way of presenting the situation would meet with general approval. If he had expected it, he would not have accepted the invitation to speak.

With regard to rearmament, he accepted the assurances that had been given. With regard to the collapse of civilisation, it was quite possible that Western civilisation would suffer everywhere; but the phœnix would rise from the ashes, and it would rise more quickly in the younger nations than in the older ones.

SIR RODERICK JONES (in the Chair), in closing the discussion and thanking Senator Malan for his address, said that it would be a poor compliment if his hearers agreed with everything he had said, but he had stimulated their minds and had provoked an unusually good debate. Senator Malan was a direct descendant of the little band of French aristocrats who found refuge at the Cape in the seventeenth century and had contributed very much towards making the South African race what it was. He had served South Africa as faithfully and with as much distinction as the most eminent of South Africa's sons, and Sir Roderick was proud to be able to claim him as one of his oldest and most highly regarded friends.

INDIA'S PLACE IN THE EMPIRE[1]

THE HON. CHAUDHURY SIR MUHAMMAD ZAFRULLA KHAN, K.C.S.I.

THE subject of my address may be approached from many points of view. For instance, the geographical position of India, alone, is of the most vital importance to the Empire. India lies across the direct sea route to Australia and New Zealand, and its position would, to a considerable extent, affect the route to East Africa through the Red Sea. It also lies across the direct overland route, through Asia Minor and Iraq and down the Persian Gulf, and is a vital link in the air route to Australia and New Zealand. India's accessibility by land from Russia through Afghanistan was one of the dominating factors in British foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century, and her accessibility by sea from Japan is a factor that must be taken account of in the twentieth century as affecting not only British commerce and shipping, but also the arrangements for the naval defence of India, Australia and New Zealand. Consideration for the feelings and sentiments of her seventy million Muslims must influence British foreign policy in the Near and Middle East, and her geographical position must influence the course of that policy in the Far East. Her people have made large contributions towards the development and prosperity of the Colonial Empire, and their position in the Colonies often gives rise to problems of peculiar complexity.

Again, India's own intrinsic value to the Empire cannot be exaggerated. The population of India comprises over two-thirds of the total population of the Empire. It would be neither vanity nor exaggeration to say that it is India which converts the British Commonwealth of Nations into a great Empire. From the purely humanitarian point of view the happiness and well-being of three hundred and fifty million people should in itself be a matter of grave concern to everyone who has any interest in the future of the human race. On the other hand, from a utilitarian standpoint, a country of such vast areas, teeming with so many millions of people, offers a large field for the fostering of international com-

[1] Address given at Chatham House on June 22nd, 1937; the Most Hon. Marquis of Willingdon, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.B.E., in the Chair.

merce, and must exercise a great influence upon the economic and industrial future of the world. The economic well-being and the industrial and commercial development of India, therefore, must be matters of prime importance to the other civilised nations of the world, and much more so to the rest of the British Empire.

India stands in a very peculiar relationship with the United Kingdom and the other nations of the British Commonwealth. I shall not attempt to trace the processes by which this relationship was originally established and the stages through which it has subsequently passed. It will suffice to give a brief outline of the position at which it has now arrived. In race, language, religion, literature, culture and form of government, India differs widely from the United Kingdom and the Dominions, and yet it has developed, and is developing, in several fields, community of ideals and even of practice with the other nations of the British Commonwealth. The system of education in India, which has, for good or ill, tended to be based more and more upon the English system, has exercised a powerful influence upon Indian culture and literature, an influence which is readily discernible by anyone who chooses to visit India, even for a brief period. Indeed, to some of us it has already become a matter of grave and anxious concern whether the process has not been too rapid for beneficent assimilation, and whether enough attention is being paid in India to those aspects of Western culture which are alone of permanent and lasting value. Some of us are afraid that, in recent years and more especially since the War, the more superficial aspects of Western culture have attracted greater attention in India, and indeed throughout the East, than those essentials and fundamentals which have contributed so largely towards enriching the intellectual life of the Western nations.

For secondary and university education in India the medium of instruction is English. It is also the official language throughout India, and the only language which, in an assembly of educated Indians drawn from all parts of the country, everyone may be expected to speak and to understand. Take, for instance, the two Houses of the Central Legislature; if a member in either House chose to deliver a speech in his own vernacular it would be entirely unintelligible to certain sections of the House, whereas a speech delivered in English would be understood by almost every member of the House, and even those members, if any, who were not able to understand every word and expression employed by the speaker would still be able to catch the import of the speech,

or, at least, would not be willing to confess that they were not aware of what had been said. This fact that English, though a foreign language and the language of the politically dominant race, is yet the only language that can serve the purpose of a lingua franca for the whole of India, has exercised, and is bound in the future to exercise, a profound influence over the literature, culture, the political system, and indeed over almost every aspect of national life in India. A widespread knowledge of English has afforded to India free access to English literature and to the study of English history and the development of English political and other institutions. To India's pride in and knowledge of its own traditions and ideals has been added knowledge of and admiration for British traditions and British ideals. This has provided a basis both for contact and for conflict. It is difficult at this stage to attempt, with any degree of accuracy, an estimate of the ultimate value of these contacts, or to forecast the ultimate issue of this conflict. It can, however, be asserted with confidence that the ultimate results likely to flow therefrom are bound to be beneficent and of lasting and permanent value.

Another link that binds India to the rest of the Commonwealth is its legal system. In the field of civil law the Indian system has borrowed wholesale from Great Britain so far as civil wrongs and the remedies therefor and the law of contract and civil obligation and the law relating to commerce and such modern developments as companies, banking, insurance, etc., are concerned. As regards personal law governing domestic relationships and inheritance there is great diversity in India; each community has retained its own personal laws, based upon various systems of jurisprudence to which these communities have, for many centuries, been attached, but the marked influence of the British legal system is to be observed in the uniformity throughout India of the codes of civil and criminal procedure, the law of evidence and the penal code. It is not often realised how great a sense of security is afforded to the people of India, as well as to those who may happen to visit it for purposes of business or pleasure, whether for long periods or for short, by the knowledge that the laws governing them and the transactions into which they might enter, and the manner of their administration, are clear, equitable and well defined; and that though there may be differences of detail between the Indian system and other civilised systems as to the actual carrying into effect of the beneficent purposes that every well-regulated legal system has as its object, no man, whether belonging to the country or a stranger to it, need

fear being placed in hazard of life, limb, liberty or property, so far as the administration of justice is concerned.

Again, though a very great deal still remains to be done, a good deal has been accomplished in bringing home to the vast millions of India the benefits of modern civilisation. I have already made reference to the educational system of India. During recent years, great efforts have been made in all provinces towards the removal of illiteracy, and considerable progress has been made in that direction. I have every hope that this progress will be continued at an ever-increasing pace. Those who are impatient over the rate of progress in this field must remember the magnitude of the problem with which provincial governments have to grapple and the slenderness of the resources at their disposal. There has been a great advance in irrigation and the development of hydro-electric projects, designed mainly to aid irrigation and agriculture and to contribute towards the amelioration of the conditions of life in rural areas. Hospitals and dispensaries in rural areas have been multiplied, and large areas continue to be opened up and brought in contact with the cities by the extension of the road system. The motor-bus no longer excites any curiosity even in the remotest parts of the country. Civil aviation is being developed, although, of course, on account of its cost, activity in that direction is at present confined to a few commercial companies, flying clubs, rulers of Indian States and well-to-do individuals. The possibilities of multiplying contacts by bridging distance which the development of civil aviation in a country like India opens up can, however, be easily conceived. It would be an amusing, though perhaps profitless speculation, to attempt to determine to what extent the recent elections to Provincial Legislatures have been influenced by some of the lightning tours undertaken by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the President of the Indian National Congress, by means of privately chartered aeroplanes, and consequently to what extent the development of civil aviation contributed to the constitutional deadlock which resulted.

In spite of her vast railway system, her increasing road mileage and the development of civil aviation, India's one great problem continues to be her huge rural population, scattered over a very large area to which access is not easily and quickly available, and which has, through so many centuries, remained almost impervious to fresh ideas. It looks, however, as if the problem is about to be solved by means of the wireless system of communication. In India broadcasting is at present under the

management of a government department which is still in its infancy, but the progress which broadcasting has already made during the course of a few years leads one to hope that it may become the chief instrument for sweeping away the inertia and the indifference of the dweller in rural areas towards all outside influences, and of bringing into his dull and monotonous existence the stimulant of fresh ideas and a broader outlook on life. The magic box that captures and re-converts into delightful vocal shape the precious waves of sound with which the ether is nowadays charged during every moment of the twenty-four hours, may soon become the means of providing amusement and instruction to the millions of India who have no other means of contact with the outside world. Already in many parts of India there are strange stirrings in the villages, and there is at first wonder and then grave talk, after the magic box has spoken in the village *chaupal* to the greybeards and the youths who are wont to gather together in the evenings for a turn at the *hookah* and for a little quiet converse. There are tremendous possibilities here, for good as well as for ill, and let us hope that these possibilities will be taken advantage of to the full, and that all the good that they are capable of yielding will be extracted from them, and that the ill will be avoided.

It would not be possible, during the course of a short address, to touch even briefly upon all aspects of life in India, but what I have said may perhaps present to those who have no intimate acquaintance with India a picture of Indian life which reveals some of the light but makes no reference to the shadows. It will, therefore, only be just to add that, on the whole, life in India flows at rather a low ebb, at times distressingly low. We are conscious that, for the man in the street and the man in the fields, life often lacks not only all that may provide comfort and dignity, but even the greater part of that which is necessary barely to sustain life itself. But those to whom the opportunity is given, and upon whom the responsibility has been laid, are doing what they can to alleviate all this distress and misery, by raising the standard of living, by providing medicine and ministration during periods of illness, by bringing more amusement and instruction into the lives of those who, at present, get too little of either—in short, by lightening to some extent, however small, the burden of the weary. Again, the problem is vast and complicated, the work to be done immense, the resources limited. The goal, however, is a noble one and well worth all the efforts that may be directed towards its achievement; and let us hope that

everything that is possible will continue to be done in this direction.

There is one source of consolation available to the people of India which makes their lives fuller and richer than they would otherwise be, and that is their attachment and devotion to religion. There is great diversity of religious creeds and practices in that great country, but in spite of this diversity there is remarkable unanimity in one respect—namely, that one's standard of conduct in every walk of life must be determined by the teachings of one's religion rather than by any other consideration. Religion, therefore, plays a far more important and intimate part in the life of India than it does in the lives of Western nations. In recent times there has been observed in many directions a quickening of religious perception and thought in India. The impact with the West has brought with it a closer study and better appreciation of the doctrines and teachings of Christianity. Then there have been several movements within Hinduism which have had a great liberalising influence upon many sections of Hindu society. There is, for instance, the Brahmin Samaj in the east and the Arya Samaj in the north-west. The late Sir Syed Ahmad Khan laboured strenuously to bring about among the Muslims a better understanding and appreciation of Western education and culture. His work in that field has been of the greatest value and is likely to influence the attitude of educated Muslims towards the West, and more particularly towards Great Britain, through many generations. On the religious side of Islam the Ahmadyyah Movement has undoubtedly supplied a vigorous impetus. It is regarded by the orthodox section of Muslims with great disfavour, as introducing several innovations into the doctrines and teachings of Islam as understood by the general body of Muslims of the present day. On the other hand, the movement claims that all it is seeking to do is to present to the world the true treachings of Islam as contained in the Holy Quran and as originally interpreted and illustrated in his own life by the Holy Prophet. The Founder of the Movement, Ahmad of Qudian, claimed to have been divinely appointed for the regeneration of Islam.

It is not my purpose, in the course of this address, to pronounce upon the merits of the various religious movements in India. All that I am anxious to stress is that religion still remains a very vital thing to the people of India, and in the case of the vast majority of them exercises a profound influence over all aspects of their lives.

Some attempts have in recent years been made to interpret

to the West the true meaning behind these various religious movements, and the Ahmadyyah Movement, to which I have made reference, has established several missions on the continents of Europe and America in addition to similar missions in Africa and the East. A striking contribution made by this movement toward tolerance and reconciliation is the acceptance as true prophets of all the divinely inspired teachers who have been the founders of the great faiths, thus proclaiming that all great faiths have emanated from the same divine source as Islam itself. The movement also lays great stress upon the truth that direct communion between man and his Maker is just as possible and can be as frequent to-day as it was at any time in the past. The importance of a vigorous religious movement like this can scarcely be exaggerated, more especially as it contains within it great possibilities of a better spiritual understanding between the East and the West. This process of reconciliation between various faiths may prove of the utmost value in cementing still further the bonds between India and the other partners in the Empire.

I have so far refrained from touching upon the constitutional position, and many of you may be thinking that perhaps that alone should have formed the subject of my address, and yet I want you to approach the constitutional aspect of the question in a human and not merely a legal frame of mind. I want you to feel that what I have to say on the constitutional question has reference to those three hundred and fifty million human beings, and not merely to a few square inches of red on a map labelled "India." And what is the constitutional position of India in the Empire? As I have said, looked at from certain points of view, India is a foreign substance in the body politic of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and for the health, indeed for the continued existence of the British Commonwealth, it is imperative that this foreign substance shall either be completely assimilated into the system or cast out of it; otherwise the safety of the whole system would be put in jeopardy. I am sure we are all agreed that the last would be too cowardly and too disastrous a remedy, disastrous alike for India as well as for the rest of the Commonwealth, and indeed, in the view of those who have the vision to see, for the world at large. We are therefore left with the other remedy that I have indicated—viz., complete assimilation.

History must have been read in vain by those who imagine that India could continue to occupy and rest content with the position that it occupies in the Commonwealth to-day. The

British Commonwealth of Nations has been described as a free and voluntary association of independent nations." In the case of those nations of the Commonwealth to whom this description is applicable to-day it is just because the association is free and voluntary, and does not in any way encroach upon the complete independence of their status and the freedom of their policies and actions, that the continuation of the association is a source of satisfaction and even of pride. It is the voluntary character of the association that does so much to add to its strength. Any suggestion of compulsion or of domination would at once cut across those invisible and almost imperceptible cords that hold these nations together and which, just because they seem so loose, are able to withstand the severest strain that may be put upon them. India's position in the Empire is not that of an independent nation, in free and voluntary association with other nations for common purposes; but it is daily growing more apparent that, if it is desired to continue India's association with the other nations of the Commonwealth and to make this association a happy one, resulting in the multiplication of those mutual benefits which should be the normal feature of such an association, this association must become more and more free and more and more voluntary, and, in order that it should assume these characteristics, India must daily grow in independence; that is to say, become free mistress of her own policies and destiny, and yet remain associated with the other nations of the Commonwealth in a common allegiance to the Crown and in common efforts for the promotion of the ideals of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

There is another consideration which makes it imperative that India's constitutional progress should be along democratic lines, that her system of government should be based upon the parliamentary model, and that her progress towards the attainment of the ideal of free and equal association with other members of the Commonwealth should be rapid. That consideration is that the nations of the world appear to be grouping themselves under two political systems, the parliamentary system and the system of totalitarian states or dictatorships. It is not my purpose to pronounce upon the merits of either one system or the other, nor need I enumerate instances of each that readily present themselves to one's mind as apt illustrations. I assume that none of us here has any doubt that if the world is to continue to enjoy the blessings of ordered freedom, the whole of our weight must be cast on the side of the parliamentary system, and, that being so, we must take care that India does not become the danger point

within the British Empire in that respect. We must make India safe for the parliamentary system, and one means of ensuring this would be for us to do all we can in our respective spheres to promote the working of the Constitution in a liberal spirit, in accordance with the traditions of English parliamentary government, and to help India to attain to the full status of a Dominion, with a responsible form of government, at as early a date as may be compatible with the difficulties that have still to be cleared out of the way. The world is moving very fast. Whether that movement is in the direction of beneficent progress or otherwise, it will be for the historian to determine, but the very celerity of the pace makes it imperative that if we are to keep up with the other nations of the world, and to give a good account of ourselves in the final conflict of ideals that appears to be inevitable, whatever shape it may assume, we must effect our domestic adjustments as quickly as possible.

Even to-day India enjoys some of the outward insignia of a Dominion. She is, for instance, an original member of the League of Nations; but though this membership confers upon her a certain recognition of her international status, India has at no time been very enthusiastic about the League. There is in this respect a considerable divergence between public opinion and the view held by the Government of India. The Government of India feel that in spite of some of the recent failures of the League, the League has done and continues to do a great deal of valuable work through its international organisations and that it has on several occasions been the means of averting collision between different nations. Public opinion, on the other hand, in India, as expressed in the press and through the Legislature, has always looked upon the League as mainly a combination of Western Nations designed to uphold the supremacy of the West. So far as the question of security is concerned, I believe, in spite of the diversity of political views in India, that India relies a great deal more upon the security afforded by the strength and solidarity of the British Commonwealth of Nations than on that afforded by the Covenant of the League. I think the indifference, some might even say the hostility, of India towards the League is due very largely to the fact that India's foreign policy is a reserved subject for which the Secretary of State for India is responsible to the United Kingdom Parliament, and the people of India have not the means of influencing it to an extent which should make it a live issue for them. The result is that their attitude towards the League, which deals mostly with questions of an international character involving the adjustment

and re-shaping of the foreign policies of different nations, is somewhat cynical. It is possible, indeed I am confident, that when India is able to settle and shape her own policy in these matters, she will begin to take a keener, a livelier and a more realistic interest in the activities and ideals of the League.

Again, India's representatives are summoned to participate in Imperial Conferences where, along with the representatives of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, they deliberate upon matters of common concern to the whole of the Empire. Here too the fact that all matters of foreign policy must be decided by the Secretary of State for India, who indeed is India's principal representative at the Imperial Conference, gives to the participation of Indian representatives in the deliberations of the Imperial Conference a somewhat academic character.

To return, however, to the picture as it presents itself inside India to-day. India's Constitution, as you are aware, is now definitely based upon a federal model. The portion of it relating to the Provinces was brought into force on the 1st of April this year, and provides that Provincial governments shall be constituted responsible autonomous units for purposes of the Federation. In the field of what are known as provincial subjects (and the list comprises a large number of what are known as beneficent subjects, such as education, health, agriculture, irrigation, roads, forests, co-operative societies, local self-government, etc.) Provincial governments will have full responsibility. The great departments of law and justice will also be administered by these autonomous governments. So far as the question of India's status with regard to these matters is concerned, it is obvious that the Constitution must be so worked in the Provinces that, when conventions have been firmly set up regarding matters with respect to which Provincial Governors have been invested with special powers and responsibilities, these special powers shall lapse; whether they lapse by disuse or by express repeal is a matter of indifference to India.

It is with regard to the Central Government that the question of India's status assumes importance outside India. Under the Federal Constitution, the Governor-General, like the Provincial Governors, will have special powers and responsibilities, well defined, but nevertheless affecting important matters in the Provincial as well as in the Central fields. If these special responsibilities had not been designed to safeguard grave and important matters it would not have been necessary to incorporate them in the Constitution. The natural fate of these special powers

and responsibilities, however, in the case of the Governor-General, must be the same as in the case of the Governors. When the normal working of the Federal Government itself may be trusted fully to secure and safeguard these matters, the special powers of the Governor-General must fall into disuse, and whether they then continue to encumber the Statute Book as an indication of the point from which the Federation started and the progress since made, or whether they are expressly repealed as anachronisms the retention of which on the Statute Book is no longer justified or desirable, India will be equally satisfied. A more important matter is the reservation of the subjects of defence and foreign relations at the centre. So long as these subjects continue to be so reserved and ultimate responsibility in respect of them rests, not in the hands of Ministers and, through them, with the Federal Legislature, but with the Governor-General, as such, responsible to the United Kingdom Parliament, so long will India continue to occupy a constitutional status comparable not even in theory with those of the Dominions.

It has been fully recognised that the defence of India must be, to an increasing degree, the concern of the people of India. There is serious controversy, however, as to whether adequate steps are being taken towards the translation of this principle into practice. The subject bristles with difficulties. Measures that are necessary and would be fully adequate for the defence of India are also an essential part of the scheme for the defence of the whole of the Empire. In that respect, India plays a great part in and makes a great contribution towards the security of the Empire. In many quarters it is strenuously argued that India's contribution for this purpose is too heavy. Everybody is, however, agreed that nothing must be done which would in any manner tend to put in jeopardy the security of India by rendering the arrangements for her defence less than fully adequate. The controversy centres round the pace of progress towards placing the army in India, subject, all the time, to the condition of full efficiency, under the control of a responsible Indian Government. On this aspect of the question it would be profitless to argue or to prophesy. It must again be recognised that the only logical issue of the controversy is some sort of arrangement under which, without sacrifice of adequacy or efficiency, the legitimate desire of India to make the defence of India a matter for her own responsibility and her own pride can be enabled to find a reasonably early fulfilment. I am not unaware of the many and serious difficulties which must be overcome before that desire can be ful-

filled, nor am I unconscious of the fact that so serious and vital a matter as the defence of India must for ever remain the subject of close and intimate co-operation between India and the rest of the Empire, but I am convinced that these difficulties, however numerous and however grave, are capable of being solved; that the Empire has within it the military genius and the large-hearted, wide-visioned statemanship which could work out a satisfactory and an honourable solution. I am also convinced that the necessity for intimate co-operation in this matter between the different parts of the Empire is not an insurmountable obstacle in the way of the achievement of what India has at heart in this connection. And when this can be achieved, the Government of India could be fully entrusted with the settlement and the execution of her own foreign policy.

I have explained that the full assimilation of India into the body politic of the British Commonwealth of Nations is the only goal to be worked for. Indeed, the pursuit of any other policy would be inconsistent with the ideals to which the British Commonwealth of Nations is irrevocably pledged, for, while the rest of the Commonwealth is advancing in one direction, India could not be expected either to travel in the contrary direction or to remain stationary. Any attempt to start this unnatural process would only result in irreparable damage and in disaster. Indeed, this is so fully recognised that it is not worth labouring at any great length. The only question in controversy is the rate at which progress can be made. I realise that we have arrived at a stage where the next step has been left to India herself. I am hoping that the abnormal position in some of the Provinces in India may soon be reduced to normal, and that all the Provinces will then push forward towards the goal that I have indicated in an earlier part of this address and that this may enable the Federation to come into being at an early date. The rest will depend upon the degree of mutual trust and confidence that may be created between the different communities in India, between British India and the Princes, and between India and the United Kingdom. I, for one, have full faith in the ultimate destiny of India, and the great and noble part that she has to play in the future history of the Commonwealth, and though I know not by what stages and after what period of time the goal may be achieved, I hope that the stages will not be too numerous and that the period will not be too long.

Before I close, may I draw attention to the discriminatory treatment meted out to Indians in the Dominions and in some of

the Colonies? This is felt very keenly in India and is deeply resented. In this connection too the feeling is that if India occupied a position of equality with the Dominions, her claim for equality of treatment of her nationals throughout the Empire would be more readily conceded. My own feeling is that, with the growth of India in constitutional stature, there is already a greater willingness on the part of the Dominions to approach these questions with more sympathy than they have received in the past, and as India advances on the path towards complete self-government she will be able to obtain complete reciprocity and equality in this respect.

This, then, is the position of India in the Empire, at least, these are some of the aspects of the problem that India's position in the Empire presents. As I began by saying, the welfare and happiness of three hundred and fifty million human beings is in itself a problem of great magnitude. There are here immense possibilities and potentialities for good and for ill for the whole of humanity. This great mass of people is stirring in its first awakening, as it were, from a long sleep; from an almost inert dead mass it is beginning to assume the character of a vast reservoir of restless energy; it behoves us to consider seriously to what end this enormous reserve of energy is to be directed and employed. This is a great responsibility which Britain and India share jointly, and let us hope that it will be worthily discharged by both.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. J. C. FRENCH said that everyone hoped that the future of India in the Empire would be as painted by the lecturer, but it was impossible to overlook the fact that the Congress Party which had won the elections in India in the majority of the Provinces proposed to take a course which the lecturer had rightly designated as cowardly and disastrous, namely to leave the Empire and effect a complete severance from Great Britain. There was another party which had shown its resolution to remain within the Empire in the most practical manner, by working the India Act and the Constitution under it. They were that section of the Indian population of which the speaker was such a distinguished representative, the Muslims. A clash between the latter and the Congress Hindus was possible, unless this was postponed by a mass agitation by the Congress Party against the British Government. On April 30th a statement had been published in *The Times* saying that there was a rumour that Mr. Gandhi was preparing such a scheme in case the constitutional impasse was not solved. When one remembered the very efficient agitations organised by Mr. Gandhi in 1919, 1921 and 1930, it had to be admitted that Congress could not have gone to a better

adviser. Before September 30th the Legislatures must be summoned, with the result that the Ministers in the six Provinces where Congress held a majority would be defeated, there might be fresh elections, and if so the Congress Party would be returned in an overwhelming majority. Then the Governors would have to rule under section 93, and the reply of Congress would be a mass agitation. On May 15th Pandit Nehru had hinted that it was possible that Congress might take office, but he had added that he had no intention of obliging Lord Zetland by working the India Act. In coming into office, therefore, their purpose would be a sinister one : to destroy the Act and effect a complete severance from the British Empire. There was only one possible peaceful solution : for Congress to unsay everything they had said, undo everything they had done, and to stultify themselves politically. If the place of India within the Empire was to remain unchanged, a firm front must be shown to the illegal activities and policy of Congress.

MR. A. YUSUF ALI said that the lecturer had rightly laid stress upon India's central position with regard to her geographical situation, her population and her historical development. It was now necessary to consider the position which India had already attained towards Dominion status. Three things were necessary to establish that status : first, a free and equal association of the particular units, secondly, complete autonomy not only in the Provinces but in the country as a whole, and thirdly the psychological factor : how far was the country willing and able to educate its nationals to feel that the Empire was a heritage worth having, and how far were the other units in the Empire willing to admit that claim? India's financial and tariff policy were coming more and more within her own powers, although even in this direction she had not yet complete autonomy under the Constitution. The most important point in her attainment of Dominion status was her educational preparedness. How was her education going to contribute to the third psychological factor? The speaker had been intimately connected with educational movements in India, and felt that though the system had many important merits, it had as yet failed to keep pace with the development of both India and the world. The transfer of education to the Provinces had introduced an element of diversity in the aims pursued in those various Provinces, and at the same time the stereotyped methods of the past had so overlaid Indian education that it was difficult now to retrace the position and build up a new system right from the bottom, a system which would not only enable Indians to understand and work the Constitution, but also to appreciate and keep in touch with those basic facts upon which the paper read that evening took its stand—namely, India's agriculture and trade, her industries, her growing population, the diversity of her races and religions, her manners and customs, personal laws, etc. So far Indian education had not adapted itself to these basic facts. Unless the system were made more elastic and more responsive to the time-spirit and to the place-spirit, India would fail to achieve the chief

purpose of all reforms—namely, to bring the minds of her people into a position in which they could develop collective life as a harmonious whole, and meet the numerous calls which the changing times made on their capacity to understand themselves and understand others.

The last speaker had reminded the audience that in India there was a large body of people who did not accept the new Act as even a first step to India's political progress. This was not merely a controversy on specific questions: it touched the very foundations of the matter. It was legitimate to ask whether there was not within the country a large body of people who would rather see the connection with the Empire ended than do anything to mend the present Constitution and bring about the happy result of a united India in a united British Commonwealth. It was not possible for Great Britain to assimilate India. Her past history and traditions and her present sentiments did not make it even desirable to bring her into a completely homogeneous political system with the rest of the Empire. But a great deal could be done through her education to bring the psychology of the people to envisage an India which, while following her own traditions, would yet be able to stand side by side with other units in the great Commonwealth and claim with pride that she could carry on her own government in her own way equally well with them. Diversity would not matter as long as the status was equal.

With regard to foreign affairs, as the lecturer had pointed out, India had not yet had an opportunity to bring her talents to bear upon that subject, and defence, although an important factor in self-government, was a question bristling with difficulties. It was only through the gradual building up of India's system in all these aspects—finance, trade, economics, defence, and above all education—that it would be possible to put the coping-stone to the great structure which had been inaugurated that year.

Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas said that he would like to mention a matter referred to by the lecturer in his closing remarks—namely, the position of Indians in the Dominions, and the hope expressed that reforms would be carried out in this connection as a result of the effects of the new Constitution. There was something, however, much worse which had lately been exercising the minds of Indians in rather a grave manner, and that was the position of Indians in a Protectorate of the British Government under the supervision of the Colonial Office—namely, Zanzibar. Indians could, to a certain extent, appreciate the reason why they should have patience regarding their position in the Dominions, but in the case of His Majesty's Government it was extremely difficult for them to reconcile themselves to a position which appeared to them, and which was, quite impossible. The first speaker in the discussion had referred to the activities of the Congress with strong disapproval, but such treatment of Indians as proposed in Zanzibar, within the British Empire and under the direct control of a

Cabinet Minister, was more likely to drive Indians towards the extreme left in India than anything else.

LORD LOTHIAN said that no member of the modern British Commonwealth could regard nationalism—in the sense of the desire for unbound self-government—as a crime, and the essence of the Congress movement was the passionate desire that India should govern itself. That aspiration might have taken sometimes a somewhat extreme and dangerous form, but none could challenge the fundamental conviction upon which it rested—namely, that India should become a nation and have supreme responsibility for its own internal government, and there was little doubt that the Congress Party would be satisfied with the status which the lecturer had indicated as being India's ultimate destiny.

The speaker had heard the speech made by Mr. French in the discussion over and over again in the past. He had heard it with regard to Ireland, and if some of the arguments which had led to the India Act had been listened to long ago about Ireland a great deal of trouble there after the War might have been avoided, and the partition which leaves the larger problem still fundamentally unsolved might never have been made. The gloomy forebodings had been heard with regard to South Africa—about Generals Botha and Smuts. What was the magic which had operated in all the Dominions and was now beginning to operate in Southern Ireland, which had succeeded in changing a majority that desired with some impatience to reach the goal of independence at one bound to recognise that progress to it could only be reached gradually? That magic was responsibility. The very essence of the new Constitution was that it introduced the principle of responsibility from the bottom upwards. The principal safeguard in the Constitution was not the legal powers given to the Governor and the Viceroy, essential as they might be at certain moments, but the impalpable and dynamic effect on the Ministers of being responsible for the government of their own Provinces. Therefore it was to be hoped that nothing would be said in Great Britain to hinder a great party in India, which had been authorised to appeal to an electorate which we ourselves had created, from assuming responsibility for the government of the Provinces. If and when Congress took office, India would take her place in the column of nations dedicated to democratic methods as opposed to totalitarian methods. As the lecturer had wisely said, this might become the great issue in the world. Therefore the action of Congress was of supreme importance. The constitutional situation could not have been made clearer than it had been by the recent declaration of both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. It was essential that nothing should be done to make people in India feel that people in Great Britain did not want Congress to take office.

MR. H. S. L. POLAK said that he wished to correct a statement made by the first speaker in the discussion. He had said that Congress was committed to separation from the British Commonwealth of Nations. Congress, however, was not committed to anything more

than a formula of complete independence. It had never defined what it meant by complete independence. Mr. Gandhi had expressly stated in a declaration receiving wide publicity in India that what he meant by complete independence was Dominion status under the Statute of Westminster. That was the position of General Hertzog and all the other Empire statesmen who had recently met in London. It was a view held by many eminent Indians in the Congress Party. Even though Pandit Nehru had made a different statement, that did not commit Congress any more than Mr. Gandhi's statement, but the important point was that never yet had Congress committed itself to the view that complete independence meant separation from the British Empire. A statement made to the contrary was calculated to create widespread prejudice.

MR. J. C. FRENCH said that on March 19th, 1937, at Delhi, at a meeting of the Congress National Convention, a thousand Congressmen took the pledge to work for Congress independence and to submit themselves to Congress discipline. At that time Pandit Nehru used these words : " And so our pledge must hold good and we must labour for the severance from the British connection." Then again at the end of May Pandit Nehru discussed and refuted the objection of journalists that this severance would expose India to external dangers. Mr. Gandhi could not speak for the Congress Party, as he had himself explained that he was merely an adviser and spoke only for himself, and that the only people who could speak for Congress with authority were Pandit Nehru and the Working Committee

MR. H. S. L. POLAK said that this was a very incomplete reply. The only things that could commit Congress were Congress Resolutions, and Congress Resolutions did not go any further than to abide by complete independence; they did not define complete independence and did not commit the Party to separation from the British Empire.

LORD WILLINGDON said that he thought that there was a good deal of difference of opinion within the Congress Party itself. He did not object to that from a political point of view, but it would have to work itself out ultimately.

He had been in India not very long ago, and he thought that the remarks of the first speaker in the discussion were a little exaggerated with regard to the danger in India. He had referred to mass agitation. It should be remembered that Congress did not mean the whole of India by any means. In fact if all the moderate people would get rid of their differences and combine together in the same way as the Congress Party had done, Congress would very probably be beaten at the elections in all parts of India. The whole trouble was that the moderate people would not do this. The speaker, personally, had had a good many difficulties in India, some of which might have been called by the first speaker mass agitations. There had been a very severe outbreak of civil disobedience under the auspices of Mr. Gandhi which the

Services had controlled in a very short time. It should be remembered, however, that India was a very large country with three hundred and fifty million people, and the whole of that country could not be quiet all the time. He had lived in India, and believed that the good sense of Indians would ultimately prevail. She had been offered a tremendous advance, and if only the moderate people could combine and get rid of the independence party, which was certainly desirable, all would be well. To say that there was real danger in India was not true, fundamentally the loyalty of India was perfectly secure.

SIR M. ZAFRULLA KHAN said, with regard to the remarks made by Mr. Yusuf Ali, that owing to the restriction with regard to time and the nature of the subject he had only been able to touch upon various aspects of India and her people before going on to deal with the Constitutional question, and therefore had not entered into any discussion of the educational system, which was in itself a controversial matter. He had merely stressed two aspects: first that a great advance was being made in fighting illiteracy, which had a very great political value; secondly, that the medium of instruction was English, which established certain contacts and influenced the minds of Indians. With reference to the observation that India should not be completely assimilated, he admitted that his use of the expression was perhaps not entirely justified. He had not meant that the political system in India should correspond, for instance, to the systems in the United Kingdom or in the Dominions. They were trying to set up a kind of Federation which had no parallel, but, while conscious of the fact that India's political system must be suited to the genius of India, he had wished to say that India must attain to the same constitutional status as the other Dominions, becoming an equal partner in the British Commonwealth of Nations, with full responsibility with regard to her own government.

Reference had been made to the position of the Indian community in Zanzibar which was attracting very great attention in India. He hoped that some solution of these difficulties would be found which might safeguard the position of Indians in that Protectorate, and at least ensure that the measures designed for the purpose of ensuring the economic welfare of the people of Zanzibar, including the Indians carrying on business there, would not be worked in a manner which might lead to the prejudice of Indians settled in that Protectorate.

In regard to the remarks of the first speaker he was not himself a Congressman, and so could not undertake to explain the Congress creed. There might, however, be a psychological reason for the utterances referred to. The statement that the only peaceful solution would be for Congress to undo everything it had done, unsay everything it had said and stultify itself politically, was exactly the kind of thing that led Congressmen to put their creed in the manner in which they sometimes did; because they feared that there were still Englishmen who thought in that way who needed a stronger dose than might be necessary for the others.

THE REPORT OF THE PALESTINE COMMISSION [1]

The Right HON. The EARL PEEL, G.C.S.I., G.B.E.

I APPROACH the discussion of the Report of the Palestine Commission [2] with some trepidation, because I see immediately in front of me no less than four of my colleagues, and if I wander at all from the truth, or fall into any error, mathematical or otherwise, there are a number of very quick-witted gentlemen ready to take me up at once. Perhaps the best thing I can do is to offer something by way of a commentary on the Report, and to describe how it was we were led to certain conclusions and what were some of the difficulties and problems which we met with in the course of our efforts.

Our Report has been generally accepted by the British Government,[3] with, of course, those necessary reservations which must always be made when the general principles of a Report are accepted, but I am sure I may speak for my late colleagues in saying that we are most grateful to the Government for the course they have so promptly and, if I may say so, so courageously, adopted, because nothing would have been worse than to have to launch our Report upon the world uncertain as to whether the Government had accepted it or not; you can imagine all the discussion and havering and doubt there would then have been.

The Commission was given terms of reference which in some respects were rather difficult to interpret, though the first point on which we had to pronounce was not, I think, so difficult. We had to try to arrive at a conclusion as to what were the underlying causes of the Arab attitude and of the disturbances of 1936. We have not dealt with them very fully in the Report, since we did not think that a history of the details of the disturbances was within our reference, but we gave some sketch of their character before we tried to analyse their cause.

[1] Address delivered at Chatham House on July 13th, 1937; Mr. Clement Jones, C.B., in the Chair.

[2] Great Britain; Colonial Office: Palestine Royal Commission, Report. Cmd. 5479. xii, 404 pp. 8 maps. 6*s*. 6*d*.

[3] Great Britain, Colonial Office: Palestine, Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. Cmd. 5513. 3 pp. 1*d*.

The Arabs were extremely frank about their position. They have never accepted the version that had been placed on the McMahon letter; they would not admit the validity of the Balfour Declaration. They have never accepted the Mandate; they declared roundly that it was against the Covenant of the League of Nations; they added that the establishment of the Jewish Home was entirely contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations. We were not, I think, concerned, and that was one of our problems, with the precise historical accuracy of the views on which the Arabs had formed their opinions. We did not think it our duty to go into the very long, very tangled, and very difficult historical sketch of all those undertakings, promises, letters, conversations, which formed the material of the arrangements with the Jews and the Arabs from 1915 onwards. (We were concerned, rather, with what I may call the historical deposit in the minds of the Arabs, and of course the sincerity of their convictions.) I do not think, anyhow, that even the most partial of supporters of either side would say that the disturbances of 1936 were primarily due to Jewish action; I think the Arabs will quite frankly take upon themselves the burden of the outbreak. That being so, we really had to do little more than find out what the Arab views were and what operated upon their minds. Whether they were leaders on the Higher Committee, or whether they were merely humble country *fellaheen*, their view was quite simply that they had the right to control the country in which they lived and in which a good many of their ancestors had lived for something like twelve or thirteen centuries. The Arabs had at first shown a certain reluctance to appear before us. Their view was, I understood, that their case had often been publicly stated and that it was open to us to study the relevant documents. They held, further, that report after report had discussed the Arab case, and presented it, and then nothing had happened, or nothing anyhow beyond a pigeon-holing of the report somewhere in the Colonial Office. But what, I think, governed them most, was this, that they really believed that the British Government was so much under the influence and control of the Jews, not only the Government but Parliament as well, that their case would not get a fair hearing. It was only towards the end of our visit, after an immense amount of *pourparler* and discussion, that they did appear before us and finally stated their case.

The Jews held a different view of the cause of the disturbances from that held by the Arabs. They thought that with a different and a firmer Government, a greater assertion of authority by the

Government in Palestine, and a stronger application of the principles of the Mandate, a more resolute assertion of law and order, and a little more acquaintance with the terms of the Mandate by some of the officials in the Palestine Government, and perhaps an attitude a little more impartial than they attributed to the Administration, things might have been different, and there might possibly have been, by this time, if not reconciliation between the two races, yet a fair measure of acquiescence.

Since my return I have been impressed in conversation with representative men by the extent to which the idea has been growing up that this system of government, this difficult system, has resulted in almost complete failure. It was, of course, hoped that the great material advantages brought into the country by the tenacity, energy, technical and scientific knowledge, and the financial resources of the Jews, might in the end appeal to the Arabs and soften their hostility, but the steady continuance and development, which is traced in our Report, of the growth of the Arab sentiment of nationality, coupled with the course of history in the adjacent Arab territories, seems to have absolutely destroyed any chance of the two races working together in Palestine.

The Arabs, when they came before us, made three very definite and very clear demands. They said first of all that self-government should be set up, and set up at once, that there should be no tinkering with advisory councils or nominated members, or anything of that sort, but a real representative assembly; secondly, that not a dunam of land should be sold to the Jews; and, thirdly, that all Jewish immigration, including those people who are allowed in on special terms, should be stopped at once. Well, these terms would have been, I think, a little difficult for any government to carry out in their entirety. They amounted to a complete repudiation of the Mandate and all its works.

We then asked them what would be their attitude towards the Jews, nearly four hundred thousand, already in the country. Their attitude was not satisfactory to the Jews, because they said the latter could rely on the usual toleration of the Arabs; I am sure the Arabs are very tolerant, but in other countries toleration has not always been a very strong reed on which to lean. There was no basis, therefore, for compromise at all, and we had slowly and sadly to go on with the rest of our inquiry.

I have not discussed in any detail, because we dealt so fully with that in the Report, the growing changes, or evolution if you

will, of the Arab attitude during these seventeen years, the extent to which the national spirit of independence has been growing, and how far it has been fostered by the situation in neighbouring Arab countries which were at first under Mandates and various forms of control, and have since attained, in most cases, full self-government. Imagine what the effect must be on a proud and sensitive people living in Palestine. The Arabs of Palestine say : " What, are we the only people among the Arabs who do not have a chance of governing ourselves ? Are we to be treated as a sort of second-class article that is not allowed these institutions ? Are we not just as good ? In fact Mr. Churchill said we were quite qualified fifteen years ago to have self-governing institutions." There was no sympathy among the Arabs in Palestine with the argument that the Arab world had been freed from the domination of the Turks and an immense service done to them, and that as the independence of so many States had been established, the Arabs should not grudge the little notch, as it is called, of Palestine in order that the Jews may settle there and have their home. They did not see why they should be the notch that was retained for the Jews. They thought they had as good a right as any other set of Arabs to self-government.

The next part of the inquiry was full of difficulties, because we had to inquire into how the Mandate was carried out as between the Jews and Arabs. We were not asked specially to say whether the government was good or bad or how it was administered, but how it was administered in relation to Jews and Arabs, a further refinement, as it were; but in order to discover this we had to examine the whole machinery of government itself, and that was a very laborious part of our task. We dived into almost every activity of the Government ; different members of the Commission examined different aspects of the work, and some of those inquiries were very long and very searching indeed.

I will take, as shortly as I can, because it is difficult to be brief on these matters, just three of the points we dealt with. One was the question of land settlement, the second, the problem of immigration, and the third, self-government. Under the Mandate the Jews were to be settled, or facilities given to them for settling, on the land. I am not quoting the exact words, because elaborate controversies turn on every shade of meaning you apply to those words, and I will deal with the articles quite generally. We had, for instance, to find out how much land there was on which agriculturists could be settled, but here

we were met by elementary difficulties. The surveys and settlements have not been completed, and it was extremely difficult to find out, with a statistical department only just set up, how much land belonged to the Government, how much was suitable for cultivation, how much had been already settled by Jews and Arabs, and what was exactly the surplus that would be available for expansion. This started a host of questions, such as: on what amount of land could a family live if it was dry land or irrigated land; if intensively cultivated or not; how much greater was the skill of Jews in cultivating the land than that of the Arabs; what were the possibilities of irrigation, either through rainfall, springs, rivers or wells; how was the land held; in how short a time would it be possible to abolish the whole of that system by which land was held in common and undivided in the villages; what were the productive capacities of the different classes of land? Again, what security was there of tenure and what compensation should be paid to tenants and cultivators; how many Arabs had been displaced from the land by Jewish acquisition; how much land had been sold by Arabs to Jews and at what prices? Well, all this is very intricate and elaborate, and this inquiry was necessary to enable us to arrive at a decision, a very grave decision, as to whether the Government had shown sufficient activity or not in settling Jews on the land, and whether this process had been carried out without undue interference with the existing inhabitants. It would be a very difficult problem to discover and to define with accuracy in any country, even if the whole of the land were settled, if everybody knew in what proportion it was divided and if a regular survey had been made of all the water supplies. But here, again, the question was not to decide whether the administration of the country in these land questions was excellent, wise or far-seeing, but how it worked, as between Jews and Arabs, and how it affected the carrying out of the articles laid down in the Mandate.

The second question, that of immigration, is the most interesting point with which we had to deal, and in dealing with it I must refer to the work of the Jewish Agency, which has a recognised position in the Mandate itself. Properly speaking, the Jewish Agency now represents in equal parts both the foreign Zionists and the foreign non-Zionists, a combination made, I think, only six or seven years ago. One of the duties of the Agency was to advise the Government on the different numbers and categories and classes within which Jews were to be admitted according to the economic absorptive capacity of the country: we devoted a

great deal of time to discovering what the words, "economic absorptive capacity" meant. In fact, that was one of our troubles; so many terms with which we were comparatively unfamiliar had to be elucidated by very accurate investigation. In actual practice, of course, the final arbiter was the Government, but the Government had to consider the representations of the Jewish Agency. The estimate of the immigrants who could be admitted according to the absorptive capacity of the country provided by the Jewish Agency almost always exceeded the Government estimate of those who ought to be admitted. This was not unnatural. We were extremely well aware, of course, of the tremendous pressure brought upon the Jewish Agency from their brethren in many countries of the world where they were suffering and in difficulties, and that the Agency was anxious to bring into the country in the shortest possible time the largest possible number of people who could be established there. But just think what the difficulties were!

Think how difficult it must be to make accurate estimates, especially if you are not highly organised statistically, of how many workpeople will be required for the next six months, and whether those people will still be occupied in the succeeding six months, or how many may be thrown out of work in the succeeding six months, or what is to be the course of business during the next year or two, so as to justify the bringing in of a large number of labourers and workers; especially when the most important people in this country, economic experts of such reputation that you tremble before them, make the most serious blunders as to when slumps are to take place. Again, there was that most remarkable situation in Palestine, different from any country in the world, in which the Jews were ready to send capital from every country of the Dispersion, not in hundreds of thousands, but in millions and often without any expectation of a return on the money so invested. The combination of all these financial factors may well have tested the insight and accuracy of the most experienced officials.

When all these elaborate questions were settled, and finally settled, the last word, of course, rested with the Government. Then followed the task of distributing the list showing the numbers of immigrants permitted among the countries of the Diaspora, and among the different parties in these different countries, Germany, Poland, wherever you will—all this was determined by the Jewish Agency itself and its officials. It was very difficult for the Government to make arrangements in all countries of

Europe, and it was convenient to have some body like the Jewish Agency to organise training schools for prospective immigrants and to relieve the Administration of a mass of detailed business.

" It is plain that the economic absorptive capacity of a country depends on a great number of factors, certainly upon the financial system of the country, upon the spending power of the Government, upon what it does with its money, whether it is spent on defence or on social services or what not. The Jewish Agency was thus able to offer advice to the Government on an immense range of administrative subjects, far beyond mere questions of immigration. In this way they necessarily obtained a considerable influence, and the result was that the envy and fear of many sections of the Arabs was quickly aroused.

" On the Arab side there was no such body, no body recognised as such in the Mandate itself, and the Government had to deal with different committees of Arabs that arose and re-formed and re-shaped and disappeared, but with no properly organised body like the Jewish Agency, which had its departments and its officials and its capacity for gathering statistics and presenting them as a formulated whole to the Government." The system was no doubt extremely convenient in a hastily organised Government. Other questions which we had to consider were the different categories into which the immigrants were to be put, what were relatives—not an easy thing to decide—and how many everybody was to be allowed to bring in; to what extent was there illegal immigration, how far people had come in on one list as travellers and stayed on; how far did an immigrant when admitted find employment, did they displace Arab labourers and workers or did they find occupation in the country as the result of the entry of Jewish capital? You can imagine that there are wide discrepancies of opinion, and different figures were produced for us by the Arabs and Jews on that subject.

We came generally to the conclusion as regards immigration, and this is the only one of our suggestions on the point to which I want to refer, that economic absorptive capacity, though useful as a test, is really not sufficient, and that such matters as psychological and social effect and the impact of the new population on the old must also be considered.

In reference to the problem of self-government I will not try to go into the different interpretations put upon the articles of the Mandate by the Jews and the Arabs. Take, for instance, the famous Article 2, in regard to the placing of the country under such political and economic condition as will secure the establish-

ment of a Jewish National Home and the development of self-governing institutions; one party contends that the establishment of self-governing institutions was subordinate to the establishment of the Jewish Home; the other contends that they were separate and independent obligations. Remember, too, that in dealing with the grievances we had to act upon a proper interpretation of the Mandate, so we were put to some extent in the position of judges trying to interpret very difficult texts. The question of numbers influenced interpretation, but the interesting point remained that these self-governing institutions were strongly pressed for by the Arabs, while the Jews, being in a minority, strenuously opposed them. The Arabs, in fact, opposed any scheme which fell short of full self-government, while the Jews criticised any more liberal proposals on the ground that they would affect the establishment of the Jewish Home. All the efforts made by successive governments to establish various forms of representative institutions always foundered on this essential problem of numbers.

I must say this, in justice to the Jews, that they did suggest what was known as parity. Let us assume an assembly of a hundred members; fifty per cent. would be Jews and fifty per cent. Arabs. The Jews, of course, would not be entitled by numbers at the present time to so large a share, but they indicated that, if at the present time they were to share half and half with the Arabs, when they had a majority they would be content with a similar representation. I do not think we could be very much impressed by the fixity or the permanence of a constitution of that kind. It is hardly satisfactory to have democratic institutions theoretically based on numbers but really based on inequality, and so we dismissed the idea as impracticable.

I should like to say something about the position of the Government in Palestine. As the inquiry proceeded, many of us began to feel rather sorry for the Government. Nobody seemed to hold it in high favour—a situation not perhaps uncommon. You had the Arabs with their ambitions, you had the Jews with their requirements, ambitions and interpretations of the Mandate, and very little common ground between them; and no great attention therefore was always paid to the wishes of the Government itself. The attitude of the Government was as conciliatory as I think it was possible for a Government to be. I know some people think that in certain aspects it was too conciliatory, and its policy has been the subject of a good deal of criticism.

Let me take one of these difficulties, the quality of the officials. A country so small as Palestine would be lacking in opportunities for ambitious men; on the other hand, if you filled your official cadre from other parts of the Empire, from Africa and so on, you got people, able if you like, but not conversant with the peculiar difficulties and problems of Palestine and of the Jewish Home. Indeed, it was sometimes suggested, I only mention it because you know how these heresies get about, that some officials had not very carefully studied all the provisions of the Mandate: criticisms of this general character are very easy to make. Now, suppose you had had the very highest skilled set of administrators, and there were many able administrators, even if you had had supermen in the way of administration, how could they govern in the same tiny country two peoples differing so much in culture, traditions, history and associations? They were supposed, but I do not think they did very much towards it, to foster a Palestinian citizenship. One of the first things we asked when we reached Jerusalem was, could we see the Palestinian flag? We were shown the Union Jack, we were shown the Jewish flag and we were shown an Arab flag, but nobody could discover in the length and breadth of the country a single specimen of the Palestinian flag. Indeed, of course, it did not exist, but here was a country trying to establish a common Palestinian citizenship with all these different flags, and not one the Palestinian.

There was another great difficulty, arising out of the constitution and the articles of the Mandate itself: there were no less than three official languages. Three official languages in a country smaller than Wales, with about a million and a quarter inhabitants! The public documents and records set down in one language had to be translated into the other two. In my lighter moments I called Palestine the Paradise of Interpreters, but you can easily imagine not only the difficulties arising from the equality of three languages, but also those arising from the perusal of imperfect translations giving rise to almost endless discussion as to whether the original document was correct and if so whether the translation was accurate or not. Some of the interpreters made, unintentionally of course, very curious changes in what had been said, and apologies and occasional explanations had to be given.

Let us turn, for a moment, to education. Jewish education, of course, was largely organised by Jews with assistance from Government subsidies, although the Jews spend most generously upon the education of their own people. Arab education, as a rule, was under Government control and assistance, but the young

people of both races were educated in separate schools, in separate languages and by separate teachers with different traditions and different loyalties. There was very little attempt to establish common citizenship among the young, and it can hardly be expected that as they grow up they will easily transfer their affections. Indeed, it is very difficult to get up any strong feeling for a Mandatory. The name is even unpleasantly suggestive; mandates are known to be temporary, and therefore to entertain a strong sensation of affection or loyalty towards a thing called a Mandatory who may soon cease to function, is, I think, too great a strain on ordinary human nature.

Then, there is the question of appointments. The different Government and official posts were to be divided in appropriate proportions between the two races. The Jews, too, claimed that, as they contributed, as indeed they did, a larger proportion of the finances than their numbers would imply, they should have a higher percentage of appointments. All these questions of ratios and proportions affected every branch of the Administration. We have referred in the Report to the way the system worked in the case of motor-cars and their drivers; we were provided with three chauffeurs, one Moslem, one Christian Arab, and one Jew. This may be tolerable in the case of chauffeurs, but in the case of appointments this balancing of the numbers between Jews and Arabs was, of course, a standing problem of administration, and the Government was always exposed to attack by one side or the other, and accused of enlisting too many Jews or Arabs, as the case might be, in a particular Government department or section.

The Government was always subject to the criticisms of both sides. Jews attacked the supineness of the Administration in not admitting more immigrants, giving more land to the Jews, and for spending too little upon the development of the land, while the Arabs were always complaining that Jews were unduly favoured and that both in Jerusalem and also in London they had far too easy an access to the ear of the Government. A very serious result arising from the impossibility of setting up representative institutions was that there were no Government institutions or places where the action of the Government could be attacked, criticised and defended. There was constant misrepresentation and misunderstanding of the action of the Government; all sorts of fancies, which would have been dissipated in a moment under some form of public institution, grew rapidly into legends and articles of fixed belief. Another difficulty was the minuteness

with which every action of the Government, every appointment almost, was criticised.

Further, there was the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, which annually reviewed the administration. This was in effect a general inspection every year conducted by people who were very critical of what was being done by a country not their own. You will agree that government is and always has been difficult when carried on under the eyes of innumerable inspectors.

I will not go through all the mental processes by which we tried to arrive at the different grievances of the Jews and the Arabs. But it was in the course of these examinations and, as we came into close contact with the difficulties of the government of the country, that it dawned on our minds and grew into a conviction that it was impossible to conduct the government of the country under the Mandate as at present written. I do not know whether what we then proceeded to do was quite strictly within our terms of reference or not. I had some doubts about it as chairman, but I have been rather relieved to find that, though I think I have read the bulk of the criticism passed upon our Report, I have not seen one single reference to that suggestion, and we might perhaps have been accused of pedantry if, having this tremendous duty cast upon us of examining the situation in Palestine, we had confined ourselves to the narrowest interpretation of our reference, and had not tried, with all the experience we had gained after all those months, to get really to the root of the matter, and if possible to suggest a final settlement of the problem.

I cannot rehearse all the travail of spirit that we went through before we really came to the conclusion that we could not recommend that the present system under the present Mandate should continue, although we were very well aware of all the implications and the seriousness of that proposal. Nor would I like anybody to think that we arrived at the solution of partition because we were strongly in favour of it and were anxious to divide up so small a country as Palestine into two States with all the difficulties of boundaries, defence and finance that must be entailed. We have had a long experience of the jungle of problems that were due to the break-up of great States after the War. We acted therefore with our eyes fully open. But it seemed to us impossible to carry on the country under the existing Mandate and with its limitations, and we felt that the only way

to arrive at a final settlement of the matter was to divide the country into Jewish and Arab areas which would make it possible at once to give them a degree of self-government which they could not possibly obtain under the present Mandatory system. We should be able to give to the Jews all the dignity of a State, instead of merely a Jewish National Home. We should get rid at one blow of all ambiguity about the difference between Palestine as a Jewish Home and a Jewish Home in Palestine; all that bundle of controversy and difference would be swept away. There would be no more bickering with the Government at Jerusalem, no more wrangling about absorptive capacity, and no more sorting out of categories of immigrants. The Jews could decide without hindrance on the countries from which they desired to bring immigrants into Palestine; there would be no limit on Jewish immigration except what the Jews themselves thought ought to be applied. Not only so (and this is really a point of great importance to those Jewish elements in neighbouring countries), but the position of the Jews in Arab countries would be immensely improved when this rivalry was once and for ever destroyed. The Jews would be able to conduct their own government in their own way. There would be no necessity to make allowances for variations in the different economic and cultural standards of two races. The Arab grievances, the Arab hostilities, the Arab fear of the Jews would be at once turned into other channels.

Now, of course, it was not practical to assign to the Jews a purely Jewish area of the country and to the Arabs an Arab area; unfortunately such a simple provision was out of the question. We considered, I think, every possible variation, and I have seen strongly advocated, in some of the newspapers, some of the variations which we dismissed after debate as being hopeless and impracticable. Our governing conditions were, of course, to make the States as compact as possible with as good boundaries as we could design. We felt it was simply impossible to arrive at any settlement, in the present state of feeling, by handing over Jerusalem to the Jews or to the Moslems, and I trust both States will acquiesce in the establishment there of a neutral Power which, as a Christian Power, will give complete toleration to the other religions, and itself be devoted to the sources and origin of its faith. By these divisions we shall sweep away rivalries and difficulties which have arisen in the last fifteen years through packing these two people closely together in the same area and trying to reconcile in a few years what centuries would hardly suffice to effect.

There is nothing strange, I think, in seeking to alter a document like the Mandate. In the last seventeen years much bigger things have been shattered. We have seen whole chapters of the Treaty of Versailles go by the board, and the vexed question of Reparations has disappeared. Even the Covenant of the League of Nations is in question and under examination. The men who were leaders twenty years ago did their best with the most intractable material, amidst a whirl of emotion and pressure which we have now almost forgotten. We have had the advantage of seventeen years of travail and experience, and it seemed to me and to my colleagues to be our duty to try to carry out our old obligations in a new and a better way.

Summary of Discussion.

SIR ANDREW MACFADYEAN said that to him the Report was undoubtedly a melancholy document. The post-War settlement had contained two constructive pieces of idealism: firstly, the League of Nations, which was now sick of a wasting fever, in his opinion largely owing to the want of resolution of the French and British Governments of the last seventeen years; secondly, the Palestine settlement, which was now so sick that a surgical operation was necessary. He had never yet heard of a disease which could be cured by cutting the patient into three parts and giving one part into the keeping of the surgeon. Was the admitted failure of the British Government to carry out the Mandate an indication that our will-power and our insight were deteriorating? We had been told that the Government had swallowed the Report whole; looking at the map behind him he was tempted to make the comment that some people would swallow anything.

The underlying argument of the Report was that there had been, from the beginning, a contradiction in the Mandate itself. The speaker did not share this view. He did not think there was anything which prevented the safeguard of Arab civil and religious rights, on a much better basis than they had ever been safeguarded before, concurrently with the development of the Jewish National Home. There was no reason why self-governing institutions should be set up immediately; given firm government, they could have waited until an approximate equality could have been reached between the two races. The contradiction lay between the terms of the Mandate and certain engagements entered into by the British Government during the course of the War. But this did not excuse that Government once they had accepted the Mandate, nor would it satisfy the League of Nations or the United States, who had nothing to do with such engagements, but were parties to the Mandate. One conclusion other Governments might draw would perhaps be not that there should have been no Mandate, but that Great Britain was not the Power to administer it, and

someone wishing to make trouble might suggest that the task had better be given to another Power.

But even if he accepted the Commission's view that there had been a contradiction inherent in the Mandate, he would not necessarily agree with their conclusion. Solomon's judgment had had one great advantage, in that it satisfied one party. This partition probably would not satisfy either party. What did it offer to the Jew? A country the size of Wales was to be split, and in a fraction of it he would have to support all the machinery of government, with responsibility for instance for education and defence, with the knowledge that there was no prospect of such a development of the hinterland as would bring prosperity to the country. There had twice been a division of Palestine already; firstly, Transjordan had been taken away from the Jews, and secondly, their immigration had been curtailed to accord with "economic absorptive capacity"—a meaningless phrase if only because what a country could absorb depended to some extent upon its absorption. The partition was just as open to Arab criticism as the Mandate itself. In spite of what had been said about economic motives counting very little, the Arab would still have the picture before him of a prosperous Jewish community and wonder why he could not have a share in that prosperity. There would have been one solution of the economic problem. If the Jews had been allowed to develop Transjordan, not with Jewish labour but with Jewish capital, and make an Arab country prosperous as a counter-attraction for Arabs, a great deal of the trouble in Palestine might not have occurred.

But if it was impossible to keep faith with both parties, the speaker did not shrink from saying that he would prefer to keep faith with the Jews. Firstly, and selfishly, he would prefer this because, having regard to the position of Palestine in relation to the Mediterranean and India, a strong, contented Palestine was of enormous importance to the British Empire as providing an alternative route to the Suez Canal. Secondly, the Arab could still say that in his house were many mansions. If anyone had obtained ninety per cent. of what was promised them during the War, it was the Arab people. What about the Jew? Out of fourteen or seventeen million Jews in the world, three or four million of them were subjected daily to the cruellest form of persecution, which was an international problem for which a cure must be found. The partition of Palestine offered no issue; it was shutting up the Jew, to borrow a phrase from the Report, in a more cramped and more dangerous ghetto.

MR. H. ST. JOHN PHILBY said that if the Mandate was unworkable it was not because, as the last speaker had said, Great Britain could not work it, but because nobody could work it. This was the view of the Commission and, fortunately, of His Majesty's Government. The last speaker had also mentioned Solomon's judgment. Had he ever thought that the same result might be forthcoming in this case? Some day the Jews would go to the Arabs and ask for a settlement as between

themselves. Already they could have got a better settlement in direct negotiation with the Arabs than the Commission and the British Government had been able to give them.

Two years ago the speaker had said that the apparently peaceful condition of Palestine was entirely illusory, that the Mandate was unworkable and that, if the British Government refused to revise its policy, there would be no alternative but bloodshed. This was now surely the accepted view. The lecturer had said that no criticism of the Report had mentioned that the Commission had gone beyond their terms of reference; the speaker had done so. In regard to the Report itself, he considered it one of the worthiest pieces of official literature ever written. It was incredible how such an amazing amount of information could have been obtained in such a short time.

As a life-long supporter of the Arab case, the speaker thought that after reflection the Arabs would accept the Report with its recommendations, as being eminently in their own interests to do so. The Report was not only a very reasonable solution of an extraordinarily complex problem, but it was the only solution, the only alternative to continued bloodshed.

In one part of the Report it had been said that a British national anthem and a Jewish national anthem had been heard in Palestine, but not an Arab national anthem. The Arab national anthem in Palestine, as throughout the Arab world, was: "There is no God but God, and Mohammed is the Prophet and the Servant of God." This was their only national anthem. In the same way, the most important year in Arab history was the year of the birth of the Prophet and the foundation of Arabian nationhood, which was known in history as the year of the Elephant. By a curious coincidence the Persian (Arabic) word for elephant is Peel!

A MEMBER said that he would like to offer his sincerest sympathies to the Chairman and the whole of the Palestine Royal Commission for the very unpleasant and thankless task which they had performed. From the beginning they must have realised that whatever they did would be criticised. In the general criticism from both sides lay evidence of the fairness of their verdict.

What would be the result of the provisions of the Report if adopted and carried out? The British Government would have a perfectly clear conscience. They would have given to the Jews a Jewish National Home in Palestine. They could also say to the Arabs that they had given them, to the best of their ability, the freedom which they had been promised, and if the Arabs felt that by giving this small portion of Palestine to the Jews the Arabs had been wronged, they could surely forgive the British because of all that they had done for the deliverance of the Arab countries. The only party which gained nothing was the British Government. It was to be hoped that British commitments in Palestine, both financial and military, would soon come to an end, but unfortunately this did not seem to be the case. The fact that

Jerusalem and the Holy Places were to remain under the control of His Majesty's Government would necessitate financial and military aid from Great Britain. It was a pity that some method could not have been devised whereby the Jews and Arabs could have been left in Palestine in two separate States. As it was, both parties would appeal to Great Britain in the case of any trouble. It was to be hoped that some way would be found of avoiding these liabilities.

The enemies of Great Britain would no doubt make a great deal of the fact that the latter had taken over the Moslem Holy Places. The speaker felt that in the present state of affairs controversy should not arise as to who owned a particular place, although in the more fanatical countries people were still guided by religious belief rather than political necessity.

From the very beginning the Commission had set to work to find a solution acceptable to both parties. They might have found a different solution if they had been thinking of the best thing for Palestine itself, but this would have been useless if it had been unacceptable to both Jews and Arabs. The speaker would have liked to see a different state of affairs with the consent of both parties. Supposing it was desired to set up a Jewish National Home in Scotland, would it be better for the Jews to live in a separate part of the country and remain hostile to the rest of Great Britain, or would it be better for them to co-operate with Great Britain and become merged with their population, and be proud of the fact, as was the case at the moment? He would have liked to see the Jews settled in Palestine with the willing consent of the Arab people. In this way only could there be a really peaceful Palestine. As it was there would be antagonism between the two States, and the future would not be as hopeful as all wished.

COLONEL F. H. KISCH said that he spoke as a man who for eight years had been the spokesman in Palestine of the Jewish Agency referred to by the lecturer as having a great deal of influence with the Government. All that that Agency ever could do or had tried to do was to submit advice on matters within its competence, and the High Commissioner would take that advice, or reject it if he disagreed with it. The Jewish influence was as nothing compared with the forces which the Arabs had brought to bear against the Mandate, and not merely against the Jews, though the Supreme Moslem Council Commissioners had established that on two occasions the Supreme Moslem Council had resorted to the method of religious incitement with the result, if not the intent of causing bloodshed. Unless those forces which had never given the Mandate a chance were eliminated, the new policy would be frustrated by them. There was reported in the newspaper that very day (July 13th, 1937) a proclamation signed by 150 members of the *Ulema* that any Moslem accepting the partition of Palestine was a traitor to Islam. In 1923 the Jews had been willing to participate in the proposed Legislative Council, but as with the subsequent proposal for the constitution of an Advisory Council, co-

operation between Jews and Arabs had been made impossible by the Mufti and the Supreme Moslem Council, who went so far as to publish at that time the statement that any Moslem who took part in an election would not be allowed burial in a Moslem cemetery. Any new solution, unless 100 per cent. Arab, would meet with the same fate so long as one man, the Mufti, retained his office and powers.

It was necessary to speak of the proposed partition, because after the publication of the Report there was little hope of conciliation on the old basis. With regard to Jerusalem, there was in the Report no understanding, no conception of what that city meant to the Jews. It was perhaps natural, if this point had not been emphasised in evidence, since no Jew could ever have conceived that there could be proposed a Jewish National Home in Palestine from which Jerusalem was to be excluded. Personally, as regards the Holy Places, he felt that the Jews would welcome the solution that the Old City of Jerusalem, with its Christian and Moslem Holy Places and their own most Holy Place, the Western Wall of the Temple, should be in the hands of Great Britain in permanent trust. But the Jews' ancestors had built Jerusalem as a town when Britain was still peopled by barbarians, the Hebrew prophets had preached the word of God from Jerusalem centuries before Jesus, a millennium before Mohammed, and no Jew could conscientiously accept a Jewish State in Palestine from which that city was altogether excluded. It would be perfectly practicable for the British to link the New City of Jerusalem, where over seventy thousand Jews were living, to the Jewish State, just as the Royal Commission had proposed that it should link Jaffa at the other extremity of the corridor with the Arab State.

As regards territory, it was regrettable that the entire district of Beersheba was to be closed to the Jews. This district was in area 46·6 per cent. of Palestine and contained only 2·5 per cent. of the population. It was a desert. The Jews had been buying land and had concluded contracts for more land there, contracts and sales having been made freely by the inhabitants: it was not a case of absentee landlords living in Syria, as had been the case with some of the first Jewish purchases in Palestine. The Arab villages and tribes had made the sales freely in the hope that Jewish capital would help to irrigate this desert land. It was hoped that a great deal might be done to develop the country agriculturally if money were available, and it was to the interest of both parties that this should be done. The position should be re-examined, and that district should at least be kept under the British Mandate, with facilities for Jewish development.

Although it had been no part of the task of the Royal Commission to examine British interests, it should be remembered that in September 1935, when it seemed that Great Britain was near to war, the Jews were discussing whether they could put ten, fifteen or twenty thousand men at her disposal, while it was at least a reasonable assumption that at that same time plans were being made for what the Commission had rightly called the open rebellion of the Arabs, which broke out on April

19th of the following year. From the point of view of British interests, the extension of the Jewish State in this triangle between Transjordan and Sinai down to the Gulf of Akaba was desirable.

It was not clear from the Report whether the Commission contemplated that Great Britain should accept the responsibility of guaranteeing the frontiers of the small Jewish State, capable of holding perhaps a million Jews. By the time there were a million Jews in the territory, the neighbouring State would contain three million Arabs and would perhaps be part of a great Arab Confederation. It was to be hoped that one day there would be a treaty of friendship between the Jewish and Arab States. He had been astounded to hear it suggested that the Jews would have done better by negotiating with the Arabs directly. Ever since Dr. Weizmann's discussions with Emir Feisal they had been trying to negotiate, but had been unable to make progress in face of the Mufti's attitude. If there were not some treaty of friendship, and if the British Government did not guarantee the frontiers, the whole man-power of the Jewish State would have to be mobilised permanently on the frontier. To draw this line of division and relinquish the Mandate in such circumstances yet without such guarantees would not be an honourable thing for Great Britain to do.

MR. A. YUSUF ALI said that as a Moslem and a loyal member of the British Empire he was under certain difficulties. The Imperial Government had accepted the principle of partition, while his people were surprised and pained. Any strengthening of the Empire would in the end help his own people, but it was doubtful whether the Commission's proposals would strengthen the Empire.

He did not think the proposed partition would be acceptable either to the Arabs or their fellow Moslems throughout the Empire. The Indian Representative body of the Moslem League had already passed a resolution of strong disapproval. If the partition could be made acceptable to the Indian Moslems, who numbered seventy million of His Majesty's most loyal subjects, it would be worth making some small rectifications to allay their anxiety. In the proposed partition the Arab portion included mostly hilly and desert tracts. The more fertile plains by the sea coast were mainly in the proposed Jewish State. Further, the Arab State would have no port at all, the port of Jaffa being within the corridor and Jewish territory, and the port of Haifa being inside the Jewish State. A proper rectification would be to take a line South of Haifa and to carry it on to Megiddo and take the northern portion away from the Jews. This would leave Acre, Safad and Nazareth within the Arab State. The Palestine Christians were at *one* with their Moslem brethren and would be content. Admittedly the Jewish State looked small as regards area, but if area were alone considered it would be true to say that the Sinai Peninsula was more important than Palestine which was not the case, because the former was mostly desert. It was only after an appraisement of the hilly land and the desert land as compared with the fertile plains that a

proper appreciation of what had been given to any particular State could be made. There was always the danger that a large population bottled up in a small area was liable to break out, but if some fertile land and a port were given to the Arabs, it was just possible that the new scheme might be made to work without too much injustice to the people who had lived in the land for more than twelve centuries. The suggested rectification would also help in removing a great part of the anomaly involved in the Commission's scheme of partition. Under that scheme 225,000 Arabs would pass to the Jewish State while only 1,250 Jews would go to the Arab State. Such an arrangement would be unjust and unworkable.

SIR RONALD STORRS observing that Lord Peel lamented that he missed in Palestine any trace of a flag acceptable to all parties, reminded the meeting that he had had the honour with Lord Samuel of trying to devise some possible symbol. They had found it not so easy as the Royal Commission might imagine. If you excluded, as you must, the Cross, the Crescent and Solomon's Seal, which were the only three symbols acceptable to the three parties concerned, there was little else for co-operation in a national flag. It had been a relief at this meeting, not to have had, as so frequently happened, the 'red herrings' brought forward on such occasions. We had been spared, by Arab protagonists, the terrors of Jewish Communism; and no one had yet displayed before us the spectre of the Arab Effendi.

On the other hand, the Report of the Royal Commission had come to most people as a very painful shock. The ugly word "cantonization" had been canvassed as a possible solution. Partition was a frank admission of failure for the British Government. Had the Report not come out and had not sovereign independence been dangled, so to speak, before both sides, it might still be possible to argue in terms of trying to make the best of things; but complete sovereign independence was a strong wine to raise to anyone's lips, and it was tempting for those at the head of affairs, who knew they would be called upon to take office, to influence those beneath them.

The fourth speaker was quite right when he said that the Jews had tried to negotiate with the Arabs and had, rightly or wrongly, always been refused.

Sir Ronald would urge, even at this last moment, that some effort should be made to avoid or to at all events postpone an act of very dreadful mutilation.

LORD PEEL, in reply, said that he would like to repeat that the Commissioners had not arrived at their conclusion that it was necessary to divide Palestine into separate States without very great reluctance. They had been driven by the force of circumstances to such a solution. Although there had been great criticism of the Report, and nobody knew better than the authors how open it was to criticism, hardly anyone had said that it was possible for the present situation to go on, and if that were the case some such arrangement as had been suggested was needed.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London: Send Book Twenty May Journal: Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

1*. THE BRITISH EMPIRE: A Report on its Structure and Problems by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1937. (Oxford University Press, for the R.I.I.A. 8vo. vii + 336 pp. 15*s.*; to Members of the R.I.I.A., 10*s.*)

THIS volume may be recommended with confidence as a corrective to much loose and uninstructed thinking and discussion, both at home and abroad, on the subject of the constitution of the Empire, and of the Imperial problems which present themselves for solution. It is obvious that both the constitution and the problems might have been treated in greater detail, but, subject to the necessity for compression, this is an excellent and remarkable work. Its purpose is stated in the Introduction to be "to provide a background for the appreciation and discussion of the main problems facing the different parts of the British Empire, in consequence, wholly or in part, of their membership of the Imperial association." This purpose is certainly achieved.

The material is divided into three parts. The first describes the individual members of the Commonwealth of Nations and their respective constitutions, and subsequently the Colonial Empire proper. The second deals with the fabric of Empire and the law and convention applicable thereto. In the third, the chief problems arising from the Imperial association are considered and an attempt is made to suggest possible solutions for some of them.

The Empire as such has no formal constitution, and the continual change in the relationship of its component parts is a tribute to the elasticity of the bonds of connection. Great Britain and the Dominions "are in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs." The sole constitutional bond is the Crown. The Dominions are no longer possessions. This is a position frequently misunderstood, especially abroad. The misconception as to the power of Great Britain in respect of the Dominions may be in part explained by the practice of geographical publishers of colouring their maps in red for both Dominions and dependencies of Great Britain. The distinction between Dominions and dependencies is very clearly stated in this volume, though the statement that Newfoundland's status "has been reduced temporarily to that of a Crown Colony" would probably be disputed in that Island.

The Indian Empire differs widely from any other part of the

Commonwealth. The chapter of this book dealing with India and Burma gives a clear and concise account of the progress of political reform, though certain of the statements therein contained may appear optimistic. Reference is made to the binding force of Hinduism, but the present apparent unanimity of a large section of Hindu political opinion in opposition to established government may be due rather to a relaxation of that binding force, than to its existence. It is true to say that "in our time political India has been established," but that "united India has become a realisable ideal" is seriously questioned by many thinkers with intimate knowledge of Indian conditions. Only with the experience of self-government will it be possible to determine whether political education and realisation of the unquestionable advantage of a "United India" will overcome the fissiparous tendencies of caste, outcaste and depressed classes within Hinduism, and of the wide diversity of religious belief and social custom of the various races of India.

The Palestine situation is dealt with summarily. There is an obvious error in the statement that "Arabs . . . outnumber Jews by about eight to one." The figures for 1936 are: Moslem population, 848,342, Jewish population, 370,483, that is, less than five Moslems to two Jews. The compilers of the volume have shown wisdom in offering no opinion on the solution of the vexed question of the policy which should be pursued in executing the Palestine mandate.

Of the problems facing the Commonwealth at the present time, those concerned with foreign relations are rightly described as the most difficult and most vital. Included among them are the questions of neutrality or passive belligerency in case of a war in which Great Britain is engaged. The difficulty of adoption of such a policy on the part of any Dominion is clear. It is true that the Irish Free State and the Union of South Africa have claimed the right to neutrality, but in practice it would probably prove impossible, and a State at war with the United Kingdom would recognise the neutrality of any of the King's other Dominions only if it suited its interest to do so. It is also pointed out that in the event of war there would be serious danger of the disintegration of the Empire, should its members differ on the fundamental question whether or not they should take part.

The bonds of Empire are only in part sentimental. They are largely based on advantages enjoyed by the component parts. Of these, economic advantages are important, but probably most important is the well-founded belief that the United Kingdom provides a power of defence which the Dominions could not themselves provide. It is unthinkable that the United Kingdom would allow one of the Dominions to be overcome by a foreign Power. The knowledge that this is so imposes on the Dominions a reciprocal obligation from which it is morally certain that they would not wish to escape.

"The Colonial Question" is the heading of a most interesting chapter, which deals with the demands of the "have-not" Powers. This is a problem on which the compilers of the volume do not hesitate to express a decided opinion, with which the vast majority of their readers will agree.

The bases of those demands are economic, sentimental and strategic. In so far as they are sentimental or strategic, it is clear that they cannot be met. The United Kingdom is not going to part with its colonies or mandated territories or any portion of them to satisfy a demand from a great Power to become even greater, or to provide

strategical *points d'appui* or reservoirs of man-power for its army. The economic claim stands in a different category, and has some justifiable basis in fact. Some of the non-self-governing colonies are parties to imperial economic agreements providing preferences for inter-empire trade. This is a position which it is difficult to justify in the interest of the colonies concerned, and still more difficult to justify in argument with the " have-not " Powers. Lord Lugard's suggestion that the economic argument could be met by re-establishment of the Open Door in all non-self-governing colonies has much in its favour. The Open Door is already guaranteed by treaty in the area covered by the Congo Basin Treaties (which includes *inter alia* Uganda, Kenya, Nyasaland, the Tanganyika mandated territory, and parts of Northern Rhodesia and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan) and in the A and B mandated territories. It seems logical that it should be extended to C mandates, and arguable that it should also include the non-self-governing colonies generally. Action of this kind would not prevent continuing demands for colonies, demands based on sentimental or strategic grounds, but it would remove some genuine grievances.

JOHN HOPE SIMPSON.

2*. THE BRITISH EMPIRE: ITS STRUCTURE AND ITS PROBLEMS. By Johannes Stoye. 1936. (London: John Lane. 8vo. xiii + 344 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS most interesting book was first published in Munich in the spring of 1935, and translated into French the following autumn. It has been reviewed with favour in many countries, and a Dutch translation, if not already issued, is well advanced in preparation. This English version, which is very well done, is from a second and revised edition.

Herr Stoye is a " geopolitician," basing himself on Blood and Soil as the governing factors in human development, and he regards the British Empire as " the outcome of the highly individual and not easily intelligible English character; which in turn is the outcome of the racial mixture, soil, climate and history that have gone to make England." The study of our achievements and prospects which results from this method is remarkably thorough and enlightening; an English reader cannot reasonably complain at Herr Stoye's knowledge or understanding or objectivity. I read his book with the feeling of an insect under a microscope, and found it a most stimulating experience. Herr Stoye's method is indeed all the more commendable because it avoids the narrow generalisations which disfigure so much modern writing on the theme of imperialism, and truthfully sets out both the instinctive character of our motives and their immense complexity. But his ultimate summing up of English character is disarmingly simple. It is a mistake, he believes, to regard us as reasoning or calculating animals, to credit us with long-range plans and to exclaim against our perfidy. He agrees with Keyserling that we are an " animal-people," who in political matters are " just as sure as the setter in partridge matters." It is therefore a hopeless task to analyse our mental processes: " The Englishman finds his way about in politics like a dog, not like a thinking human being."

Herr Stoye accordingly understands the Empire and its strange constitution or lack of constitution. He describes it with real insight, and is often generous in his admiration. His last words illustrate the spirit which inspires him:

"Weak States are an incentive to war, and peace-loving Germany has therefore an interest in the inner consolidation and strengthening of the British Empire. We do not see the disintegration of the British Empire before us, and still less do we desire it—in the interests of world peace."

I wish indeed that an Englishman would write a similar book upon Deutschtum and its complex yearnings, for this is a real contribution to international understanding. EDWARD GRIGG.

3. HOW IS THE EMPIRE? By Percy F. Roe, Captain, Army Educational Corps. 1936. (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, Ltd. 8vo. xiv + 294 pp. 6s.)

CAPTAIN ROE'S little book is a useful review of how things stand at present in the different parts of the Empire, but it is superficial by comparison with Herr Stoye, and it passes over the deeper waters of the imperial problem with a rather unsatisfying optimism which is perhaps more suitable for army classes than for the general reader. It takes, for instance, some hardihood to aver that "the policy of the Colonial Office" with regard to the native in East Africa "has never wavered," as also to suggest that the principle of "indirect rule" has solved all the problems of government in West Africa. But although Captain Roe is not always quite equal to the subjects he is treating, his faith is stimulating, his style is clear and readable, and his book should be of genuine value to many who want an easy bird's-eye view of the Empire and its peoples.

I noticed one or two inaccuracies which can easily be corrected in another edition. The population of the three East African Territories is, for example, given differently on pages 176 and 193; and those who have seen that part of the world will be surprised to read on page 201 that Italy's Eritrean colony "contains elevated plateaux similar to those upon which she has cast her eyes in Abyssinia." To compare Eritrea with Abyssinia as a field for white settlement shows too scanty a knowledge of that difficult subject to justify the dogmatism with which Captain Roe discusses it—more especially since dogmatism of any sort on matters of opinion is out of place in a book written obviously for instruction rather than controversy. The general purpose and effect of the book is so sound that I regret to mention these blemishes; but since the future development of East Africa is one of the most searching problems which confronts us, it should have been more broadly and understandingly treated.

EDWARD GRIGG.

4*. THE EMPIRE IN THE WORLD. By Arthur Willert, B. K. Long, and H. V. Hodson. 1937. (London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. x + 323 pp. 10s. 6d.)

THE three collaborators in this volume are responsible respectively for foreign affairs, intra-Commonwealth relations on their political side, and economic affairs. They have taken pains to fit their separate contributions together, so that the book flows onward in a unity of theme. Sir Arthur Willert opens the argument with a view of the world which has developed since the War (section i) and closes it (section iv) with a balanced view of the present world situation as it affects the Empire. He concludes that the Empire would be well advised to take the lead in another attempt to create a real collective system in Europe. Mr. Long, in the second section of the book, takes a realistic view of Dominion nationality. He is impatient

of the metaphysics and legalisms associated with the 1926 Declaration, the Statute of Westminster, and subsequent developments. He urges that the controversies ought to be cut short by accepting as a fact the reality of Dominion independence: then the way would be cleared for the problems of common concern, in which it remains incumbent upon Great Britain to lead. Mr. Hodson deals carefully with the economic side of these problems. It is no reflection on the other two contributors to stress Mr. Hodson's part in the book as the most valuable one in present circumstances. Knowledge about the political and constitutional aspects of the Commonwealth is widely diffused; the economic discussions have usually been vaguer. Mr. Hodson clears up many of the issues in an analysis which is as succinct and precise as any which has appeared. His section is a most useful guide to the general reader on the recent history of economic policies in the Empire.

W. K. HANCOCK.

5. THE EMPIRE—YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY. By Stephen King-Hall. 1937. (London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. 101 pp. 2*s*. 6*d*.)

In this short sketch Commander King-Hall starts by asking the question "Is the Empire worth while?" which he proceeds to answer by giving a brief historical survey of the growth of the Empire since 1585 and by a discussion of democracy *versus* totalitarianism. He concludes that the Empire is worth while, and outlines its present organisation and refers to some of its major problems.

K. C. B.

6. IRELAND AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1937. Conflict or Collaboration? By Henry Harrison, O.B.E., M.C. 1937. (London: Robert Hale. 8vo. 356 pp. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS book is substantially a plea for Anglo-Irish reconciliation, addressed to the English people by a gallant and chivalrous Irishman. The plea is supported by a trenchant argument about the nature of the Irish Treaty and the course of Anglo-Irish relations since the Treaty. It is the writer's thesis that the dispute which broke out in 1932, and which still continues, is grounded upon a denial by Great Britain to Ireland of her treaty rights. In particular, he argues that it is grounded upon the British Government's refusal to recognise the Free State's unfettered power to amend its own constitution—a power which it possesses, "by virtue of the Treaty, in accordance with the now agreed interpretations of Dominion status."

A great deal of Captain Harrison's argument is beyond criticism. His account of the evolution of Dominion status (in Chapter IV) is admirable. His criticism of the inconsistency of British interpretations of the Treaty, and of their restrictive effect, will be in large measure accepted by those familiar with the course of the controversy, *e.g.* about the Privy Council. Nevertheless, Captain Harrison over-simplifies the controversy. In the first place, he treats it, in its legal aspects, as a controversy solely between Great Britain and Ireland, whereas in fact there have been not merely two, but *three* conflicting views about the powers of the Irish Free State, the view of the British Government, the view of the Irish Government under President De Valera, and the view of the Opposition led by Mr. Cosgrave. The third view is very closely reasoned, and is entitled to respect. (See *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, p. 332 ff.) Captain Harrison's second over-simplification is a political one. He is right to argue for

an unrestrictive interpretation of the Treaty, but he ignores the vehement body of Irish opinion which, on the ground of natural right, has always opposed the Treaty, however interpreted. An ordinary Fianna Fail deputy (to say nothing of the I.R.A. men) would answer with some derision Captain Harrison's rather naïve question "Is it not time to get back to the atmosphere of the Anglo-Irish peace negotiations of 1921?" One has to remember the widely propagated hatred of "the treaty of surrender," extorted from a yielding Irish delegation under the threat of "immediate and terrible war." And one has to remember how much of the legalistic disputation, from 1921 onwards, has screened more deeply-conflicting convictions about right.

Since this is true, the problem is not merely to get back to the Treaty, but to get beyond it. It is best to look on it in the historian's way, as a *necessary but imperfect stage in appeasement, which may* prepare the way for a deeper agreement. If this agreement is to come, it must come in the spirit to which Captain Harrison appeals. "Without freedom from constraint," he writes, "there can be no freedom for constructive purposes." The reviewer believes, with Captain Harrison, that both the objective interests of the two countries and their peculiar individual dispositions make partnership between them part of the natural order of things, which will work itself out if frustrations can be removed. For their removing patience will sometimes be necessary, and at other times the swift seizing of opportunity, but at all times the steady preparedness of friendly dispositions. It is for this spirit which Captain Harrison appeals, and there can be no better way of fostering it than by cutting away the débris of the controversy whose history he recounts. There are other more important things to remember, and not least among them the true facts of Ireland's war record, which Captain Harrison records in his second chapter. And this not in expectation of another war, but as a reminder of the comradeship which has been wasted, but must be sought again for its own sake. W. K. HANCOCK.

7*. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LAW OF NATIONS. Volume II, Territory (Part I). By Herbert Arthur Smith. 1935. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. x + 422 pp. 16s.)

THIS is the second volume in Professor Smith's interesting and useful work on Great Britain and the Law of Nations, and, in the opinion of this writer at least, it is perhaps the most important and the most salutary approach that can be made to the science of international law. Too often, the contemporary "man in the street," including, in many cases the practising lawyer, is inclined to dismiss international law with a sniff, and to point to Manchuria, to Abyssinia, to Spain, and particularly to the Covenant of the League, as proof that national self-interest and expediency are the only laws governing the conduct of States to-day. It is not only encouraging, therefore, but a necessary corrective as well, to turn to a volume like the present one, which contains not the wishes of the idealist, but the actual practice of a great nation over a long period in its history, and to discover there the legal principles which govern the conduct of that nation in its relations with other nations.

Nothing seems clearer to-day, in the rapidly changing world in which we live, than that all law—domestic and international alike—is made for man and by man, and that any principles which run

through it are basic and enduring only so long as they are proven to serve the best interests of contemporary society, and to meet with the approval of the governing group within the community, whether that group be a majority or a minority. But despite this it is useful to examine *what is* and *what has been* in the relations of men and nations, for even though ideas, habits and principles may change with changing circumstances, it may be that experience is teaching us something in respect of the procedure and technique of conducting these relationships through such agencies as legislatures, executives and judiciaries or, in the less formal field of international relations, through arbitration, negotiation, conference and judicial settlement.

This volume contains material dealing with such topics as the discovery, occupation and possession of territory; its abandonment, loss and re-occupation; jurisdiction on the high seas; title to the bed of the sea; territorial waters; straits; bays; hot pursuit; jurisdiction in port; international rivers; and an appendix giving the British case in the Behring Sea Arbitration. The editor's task has been no light one, for he has not only made a selection from amongst a great mass of material, but in addition he has summarised and interpreted many of the sections of the documents selected, thus bringing the collection within a reasonable compass without losing the value imparted by primary source material. Canadian students of this subject will find much in the book that throws light on problems confronting Canada to-day, *e.g.* title to areas in the Arctic territorial waters, the St. Lawrence deep water way development and the Chicago water diversion, as well as much of historical interest. It is to be hoped that the funds will be forthcoming to permit Professor Smith to continue this series on which he has made such a promising start. NORMAN MACKENZIE.

8*. LA PRÉFÉRENCE IMPÉRIALE ET LE COMMERCE DES PAYS BRITANNIQUES DEPUIS LA CRISE. By Jacques Villeneuve. 1937. (Paris: Librairie Technique et Economique. 8vo. 232 pp. bibl. 30 frs.)

THE first part of this book deals with the policy of Imperial Preference up to and including the Ottawa agreements, and analyses the customs policy of Great Britain and the Dominions since the agreements. The second part deals in general with the commerce of Great Britain and the Dominions since the crisis, and in particular with the commerce between Great Britain and the Dominions, and that of the Dominions among themselves. The colonies are excluded, though in his introduction the author expresses the opinion that the consequences of giving up the old justification of colonial possession —equal economic opportunity for all—" may be extremely grave."

The work is done competently and the arrangement of statistical information is neat and useful. In a short concluding chapter the writer argues that the increase of Empire commerce since the Ottawa conference is in fact only one aspect of the development of commerce among the members of the sterling *bloc*. In fact it is due to exceptional causes, *e.g.* the exceptional prosperity of South Africa. Yet the agreements have had a real economic effect. The Empire was fortunate in the time when they were concluded—the bottom of the depression. As for the political side, the author ranges himself with those who fear that tight economic bonds will eventually enfeeble the unity of the Empire. W. K. H.

9. THE FAITH OF AN ENGLISHMAN. By Sir Edward Grigg, D.S.O., M.C., M.P. 1936. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xiv + 405 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

THIS book was begun, we are told, at Easter 1936 and sent to press in the following September. Accident has prevented it from being noticed earlier in these pages, but a reviewer writing in June 1937 finds that the intervening months have, on the whole, strengthened and underlined its arguments.

"Moral uncertainty," says the author, "was at the root of our feebleness over Abyssinia"—an uncertainty due to the conflict between rival, if often inarticulate, doctrines. His object is to clarify our conceptions of policy by bringing these confusions into the daylight. If the book were an essay in political philosophy, there would be much to criticise in it: in particular, the case for the League of Nations as an agency for preventing war in an economically interdependent world is understated, if not distorted. But as an analysis of what is possible in the existing state of British opinion it is not only well argued, but in the main convincing. Our continental friends would do well to study the pages on "The Army and the People," which make clear why a commitment to a military effort on the scale of 1914–18 is politically impossible. It is a mistake, however, to imply that anything of this kind was involved in the full League policy, as embodied in the Geneva Protocol of 1924.

The positive proposals made in the book include a scheme of universal training for home defence, air parity with the strongest air force within striking distance of our shores, the re-establishment of our sea-power in the Mediterranean and in the Far East, a constructive policy of friendship with the United States and the promulgation of a British Monroe Doctrine extending (in addition to the whole Empire) to the Eastern frontier of France and Belgium, to Egypt and the Suez Canal, to the region of Singapore and to the Philippines. A. Z.

10*. THE ROAD TO WAR: Being an Analysis of the National Government's Foreign Policy. By "A Small Group of Experts," including two of the three who, as "Vigilantes," wrote *Inquest on Peace*. With a preface by the Right Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P. 1937. (London: Gollancz, for the New Fabian Research Bureau. 8vo. 207 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

THERE is at any rate this much to be said for Mr. Gollancz's political publications: their left bias is frankly avowed; this form of "bend sinister" is proudly symbolised in the danger signal of their blushing covers. In the language of the roads, "You have been warned." *The Road to War*, like *Inquest on Peace*, to which it is in some sort a sequel, is admittedly not objective history, but party polemics. The same action is differently interpreted according to the political leanings of those who indulge in it. Rearmament, for instance, is to the blameless U.S.S.R. merely "a hateful necessity," but when carried out by "capitalist governments" it becomes "war preparations as their only way out from the problems of unemployment and poverty." No impartial student will, of course, maintain that the foreign policy of Great Britain since 1931 is not open to criticism. A legitimate and highly effective point is scored by recalling that *Inquest on Peace*

"predicted that immediately after the election the Government would attempt a deal with Mussolini for the partition of Abyssinia; that sanctions would never

be honestly applied and would be dropped at the first opportunity; and that the occasion would be used by the Right Wing of the Conservative Party to proclaim the end of the League as a guarantee of peace, and to press successfully for unlimited rearmament."

But the motives actuating the National Government, in the difficult situations in which they found themselves, seem to most of us extremely intelligible, and they are markedly different from those imputed by the surviving "Vigilantes" and their associates. Overriding all was a perhaps exaggerated desire for peace at any price, which is certainly not confined to Conservative or "capitalist" circles. There was also the realisation of the disproportionate burden which a sanctions policy, carried to extremes, would cast upon the depleted forces of Great Britain, and, in the Abyssinian case particularly, there was the dilemma that, while on the one hand the challenge to the League's authority was too flagrant to ignore, the effective pursuit of a sanctions policy might result in precisely that type of general war which it was the primary object of the League to avert. In Spain there was genuine lack of sympathy with the ideologies of either belligerent, and a cleavage of public opinion which made any policy other than that of non-intervention impracticable. Incidentally, to describe, as this book does, the *Frente Popular* in Spain as a "Government of a mildly liberal character" is to close the eyes to the manifest facts of the situation.

There remains, indeed, a very grave doubt whether, in the circumstances, the policy of a Labour Government in these crises would have been noticeably different from that actually pursued. In any case, the average man will find difficulty in tracing the "capitalistic" and crypto-Fascist motives which this volume seeks to impute. It is not legitimate to identify the Government, as these authors repeatedly do, with the views of extreme Tories and "big business" interests, from which only a negligible proportion of the Government's popular support can be drawn. An even more questionable expedient is the misrepresentation of speeches to which reference is not readily accessible. Thus:

"At luncheons by the National Labour Party, in October 1933 and October 1934, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. Baldwin and Sir John Simon boasted that the National Government represented *the same* principle of national concentration, and was performing the same task for this country in the world crisis, as the Fascist dictatorships were doing for Germany and Italy."

Reference to the speeches made on these occasions will show no justification for such a statement. The whole point of every passage relevant in this connection was, on the contrary, that the National Government represented a *wholly different and alternative* principle of national concentration. One quotation must suffice, from Sir John Simon's speech in 1934:

"One of the results of the War everywhere has been that nations have been compelled to seek some method of national concentration. There are only two ways. Most of the world has adopted one, and we have adopted the other. Nation after nation has secured for the time being national concentration by putting all the power in the hands of a single man. The other method by which this national concentration may be achieved is the method of creating a National Government which works in the name of the whole nation without the smallest suspension of parliamentary liberty, or the least sacrifice of individual freedom."

There is nothing here to support the innuendo that the National Government boasts that it is tantamount to Fascism, an innuendo required by the thesis that the Government "have persistently

connived at and encouraged Fascist aggression" and are possessed by Fascist sympathies. Perhaps, however, *The Road to War* itself supplies the most conclusive answer to this suggestion.

"Germany is to-day the chief enemy against which the Government are rearming on such a gigantic scale . . . although Japan and Italy have become pretty formidable contingent liabilities" (p. 96).

The authors really cannot have it both ways.

Open to similar objection are the inclusion of an unauthenticated piece of gossip about Sir Samuel Hoare, with the remark, "Se non e vero e ben trovato," the uncritical wholesale acceptance of the Italian version of the Maffey Report, and the statement that under the arrangements for Abyssinia devised by Mr. Eden and M. Laval in August 1935 "unspecified parts of the lowlands were to be ceded outright to Italy." This is indeed a remarkable rendering of Mr. Eden's report to the League Council on these negotiations:

"Finally, we did not examine, but we did not in any way exclude, the possibility of territorial adjustments to which Italy and Ethiopia might agree."

Enough has been said to suggest that this is a work to be read with caution, and with the ever-present recognition of the fact that, at best, only one side of some highly complicated questions is being revealed. G. M. GATHORNE-HARDY.

11. THE MENACE OF BRITISH DEPOPULATION. By G. F. McCleary. 1937. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 148 pp. 4s. 6*d*.)

THIS little book falls readily into three sections: first, a brief introductory review of the history and statistical development of the population question in Great Britain; second, occupying half the book, a concise and clear statement of the position in the several lands of the British Commonwealth, with the exception of Ireland; and lastly three chapters on causes of the decline of the birth-rate, on means taken to counter the decline in France, Belgium, Italy and Germany, and on the outlook for the future. The demonstration that the economic measures so far employed to stimulate an increase in births have had no substantial effect, supports the opinion that the problem is primarily one of moral and spiritual values.

As a clear and concise statement of the facts of the case, such that "he who runs may read," if he will, the book deserves high commendation. The student of population will find in it nothing new; but it could be of value in the education of the public. Unfortunately it is too expensive. If it were published in one of the sixpenny series now widespread, it might reach the public for whom it is intended, and so do more to serve the purpose for which it has been written.

C. B. FAWCETT.

12. THE POST-WAR HISTORY OF THE BRITISH WORKING CLASS, 1918–1937. By Allen Hutt. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 320 pp. 6*s*.)

HISTORY written with passion is always worth reading: it may also be good history, in spite of the author's partial blindness. Mr. Hutt's history of the organised Labour Movement in Great Britain since 1918 is vigorous, well written and not unfair. The author is to the Left of the Left—a position not at all typical of the rank and file in the Trades Unions or the Labour Party. But his history is admirably done. It is a minor matter that the book does not deal with "the

working class"; but only with the organisations of that part of the manual workers which has a definite point of view and policy of its own. The first chapter is entitled "The Revolutionary Years"; and it ends with an account of the Council of Action of 1920. The establishment of the General Council of the T.U.C., the resistance to the beginnings of economic depression in 1921, the failure of the Labour Government of 1924, and the "General Strike" of 1926 are well described. But the events recorded are taken to show the ineptitude of the leaders of the Labour Movement; and prominence is given to Communist warnings and proposals—a prominence hardly warranted by the amount of influence they actually had in the Movement. The Labour Government of 1929-31 is adversely, but not unfairly, criticised. As the author puts it: "The whole outlook of the Cabinet was hidebound: the limits of orthodox capitalist precept and practice were their limits." Then follows a chapter called "A Soldiers' War," which describes very well the "unofficial" movements, based largely upon the discontent due to unemployment, which tried to inflame the cautious Trade Union leaders. And the book ends, as so many books of "the Left" now do, with an appeal for "unity," which is really, but perhaps unconsciously, an appeal to the Labour Party to follow the Communist Party. Mr. Hutt replies to the Labour Party Executive's assertion that the Communists represent "no substantial part of British public opinion," with the announcement that "on the contrary, the Communists were attracting into their ranks, or into whole-hearted participation in the drive for unity against war and Fascism, the most significant and able elements in the intellectual life of the nation." One should not laugh at anyone who is generously inflamed by his beliefs: but that is the trouble with the Left of the Left. They really think that they are very fine fellows—and, of course, they may be; but the elected leaders and the great majority of the rank and file of the Labour Movement do not seem to think so. The fundamental characteristics of the British Labour Movement are not described and perhaps not thought worthy of description by Mr. Hutt. Karl Marx provides too simple a version of the forces at work in the Trade Unions and the Labour Party: but Stalin's present version of the Marxian gospel seems to have complete dominance over the younger intellectuals on the Left. This may invigorate their writing of history; but it weakens their influence in the British Labour Movement. C. D. B.

13. THIS OTHER EDEN. By R. D. Charques. 1936. (London: Peter Davies. 8vo. 288 pp. 8s. 6*d*.)
14. ENGLAND CONQUERS THE WORLD. By Norwood Young. 1937. (London: John Heritage, The Unicorn Press. 8vo. 239 pp. 8s. 6*d*.)

MR. CHARQUES and Mr. NORWOOD YOUNG have both written studies of English institutions and policies of the present day. There is, however, so wide a gulf between the two authors in outlook and treatment of the subject, that comparisons are hardly profitable.

This Other Eden is extremely interesting. The child of Jewish parents who emigrated some fifty years ago from West Russia to England, Mr. Charques claims to write both as an Englishman and a foreigner, with the appreciation of the first, and the critical detachment of the second. The book amply justifies his claim. Even those who do not share his views will be impressed by the skill and humour

of his survey, and by the ability which fits a very long and diverse list of topics into an admirably coherent argument.

Many readers will realise for the first time how small a fragment of the population is represented by the class known to the foreigner as " typically English," while those who have a connection with the educational system may be depressed by Mr. Charques' opinion that the two older universities, with their growing proportion of students whose first education has been in the elementary school, stand mainly for " the genius of assimilation of the ruling class, its absorption of the most successful elements in the ranks below into its own prerogative of power."

His comments on current politics are penetrating and provocative. In one sentence he sums up his belief in the vital connection between home and foreign policies : " Peace will be ensured, not when democracy has been destroyed in England, but only when democracy has ceased to be a capitalist democracy." But his criticism of left-wing tactics is as searching as that of conservatism. " It is a fatal mistake," he urges, " to idealise the masses as the masses," and points out that left-wing politicians no less than right have shown themselves susceptible to the abuses of a half-educated democracy. His plea for a more positive foreign policy will find many adherents. During the growing unease of the past few years there has been widespread if not very articulate conviction that " the choice is between going forward and retreating precipitately. There is no safety in standing still."

Mr. Norwood Young's book belongs to another category altogether. It is difficult to believe that he intended it to be taken seriously—that any author could in sober earnest construct so blatant an Aunt Sally. *England Conquers the World* consists of a recital of the virtues of the English political system, a decrying in comparison of those of Germany, Russia and America, a short survey of the Feminist Movement and a sketch of the author's Utopia. Geographers will squirm at his superficial attempt to explain the varying development of groups by the influences of geographic environment, a misuse incidentally of the tentative studies of some American scholars. Historians will have little use for his distorted picture of the American War of Independence, calmly ignoring the economic factors, while anthropologists, on learning that the Prussians " are a people of Slavonic origin, Wends, Huns, Czechs, Letts and others," will think that Mr. Norwood Young rushes in where angels would not think of treading. As to his Utopia, most of us would rather perish in the gas warfare of familiar prediction than survive to partake of it. One turns the pages of this book fast enough to find out what absurdity or enormity can possibly appear next, but that is a poor reason for reading quickly.

H. G. WANKLYN.

15*. A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF BRITISH GUIANA. By Sir Cecil Clementi. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xxii + 546 pp. 20s.)

THERE is probably no one better qualified than Sir Cecil Clementi to write a history of the constitution of British Guiana. As Colonial Secretary for some nine years and as Acting Governor for three periods he left his mark upon the Colony and his minutes upon the official files, minutes which the reviewer, having had frequent occasion to refer to them, commends to the perusal of succeeding Governors and

Colonial Secretaries. It is a marvel that any one was able to make the old British Guiana constitution work at all, and a pity that for so many years some of the best brains and energy in the Empire should have been wasted upon a task so Sisyphean. When the ancient structure was finally condemned in 1928 and replaced by a new one of modern and accepted design, and when, in spite of muttered protests and even rumours of active resistance, nothing very startling happened, many must have wondered why reform had not been insisted upon years before. Actually the moment seized by Mr. Amery was the psychological one. Earlier action might have been premature. Further delay might have set the clock back for another generation.

The objects of the book are well stated by the author in his prologue. The strange story which he tells is " little known even in the Colony itself, and is wholly unknown elsewhere." He tells it in detail as an illustration of problems which beset colonial administration everywhere, as an object-lesson in the futility of " cramming the political education of a people," and as a record of a unique system replete with curiosities and anomalies which might otherwise have become buried in oblivion. The history of British Guiana as a British Colony may be regarded as starting from 1803, when Demerara and Essequebo passed finally into His Britannic Majesty's possession; but the tale begins two hundred years earlier, and in those two centuries the settlements which now compose the Colony passed through many vicissitudes—founded by the Dutch, surrendered to Great Britain, captured by France, restored to the Dutch, again surrendered to Great Britain, and once more handed back to Holland. The mixture of origin is reflected in the official designations—Council of Policy, College of Kiezers, Patroon, Combined Court, Commissary, Financial Representatives, as it is in the naming of the old sugar plantations—Uitvlugt, Diamond, De Kinderen, Port Mourant, Albion, La Bonne Intention, and so on.

The success of the author in clothing with so much interest the dry bones of these obsolete institutions encourages the hope that he may essay a picture of social life in British Guiana from its earliest beginnings to the present time. Among the estate proprietors, the merchants and the administrators of bygone days there must have been many stout fellows and not a few queer characters. No doubt they had their recreations and their dinner-parties, presided over by fair ladies in crinolines and Paris dresses, and perhaps they bothered less about the prevailing form of constitution than might be inferred from a history devoted wholly to that subject. Certainly their present-day representatives, the European community of British Guiana, contrive to enjoy life. Any one who has had experience of their kindliness and their hospitality will second the " affectionate good wishes " with which Sir Cecil Clementi dedicates his book " to all who live in El Dorado." C. H. RODWELL.

16. POSSIBLE PEACE. By W. Macmahon Ball. 1936. (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. 199 pages. 3*s.*)

A general account of the main features of the present international situation. The book contains an urgent plea that Australians should give more time and thought to Australia's part in world affairs.

17. NEW ZEALAND FROM WITHIN. By Donald Cowie. 1937. (London: Routledge. 8vo. xiii + 300 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

Mr. Cowie worked for eight years as a journalist in New Zealand. Much of his book consists of reprints from no fewer than eighteen journals

to which he has contributed. It is a gossipy, superficial series of comments on various aspects of New Zealand life. J. B.

AFRICA

18. General Smuts. By Sarah Gertrude Millin. 1936. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. Vol. I. xv + 393 pp. 18s. Vol. II. xi + 496 pp. 18s.)

19. Grey Steel. By H. C. Armstrong. 1937. (London: Arthur Barker. 8vo. 406 pp. 9s.)

That two biographies of the same man, by different observers with different outlooks, should have appeared within a few months, adds enormously to the interest of each and enables the reader to form a better appreciation of the character, life and achievements of a remarkable contemporary figure—General the Right Honourable Jan Christian Smuts.

Mrs. Millin's biography, as she tells her readers, has been revised as to its facts but not its opinion both by General Smuts himself and the Hon. J. H. Hofmeyr and, based on General Smuts' own official and private papers, cannot fail, as the publishers rightly claim, to be of extreme interest. Mrs. Millin's book is further based " on a personal experience extending over fourteen years; on an admiration increasing with this experience."

Mrs. Millin's knowledge of South Africa and the political scene has particularly fitted her for the task of presenting the life-story of one of the most outstanding South African personalities, and her biography enables the reader to visualise and follow the evolution from a farm, of the boy, who until the age of twelve could neither read nor write, into scholar, lawyer, politician, soldier, philosopher and statesman. The book bears the stamp of authenticity except where the story is tinged by prejudice against Cecil Rhodes and Sir Alfred (later Lord) Milner, although Mrs. Millin does bring out the lack of support which Milner received from Sir William Butler, the G.O.C. at the Cape, and which had far-reaching consequences in the early months of the South African War.

The second volume is perhaps more interesting than the first. General Smuts has then become a member of the War Cabinet, and the authoress's account of the happenings and delicate missions with which he was associated will probably shed new light on these events for the general reader.

Whether, if considered as an impartial biography, the attempt should have been made to carry the story up to 1936 is, at least, open to doubt. The view is too close, and opinions must perforce be coloured by political leanings.

The illustrations are well chosen, and the photograph opposite page 444 is a happy likeness of General Smuts as he is to-day.

Grey Steel is written from an impersonal angle. Captain Armstrong claims no close friendship with the central character of his book, and has relied mainly on a vast quantity of books and documents; on the writing and speeches of General Smuts himself; on discussions with both his admirers and his detractors; and on the personal knowledge of many friends and acquaintances.

Captain Armstrong admits that much that he has written about General Smuts will not please his admirers—an avowal with which

the reviewer will not argue—but takes the stand that so great a reputation does not need to be shored up with false sentiment and unreasoning partisanship. This is the keynote of the book:

"his reputation can stand on the firm foundations of his real qualities and achievements and these foundations are of steel."

Written in somewhat staccato prose, it is surprising how much the author has condensed into 393 pages. Want of space has, no doubt, necessitated the omission of incidents such as the failure of the English guns to open fire after Talana and the luck of Spion Kop—opportunities which, had they been seized, might by their moral effect have had an incalculable influence upon the whole subsequent course of the South African War, and, who can say, on the career of General Smuts himself.

A story told concerning "a queer piece of disloyalty by Kitchener to his colleague" (Lord Milner) at the Vereeniging Peace Conference is not mentioned in the Official or *Times* histories of the South African War, nor in the Milner Papers, though if the incident occurred as recounted, it is difficult to believe that Lord Milner would not have learnt of it subsequently.

Though in *Grey Steel* accuracy sometimes yields place to vividness, this is an exciting story. The manner of its telling may rouse some resentments, but this will not detract from its interest for the general reader not influenced by or associated with South African politics.

The maps will be useful to those who do not know South Africa, but the other illustrations give a poor idea of the persons they serve to portray.

To the student, the value of both *General Smuts* and *Grey Steel* is increased by the chronological tables and references. P. G. S.

20. THE CAPE-TO-CAIRO DREAM: a study in British Imperialism. By Lois A. C. Raphael. 1936. (New York: Columbia University Press; London: P. S. King. 8vo. 514 pp. 20s. 3*d*.)

THIS very well documented account of one aspect of British participation in the "scramble for Africa" covers a wider field than the title might, at first sight, lead one to suppose. To those familiar with the development of Africa during the last fifty or sixty years the phrase "the Cape-to-Cairo dream" conjures up a picture of that superficially attractive project of building a railway traversing the continent from north to south. It will probably never be known exactly to what extent Cecil Rhodes' powerful support was due to genuine belief in the commercial soundness of the scheme, or to his readiness to use any means which would assist the realisation of his larger objectives. Would it be unjust to the memory of this great man to suggest that he had a very lively appreciation of the value of the attractive—"Cape to Cairo"—slogan with which to tickle the ears of the groundlings? And not only the groundlings, as the event showed; although the late Sir John Kirk's friends are likely to doubt the statement that he was a protagonist of the idea. Lord Lugard, too, will be surprised to learn that he—as Captain Lugard—is said to have been an advocate. It is known that Joseph Chamberlain was extremely sceptical.

The criticism levelled against the Cape-to-Cairo railway, when the proposal to build it was mooted fifty years ago, is based mainly upon two considerations. In the first place, assuming that the amount of

money available for railway development in Africa is not unlimited, it was held that the available resources would be better employed in pushing lateral railways inland from the main harbours and ports, in order to serve the practical need of transport for the manufactured goods of Europe to the interior and to bring down raw produce and minerals from the interior to the port for shipment to Europe, rather than in dissipating vast sums of money in a scheme which had little but its alliterative title to commend it.

In the second place, those who knew the country realised the immense physical difficulties of railway construction in the swamps of the Southern Sudan and through the unhealthy centre of Tropical Africa, thousands of miles from a base on the sea.

Clearly, too, it would be fantastic to carry merchandise by ship from Europe to Cairo, off-load it on to railway wagons and send it by rail to the Cape, when it could be transported much more cheaply and directly by sea. The value of the through passenger traffic would be trivial compared to the cost of maintenance of 5000 miles of railway even on the very dubious assumption that such an overland route would offer superior attractions to the voyage by sea.

In the event, the critics were justified. Taking British territory alone into consideration, it is clear that railways running inland from ports such as Sierra Leone, Takoradi, Lagos, Port Harcourt, Lobito Bay, Cape Town, Durban, Lourenco Marques, Beira, Dar-es-Salaam, Mombasa, Port Sudan and Alexandria, have served the needs of the past generation in a way that no transcontinental line down the centre of Africa from north to south could possibly have done.

But whether fifty years ago the proposal to build a railway from the Cape to Cairo was merely flamboyant propaganda as held by some, or whether it was the noble vision of a high-souled Empire builder as held by others, the authoress is entirely right in the emphasis she lays upon the magic that the phrase " Cape to Cairo " exercised upon the public imagination in the Britain of the 1890's. She describes sanely and fairly the many factors and motives which guided and swelled the stream of ambition to colour the map of Africa a good British red from the Cape to Cairo. She recognises clearly the very real desire to suppress the slave trade and all its accompanying horrors; to put peace, prosperity and enlightenment in the place of darkness and misrule; but she does not ignore the expectation of commercial advantage as a driving force. She quotes Cecil Rhodes' saying " that philanthropy is good, but philanthropy at 5 per cent. is better." Or, to put the matter on a higher plane, she would, we think, approve the phrase " the dual Mandate " as a fair summary of British principles and policy.

Mrs. Lois A. C. Raphael's book can be recommended as a lucid, comprehensive and well-documented study of a fascinating chapter in British imperial expansion. R. H. BRACKENBURY.

21*. NATIVE ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA. By Marjorie Perham. 1937. (London: Oxford University Press. 8vo. xii + 404 pp. Maps. *17s. 6d.*)

22. THE SOUL OF NIGERIA. By Isaac O. Delano. 1937. (London T. Werner Laurie, Ltd. 8vo. 252 pp. *10s. 6d.*)

Is " the government of men by themselves," which is supposed to be the principle of the British Commonwealth, relevant in Africa; or is it hypocritical and ignorant to pretend that it is relevant? This book assumes throughout the relevancy of the principle, and says

definitely, on the concluding page, that " it is both our duty and our interest to assist the Africans of Nigeria to build up a sound united State." But the examination of Nigerian realities shows that the realisation of the end lies in the very far future. The immediate task is tô bridge the gap between British techniques and conceptions, and Nigerian society as it is now. The method of bridge-building, which has been developed out of Nigerian circumstance by the " deliberate " and " constructive " purpose of Lord Lugard and his successors, is indirect rule, which Miss Perham defines as " a system by which the tutelary Power recognises existing African societies and assists them to adapt themselves to the functions of local government " (p. 345). How hard even this task may be is best shown by Miss Perham's study of the south-east, which includes an account of the Aba riots of 1929. The fifty odd pages (pp. 200 ff.) in which Miss Perham pursues this inquiry illustrate the perfection of method which marks the whole book. First she recounts the attempts to reform a method of administration which had failed to strike roots in the native society; then she shows how these very attempts created fears which exploded in a violent uprising of women; after narrating the course of this uprising and analysing its causes, she proceeds to study the society with which government has failed to make contact, and the renewed efforts of government to repair this failure. It can only be done by sympathetic and scientific understanding of the forms and spirit of African life. "Indirect rule" is not a formula easily applied; the society of the south-east is immeasurably distant from our notions of administration; and we must get close to this society as a preliminary to calling forth those energies in it which will help it to bridge the gap. This means patient and careful study, for which the whole book is a plea.

But the whole book is also an example of this study. Its extraordinary merit lies in the way it gets close to the concrete administration problem as this is set in the actual context of the individual and widely varying forms of Nigerian society. Miss Perham never wavers in this purpose; there is not a single vague paragraph or loose sentence in the book. She is always concentrated on the particular issue; but in this concentration she never forgets the general issue. A notable example of her capacity to relate the particular facts, which she studies so exactly, to the whole problem, is her very sympathetic and important treatment of the educated Nigerian, who has, individually, " bridged the gap." She rightly insists on the necessity of giving him scope to understand and exercise his share of responsibility towards the great mass of the Nigerian people.

One should not complain if a book keeps within its own limits. But, just as a study of Nigerian administration leads into Nigerian society, so it might lead into British society operating in Nigeria. There are some good pages (notably Chapter XIX) where Miss Perham shows that she is conscious of this; but the reviewer would have welcomed a fuller account of the action of external economic forces on Nigeria. A fuller knowledge of them is certainly necessary to explain the growth of British administrative responsibilities; to fill out Miss Perham's account of origins, given in the early chapters, the student of Empire history must still wait for a study of that " legitimate trade " which took the place of the slave trade.

Mr. Delano is one of the Nigerians who have " bridged the gap." His book consists of sketches of a journey which he made from Lagos

in search of personal and literary adventure. He did not go outside Yorubaland; he is in a sense more remote than a European administrator would be from many of the problems which Miss Perham analyses. But kinship gives him intimacy of a kind which the European could hardly achieve. The present reviewer cannot judge the value of his sketches as an accurate report; but they make very attractive reading. The English prose is fresh and graceful, and the writer is full of fairness and goodwill. Some of his reflections—*e.g.* on education and the churches—are very suggestive.

W. K. HANCOCK.

23. HOW BRITAIN RULES AFRICA. By George Padmore. 1936. (London: Wishart. 8vo. xiii + 402 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

MR. PADMORE here pursues his familiar, and in many ways impressive, denunciations of European imperialism. Great Britain is his target in this particular case. But that is merely because he happens to be writing for a British audience. What he has to say would apply *mutatis mutandis* to French, Belgian, Portuguese, or Italian colonial rule. His is the voice of the black Prometheus cursing the white Jupiter. It is hope creating from its own wreck the thing it contemplates. It is the picture of native Africa chained to the rock while the vulture of European acquisitiveness tears at its vitals. "Our flag," he cries, "is our colour. An injury to one is an injury to all." He is the prophet both of black nationalism and of international socialism, crying out upon the hypocrisy and the barbarity of the white man's "trusteeship."

The author assumes that the dependent status of colonies, together with the atrocities which in his view accompany that status, is necessitated by the methods of production which have grown up under the profit-system at home, and that it will endure as long as the profit-system endures. Consequently he is sceptical, not to say scornful, of League of Nations control of colonial territories under the kind of extension of the mandate system that has found favour with certain sections of opinion in this country. He prefers to appeal direct to the working class of Great Britain and other defenders of the hard-won democratic rights of the British peoples. "The fight against Fascism," he reminds them, "cannot be separated from the right of all colonial peoples and subject races to self-determination. For any people who help to keep another people in slavery are at the same time forging their own chains." One recognises this refrain.

Mr. Padmore does not here work out in any practical detail the forms which co-operation between subject races in the colonies and unprivileged classes at home might assume. Perhaps this topic is reserved for a further volume. LEONARD BARNES.

24. WHITE AFRICAN. By L. S. B. Leakey. 1937. (London: Hodder and Stoughton. 8vo. 320 pp. Illustrations. 15*s*.)

THIS is not a novel, but an autobiography. "The White African" is Dr. Leakey himself. Born on a mission-station in Kenya, brought up in intimate contact with the Kikuyu and speaking their language as one of themselves, he has always considered himself in many ways more of a Kikuyu than an Englishman. He confesses that he still dreams in Kikuyu. Dr. Leakey has won fame as an archæologist, and here he tells how, early in his youth, his curiosity was aroused first in birds and then in relics of the Stone Age, and how he managed

to get to Cambridge and study anthropology. The account of his boyhood in Kenya is full of interest, and no less so are the accounts of his various expeditions to East Africa, the first (while he was still an undergraduate) with Mr. Cutler in search of the fossil remains of Dinosaurs, and the others as leader of parties of scientists who brought to light much of the prehistory of the country. The results of the expeditions have been chronicled in weighty tomes: in these pages we have the lighter side, with many good stories. Here and there Dr. Leakey touches on actual human problems, as when, in an illuminating manner, he recounts experiences as a member of the Government Committee to investigate the Kikuyu system of land tenure. Students of African problems should read what he has to say about it. Dr. Leakey crowded a great deal into the first thirty years of his life, and the tale was worth telling. Unfortunately there is no index.

EDWIN W. SMITH.

25. OUT OF AFRICA. By F. G. Carnochan and H. C. Adamson. 1937. (London: Cassell. 8vo. xiii + 301 pp. Illustrations. 10*s*. 6*d*.)

The biography of an old medicine-man that, directly translated, would have made an epic, turned into a "founded-on-fact" novel peopled by Black Genghis Khans and Nyamwesi Napoleons. L. M.

INDIA

26. INDIAN ADMINISTRATION. By G. N. Joshi. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. 316 pp. 6*s*.)

THIS book is primarily intended for use as a text-book by undergraduates of Indian universities, but its author, who is Professor of Law in the Government Law College in Bombay, modestly expresses the hope that it may also be of use to the general public. This hope should be fulfilled, for it is a handy book of reference, giving within a little over 300 pages an up-to-date conspectus of the system of government in British India. It is divided into two sections, of which the first contains a comprehensive analysis of the constitution under the Government of India Act of 1935, including both the existing and the federal system of government, together with a brief sketch of the previous constitutional history. The second is a short but informative account of the principal branches of the administration, viz., district administration, land revenue administration, local self-government, village organisation, education, medical relief and public health, police, jails, irrigation, railways, and the organisation of famine prevention and relief.

The field covered is very large, and an immense number of facts have been compressed within a short space. Partly no doubt on this account, and partly because of the primary purpose of the book, the author's treatment of his subject is detailed rather than general, and expository rather than critical. The provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935 are recapitulated and the powers and functions of the legislatures and executive authorities are set forth in detail, but the principles on which the constitution is based and the considerations which prevented the granting of a fuller measure of responsible government have not been explained. In the case of the provinces some stress is laid on the limitations of responsible government, but attention is not drawn to the far-reaching powers, embracing practically every branch of public welfare, which have been conferred on the ministers, nor to

the prospect that one result of provincial autonomy may be that the provinces, no longer subject to standards of uniformity imposed on them by the central government, will develop independently on lines of their own. It is, however, natural that a book of this kind should not venture on forecasts of future developments, though we are told that the administration of land revenue will receive the immediate consideration of the new provincial legislatures and that some changes in the system are not unlikely. Incidentally one of the measures said to be favoured by "public opinion" is the abolition of the Permanent Settlement, others being the abolition of commissioners and the separation of executive and judicial powers. L. S. S. O'MALLEY.

27. THE INDIAN FEDERATION: An Exposition and Critical Review. By Sir Shafa'at Ahmad Khan. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. xii + 450 pp. 15s.)
28. INDIA TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW. By Margarita Barns. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 304 pp. 7s. 6d.)
29. PEASANT AND PRINCE: Modern India on the Eve of the New Reforms. By Glorney Bolton. 1937. (London: Routledge. 8vo. xi + 296 pp. 12s. 6d.)
30. DIAMONDS AND DUST: India through French Eyes. By Baron Jean Pellenc. 1936. (London: John Murray. 8vo. xii + 313 pp. 10s. 6d.)

HERE we have four works on India when the new reforms are coming into force in that country. They are ranked in order of seriousness, the first three having the political changes directly in view, while the fourth seeks merely to record picturesque impressions of the country, particularly in those aspects which are least affected by these changes.

Sir Shafa'at Ahmad Khan, the well-known exponent of the claims of the Mahomedan Community both at the various Round Table Conferences and elsewhere, has written a book which will be of much importance to students of politics in India. It is not a book with which to while away an idle hour, but a work with which a serious student may grapple.

After the brief introduction, each chapter deals exhaustively with a single topic as "The Federal Centre," "The Provinces," etc. Statistics are freely given and various points of view are indicated. It is impossible to do justice to this work in the small space here available.

Margarita Barns's work should not be given to a "die-hard," as it would tend to confirm his worst fears as to the probable working of the reforms in India. The authoress and her husband were connected with the various Round Table Conferences in a journalistic capacity. About the time these started it had occurred to many Indian journalists that there was something unsatisfactory in the manner in which news of the outside world was given to India by a European agency, and it was proposed to inaugurate a rival service under Indian control.

To this Mr. and Mrs. Barns, who are evidently young and enthusiastic supporters of new and revolutionary ideas, gave their co-operation. The service lasted till 1934, when it came to a disappointing end in circumstances shown in the first part of the book. This part also gives an inside account of the Conferences, reports on which it was the duty of the new service to transmit to India, and contains sympathetic but candid appreciations of the Indian politicians who took part. The authoress, as

a consequence of her experiences, discovered that the problem of giving self-government to India was more complicated than she had supposed, and that some of the difficulties were created by the outlook of the Indian politicians. It must certainly have been disconcerting to be told by the greatest of them to whom she had appealed for help when her valiant efforts to serve India were on the point of being frustrated, "Whatever sacrifice you have suffered as a consequence of what has happened, you must regard it as part of the debt that England must pay back to India." Perhaps the delay in publishing a work practically completed in 1934 was to enable the authoress to regain her natural optimism. The second part of the book deals with the various influences at work in India to-day.

"Mr. Bolton," we are informed by the notice on the jacket, "has devised a new and original method of presenting the vast subject of India to the public" under the five headings "Excellency," "Highness," "Barrister," "Convict" and "Minister." The result is a book appealing perhaps to the general public who have no previous knowledge of the subject and who only require entertainment, but not to more fastidious critics, who will be deterred by its somewhat irritating journalese. In endeavouring to be picturesque, the author frequently buries his meaning out of sight, but he is most exasperating when he endeavours to pose as a mystic.

Baron Jean Pellenc shows himself in *Diamonds and Dust* to have a poetical disposition, but also the detached logical French temperament. He writes as a candid friend both of the Government of India and of the Indian Princes who were his hosts, one who sees everything without any illusion, but is willing to make allowances. In spite of the comparatively short time he spent in India, he claims to have been able to enter to some extent into the life of the people ; and he has produced a most colourful work, though it may not give unmixed satisfaction to those whom he describes. His description of the cities and palaces of Northern India is in itself worth reading, but still more interesting is the light he throws on the Courts of the Indian Princes whose co-operation in the Government of India is of such importance to-day.

H. S. CHATFIELD.

31. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST ENTERPRISE IN INDIA. By D. M. Buchanan, Ph.D., D.Sc.(Econ.). 1935. (New York and London : Macmillan. 8vo. ix + 497 pp. 21*s*.)

PROFESSOR BUCHANAN, who has spent some dozen years in the East, has made a substantial contribution to the history of capitalist development in India, and to the analysis of Indian economic problems.

After a preliminary review of the Indian background, the author describes the rise of modern types of economic organisation, the nature of existing organisation, and the development of the more important large-scale industries. He then discusses the position of, and problems connected with, industrial labour, and concludes with a short survey of the policy pursued by the Government of India, and of the economic results of British rule. He writes as an "outsider, with neither Indian nor British ties," and is to be congratulated on the success with which he maintains a detached attitude, and on this account his concluding chapter is particularly valuable.

Professor Buchanan's most valuable contributions are, perhaps, to

be found in his historical account of the development of capitalist enterprise and in his analysis of prevailing forms of organisation. For instance, in dealing with the development of indigo plantation, he gives an exhaustive account of the different methods of organisation, and makes excellent use of sociological explanations of economic facts. It was found difficult, for instance, to induce ryots to plant selected seeds, lest these be counted a customary advance and lead to permanent indebtedness. Again, the innocent assumption by the ryot that he inherited not only his father's debt, but also the engagement to discharge this debt by producing indigo, explains the continuance of cultivation against the interests of the ryot. The author pursues a similar method in relation to other industries, and the descriptions of the processes of production and marketing are also excellent.

On the other hand, it is a pity, even allowing for the fact that the bulk of the work was written several years ago, that up-to-date facts and figures, such as those made available by the Census of 1931 (even before the publication of detailed results), have not been included. For instance, the occupational distribution of the population is discussed for 1921 only, and no reference is made to the recent, and very important, changes in the prospects of the jute industry.

A certain number of minor errors have crept in. For instance, Calcutta is more than 60 miles from the open sea (p. 3); the Tata Industrial Bank was taken over by the Central Bank of India, not by the Imperial Bank (p. 162); a return to revenue duties was made in 1894, not in 1892 (p. 163); the account of changes in the duties imposed on cotton goods is not quite accurate (p. 164); it is somewhat misleading to say, under the heading of "Management," that the East India and Great Indian Peninsula Railways were "taken over in 1880 and 1900," when Government management (as opposed to ownership) was not introduced until 1924 and 1925 respectively (p. 184). The definition given of "competitive counts" (p. 215) is inaccurate: the term denotes counts 30's to 40's, simply because there is competition in those grades between Indian and Lancashire mills, not (as is stated) because Indian mills cannot compete on counts above 30's. It is not clear what is meant by saying that Calcutta has the largest cloth market in India (p. 218), unless jute is to be included. It is misleading to say that "chiefly" men are employed in night-shifts in Bombay and Ahmadabad, when legally only men may be employed.

The chapter on labour efficiency brings out clearly many important differences in organisation, etc., in India and the West; for instance, the fact that machinery is run faster in Oriental than Occidental countries, because, whereas in the West machinery is relatively cheap and labour dear, in the East labour is cheap and machinery dear. This chapter also contains interesting tables on the comparative direct labour costs of coarse spinning and plain weaving in three or four countries, in 1928 (p. 381). It would have been helpful if the bases and sources of these comparisons had been more fully explained, and from the point of view of the competitive position it must not be forgotten that the costs given are "direct labour costs" only, and hence do not allow for the use in India of a much larger labour force in indirect processes than in the West; that the costs are for 20's yarn and plain sheeting only, and hence exclude some lines in which competition is keenest; and that since 1928 Japanese costs have been

very greatly decreased. Nevertheless, the figures are in accordance with prevalent conclusions reached on other grounds, and give some indication of the difficulties encountered by Western countries on the score of cheap Eastern labour. VERA ANSTEY.

32. INDIAN SPEECHES AND DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH RULE, 1821–1918. Edited by J. K. Majumdar, with a Foreword by Ramananda Chatterjee. 1937. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. xx + 186 pp. 3*s.* 6*d.*)

THE editor has adapted an idea which was first applied by Professor Berriedale Keith in his two volumes of *Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy*, 1750–1921, published by Humphrey Milford in the "Worlds Classics Series." The selection is interesting and valuable as showing the thorough recognition in pre-War days by Indian speakers and thinkers of the benefits India has derived from the British connection, side by side with an ever-growing plea for a more liberal policy in the direction of associating Indians more fully in the administration of the country. The cult of extremism and of complete and unalterable dissatisfaction with the British association is of relatively recent growth. It is to be earnestly hoped that the granting of the new Constitution, now that the Congress Party has agreed to the acceptance of office, will bring a return in Indian national consciousness of recognition that the British connection is of value to both countries, and that the way of progress is evolution and not revolution. The editor brings his extracts to a conclusion by quoting a recruiting appeal which Mr. Gandhi made in 1918, and which shows that up to that time, and before the first civil disobedience movement he was, in the words of the editor, "imbued with the same sober ideas and sentiments as his predecessors." A. Y.

WAR AND DEFENCE

33*. TOWARDS ARMAGEDDON: The Defence Problem and its Solution. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. 1937. (London: Lovat Dickson. 8vo. ix + 244 pp. 6*s.*)

ANYONE interested in the problems of modern warfare and the vital question of Great Britain's rearmament programme should read General Fuller's new book *Towards Armageddon*. The professional soldier is apt to base his conception of a new war on the experience of the past. We started the Great War in the "cavalry spirit," and with a contempt for the machine gun. General Fuller's book acts as a useful antidote to any complacency we may feel about the future.

One of the things he advocates is that a very large sum be spent on experimenting in new types of weapons. Even if this sum ran into millions, it would be money well spent if it helped to discover some new weapon, better than that of any potential opponent. I remember one misty morning on the Somme when the first few tanks went into action "as an experiment": the awe they inspired in the enemy, the inspiration they gave to our attacking troops. Had this experiment been tried with a thousand tanks, a "break through" on a big scale might have resulted.

With regard to anti-aircraft defence, General Fuller considers that "much too little attention has been given to the possible use of liquid fuel rockets which, acting like a depth-charge, may render flights in formation highly dangerous." In another chapter he advocates "the

amphibian tank " to protect the landing of troops under enemy fire—such amphibian tanks to be carried by a " floating tankodrome from which tanks can crawl in and out at their ease and need not be launched overboard." " Amphibian tanks already exist, yet though we are the greatest naval power in the world and though every military expedition we undertake must be an overseas one, we have not yet adopted such a weapon." These are but examples of General Fuller's fertile suggestions.

One of the problems to which General Fuller devotes great attention is that of disciplining the civilian population, on whose " morale," being constantly subjected to attacks from the air, victory or defeat ultimately depends.

In rightly emphasising the importance of the aeroplane and submarine in any war of the future, General Fuller rather neglects the importance of the infantryman. It is he, in the final analysis, who has to occupy or defend positions devastated by the modern weapons of aircraft and gas. The civil war in Spain has certainly continued to vindicate the increased power of defence against the attacker. Owing to the power and mobility of the new anti-tank gun, the tank, unless advancing in a mist or smoke barrage, may be a moving death-trap. Mechanised divisions require good roads and ground suitable for them to deploy. The power of the machine in any future war will tend to be equalised in the two opposing forces, and the final decision will probably rest, as in the past, in the fighting qualities of the individual soldier.

General Fuller deals with many controversial problems in this book, but it must not be missed by any serious student of modern military problems. E. BEDDINGTON BEHRENS.

34*. THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE. By Sir Norman Angell. 1937. (London: Hamish Hamilton. 8vo. 245 pp. 6s.)

THIS closely reasoned, well-documented, and provocative book both deserves careful study and invites counter argument, neither of which is possible in this short review. With all the debater's skill, Sir Norman maintains that British foreign policy during the last decade has been incompatible with the security of the British Empire in this age of dictators and " Have-nots." " De-imperialised " though our Empire is, there are still markets, trade-routes, and traditions of democracy and liberty to defend. But " again and again we have retreated from positions which before the War we should have regarded as indispensable to the Empire's security." Manchukuo, Abyssinia, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, Non-Intervention in Spain, mark the line of retreat. Sir Norman attributes this retreat to moral rather than material weakness; to confusion in the minds of a capitalist society about what is and what is not worth defending. A halt to this policy of retreat must be called, and Great Britain, together with all democratic countries, must pursue a course of collective defence of their principles and not be afraid of all-embracing commitments.

Thus, briefly, runs the argument. One thought occurs to the mind. Those who now urge Great Britain to be firm in her attitude to the totalitarian States were those who " during the last decade " urged her to a policy of disarmament as an example to the rest of the world. Perhaps that policy rather than any moral weakness is the real explanation of the policy of retreat. K. C. BOSWELL.

35. MODERN WAR: Armies, not Air-forces, decide Wars. By Lieut.-Colonel B. C. Dening, M.C., R.E. 1937. (Fleet, Hants: North Hants Printing Co. 8vo. 107 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*)
36. THE ELEMENTS OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE. By O. C. Boycott. Second Edition. 1937. (Aldershot: Gale and Polden. 8vo. xv + 434 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Modern War is a much better book than its cover, its editing and general get-up would suggest. It contains a sober and clearly stated series of arguments in favour of the continued employment of large armies as the principal means of achieving victory.

The author believes that our military judgment is clouded by our anxiety for the safety of London; and he therefore, in order that matters may be scanned with a clearer vision, discusses war in general terms without relation to the particular defence problems of the British Empire.

He does not believe that air-attacks have great prospects against cities which are well organised both for active and passive defence and the morale of whose population is disciplined. He may be right; but no one even suggests that we have reached that stage, or that our air-defence is proof against attack. Therefore, since we regard London as both vulnerable and vital, we must devote our thoughts and energies mainly to its preservation. The security on which we base our plans must apply first of all to our capital—at once the centre and the terminal of teeming communications. No valiant battling of vast armies abroad will avail if it falls. The author deduces the effect of an air-attack on London from that of a bombardment by an equal weight of projectiles in France. But a trench-area, with simple communications and defended by disciplined troops, can hardly be compared with an area like that of the London Docks, with its inflammable stores, its gas-mains, its power-stations, its traffic and its uncontrolled population. He holds that the chances of the assailant in battle are as great as ever, in spite of fortifications of the *Maginot* type, that "victory will lie with the side with the greatest reserves" and that it is dishonourable to allow allies "to do the land-fighting for us." He comes "back every time to the conclusion that *land-forces are decisive* in settling the issue."

There is much military wisdom in the book, and its careful perusal cannot fail to open up fresh fields of thought. Its principal fault seems to lie in an omission on the part of the author to ask himself the oft-quoted question of the German commander at Nachod: "What is the problem?"

Under an unpretentious title, *The Elements of Imperial Defence* makes an encyclopædic survey of the British Empire—its political organisation, defence organisation, geography (especially with regard to communications) and material resources—and presents all these matters in handy form to the reader.

In one of the earlier chapters the author deals with the subject of co-ordination in defence. In doing so, he endeavours to make out a case for the existing system. Unfortunately, he supports it by arguments long worn threadbare by previous quotation and some of them singularly inapposite in existing conditions. At the same time, he omits the trenchant arguments in favour of a Ministry of Defence put forward during recent debates in both Houses of Parliament. He sums up a matter vital to our security in sentences which can only

be described as having no meaning whatever: "Complete success," he says, "can follow only if the principles of war of the three Services or two Services working in co-operation are harmonised. The correct co-ordination of principles will result in the correct and effective co-operation of the Services in war."

There are other faults in the book—notably inaccuracy and redundancy. As regards the former, three examples may be given of the mistakes and contradictions which occur both in the text and in the maps. The "forward policy" on the Indian border is described on p. 260 as "firm occupation up to the Durand Line," and on p. 265 as aiming at holding the line Kandahar–Ghazni–Kabul. On p. 269, Iraq is described as a Mandated Territory. On the map of the Middle East the pipe-line is shown as starting from Mosul instead of Kirkuk. As regards redundancy, some recommendations made by the Committee of Imperial Defence covering three pages are repeated 2½ times in the course of 25 pages.

The arrangement of the subject-matter is in places somewhat illogical. For instance, in the middle of the section dealing with the defence of India and without relevance to the question at issue, are inserted paragraphs dealing with the division of the population into three types—the Indo-Aryan, the Dravidian and the Mongolian.

For a book clearly intended as a work of reference the index is poor.

H. Rowan-Robinson.

ECONOMICS AND FINANCE

37*. The Problem of International Investment: Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1937. (Oxford University Press, for the R.I.I.A. La. 8vo. x + 371 pp. 18s.; to Members of the Institute, 12s.)

To its three volumes on monetary questions, entitled *The International Gold Problem*, *Monetary Policy and the Depression*, and *The Future of Monetary Policy*, a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs have now added a fourth volume entitled *The Problem of International Investment*. This work has been produced by a group under the chairmanship of Mr. H. D. Henderson, and it is pointed out in the foreword of Lord Astor, Chairman of the Council, that in drafting the volume the group has had the advantage of help and criticism from a large number of authorities on monetary questions both British and foreign.

The subject-matter of the book falls broadly into two sections, which are skilfully interwoven. It contains an analysis of the conditions under which international investment was conducted by the leading monetary centres prior to the Great War. The chapters dealing with this aspect of the case are copiously illustrated with statistics gathered from numerous sources, which are cited in notes so that those who wish to pursue any particular point further have ready means to do so. The other section of the work deals with the interruption of international investment caused first by the War and then by the depression; discusses in an interesting way the different conditions which will surround its resumption; and indicates the part that international lending still has to play in a changing world.

This dive into the future, with all its uncertainties, political and

economic, will prove to many the most intriguing side of the work. Its practical aspect is considered in relation to such semi-theoretical issues as the relation of foreign lending to the balance of payments; the view that foreign loans, directly or indirectly, lead necessarily to increased exports is considered; and the inter-relations of debtor and creditor countries are examined. The authors take on the whole a somewhat reserved view of the prospect of reviving international investment on the former scale, which was such an important factor in the development of non-industrialised areas and the raising of the standard of living during the pre-War period. Stress is laid on the prospective decrease in population in the industrialised countries, the increasing efficiency of agricultural technique and the tendency of countries to assume in varying degrees a policy aiming at greater self-sufficiency.

It was undoubtedly true that international investment, as formerly practised, resulted in the development of agricultural or raw-material-producing countries from the surplus income of the creditor and industrialised nations. If the surpluses of the latter are to be reduced and the self-sufficiency of the former is to be increased in the future, it is clear that there will have been an important change in the conditions that have hitherto governed international lending. It seems, however, possible that these tendencies may be counteracted, possibly to a large extent, by other new factors. Whatever may be done in debtor countries to broaden the basis of their economic life, it must be conceded that many of these are likely to have for a long time a standard of living lower than that of the fully-industrialised countries. If part of the agricultural labour in primary-producing countries is gradually diverted to industrial output, it is probable that this industrial production will be devoted to the less complicated processes, while the more elaborate forms of industrial specialisation will find their principal outlet in those countries which have had longer experience in perfecting industrial production. One might therefore entertain some hope that as the standard of living rises in countries with a more simple economic organisation, their demand for the inventions of modern science in its applied form may increase and that the export of such articles as motor cars, radio sets, photographic appliances, high-class textiles and machinery of all kinds may help to make up for the decline in the exports of simpler products.

At any rate the writers of the book consider that there will be a valuable rôle for international lending in the future, though perhaps through different channels than in the past. However this may be, the volume merits careful study by reason of its suggestive and critical character. Its publication at the present time is appropriate. The resumption of international lending is being advocated by many bodies, including recently the International Chamber of Commerce, and it is well that the difficulties and novel considerations affecting it should have been explored without bias by trained experts. Further, with increasing achievement of exchange stability, it may be hoped that a time is arriving when judicious international lending may help to restore more normal trading relations and to promote a reduction of the barriers to international commerce. CECIL KISCH.

38*. Economic Planning and International Order. By Lionel Robbins. 1937. (London: Macmillan and Company. 8vo. xv + 330 pp. 8s. 6d.)

Professor Robbins' work on the economic significance from an international point of view of various types of planning is difficult to review. He calls it an essay, and it has all the compactness of an essay; with the possible exception of a page or two in which he is concerned to show that his individualist philosophy is also a plan—as the burden of the essay is that we must "de-plan," the point is little more than verbal—there is scarcely an otiose word. It is a wholehearted denunciation of State interference and the economic nationalism which is both the cause and the effect of such interference, and a wholehearted plea for the restoration, both in the national and the international sphere, of economic liberty. Within its small compass it deals with all the arguments, economic, political and social, serious or specious, which are put forward in favour of various forms of regimentation.

It is no good, however, to issue the reader with a general invitation without giving him some indication of the fare which is provided. Fortunately the argument may be summarised almost in Professor Robbins' own words.

He begins by enumerating the various ways in which national planning is operative, starting with tariffs, the commonest form of interference with trade, and moving on to superficially more reputable intervention in the sphere of monetary policy. He has no difficulty in showing that "independent attempts to plan economic activities *within* national areas must lead to a diminution of economic relations *between* national areas." He refuses to admit the suggestion that there is a compensation in greater international stability for the loss of wealth which is entailed by such attempts. On the contrary, they involve a greater instability of prices and a "politicalisation" of trade fraught with grave dangers to peace.

In Part II Professor Robbins examines and rejects the theory that the difficulties created by independent national planning can be obviated by the kind of partial international planning attempted in bilateral trade agreements or regional re-grouping. He proceeds to show that we cannot hope for salvation from the international planning of particular lines of industry, as opposed to particular channels of trade. Finally he explains why the notion "of making possible an orderly international co-operation by the equalisation of wages and hours of labour" is a bizarre delusion.

In Part III he examines the question whether complete planning as exemplified by international communism, a totalitarian plan for the world, which is the logical conclusion of our half-hearted and empiric efforts at national planning, would solve our problems. He has arrived at the conclusion, on grounds which it is impossible to summarise, that international communism, in aiming at more wealth and more freedom for all, must use means which are likely to frustrate these ends.

The remainder of the essay is a plea for international liberalism, which is not a plan which has been tried and failed, but one that has never yet had a full chance. Professor Robbins pleads for freedom of trade, freedom of investment and freedom of migration, and does not jib at the conclusion that we are unlikely to take a permanent farewell of the welter in which we are now living unless, in economic

as in political matters, there is some surrender of sovereign rights to an international authority.

In a world ruled from day to day by reason, the liberal policy as adumbrated by Professor Robbins might operate with considerable speed, and those of us who are optimistic enough to believe in the ultimate reasonableness of human beings can have faith in its eventual victory. The really agitating question is whether the world will reverse a course which must, it would appear, make life "poorer, nastier, more brutish and shorter," before it meets a smash which it will take a long time to repair. One restriction begets another, and it is questionable whether we can have economic freedom unless we are prepared to go the whole way with Professor Robbins. So long, for instance, as immigration is closely restricted there will be pleas, politically almost overpowering, for further restrictions in favour of vested interests represented both by capital and labour, which may mean that we shall have to wait until the decline of population in highly developed countries breaks down this ultimate barrier.

ANDREW MCFADYEAN.

39*. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE. Published by PEP. Political and Economic Planning. 1937. (London: PEP, 16, Queen Anne's Gate. 8vo. 302 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

THIS Report bears little resemblance to the economic text-books on international trade. It is rather, in the words of the sub-title, "a survey of problems affecting the expansion of international trade, with proposals for the development of British commercial policy and export mechanism."

The Report advocates low-tariff clubs, which raises the question of the most-favoured-nation clause. This is already violated *de facto* by quota systems and exchange controls. But rather than abandon the clause, it is thought preferable (as agreed at the Montevideo Conference of the Pan-American Union in July 1934) "to refrain from invoking the obligations of the M.F.N. clause in respect of certain multi-lateral conventions." Another suggestion, that inter-governmental agreements need to be supplemented by parallel agreements between producers, leads to an exhaustive analysis of all existing international industrial agreements. The failure of British exporters to study foreign markets is criticised; while it is argued that countries which are good customers for British goods should be assisted to market their products. The Report advocates an extension of the services provided by the Department of Overseas Trade, but criticises the Export Credits Guarantee Department, rather strangely on the grounds that it competes on unfair terms with private enterprise, owing to its access to diplomatic sources of information; foreign lending should be resumed, but on an "equity" rather than a fixed-interest basis; traders should be re-instructed in the use of the bill of exchange; early stabilisation is desirable, for the period of "testing" for the proper rate of exchange may last indefinitely; finally, British agricultural policy should concentrate on the production of dairy produce, fruit, vegetables, etc., continuing to import products the freshness of which is less important, or which are out of season in Great Britain.

One or two small points may be questioned. The Open Door does not presuppose completely free imports (page 5); and it was abandoned in a large part of the Colonial Empire long before the world crisis

(page 31). Again, is it strategically sound to discuss the supply of foodstuffs entirely apart from that of industrial raw materials (page 206)? But these are trifles. The Report as a whole is most stimulating, the material on Empire trade, the most-favoured-nation clause, and international industrial agreements being of particular value.

B. S. KEELING.

40. STABILISED MONEY. By Prof. Irving Fisher, LL.D. 1935. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. xxi + 442 pp. 10s. *6d.*)

This is an introduction to a now-famous theory prepared by its principal living exponent. The greater part of the book describes contributions made during the last three centuries by authors of many nations to the conception of a monetary unit that will always purchase the same amount of goods and services.

The author is always persuasive in his exposition of the need for such an ideal money, but the particular solution which he provides does not seem any less fraught with difficulty in the light of the experiments which have been made by President Roosevelt in recent years. C. I. B.

41. KEMMERER ON MONEY. By Prof. Edwin Walter Kemmerer. 1934. (London: Routledge. 8vo. xvi + 219 pp. 6s.)

In this small book the author attempts to "describe the present monetary problems, explain the fundamental economic principles underlying them and proposes a definite plan for a prompt return to the gold standard."

It is natural that his treatment should be hurried, but he succeeds in giving a clear picture of the symptoms of monetary disease and of the various cures that have been proposed. C. I. B.

42. PFUND, YEN UND DOLLAR IN DER WELTWIRTSCHAFTSKRISE. By Otto Pfleiderer. 1937. (Wirtschaftlichen Schicksal Europas, Teil 1, Heft 4.) (Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt Verlag. viii + 256 pp. *Rm.* 9.)

A detailed analysis of monetary policy and developments in Great Britain, Japan and the United States during the depression. There are some fifty pages of useful statistics at the end of the study.

A. T. K. G.

43. THE CURSE OF CREDIT. By Baron R. A. de Lynden. 1937. (London: Longmans. 8vo. xxxv + 254 pp. 10s. *6d.*)

On the jacket of this book is the moral "A monetary system must tell the truth. . . ." The author's thesis would appear to be that existing monetary systems do not satisfy this criterion because they confuse credit and money, and that credit is the villain responsible for at least a considerable proportion of the world's ills. A. T. K. G.

SPAIN

44*. WAR IN SPAIN. By F. White. 1937. (London: Longmans, Green. 8vo. 85 pp. 1s. *6d.*)

45. THE SIEGE OF ALCAZAR: A Warlog of the Spanish Revolution. By H. R. Knickerbocker. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 192 pp. 7s. *6d.*)

MISS WHITE's pamphlet is the best account of the Spanish War that I have read. It gives a clear and concise picture of the whole situation. Having started with a survey of the events which led up to the outbreak of hostilities, it follows the conflict through its many phases, both national and international, up to a few weeks ago.

Some of the conclusions that the author arrives at are naturally open to criticism, and she herself is quite ready to admit that the future may prove her wrong not only in her judgments, but also in her facts. But be that as it may, there is no denying that Miss

White has produced a most lucid and interesting account of a very complex situation.

My only regret is that, because of its modest appearance and unpretentious title, the general public may fail to realise that here is a book that would help to fortify its judgment against both the propagandist and the fanatic.

Mr. Knickerbocker's book provides a good example of the sales-value of a clever title. Nevertheless the fact remains that both the titles chosen for this book only flatter to deceive; they flatter the book and deceive the reader.

The author certainly covered the relief of the Alcazar, but his account of this important event, together with a few statistics, only occupies a bare 20 pages out of a total of 192. The rest of the book is devoted to his personal experiences up and down the Insurgent front. The result is a very lop-sided and trivial account of the Spanish Civil War. C. H. GUYATT.

46. THE WAR IN SPAIN: A Personal Narrative. By Ramon J. Sender. Translated from the Spanish by Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell. 1937. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. xi + 316 pp. 12s. 6d.)

A GREAT many books have been published recently describing the Spanish War, written by journalists and other eye-witnesses, but the distinguished Spanish novelist, author of *Seven Red Sundays*, succeeds in *The War in Spain* in conveying to us the feelings and thoughts of the militia who defended Madrid in the days before the first drive by the insurgents on the capital was stemmed.

In the opening chapters Ramon Sender describes the atmosphere of tension in and around Madrid before the revolt broke out. He criticises—but without bitterness—the Liberal Republican Government for not taking more energetic—if undemocratic—measures to nip the revolt in the bud. But he admits that the people as well as the Government were over-optimistic, and in any case had not reckoned with intervention from outside on a large scale. The chapters dealing with the defence of Madrid—in which the author took part—are almost unbearably moving.

"It is astonishing [he writes] that a month and a half after the attack on Madrid began—when Franco confessed to have lost 18,000 men, we had not yet forced a single man to mobilize. It was voluntaryism, the spontaneous movement to the front of workers, peasants, and very many young men of the smaller bourgeoisie, without other requisition than printed manifestoes and propaganda leaflets. That is the most significant of all the verdicts which future historians will have to make."

At the end of the book he touches on his personal tragedy—the shooting of his wife by the insurgents. The restraint with which he writes, and the understanding of the common people of Madrid which he shows, lift this book high above the level of mere reporting.

HELEN F. GRANT.

47. SALUD! AN IRISHMAN IN SPAIN. By Peadar O'Donnell. 1937. (London: Methuen. 8vo. 256 pp. 7s. 6d.)

48. LA RÉBELLION ESPAGNOLLE DEVANT LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL. Par A. Berenstein. 1937. (Geneva: Association des Amis de l'Espagne Républicaine. 8vo. 15 pp. 20 c.)

49. CRUELLE ESPAGNE. Par Jerome et Jean Tharaud. 1937. (Paris: Plon. 8vo. 255 pp. 15 *frs*.)

MR. P. O'DONNELL gives some good word-pictures of Spanish life, and reveals the great similarity of some of the characteristics of the

Irishman and the Spaniard. He has many words about trivialities and fewer about essentials and his vision was apparently limited to facts and actions which support his political outlook. His Spanish names are also open to criticism on account of inaccuracy.

Mr. O'Donnell gives a good deal of Irish politics which are hardly relevant to the Spanish situation, and one is tempted to think that his book has a definite Irish political motive opposite to that which he attributes in his last chapter to General O'Duffy and his Irish brigade.

La Rébellion Espagnolle, published by "The Friends of Republican Spain," is purely a propagandist pamphlet, which condemns the European Powers for "attempting to invoke the law in their own favour and then proving that their attitude is just," and proceeds itself to do exactly the same thing. This is merely the repetition of the published expressions of opinion of the Valencia Government against the Non-intervention policy in favour of their own legal right to receive arms and the illegality of their opponents doing so.

In contrast to the two previous works, *Cruelle Espagne* is a serious book, which shows that its writers have, at all events, a partial comprehension of the heart of things Spanish, or what is known as Españolidad. One would have preferred some other title to that of "Cruelle Espagne," which savours of generalisation and the unfair lumping together of the sheep and the goats.

The book has much descriptive and historical merit; it covers lightly but accurately the background of the outline of the events leading up to the Revolution of 1931 and the Civil War of 1936.

The writers give eye-witness accounts of Badajoz and Toledo soon after their fall, and of Madrid during the battle of October, which are picturesque and convincing, notwithstanding the fact that no reference is made to the forgery of the alleged massacre of Bajodaz. For these reasons the book is valuable to students of the Spanish Civil War.

The picture of Catalonia and the life of Barcelona "Sovietisée" and the accounts of the massacres there are especially vivid, but perhaps the most interesting feature of the book is the confession of faith made shortly before he died by the great Professor Unamuno, the leader of the Spanish Intellectuals, who contributed so largely in bringing about the Revolution, but who subsequently recanted and joined the side of General Franco.

As in Mr. O'Donnell's book, inaccuracies in the Spanish are to be noted. Surely the word "Desperado" to which he devotes a whole chapter should be "Desesperado"? ARTHUR F. LOVEDAY.

50. LA GUERRA CIVILE DI SPAGNA E IL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE. By Roberto Sandiford. (Reprint from Nuova Antologia, 16 Aprile, 1937.) 1937. (Rome: La Nuova Antologia. 8vo. 10 pp).

THIS short article, analysing from the point of view of international law the relations between foreign countries and the opposing forces in a civil war, is clear and objective. The duty of foreign Powers not to intervene in a civil war, belligerent rights and neutrality are discussed. The writer only relates these questions to the Spanish Civil War in a few paragraphs at the end. The recognition by Italy and others of General Franco's Government as the legal government of

Spain is defended on the grounds that the Valencia Government has not the authority or the will to guarantee public order, whereas the "Nationalists" have earned the right to be considered the legal representatives of the country and a legitimate belligerent. The failure to grant belligerent rights, he claims, has prolonged the struggle, since neither side has been able to operate freely and use the powerful weapon of blockade. Apart from the closing paragraphs, however, the arguments are treated purely from the academic point of view.

HELEN F. GRANT.

THE MEDITERRANEAN

51*. THE DANGEROUS SEA: THE MEDITERRANEAN AND ITS FUTURE. By George Slocombe. 1936. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 286 pp. 12s. 6*d*.)

52*. LORDS OF THE INLAND SEA: A STUDY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN POWERS. By Sir Charles Petrie. 1937. (London: Lovat Dickson. 8vo. xi + 284 pp. 10s. 6*d*.)

53*. ITALIA, FRANCIA, INGHILTERRA NEL MEDITERRANEO. By Pietro Silva. 1937. (Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. 8vo. 129 pp. *Lire* 8.)

THE political events of recent years have focused almost world-wide attention on the Mediterranean arena. In the nature of things the Middle Sea must always strongly influence, and at times control, the ebb and flow of political currents in the Old World, since it not only unites three continents, but contains within its own and contiguous waters the territories of four out of the "Big Five" Powers of Europe, not to mention those of the Balkan States and Turkey. Nowhere else in the world are to be found within a narrow geographical compass so many conflicting national interests and policies. To the pre-War generation the Balkans were known as the powder-magazine of Europe, and grimly did they justify that appellation. Whether history is to repeat itself remains to be seen, but it is perhaps an ominous circumstance that Balkan politics continue to exert a marked influence on the destinies of the Mediterranean, that most perilous of all seas to those responsible for navigating ships of State.

Of the three books under notice which treat of this subject, Mr. George Slocombe's is definitely the most valuable, presenting as it does a comprehensive and unbiased picture of Mediterranean Powers, policies, and armaments as they stood at the beginning of this year. "The Dangerous Sea" is essentially a journalist's book of the best type. That is to say, it contains an abundance of facts as noted by a trained observer who is content for the most part to let his readers draw their own conclusions. None save a skilled journalist could have packed so much information into such a modest volume, and probably only a mind disciplined to Fleet-street's rule of divorcing news from views could have resisted the temptation to state a case for one political group or the other out of the mass of material which could, without difficulty, be manipulated to prove almost anything. In 280 pages Mr. Slocombe "covers" the political and strategical history of the Mediterranean with reasonable adequacy. If his lightning-sketch methods may leave the student of history somewhat dissatisfied, they do serve the useful purpose of furnishing

the plain man with a guide through the labyrinth of Mediterranean problems.

It is accepted as a truism that strategy is the handmaid of policy, yet in this inland sea the rôles often appear to be reversed. Mr. Slocombe deals first with "the gates of the sea." Of Gibraltar he writes:

"In the past the Rock has successfully resisted sieges, in part owing to its own great strength, in part owing to British naval supremacy in the surrounding waters. Naval supremacy and natural strength are henceforth not sufficient to prevail against a powerful adversary capable of arming and manning the coast of Africa. The security of Gibraltar, and with it British command of the Straits, will in future depend to a considerable degree upon our relations with the Power which possesses the Moroccan fortress of Ceuta, and upon the continued neutrality of Tangier."

From this judgment few will be inclined to dissent. We are then conducted along to the European shore of the Mediterranean, where the political and strategical aims of France, Italy, Spain and the Balkan States are lucidly expounded. Since our guide is neither "pro" nor "anti," his informed comments are enlightening and impressive, not least when he is writing of Fascist Italy. The chapter on the civil war in Spain should help to clear up any doubts which may linger as to the motives actuating the interventionist Powers, just as it explains why Britain and France must needs view the Spanish situation with misgiving. Mr. Slocombe's book is to be warmly recommended as a useful and timely work of reference, which happens also to be well written and eminently readable.

Sir Charles Petrie sub-titles his more imposing volume "A Study of the Mediterranean Powers," but it may be doubted whether he himself would claim it to be an objective study. His vigorous partisanship inevitably renders his conclusions suspect. This is particularly the case in his observations on Italian policy, strongly coloured as they are by his fervid admiration for Signor Mussolini. The chapter on "Imperial Italy" is, indeed, a singularly able if not wholly convincing vindication of all the actions undertaken by the Duce from the March on Rome down to the present day. At times Sir Charles allows his bias to lead him into statements which, to put it mildly, are open to question. Here is one example, taken from his comments on Malta: "That some irresponsible Italians have attempted to make trouble is only too true . . . but the attitude of the Rome Government has always been studiously correct, and no sensible Italian believes that his country has any right to Malta." As one who was in Malta in 1929, when the pro-Italian agitation was at its height, and who later discussed the question in Italy with Italians who could in no sense be termed irresponsible, I am afraid that Sir Charles is sadly misinformed on this point. His plea for the restoration of the old and traditional friendship between Britain and Italy will command general approval, but it is difficult to see how this can be achieved without some change of heart in Rome. Britons have never yet responded to overtures based on the well-known doggerel:

"Willst Du nicht mein Bruder sein,
So schlag ich Dir den Schädel ein!"

and it is unfortunate that this inbred national disinclination to be badgered about by foreign potentates is even now not realised either in Rome or Berlin. And, if a slight digression is permissible, it is

rather surprising to find that Sir Charles Petrie's almost reverential attitude to Signor Mussolini is by no means extended to Herr Hitler, of whom, indeed, he appears to disapprove. Yet to the plain man there is little to choose between the political methods of the two dictators.

As with Italy, so with Spain. In the author's eyes the civil war resolves itself into an altruistic crusade by General Franco, and by implication his German and Italian patrons, against the powers of darkness. If credulous readers find this thesis proved to their own and Sir Charles' satisfaction in the chapter on "Troubled Spain," others of a more critical turn of mind, though not necessarily of "Leftist" sympathies, may admire it more as a brilliant example of special pleading. Nevertheless, for all its partiality, the book must be accepted as a noteworthy contribution to the current political history of the Mediterranean. The author's honesty is transparent: he never attempts to camouflage his pronounced right-wing sympathies, and he belabours with gusto most of the ideals and institutions which bear the democratic label. Of special interest are the chapters on Greece and the Balkans, Nationalist Turkey, the Palestine situation, and modern Egypt. His views on Mediterranean strategy coincide more or less with those of Mr. Slocombe, though in my opinion he over-estimates the military potentiality of Italy and minimises her strategical handicaps. It is difficult to see what good purpose is served by the tendency in certain quarters at home to magnify the, as yet, untested combatant powers and martial resources of a State which is too apt to employ the language of menace towards Great Britain.

Signor Silva's monograph, which treats of the Mediterranean primarily in its historical aspect, touches but lightly on present-day problems. The keynote of the study is moderation, and there is, happily, an almost complete absence of propaganda. This little work may be read with advantage by those who care to know how the Mediterranean question is viewed through the eyes of an Italian patriot who is also a scholar. In a work so refreshingly free from national bias it is rather surprising to find a statement that Great Britain's concentration of armed force in the Mediterranean during 1935–36 antedated the controversy with Italy over Abyssinia. It need hardly be said that on this not unimportant point Signor Silva's information is at fault.

HECTOR C. BYWATER.

54. IL REGIME DEGLI STRETTI. By Gaspari Ambrosini. L'Quaderni dell' Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Cultura, Serie Sesta, IV. 1936. (Rome: Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Cultura. 8vo. 76 pp. *Lire* 5.)

THE first part of this study provides a competent historical summary of the various solutions of the Straits question attempted since the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarjah. The second part, which deals with the Montreux Conference and the Straits Convention of July 1936, is of more value as an expression of the present Italian point of view on the Straits question than as an impartial study of events.

D. A. R.

55. IL PROBLEMA DELL' ALTO ADRIATICO. By Pier Lodovico Bertani. 1937. (Rome: L'Economia italiana editrice. 8vo. 111 pp. *Lire* 15.)

THE author discusses the division of labour and the competition between the ports of Venice, Trieste, and Fiume, and also the functions

of Ravenna, and, on the other side of the Adriatic, of Sushak (the Yugoslav relic of Fiume), Spalato, Sebenico and Ragusa. He examines the efforts of the Yugoslav State to develop a large merchant navy, pointing out that British and French interests have assisted in this, and the railway construction programmes of the same State, which, however, has dissipated resources and energy in hesitating between Salonica, Spalato, and Sushak as the best shipping centre for Yugoslav external trade. The author holds that as soon as world business picks up, Italy should get going upon new railway communications with the Tyrol and South Germany, for the attraction of German import and export trade to Trieste and Venice.

C. J. S. S.

THE NEAR EAST

56*. PALESTINE AT THE CROSSROADS. By Ernest Main. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 309 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

MR. MAIN, who was in Palestine during 1936 as special correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, has made a more serious attempt to be impartial than the problems of that country usually inspire. It cannot be said that he has entirely succeeded. He tends, for instance, to exaggerate the economic backwardness of the Arab population. The statement that a fellah needs 30 acres to support his family "even in the richest land," conflicts with official estimates ranging from 7½ acres on good land to 30 on the poorest; and it appears, rather surprisingly, within five pages of a passage describing the prosperity of an Arab village, close to a Jewish settlement, in which the normal holding seems to be less than 12½ acres.

A similar over-statement appears in an interesting chapter on British policy in the Middle East. Mr. Main here asserts that the Arab States are becoming increasingly hostile to Great Britain. That the arguments by which this view is supported are not always convincing may be shown from three brief extracts:

"The position of Egypt is different from that of the Arab countries. The latter are not exposed to any danger from a withdrawal by England, but Egypt certainly might be, and to this extent British interests in Egypt are secure because Egypt is always more or less dependent on Britain" (p. 59). "Nothing could stop Turkey or Persia walking into Iraq to-morrow except the presence of Britain" (p. 61). "If Britain moved out [of a Palestine predominantly Arab] another Power would certainly move in" (p. 62).

The book remains useful as a clear and readable analysis of the development of post-War Palestine and its problems. There is a curious error on page 178, where immigration under the Labour Schedule is confused with the total of Jewish immigration.

H. BEELEY.

57. ALLAH DETHRONED: a Journey through Modern Turkey. By Lilo Linke. 1937. (London: Constable. 8vo. xvi + 341 pp. 15*s*.)

THERE are two ways of travelling: one to be so rich and powerful that you are the host and guest of the governments and your movements are shown in the headlines; the other to travel so light that a small and unexpected kindness is accepted with gratitude but is not missed. Rockefeller did the one; Miss Linke tried the other.

The author started her journey from the eastern frontiers of

Turkey, after passing quickly through Istanbul and Samsun. Life is primitive in these parts and travellers do not usually go for fun. Kars she found dreary and inhospitable. The lorry journey, frequently interrupted by punctures, from Kars to Hopa on the Black Sea, reminds one of few parasangs and many stations of the Ten Thousand. The driver's triumphant cry "Kara Deniz" must have been as enthusiastic as that of "Thalatta." By boat, lorry, private car and a free railway pass she visits Adana, Tarsus, Malatya ("the pearl of the Euphrates"), Konia, Smyrna and finally Ankara. The Kurds apparently have not changed much from Xenophon's days. According to Miss Linke—

> " . . . they say that he [the Governor of Malatya] and the vilayet police inspector were overwhelmed and robbed by bandits when they were travelling overland."

Compare this to Xenophon :

> "These Carduchians, they said, dwelt up among the mountains, were a warlike people and were not the subjects of the King."

She describes the view of Smyrna as seen from the stern of the steamer in the bay and concludes : "There cannot be many views on earth like it." We agree. But Ankara is described as half a capital "dedicated to nothing but work."

> "The buildings [she says] are strictly utilitarian and are set up as models for the rest of the country. . . . Occasionally I wondered if they were marked by numbers and could be looked up in a catalogue—7B, outsize, 30,000 liras."

This book is a distinct and welcome contribution to the literature on the development of Modern Turkey. The author spared no pains to visit factories, railroads completed and under construction, tobacco warehouses and the large textile factory at Kayseri; she visited the people at their homes, lived as they did, toured the country with governors and doctors on their tour of inspection, and she describes accurately what she saw and the emotions she felt at the organisation of a virgin country. Being young and fair, she excites attention; not every Turk is like the pantaloon; she has many humorous adventures, but they remain humorously romantic and are described with finesse and frankness.

She did not see Kemal Ataturk, but her book is a tribute to his organising genius and the driving power derived from his inspiration. A lot of work has been done; much, much more remains to be done. Even if major enterprises must remain State-controlled, Turkey will need foreign experts. If the mistakes of the past are avoided, sympathy shown by both sides and security assured to foreign capital and entrepreneurs, there is a vast field for development such as lies in an engineer's dreams.

There is one criticism. The title of the book is misleading. Caliphs come and Sultans go, but religion goes on for ever in the East. The Muezzin may alter his call from "Allah Ekber" to "Tanri uludur," but the old men still pray in a language they do not understand to a God they cannot interpret but accept as omnipotent, avenger or friend. Saxon love for statistics and Anglo-Saxon coolness for these things are both satisfied by leaving them at the end of the chapter. The book has many and beautiful illustrations. The photograph on page 61 looks like a ski-er's paradise.

H. M. BOSTANDJIS.

58. Moslem Women Enter a New World. By Ruth Frances Woodsmall. [*Publications of the American University of Beirut, Social Science Series, No.* 14.] 1936. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 432 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

There is much that could be criticised in Miss Woodsmall's book. It is prolix and repetitive, it displays a tendency to exaggerate the significance of certain persons and events, and to accept things seen and heard at face value; it takes a good deal too much for granted, and relies too much on what may be called "American college circles." But when these things are said, it still takes an unquestioned place among the best books of its kind.

Miss Woodsmall is most at home in her second and fourth sections, which deal with the education of girls and with health organisations. These chapters are thorough and admirably free from captious criticism. In discussing the social, religious and economic factors, she is on less sure ground. But in these, too, there is much of permanent value, which is enhanced by the skilful way in which the situations in different regions are compared or contrasted. Even when her conclusions may be described as intuitive impressions, they carry weight as those of a keen and sympathetic observer. One particularly notable example is the passage in which she remarks on the failure of educated Moslem man to produce any real change in social standards, which seems a truism when once stated, but has not, I think, been said before. H. A. R. Gibb.

59*. Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Edited by Enzo Sereni and R. E. Ashery. 1936. (New York: Hechalutz Press. 8vo. 315 pp.)

This collection of essays is valuable as an indication of the direction of the most important political force in Jewish Palestine, the Labour Party. The essays are divided into two groups, the first analysing the economic and social structure of the country, the second suggesting future lines of policy. The latter will naturally arouse greater interest at the present time.

They reveal an encouraging anxiety to discover some basis of reconciliation with the Arab community, though it must be remembered that most of the book was written before last year's disturbances, which have resulted in a hardening of attitude on the Jewish as well as on the Arab side. Mr. Katznelson makes the proposal, which has also been advanced by Mr. Amery, for a Legislative Council consisting of Jews and Arabs in equal numbers, irrespective of the relative strength of the two communities either now or in the future; such an Assembly would have to work by co-operation or do nothing. More novel and far-reaching is the policy expounded by Mr. Sereni and Mr. Liebenstein, of allying Zionism to the pan-Arab movement. "A Jewish Palestine within a greater Arab federation" is presented as a desirable goal on both political and economic grounds.

This evident desire for agreement would inspire more hope if it seemed to be based on a more realistic analysis of Arab feeling. The essayists, almost unanimously, lay stress on the divergent interests of fellah and effendi, and argue that Jewish immigration offers an opportunity for the redemption of the masses from feudal oppression.

"We need not [writes Mr. Beilinson] be fooled by the present supposed unity of the Arabs. It is only a momentary phenomenon bound to change with time.

When such a feeling of unity consciously exists between the rulers and the masses they subject and exploit, it contradicts reality and is doomed to disappear."

It would be interesting to know whether this academic illusion has survived the rising of 1936. H. BEELEY.

60*. DIE TÜRKISCHE AGRAR- UND INDUSTRIEPOLITIK NACH DEM KRIEGE. By Dr. rer. pol. Ali Ekber Mahoutdji. 1937. (Dresden: Verlag M. Dittert. 8vo. 150 pp. *Rm.* 3.)

61. AFGHANISTAN: A Brief Survey. By Jamal-ud-Dīn Ahmad and M. Abdul-Aziz. New impression. 1936. (London: Longmans, Green. La. 8vo. xx + 160 pp. 15*s.*)

A new impression of the work noticed in the May 1935 issue of this Journal, when the reviewer commended it. It deals briefly with the geography, geology, climatic statistics, history, reigning house, constitution and administrative services of the country.

62. LE PORT DE BEYROUTH ET L'ÉCONOMIE DES PAYS DU LEVANT SOUS LE MANDAT FRANÇAIS. Par Jacques de Monicault. 1936. (Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique. 8vo. 231 pp.)

A very useful compilation of statistics (not without a certain propagandist tendency) relating to the installations and traffic not only of Beirut but also of the other Syrian ports, supplemented by statistical summaries of the progress of agriculture and industry in the French mandated territories. H. A. R. G.

U.S.S.R.

63*. THE REVOLUTION BETRAYED. By Leon Trotsky. Translated by Max Eastman. 1937. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 312 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

TEN years of exile have not diminished the revolutionary fervour of Trotsky, nor have the events of those years in Soviet Russia or elsewhere shaken his conviction in the inevitability of a world proletarian revolution.

"Socialism," says Trotsky, ". . . must guarantee to Society a higher economy of time than is guaranteed by capitalism." When a condition of complete socialism is reached, the State will die away, because when every member of the community enjoys all the material comforts he can desire the greed and envy inherent in personal ownership will resolve themselves into contentment and happiness. Then the essential function of the State to maintain law and order and protect the possessions of the "have's" from the "have-not's" will no longer exist.

It is permissible to wonder whether human nature, being what it is, will ever be completely satisfied and whether, in any case, the boasted superiority of socialist over capitalist technique and labour (proof of which remains unaccountably lacking) could ever give the socialist community such wealth that every individual wish was gratified. Trotsky does not suggest that this stage could have been reached at the present time, whatever road the Revolution had travelled. But he finds in Stalinism nothing to encourage hopes of the final emergence of true socialism.

It is true that the means of production and distribution in Soviet Russia have been nationalised. But the distribution of consumable wealth is quite as unequal as in any capitalist State. Instead of a gradual disappearance of classes, Stalinism has created a bureaucracy which combines in itself the qualities of a ruling class and a capitalist

bourgeois class. But whereas in capitalist democratic countries the bureaucracy is connected by many links to the bourgeoisie which exercises a restraining and stabilising influence on the Government, "in no other régime has a bureaucracy ever achieved such a degree of independence from the dominating class." Thus, argues Trotsky, the Soviet bureaucracy serves no interests but its own. As an exploiter of the labouring classes it is no whit behind the bourgeois capitalists.

It follows that the Soviet bureaucracy, which may equally well be called the new Soviet aristocracy, is opposed to the idea of a world revolution, which would destroy it equally with the bourgeois governments of other States. For this reason the Soviet Government has kept its grip on the Communist International, for so long as it is under the direction and control of the Soviet bureaucracy it can be sterilised and made harmless, but were it transplanted to another soil it would undoubtedly include Stalinism among the chief enemies of the international proletariat.

Trotsky concludes that the overthrow of the Stalin bureaucracy is only a matter of time. Believing as he does in an inevitable proletarian revolution, he favours the chances of a social revolution in Russia which will remove the bureaucracy without changing the social and economic foundations established by the Bolshevik revolution. But he does not exclude the possibility of a bourgeois party overthrowing the ruling Soviet caste; "it would find no small number of ready servants among the present bureaucrats . . . a purgation of the State apparatus would, of course, be necessary. . . . But a bourgeois restoration would probably have to clean out fewer people than a revolutionary party."

When Trotsky asserts that Soviet Russia is now under the control of a comparatively small bureaucratic oligarchy concerned for its own welfare and acquired interests and distrustful and apprehensive of the masses, few will disagree with him. But his implication that this bureaucracy foisted itself on the Russian people is not to be accepted without further examination. It is equally or even more credible that when the revolution was spent, its final throes were bound to throw up a bureaucracy consisting, as is always the case after a national cataclysm, largely of place-seekers and professional politicians and administrators by no means anxious to undermine the foundations of the system under which they flourish. It may be questioned whether, if Trotsky had secured the leadership, he would or could have acted very differently from Stalin. In spite of his democratic theories, would he have been more tolerant of criticism and factions? His record when a leader of the party showed little inclination to compromise. And, finally, would he have been more successful than Stalin in developing socialist production on a basis of equal remuneration?

L. E. Hubbard.

64*. World Revolution 1917–1936: The Rise and Fall of the Communist International. By C. L. R. James. 1937. (London: Secker and Warburg. 8vo. 492 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

65*. Soviet Union 1936. 1937. (London: Laurence and Wishart. 8vo. xi + 752 pp. 6*s*.)

Mr. James has written a dogmatic and controversial, but decidedly useful book. It is the first attempt outside the works of M. Trotsky himself to tell the story of the Russian revolution from the

Trotskyist or, as the author would prefer to say, Leninist–Bolshevik standpoint. The conclusions are approximately the same as those of M. Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed*, and the author exhibits a rather pathetic faith in the salvation of the world by the "Fourth International" (of which not many people had heard until M. Stalin gave it a free advertisement in the treason trials of August 1936 and January 1937). But in his analysis of the course of the Russian revolution and of the point at which it took the wrong turning, Mr. James displays commendable independence of judgment and desire to arrive at the truth.

In particular, he faces with more detachment than Trotsky himself could do, the divergences between Lenin and Trotsky in the years prior to 1917. In the first place, they differed on the issue of "permanent revolution"; and here, according to Mr. James, Trotsky was right and Lenin wrong. At any rate, it is clear that down to the spring of 1917, Lenin maintained that the Russian revolution could at that stage only be a *bourgeois* revolution, and that in the spring of 1917 he went over to a view indistinguishable from that of Trotsky, *i.e.* that the *bourgeois* revolution should be pressed home and transformed into a true proletarian revolution. It might, of course, be argued that subsequent events have proved that Lenin's original view was the right one, and that Russia was not, and is not yet, ripe for anything but a *bourgeois* revolution comparable to those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Western Europe; but Mr. James does not take this point. Secondly, Lenin and Trotsky differed on the issue of the stricter or looser organisation of the party; and here Trotsky admitted himself in the wrong when he joined the Bolshevik Party in July 1917. Nor has Trotsky ever withdrawn that admission, though he has freely denounced the dictatorial régime within the party set up by Stalin since 1927.

In the latter part of his book Mr. James has no difficulty in exposing the inconsistencies and theoretical shortcomings of Stalinism, though he is less explicit and less convincing about what he would have put in its place. The book contains many useful references to the little-known Trotskyist literature of the subject, and to a good many official Soviet publications of an earlier period which would not square with the orthodoxy of the present day. For example, how many people now remember the first edition of Stalin's famous *Problems of Leninism*, written in the spring of 1924, in which Stalin declared that "the victorious revolution in our country . . . ought not to be considered as of independent value, but as an auxiliary, a means of hastening the victory of the proletariat in other countries"? The book cries out for an index, which is not provided.

Soviet Union 1936 is a collection of some of the principal speeches delivered during 1936 by Soviet notabilities, including Stalin, Kaganovich, Orjonikidze, several Stakhanovite workers and—Marshal Tukhachevsky. E. H. CARR.

THE FAR EAST

66*. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY IN THE FAR EAST: A perspective of Events, Cultural Influences and Policies. By P. H. B. Kent. 1937. (London: Arnold. 8vo. 390 pp. 16s.)

IN this book Mr. Kent aims at providing for general purposes in simple terms, at the length of a medium-length novel, a statement of

the Problem of the Pacific set against its essential historical background and brought up to the close of 1936.

The author brings to his task the knowledge acquired by thirty-five years residence in China, as well as the accuracy and impartiality to be expected of a member of the British Bar, whose professional work has combined defence of the interests of the Treaty Port resident with legal advice to departments of the Chinese Government. Like many other such residents, Mr. Kent returned to Europe to play his part in the Great War, and so has the additional qualification of personal experience of that moral and material upheaval which was to affect the mentalities and destinies of the Far East no less than those of Europe and the West.

The method adopted is to narrate the course of events in the Far East since the beginning of the present century in a series of short chapters, each based on some outstanding event "like a chain of telegraph posts carrying the thread of the story."

The story opens with the Boxer Protocol of 1901, that first attempt at international co-operation between East and West—of which the lessons were forgotten when statesmen sought later at Versailles, Washington and Geneva for collective security—and seven chapters cover the first decade to the outbreak of the Revolution in China. Sixteen chapters cover the forging of Nationalist China during the next two decades, which included the Great War, the advent of Communism and the Japanese move into Manchuria; eleven chapters follow to describe the foreign contribution—including the Treaty Port System —to the economic and cultural fabric of China.

The reader is then introduced to Japan, whose relations with the mainland of Asia from the sixteenth century to the present time are sketched in ten chapters.

Having thus made the acquaintance of the two leading ladies on the Far Eastern stage and their antecedents, the reader is finally invited to speculate on the possible solutions of the problem in the light of the author's well-documented appreciation of the nature of the world forces engaged as actors in the scene.

Both the historical material selected and the method of its presentation are well adapted to explain to the thinking reader the present situation in the Far East, which can no longer be ignored as too remote or academic, since—to quote the author—

> "The need for understanding of the East by the West is more pressing to-day than ever it was. The problems of Europe have obscured far-away processes of evolution charged with Fate. Europe has led the world too long to see before her any other destiny. National rivalries are sapping her strength. She forgets that she invaded the seclusion of Eastern Asia, however inevitably, with world consequences which can neither be avoided nor delayed."

So few inaccuracies are noticeable in the author's statement of history that a reference to two apparent ones may serve to indicate his absence of partisanship. While his reading of the "Partition of China" period leads him to ascribe the British lease of Weihaiwei in 1899 to instigation on the part of China—in contrast to the similar unwelcome occupation of Port Arthur by Russia and of Kiaochao by Germany—he is moved in dealing with the attack on the British Concession at Hankow in 1927 to attribute to Whitehall a prior refusal to heed the appeal of the British community for increased protection. The condonation of British policy implied in the one case would appear to be as unmerited as the condemnation implied in the other.

In his appraisal of Japan's motives and actions throughout the period under review, the author is equally impartial, and he rightly questions the dictum of an American Professor that Japan in 1914 used her alliance with Great Britain as an occasion for herself coming into the War and as an encouragement in her policy as embodied in the Twenty-one Demands. In fact it was Great Britain which called her ally to her aid, and it is unusual to dictate to the friend in need how to be the friend in deed.

In short, the narrative of events is as free from the taint of that much-abused chimera, the Treaty Port mind—the alleged existence of which the book itself is among the best refutations—as it is from the moralising of the doctrinaire Paget M.P.s who have contributed so many so-called elucidations of inconvenient realities. Thus the communism which undoubtedly exists in China is treated on the basis of facts and documents as a genuine type of this " ism " with genuine origins and repercussions, and not as a mere synonym for endemic banditry.

As the premises are accurately and calmly stated, so the possible conclusions are indicated with a corresponding absence of alarm or complacence, with the result that Mr. Kent's work can be regarded as an excellent guide to the study of the difficult but pressing " Problem of the Pacific." SIDNEY BARTON.

67*. THE SHANGHAI PROBLEM. By William Crane Johnstone, Jr. 1937. (Oxford University Press; Stanford University Press. 8vo. xi + 326 pp. 13*s*. 6*d*.)

IN this recent addition to the " Stanford Books in World Politics," the Associate Professor of Political Science in the George Washington University sets out to state a problem rather than to suggest its solution. Though the student of Shanghai affairs will continue to rely mainly upon the Feetham Report, published in 1931, Professor Johnstone's book will be of value to those general readers interested in Far Eastern affairs who wish to appreciate the tangled problems of what is perhaps the most complicated city organisation in the world.

The author first sketches the history of the three Shanghai municipalities: the International Settlement, the French Concession and the newly created Chinese City Government of Greater Shanghai. He shows how at an early date there arose doubts as to the proper division of authority between the treaty consuls and the Shanghai Municipal Council. It should be stressed that, so far as the foreign members of the Council are concerned, the ultimate authority must in practice lie with the governments whose troops are in the last resort the protectors of the Settlement. The advent, however, of Chinese members to the Council has made it necessary for the foreign members to persuade their Chinese colleagues that the views pressed by their national authorities are in the common interest. Similarly, the new predominance of Japan results frequently in failure on the part of the Consular Body to reach unanimity, with the result that the Municipal Council is forced to take the responsibility for decisions which would more appropriately be taken by the treaty Powers.

The author has realised the weakness of the land regulations which, framed for a small community of merchants and traders, still form the constitutional law of a vast cosmopolitan community. The ultimate authority in the International Settlement, with a population

of over a million, is still the ratepayers in annual meeting, whereas in England the parish meeting survives only in those places with a population of less than two hundred souls.

Having sketched the history of Shanghai and given an adequate outline of the administrative organisation of the three municipalities and the history of the Mixed and Chinese Courts, the author proceeds to summarise the various Shanghai problems that await solution. Of these, perhaps the most fundamental is the problem of industrial and labour conditions. Credit is rightly given to the persuasive and educational work that is being done by the Industrial Section of the Shanghai Municipal Council, but it is of imperative urgency for an agreement to be reached with the Chinese authorities and extra-territorial Powers in regard to the enforcement of labour legislation. The foreign settlements cannot afford to let it be said that their existence is a stumbling-block in the way of an improvement in Chinese social and industrial conditions. The problem of the extra-Settlement roads affords a happy illustration of the point well made by the author that Shanghai problems have a way of settling themselves piecemeal without any formal agreement being reached.

The author gives a brief account of the Sino-Japanese war of 1932, and stresses the vital importance of Japanese aims as affecting the future of Shanghai. He summarises various proposals that have been made for the gradual rendition of the International Settlement to China, and reaches the conclusion that no settlement of this problem can be found until the treaty Powers have come to an agreement among themselves. C. A. S.

68*. A History of the Press and Public Opinion in China. By Lin Yutang. 1937. (Oxford University Press, for the Institute of Pacific Relations. 8vo. 179 pp. *8s. 6d.*)

69. Can China Survive? By Hallett Abend and Anthony J. Billingham. 1936. (New York: Ives Washburn. 8vo. ix + 317 pp. $3.00.)

70. China in Revival. By Gustav Carlberg. 1936. (Rock Island, Ill.: Augustana Book Concern. 8vo. 258 pp. $1.50.)

Any book by Dr. Lin Yutang is sure of a ready audience, and although the scope of the present one is not so wide as that of *My Country and My People*, it abounds in interest, in erudite recollections of the far past easily and pleasantly recalled, and of trenchant, lively criticisms of the present.

China's Press has the oldest history in the world. A gazette was being circulated to officials before Julius Cæsar had begun to post up the *acta diurna* in the Forum. In the T'ang dynasty the official gazette was a regular institution: it was a dry affair concerned mainly with official doings and appointments, and the thirst for news was gratified by numerous unofficial sheets of gossip and leakage from Court circles, even as to-day. Most curious feature of all, evidence of the Chinese people's innately democratic instincts even under imperial autocracy, were the popular ballads in which from time immemorial the people vented their opinions of government. It was a custom of the Emperors to send out officials twice a year to collect these ballads in order to know what the nation was thinking.

It is the extraordinary vigour of public opinion as voiced by courageous scholars, censors and students which specially and justly interests Dr. Lin. In the recurrent times of eunuch and petticoat

spoliation, neither torture nor death deterred these brave men from denouncing the people's oppressors in the boldest terms. Sometimes they won, more often they were slaughtered. Those who remember the Chinese students' rising against the Versailles Treaty will find an apt counterpart in the Sung dynasty, at the time that the Normans were ruling in England. It is all a great story.

In modern times Dr. Lin pays a deserved tribute to the influence of such splendid missionaries as Morrison, Medhurst, Young Allen and Timothy Richard in introducing a vital journalism to China. From the Sino-Japanese War to the fall of the Manchus was the golden age of Chinese journalism led by that brilliant scholar, Liang Chi-chao; how little the outside world knew in those vital years of what was really passing in China, is here vividly revealed.

Of the Chinese Press to-day Dr. Lin gives a deplorable account: it is badly edited, unreal, and completely muzzled. The remedies needed are trained reporters to observe and describe accurately the events of the day; more money to pay for them; and above all, constitutional freedom and the rule of law to protect them.

Four years ago Mr. Ignatius Phayre produced a gloomy book called *Can America Last?* The same question now asked about China in almost the same words by Messrs. Abend and Billingham might be asked of nearly every country in the world with equally pessimistic conclusions. Yet without disputing that China offers as many regrettable samples of "life's enormous disarray" as most countries, it is not too much to say that many of the phenomena on which the authors based their verdict are already being contradicted by events.

Japan, we read, "is weary of the dangerous and self-destructive chaos which has prevailed in China for the past quarter of a century," and has therefore resolved to take charge. China is powerless to resist, and "nothing except a decisive defeat in war will stop Japan's progress on the mainland." But in a later chapter on reconstruction in China, it is evident that the chaos of twenty-five years is resolving itself into remarkable unity. Only recently the submission of Szechuan has brought the last contumacious province under the ægis of Nanking. Japan's latest onslaught in North China, the immediate outcome of which cannot be foreseen at the moment of going to press, certainly seems to justify the author's gloomy prediction. But it is an equally fair prediction that Japan's soldiers will do infinitely more harm to Japan than to China, whose inexhaustible vitality has perhaps no equal in the world.

It is extremely difficult to write of Mr. Carlberg's account of the wave of revivalism which he tells us is sweeping over China. His utter enthusiasm and simple faith in the reality of the many stories he relates of people screaming and groaning in instantaneous conviction of sin, are something that one would not offend. Here, for example, is Mr. Carlberg's picture of an entire school of small boys after being preached to:

> "Some stood pounding the walls; others were in a sitting posture, beating their desks; several were prostrate on their knees, while one little chap was in such agony of soul that he kept rolling about on the floor. . . . Later . . . they began to pour out their little hearts in confession, and oh, such a catalogue of sins!"

Elsewhere it is seriously suggested that the Almighty allowed a

little boy of five years old to be drowned in a well in order to bring about his father's conversion, and that He caused some 30,000,000 people to be beggared and made homeless in the floods of 1931 in order to bring some thousands of others to the mourners' bench.

That there is a great renascence of transcendental thought throughout China (as attested in Mr. William Paton's impressive *Christianity in the Eastern Conflict*) is beyond dispute. But one cannot help thinking that real conversion is too personal and sacred a matter to have much part in the hysterical publicity of Mr. Carlberg's narratives. O. M. GREEN.

I. UNDER THE JAPANESE MASK. By Miles W. Vaughn. 1937. (London: Lovat Dickson. 8vo. 386 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THE chief fault to be found with Mr. Vaughn's book is its title: titles such as "Under the Japanese Mask" have come to connote to many English readers ill-conceived attacks on Oriental customs by prejudiced writers who have neither understanding of nor sympathy with the nations of the Far East.

This book is an exception: Mr. Vaughn has been fortunate that his work as a journalist brought him into contact with many of the best elements in Japan: it is given to few to turn business contacts into real friendships and to fewer still to be able to explain the mentality of an Eastern people in words which are comprehensible to the people of the West, and this is what Mr. Vaughn has done for Japan.

He has not been so fortunate in China. His contacts there seem to have been mainly with the "old war-lord" type, and with the Western educated politician: had he had the good fortune to have had real friends amongst the best of the Chinese, his picture of China would have been clearer, and he would perhaps have shown more sympathy with her problems.

His book is not one which will appeal to the average treaty-port resident, of whom he says truly that "one cannot understand the blindness of many Occidentals long resident in the Orient, who refuse steadfastly to use the common sense with which they were born so as to see that which is in front of their eyes."

Despite the fact that some of the chapters, particularly the early ones, are of little interest, except in so far as they sketch in the author's background, the book is one which should be read by those who have no first-hand knowledge of the Far East, for it paints a true picture of the situation in Japan; for those with first-hand knowledge it will call to mind many old friendships and will refresh their memory as to the historical background to the problems which are facing Japan to-day.

A minor criticism: in his very sympathetic portrait of Toyama Sensei it seems a pity that Mr. Vaughn has made no reference to his connection with the school of Yamaoka. EDWARD AINGER.

72. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PACIFIC. By Gregory Bienstock. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 299 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THE strategical problems of the present situation in the Far East and the Western Pacific have found in Mr. Bienstock a most enthusiastic interpreter from what he repeatedly describes as the geopolitical point of view. This—in contrast with the extremely wide and, consequently, vague use which the term "geopolitics" has tended to acquire in recent years—with him stands for a clear and sharply defined conception of

what Mahan very aptly described as "political strategy," *i.e.* the geographic strategical aspects of a certain area, the "strategical" positions of the various powers interested in it in their relation to each other and their strategical moves by such means as sea-trade, railways, air communications, trade expansion, emigration and territorial expansion. This *political* strategy of the Far East, to which the first two-thirds of his study are devoted (the first part, "The Pacific World in the Making," gives a wide-sweeping historical survey of the general process of the formation of a definite Pacific area as a whole, the second, "Rivalries in the Pacific," analyses the rôle of the leading powers in their struggle for the hegemony of the Far East), in its turn leads to an extensive investigation of the probable features of the *military* strategy of a Russo–Japanese or American–Japanese war which constitutes the central theme of the study.

Unhappily, the execution of this ambitious task is not on a par with its conception. The difficulties of access to really reliable sources—as shown in his bibliography, in which the majority of important contributions to this particular aspect of the Far Eastern question are conspicuous by their absence—have led Mr. Bienstock to rely to an excessive degree upon material of a highly superficial, if not actually doubtful, character. Small wonder that he is constantly in danger not only of being misled into individual misstatements, but, worse still, into missing the real problems altogether and giving either a mere accumulation of data without the fundamental issues underlying them, or substituting for these imaginary "geopolitical" tendencies of his own; a tendency particularly noticeable in his treatment of railways and air communications, and again of the problems of internal political developments in Japan during recent years.

Although Mr. Bienstock does not achieve all that might have been possible on the lines chosen by him (he ignores, for instance, the study of the political strategy of the Far East published by Mahan more than thirty years ago in his *Problem of Asia*), the first two sections of his work are certainly of great interest, giving not only a highly stimulating bird's-eye view of the Far Eastern situation from a point of view till now unduly neglected, but also conveying a good impression of what "geopolitics" at its best is standing and striving for.

Unhappily, the objections mentioned in referring to his geopolitical investigation hold true, in the main, of his strategical observations too, although these form not only the most important, but also by far the best part of his work. Thus his initial estimate of the economic staying power of Soviet Russia and Japan respectively, while succeeding in conveying on the whole a fair conception of the economic forces mobilisable for military supplies on both sides, completely neglects to investigate the wider aspect of the general capability of both States to stand the economic strain of a protracted war—such as he himself is inclined to prognosticate. Again, in his strategical study of a Russo-Japanese war Mr. Bienstock feels himself induced to dismiss the Russian Far Eastern Fleet—certainly the element which has contributed most to change the strategic situation in the Far East in recent years—as negligible, and barely touches the Russian Air Force—obviously the key factor both of the military and the naval strategy of such a war. Moreover, for no ascertainable reason, he bases his whole discussion upon the assumptions—both of them highly arguable—that the Russians will not defend the Vladivostock Area and that initial tactical success will be with the Japanese. In the wider aspects of strategy not

only the problems of the Russian railway system are inadequately dealt with, but also the new Borea–Khingan Kombinat, developed at top speed to make the Far Eastern Army economically independent, is not even named. Finally, in the highest realms of general strategy the analogy of the War of 1904–1905—so illuminative in so many other aspects—unhappily misleads Mr. Bienstock into the assumption that a Russian victory on land would *not* constitute a signal defeat for Japan, and owing to the lack of sea-power would lead to a stalemate, a point again most highly arguable in view of Japan's commitments on the mainland since that time.

These same objections, if to a somewhat lesser degree, apply also to Mr. Bienstock's discussion of the problems of an American–Japanese war in the Pacific. His evaluation of the fighting strength of the American and Japanese fleets respectively is greatly vitiated by the fact that it is based upon figures of several years back. The assumption that the American Fleet will move into Far Eastern waters—despite the fall of Guam and the Philippines predicted for the first days of the war—is made, and the possibility of a purely defensive attitude in the strategic sphere coupled with an indirect attack upon Japan's economic staying power not even envisaged. In the same manner the problems of a commercial blockade of Japan are in no way adequately linked up with the general lines of naval strategy.

Thus the value of Mr. Bienstock's contribution to the study of present-day Far Eastern problems, apart from the general conception, which certainly deserves further development, on the whole rests upon a number of interesting Russian comments upon the strategy of a Pacific war not easily accessible elsewhere—whereas his German sources confine themselves to relatively few and generally highly controversial studies. Beyond this, like so many "geopolitical" studies, his work unhappily misses the full effect of the laborious pains obviously taken in its preparation by being neither fish, flesh, fowl nor good red herring. It is not close enough to its subject in contact and grip to give a vivid journalistic snapshot, while it lacks the depth and width necessary to constitute a treatise of scholarly pretentions.

H. Rosinski.

UNITED STATES

73. Why We Went to War. By Newton D. Baker. 1936. (New York: Harpers, for Council on Foreign Relations Inc. 8vo. vi + 199 pp. $1.50.)

In the United States, as in Great Britain, the disillusionment of the post-War years has given rise to a volume of criticism, much of it cynical, of the official reasons stated at the time for participation in the World War. In Great Britain such criticism as is worth confuting seems now to be concentrated on British relations with Germany before the War and the conduct of foreign policy between the Sarajevo assassination and the declaration of War: in short, it has become a criticism of Sir Edward Grey. In the United States, on the other hand, criticism has been less canalised: like the Mississippi flood, it has covered a wide area and left much air-polluting detritus piled up on the once-cultivated fields of international goodwill. America's interest in other people's quarrels in a remote continent has been variously attributed to the Machiavellian astuteness of allied diplomacy, to the imbecility of German diplomacy, to the

hidden power of financial interests deeply committed to the Allies' victory, and above all to propaganda, the new whipping boy of the international conscience. One indictment is sometimes heard in conversation, though it has appeared less frequently in the press; it is that from the outset President Wilson had made up his mind that while he would prefer to see a peace without victory, he was determined to prevent a German victory or a German-imposed peace.

Each of these criticisms is met and answered by Mr. Baker. He reminds his fellow-countrymen that they were kept well informed about every aspect of America's relations to the belligerent nations, and as to the injuries inflicted upon American rights by those belligerents. Not only did the Press play its part, but the President also kept his countrymen informed in messages which at the time irritated each side in turn and yet now seem to deserve Mr. Baker's encomium, "For clarity and candour as well as eloquent restraint they are among the most remarkable official publications of our times" (page 31).

On both sides of the Atlantic the power of propaganda is too readily accepted to-day by a public which fails to appreciate the limitations of this comparatively new weapon. Mr. Baker (Chapter 8, "Our Domestic Warfare while Neutral") does well to remind us of Sir Cecil Spring Rice's wisdom in deprecating "deliberate efforts on the part of the Allies to set up agents of propaganda in the United States, as Americans do not like being preached at." This applies to other nations besides the Americans: perhaps it is a sign of an Anglo-Saxon complex!

Writing with the authority of a member of President Wilson's Cabinet, Mr. Baker has rendered a service to the historian and to the student of contemporary affairs, by publishing this well-documented, convincing, straightforward and admirably presented statement of the reasons for the entry into the War of the United States in 1917. He confirms what we already knew: America was submarined into the War. As that is too simple an explanation for the brewers of international mischief Mr. Baker's illuminating book is welcome.

R. POPE-HENNESSY.

74. THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1936. By Whitney H. Shepardson, in collaboration with William O. Scroggs. 1937. (New York: Harper Brothers, for the Council on Foreign Relations. London: Hamish Hamilton. 8vo. xiii + 312 pp. $3·00. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS is the fourth annual volume of the Survey of American Foreign Relations in the new series which began in 1932, after the death of Mr. Charles P. Howland. It is the American counterpart of, and the indispensable companion to, the Chatham House *Survey of International Affairs.* To its regular appearance every European student of American affairs looks forward, in the knowledge that the staff of the Council on Foreign Relations will furnish reliable material, and that Mr. Shepardson will interpret it in his characteristic way. Mr. Shepardson contrives with success to be both objective and lively. He accurately describes the scene of the world in 1936, viewed by American eyes, and shows how American opinion moves, now this way, now that, under the influence of the changing forces in international politics, whether in Europe or in the Far East.

In a survey devoted to the year 1936, in the course of which he

has to narrate " the Collapse of the Collective System," " the End of the Pacific Régime " and " the Liquidation of Locarno," it is inevitable that he should be compelled to describe the United States not so much as *in* world affairs, as withdrawing from them into the fancied security of isolation. But the reader will soon see that, while the mood of detachment is perhaps as strong as it has ever been in American history, there is a sense in which the policy of isolation does not fully satisfy the American spirit. Moreover, the present withdrawal from European affairs is mainly political, and Mr. Shepardson is at some pains to show, with convincing evidence, that the mood of isolation has not prevented the Roosevelt Administration from seeking and seizing every opportunity of proving to the American people that their economic relations with the rest of the world cannot be governed by that temper. Some of his most interesting pages are devoted to the trade agreements negotiated by the President and Mr. Cordell Hull under the powers of the Trade Agreements Act; and it must be hoped that the same Act may be the means of an Anglo-American trade agreement in the very near future. No doubt, there are real difficulties on both sides. Doubtless, too, the blend of high principle and horse-dealing, which is one of the many mixed ingredients in any such process of negotiation, tends to make the pathway to an agreement none the easier. But there is a not unhopeful prospect now before us both; and a common recognition, on both sides, of the great political value of such an economic agreement between the two stable democratic Powers should avail to carry them to the desired goal. It may be said here that there is a stronger disposition to make a trade agreement in responsible quarters in London than is commonly supposed in America; and one of the first acts of the new Prime Minister was to press its desirability on his Dominion colleagues at the Imperial Conference.

Isolation, none the less, is the keynote of Mr. Shepardson's story: and the core of his book is to be found in the chapter on " Neutrality " in its new aspect. In the United States in 1936, the neutrality which most people had in mind " was not in the dictionary of diplomats, international lawyers and historians. Nor was it in the book of American experience." This is well said. The American people to-day will have nothing to do with their own historic neutrality, and they reject Judge Bassett Moore and all like him. But it is a curious (and to the British watcher an encouraging) conclusion that now emerges from the American resolve to interpret their neutrality as " keeping out of war " : for the net result of the latest enactment is by no means unfavourable to Great Britain as belligerent. Actually that result lies beyond the calendar year of Mr. Shepardson's book; but the manner in which he has told the story of 1936 whets our appetite for his narrative of 1937. As long as the Council on Foreign Relations continue to give us their annual record of America in World Affairs, written as this one is, their volumes are sure of a permanent place on the bookshelf of Anglo-American relations. A. F. WHYTE.

75. MIDNIGHT ON THE DESERT. A Chapter of Autobiography. By J. B. Priestley. 1937. (London: Heinemann. 8vo. 312 pp. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

As the sub-title implies there is much in this book of purely autobiographical interest. But Mr. Priestley's account of social changes in the United States and the picture of the psychological background

are of some interest to the student of international affairs. In spite of the depression, Communism, he finds, is a fungoid growth which has not caught on. Curiously enough, Hallgren, writing from a very different angle in *Seeds of Revolt* in 1933, notes that even the unemployed were utterly cold to Communism as a way of life. Fascism Mr. Priestley finds equally unlikely to capture America. But the so-called " rugged individualism " is also contrary to the American genius, which is in the main co-operative. Hence the constant attention paid by Lenin and Stalin to American methods. Mr. Priestley believes that the United States is working out something new, satisfying the national genius for concerted effort and co-operation, shaking off what he calls " the adolescent frolics " of individualism, but retaining liberty of conscience and press. President Roosevelt's recent victory, in spite of the hostility of 95 per cent. of the periodicals and over 80 per cent. of the newspaper press, confirms this view. The talk of professors and students at the Universities, the increasing influence of the publications of non-political Foundations all point in the same direction. As Mr. Priestley points out, " a great deal of deck cargo may have to be thrown overboard to save the ship "—for instance, the spoils system and the prevailing corruption in the state, county and city administrations. And " the people of America, so vast and confused, often still stumbling between what remains of an old language and the beginning of a new, have not spoken yet." In a sentence he sums up another puzzle of America. " Money has been poured out in Niagara cataracts in the big cities to build their towers. But if there is much money in the country between, then fifteen hundred miles of it are inhabited by misers."

C. WALEY COHEN.

76. NEITHER PURSE NOR SWORD. By James M. Beck and Merle Thorpe. 1936. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. xiii + 210 pp. 10s.)

77. AFTER THE NEW DEAL, WHAT? By Norman Thomas. 1936. (New York and London: Macmillan. 8vo. ix + 244 pp. 10s.)

ALEXANDER HAMILTON'S statement that the Judiciary has no influence over the sword or the purse is the text which Messrs. Beck and Thorpe develop into a general lament about recent changes in the method of government in the United States. The authors try to give the appearance of impartiality in their account of the development of the American Constitution, but do not succeed in hiding their extreme political views. Their general thesis is that the principles laid down by the framers of the Constitution are exactly applicable to the modern world, and that unless the Federal bureaucracy is curbed, America will develop into a totalitarian State. On controversial questions regarding the origins and intentions of the Constitution the authors are quite uncompromising. They reject the whole liberal case that the Constitution was intended to develop with the times. Many of their historical judgments, made so confidently that the unwary reader may accept them without question, are in fact open to very serious criticism. Still more serious are the criticisms that can be levelled against the sections of the book dealing with economic matters. As a constructive account of American constitutional development this book offers very little of importance. English readers will be more interested in the light which it throws on the minds of its authors. The general fear and distrust

of democracy which are openly expressed illustrate excellently the direction in which a certain section of American opinion is moving.

Mr. Thomas's book is very different in intention. It is a vigorous piece of political propaganda written just before his campaign as socialist candidate for the presidency in 1936. The case against the New Deal from the socialist point of view is cogently argued, and the programme of the American Socialist party is briefly described. The last part of the book is largely devoted to an account of the disputes between various socialist and communist factions. These disputes alone serve to explain the ill-success of all American socialist movements in attracting popular support, and are in strong contrast with the movements for socialist unity in many European countries.

E. A. RADICE.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor,
International Affairs.

SIR,

With regard to the critical article on my book, *Bulgaria Past and Present*, which appeared in your last issue, I believe that my critic must have glanced very superficially over the book to have come to the conclusion that I am suffering "from a violent, even bitter prejudice." For instance, he affirms that the book is divided into two parts, political and economic, when there is a cultural and historical section appended.

All my statements concerning political and economic matters are corroborated by official documents and upheld by public pronouncements made by leading Bulgarian authorities.

Concerning the Refugee Loan, I cite the views of M. Stefanor, a former Bulgarian Minister of Finance, and of other Bulgarian economists, to the effect that the League loans proved ruinous to the country. The *Devisen* alluded to by my critic were merely taken out of the pockets of unwary American and British investors, and transferred to the coffers of French bankers without exercising the least effect in stimulating or benefiting the Bulgarian economic system.

It is unfair to charge an author with bias seeing that only as regards the ancient history of the country have I permitted myself somewhat more latitude, and expressed opinions not in strict conformity with the orthodox views currently held, but which I do not consider to be based upon sufficient proof.

It is regrettable that my outspoken statement should have been mistaken for prejudice and your readers thus given to understand that my book will fail in its object of enlightening them. For this reason I hope I may be allowed to quote some expert opinions which will to some extent correct the unfair and, I believe, unjust judgment passed upon it by my critic.

Thus, Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson, in the *Slavonic Review* of April, 1937, writes :—

"Some years ago Mr. Logio wrote an outspoken volume on post-War conditions in Roumania, and in his latest book he does not hesitate to attack no less fearlessly the pseudo-democracy, bureaucratic incompetence, and ministerial corruption from which Bulgaria has suffered in the post-War period. Mr. Logio is undoubtedly right in affirming that the Agrarian régime . . . completed the work of demoralisation introduced by Ferdinand."

Mr. George Glasgow, in the *Contemporary Review* (Sept. 1936) likewise affirms :—

" The book gives a valuable complete picture of Bulgarian politics, economics, finance, education, agriculture. An honest and trustworthy exposition of this kind is exactly the sort of thing we have been led to expect from Mr. Logio, and will be of immense service to his many British readers."

In conclusion I shall quote a passage from a notice on the book which appeared in the *Geographical Journal* (January 1937). The last paragraph of this weighty, scientific, and therefore impartial verdict may possibly throw some light on the motives which prompt the unsympathetic attitude of my critic :—

" . . . here is perhaps the best-informed and most outspoken book which has yet appeared on Bulgaria. Sound sense and accurate information characterise the whole of the bulky volume, which is packed full of interesting material for whoever wishes to study the present-day conditions, though it may very possibly displease both English and Bulgarian politicians."

Yours truly,
GEORGE CLENTON LOGIO.

Villa " Les Guides "
4 Place Osiris,
Malmaison (S. et O.).
July 12th, 1937.

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The Institute, as such, is precluded by its rules from expressing an opinion on any aspect of international affairs. Any opinions expressed in the papers, discussions, or reviews printed in this Journal are, therefore, purely individual.

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relations and the assurance of peace in Asia. The first affirms that powerful Japanese armies of occupation on the mainland of Asia are the essential guarantees both of tranquillity and economic co-operation. As elsewhere, so in Japan the pendulum swings and public opinion is volatile. In April last it looked as though the second school of thought had a chance of determining government action; by the middle of July the mentality of the first school was driving Japan into a ghastly, unneeded and unwanted war.

In March of this year, an influential group of Japanese industrialists and bankers visited China as members of an Economic Mission. They travelled widely and met a large number of Chinese bankers and business men. The members of the Mission were deeply impressed with the quite extraordinary changes that had taken place in China in the last few years. One of them told me that the Mission on its return to Japan had reported privately to the Government and to the great banking houses that there was abundant opportunity for Japanese trade in China and for the profitable investment of Japanese capital, provided that the North China situation could be cleared up. He told me that the Chinese grievances in North China at that time were serious. Chief among them was the existence of the East Hopei Autonomous Government under Yin Ju-keng, whom the Chinese regarded as a renegade. The wholesale smuggling movement, condoned if not instigated by the local Japanese, and the rapidly expanding opium and heroin traffic from the Japanese concession in Tientsin were other major causes of Chinese irritation and suspicion of Japanese policy in North China. Finally the Chinese asserted that some of the Japanese officers in North China still treasured the hope that they might revive the abortive five-province autonomy movement of two years before and detach the entire area from the control of the Nanking Government. Several Japanese told me that the Chinese felt that so long as these sores existed in North China, economic co-operation between the two countries was impossible; but if the North China situation could be cleared up, then the business men of both countries could work out a mutually beneficial plan of economic development. A group which met under the auspices of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce affirmed that nothing was to be gained by further pressure in North China, and that a settlement of political differences was a prerequisite to economic co-operation.

The chief representative in China of *Domei*, the great

Japanese News Agency, came back to Japan last April with the same report, as a result of his contact with his Japanese correspondents all over China. To members of the General Staff and others he gave a vivid and objective account of Chinese progress in unification and reconstruction. The late Japanese Ambassador to China, Mr. Ariyoshi, had written just before the incident an important article in one of the leading reviews, pleading for a new Japanese policy in China. It was asserted that this was the attitude of those closest to the Royal Family. It was known that the present Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Kawagoe, had come back from China to Japan to urge the Foreign Office that the North China situation must be adjusted if friendly relations between the two countries were to be established. Even a Japanese spokesman in Peiping had said that in certain circumstances a change in the political status of North China and the resumption by China of full political control in the North could be achieved. The then Foreign Minister, Mr. Sato, was known to hold this view, and the Prime Minister, General Hayashi, himself the nominee of the Army, was in agreement as to the necessity of getting the Japanese North China Garrison greatly reduced and of abolishing the East Hopei autonomous régime.

They reckoned, as it now seems, without the Japanese North China Garrison. This Garrison, like any going concern, naturally had no desire to be liquidated. At the time of the Sian and Suiyuan incidents last winter there had been considerable division of opinion between the two Japanese armies on the mainland of Asia—the Kwantung Army in Manchuria and the Japanese North China Garrison at Tientsin. These two armies were a little jealous of each other. Each wanted to do something for the Emperor and the Empire, but there was no clear agreement as to their respective functions. Nor were they agreed as to the future course of Japanese economic policy in North China. Should it be left to the business and banking interests of Tokyo and Osaka, or should it be controlled by the Kwantung Army or by the North China Garrison? When, however, members of the two armies became aware of the growing trend among certain civilian and military elements in Japan in favour of reducing the strength of the Japanese North China Garrison and abolishing the East Hopei régime, they quickly came to a very definite agreement as to spheres of influence and respective activities. This new agreement is said to have become effective on July 1st, 1937.

Already a delegation from East Hopei had gone to Japan to

visit the patron of the autonomy movement in North China, Major-General Doihara, who was at that time Garrison Commander at Hiroshima. Doihara was reported to have stated that, rather than being reduced, the area of the East Hopei Government must be enlarged. As a counter-offensive against the growing Japanese opinion in favour of moderating Japanese policy in North China, a widespread propaganda was launched, with the backing of Japanese soldiers in China, to convince the Japanese people that instead of withdrawing the North China Garrison it must be increased and the area of the East Hopei Government greatly expanded. This campaign did not get wide public support. Indeed, the General Staff in Tokyo had sent out Major-General Tashiro, a very wise and able soldier, to command the North China Garrison and to moderate Japanese activity in Hopei and Chahar. Rumour had it that he had in his pocket the names of over two hundred extremist officers whom he was gradually to weed out and send back to Japan as one means to a better relationship between the two countries. But, alas, he fell seriously ill. While he was at death's door the new plan for co-operation between the Japanese North China Garrison and the Japanese Kwantung Army became effective. According to neutral opinion on the spot, the extremist element which had not yet been weeded out may have decided that the only way to alter opinion in Japan was to create a situation which would force the Japanese people to recognise the necessity of strengthening rather than reducing the army in North China.

According to some of the Japanese officers, the Chinese were becoming less and less amenable to Japan's peaceful advance in North China. They asserted that the Chinese were opposing such Japanese proposals as the following: the building of a railway from Shihkiachwang to Tsangchow, the extension of the Japanese air lines into the centre of the northern provinces, the purchase of land by Japanese for agricultural purposes in Hopei, the assistance of the Japanese Army in fighting Chinese leftists in various parts of China, the organisation of a Sino-Japanese syndicate to exploit the Lungyen Iron Mines near Peiping, and the large-scale development of cotton production in Hopei and Shantung. The Japanese officers noted that Chinese statesmen, in guarded and courteous language, were saying that China's attitude towards Japan could be described as "resistance." The extremist elements in the Japanese Tientsin Garrison were afraid that both their fellow-officers and the public in Tokyo understood this as meaning that no aggressive drive against

Japan was intended; that it indicated simply China's decision to resist if there was further Japanese aggression. Japanese military opinion in North China was clearly divided on this issue. One clique felt that the Chinese were simply sticking up for their own rights in a dignified and legitimate way. The other clique felt that this attitude of independence was a preliminary to definitely aggressive action. Any move by either the national or provincial authorities to bring all of North China under the direct control of Nanking was inevitably regarded by this clique as aggression.

May I now try to describe briefly some of the economic and political trends in China just prior to the outbreak of hostilities? On the political side it was evident to a great many people, including Japanese, that unification in China was proceeding rapidly. The recent report of His Majesty's Commercial Counsellor at Shanghai for the period ending March 31st, 1937, gives substantial evidence of the progress which China has made during the last two years in political unification and economic recovery.

In the matter of trade, crops last year were good and this year were very promising. For the first six months of this year imports increased 30 per cent. over the corresponding period last year, and exports increased by 45 per cent. Remittances from overseas Chinese were beginning again to assume substantial proportions. The currency reforms introduced two years ago were succeeding beyond the hopes of their most enthusiastic protagonists. The growing financial stability was being reflected in increasing Chinese reserves abroad, in the resumption of payments on many foreign loans long in default, and in the willingness of Germany, France, Great Britain and, in a minor way, the United States to recognise that Chinese national credit and Chinese commercial credit were better than they had been for years. The increase in Post Office remittances and in postal savings deposits in distant provinces such as Szechuan and Kansu revealed the expanding area under the Nanking Government's control. In the south, the provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi had buried the hatchet with Nanking and were rapidly proceeding with an extensive programme of economic reconstruction. General Liu Hsiang, Governor of Szechuan, was at long last placing his troops at the disposal of Nanking to be incorporated in the Nationalist Armies. Finally, the Chinese Communists, after their epic march from Kiangsi to Shensi, had substituted negotiation for military action in their dealings with the Government of China. It was known that Nanking and Yennanfu had

discovered that it was possible to place the unification of China ahead of all other considerations.

When I arrived in Peiping on July 5th, two days before the incident, Dr. Hu Shih asked me whether, in view of the fact that I had been in the south, the west, the centre and the north, I could give him any summary of the Chinese attitude towards Japan; whether I found any consensus of opinion all over the country. I replied that it seemed to me that China wanted above everything else to go on with her work of unification and reconstruction; that she was willing to forget Manchuria for the time being; that she was willing to avoid aggression despite the provocation of the Japanese North China Garrison, but that if Japan demanded one more inch of Chinese territory China would be forced to resist, not because she had any certainty of winning, but because further submission would mean the end of the Chinese State. China might be wiped out in resisting, but it was better to be wiped out resisting than wiped out running away.

Let us now turn back to Japan. On the economic side Japan was beginning to experience difficulties. Since 1931, her armament programme, her military and naval budgets and her national debt had been increasing rapidly. The gigantic export boom was beginning to slow down, while her demand for imported raw materials grew apace as she struggled to put her economy on a basis adequate for war-time needs. The armament programme, running each year at a more feverish pace, was beginning to cut into what the average Japanese business man regarded as legitimate business. Many of those engaged in industries other than armaments and the heavy industries were not allowed to make remittances abroad for necessary raw materials, because the equipping of Japan for war-time necessities placed too great a strain on her foreign exchange to permit of normal capital movements.

How can Japan raise the staggering sums that the Army and Navy demand? In the last analysis it comes down to the soul of the people. Their work can be speeded up and simultaneously their standard of living lowered. This is the heroic design for living for the next two years in Japan. I asked the manager of an Osaka cotton mill, employing over two thousand operatives, what his greatest problems were—securing materials, or repairing the machines or handling his labour. "There is only one problem," he said, "and that is the last you have mentioned." To this I replied, "How would you state this

problem?" and quick as a flash he said, "To generate a spiritual motive for collective action in speeding up mass production." It is by the application of this formula to every department of life that the ruling groups in Japan will endeavour to achieve that which would mean financial collapse or revolution or both in most other countries. In the military field, the physical standard for entrance to the army has had to be lowered in order to get enough recruits. In the heavy industries there is an increase in the employment of boys in their middle teens.

During the past year the cost of living in Japan rose rapidly, as wages lagged far behind the rapid rise in wholesale and retail prices. By the end of June the purchasing power of the yen within Japan was probably 28 per cent. lower than in 1931. The sharp rise in living costs naturally produced labour unrest, and a wave of strikes developed in the spring which caused the Government considerable anxiety. Rising commodity prices throughout the world increased the burden of Japan's import requirements, and by the end of July she was faced with an adverse trade balance of Y. 720 million. Heavy gold shipments abroad were required to maintain the stability of the yen; foreign exchange controls were still further tightened, and the gold reserves of the Bank of Japan were revaluated, resulting in a profit to the Bank of Y. 747 million, of which Y. 418 million was to be used to establish an exchange stabilisation fund, and the remainder for the purchase of new gold and for investment in government bonds. The problem of marketing new issues of government bonds to banks already heavily "loaded" with government securities was a serious one, even before the need arose of financing a war budget unsurpassed in Japan's history.

On the political side, the year had been one of growing confusion. Was the parliamentary system to stand or was it to go? During the spring when the Hayashi Cabinet was in office, there was already behind the scenes a large, intelligent group at work whose aim was the formation of a new party—a party which would unite the Army, the Navy, and the civilian business interests in a comprehensive programme for strengthening Japan's economic position and carrying forward the process of national expansion.

At the home of Count Arima at Ogikubo, on December 24th, 1936, several powerful political leaders met together to lay the basis for this new party and to sketch its programme. Besides General Hayashi, who later became Prime Minister, there were no less than three who are now members of Prince Konoye's

Cabinet: Count Yoriyasu Arima, the host, now Minister of Agriculture (his programme is printed in the September number of *Contemporary Japan*), Chikuhei Nakajima, the prominent aeroplane manufacturer, now Minister of Railways, and Ryutaro Nagai, an expert on colonies, now Minister of Communications. This constellation spelled for the Army a positive colonial policy, agrarian reforms, and rearmament in the grand manner. But this was not all. The Army noted that the outspoken Kakichi Kawarada had acted as Prince Konoye's go-between in the creation of his Cabinet. While a Minister in the Hayashi Government, Kawarada had endeared himself to the Fascist element in civil and military circles by announcing just before the April 1937 election that Japan's parliamentary system of government should be altered to that of the corporate State.

Those who met at Count Arima's residence on December 24th, 1936, and several times subsequently to lay the basis for a new "revolutionary" party had very definite objectives. Their aim, and that of their followers, was the mobilisation of all Japan's resources through greatly increased State control of the country's economic life. Prince Konoye, with his scepticism about the old parties and with his flair for making himself the confidant of both the Army and the Navy, appeared the ideal person to head the new Government. When the Hayashi Cabinet fell he was prevailed upon to head the new Government. He turned at once to this group which had been working for a new party.

Prince Konoye had developed the art of listening not only to the Army and Navy, but also to every responsible group in Japan. And so it came about that a large liberal element hailed his leadership with enthusiasm. Some of these affirm that by his swift mobilisation after July 7th, he has really asserted once more civilian control over the Japanese Army, and that he can be relied upon as efficiently to withdraw the army from China the moment he feels it is no longer needed.

Meanwhile, the new party, under Cabinet leadership, is taken more and more for granted. A leftist writer has described it thus, "Certain common elements of the two old-line parties will combine with other Fascistic elements to form a party representing the triple alliance of the army, the banking interests and the armament industry. The remnants of the old-time parties will be gathered up to form a *petit bourgeois* party to represent the medium and small capital interests. Thus the realignment will follow the logical course."

The development of the war situation has resulted in a rapid intensification of State control in Japan. Import restrictions have been placed on many categories of foreign goods, by which the Government hopes to save millions annually, and it is reported that additional control measures will be enacted. The severe strain on the Japanese economic and financial structure imposed by vast war expenditures plus the loss of one of the country's most important markets is not likely to cease with the termination of actual hostilities, and it seems probable, therefore, that State controls adopted as war measures will be found to be equally imperative in the critical period of post-war readjustment.

Looking forward to that day, which may be near or may be distant, when it will be possible to think about the constructive forces in the Far East and in the world generally, what may we count on in China and Japan? China has not yet completed her revolution. The problem of the peasant and the absentee landlord remains to be solved. Though the long, arduous task of getting civilians and warlords alike to recognise the paramount authority of the central government was nearing completion when the war began, the development of a democratic State remained to be achieved. The war may accelerate unification, which must be regarded as a constructive force. Progress towards democracy may be retarded, for in China, as in Japan, war-time necessities will inevitably strengthen the trend towards a totalitarian State. But the necessity of securing the maximum war effort will undoubtedly force the Government to give the masses an assurance of a better life when the war is over, by announcing a far-reaching programme of agrarian reform. It seems probable that sustained public pressure will require the peace-time fulfilment of at least part of this programme, which cannot fail to be of transcendent importance in the social reconstruction of Chinese life.

The Chinese abandoned their anti-foreign feeling against Great Britain the moment they were assured that Britain's desire for economic co-operation was stripped of all British political designs on China. The Chinese will be ready for healthy economic co-operation with Japan the moment they are assured that Japan entertains no ambition for political domination in China.

Is there any likelihood that the forces in Japan which were gaining strength in the spring will again reassert themselves in the formation of Japanese policy? Though within a few hours of the Cabinet's decision to go ahead and punish China, most organisations in Japan were asked to send a signed statement

of the degree to which the Government could count on their support, we know that statements of war aims in such circumstances in all countries differ from the views of the same organisations in later months and years. We all know that there are soldiers and civilians within Japan who feel that the co-existence of an autonomous Japan and an autonomous China is essential to the peace of Asia. The political influence of those who hold this view will steadily increase, provided their programme includes fundamental internal changes and a new foreign policy. Internally they feel they must face once and for all the need of radical agrarian reforms and a wholly new concentration on raising the purchasing power in the home market by subordinating armament expenditure to internal industrial development. Such an internal policy would make possible the adoption of the desired foreign policy. This, I surmise, calls for persuading the British Empire slightly to lower its barriers to Japanese trade; for persuading the United States to alter its immigration legislation in the manner that was imminent in the winter of 1931–32 when the invasion of Manchuria made favourable congressional action impossible; and for persuading the Japanese public that the U.S.S.R. is innocent of any desire to invade Japan. A progressive and collective scaling down of armament expenditure in the United States, Japan, China and the U.S.S.R. in the Far East could release enormous sums of capital for the productive internal investment which is so sorely needed in all four countries.

But a general rise in the standard of living in all countries of the Pacific awaits a generation perhaps yet unborn that recognises the limitation of nationalism, the value of human life and freedom, the indivisibility of peace and the paramount importance of the collective system, nationally and internationally.

Summary of Discussion.

SIR WILLIAM SHENTON said that he had had an experience of thirty years in China. Japan had a long-range and a short-range policy with regard to the Far East. Her long-range project was a complete ultimate domination of the Far East politically, a refusal to recognise the intervention of any other Power there, and a complete monopoly of the economic facilities of the Far East; in other words, Japan regarded China particularly as a source from which she could draw raw materials and as a market in which she could sell her finished products. Fundamentally the unity of China was not regarded as of ultimate benefit to her own foreign policy. Lastly, Russia should always be kept as far away from the Pacific as possible. Contained in the short-

range policy were those benefits which Japan hoped to obtain from the present fracas with China. She hoped to create a puppet State similar to that in Manchukuo right through to the Yellow River, thereby dominating the railway communications of China. She desired to obtain control of a municipal area at Shanghai and possibly also at Canton, and to have advisers in the key positions in the administration of China. Finally, as a result of the present war, she hoped to obtain a very favourable trade treaty. The Chinese, well aware of these aims, had for a long time put up a very strong passive resistance, and there was throughout the length and breadth of the country a powerful anti-Japanese feeling. The two things combined had resulted in the present tragedy.

These trends had developed as they had at the present time for various reasons; one was the general political position of the world to-day. There was the Rome–Berlin axis and the London–Paris axis; Europe was practically back to the old balance of power of 1914. Taking the position of the League of Nations, if Great Britain and the British Empire were eliminated, very little potential force was left to carry out any resolutions it might pass. The United States had a policy of isolation and neutrality, and was faced with economic and labour difficulties. Russia had recently been tried out by Japan in the Amur river; Japan had sunk a couple of destroyers and Russia had smoothed the matter over. Russia was also very much taken up with her own internal political troubles. Therefore the present time was most expedient for operations in China.

How would it be possible to enforce the will of any foreign Power upon Japan? Great Britain would have to move the greater part of her Navy as well as military forces to the Far East with an unappeased Germany in the rear. What military aid could France give with an unappeased Germany sitting upon her front doorstep? Complete co-operation was necessary to make the application of economic sanctions effective. Would the United States refuse the supply of oil? Would Australia refuse to supply wool? Would Egypt and the Southern States of America refuse to supply cotton? Only one channel remained open, diplomacy. It was no good blackguarding a country by passing resolutions unless they could be backed up by force and sanctions. Diplomacy was a channel along which Japan was prepared to be approached. In Nanking it would be pointed out to the Chinese that although she had the sympathy of the whole world, she would have to face the bayonets and the cold steel alone, also that Japan must, for her future development, look to the economic resources of China. To Japan the diplomatic representatives of foreign Powers would point out the world opinion against her, her future dependence upon China, and the necessity of gaining her ends in a manner which would not create a boycott against her throughout China and resentment on the part of the rest of the world.

To the merchants, the bankers, the insurance representatives and the shipping people the speaker wished to point out that when

the war was over they would still wish to trade with both China and Japan; therefore the position should be handled with care.

MAJOR E. AINGER agreed with the picture drawn by the last speaker, but pointed out that the lecturer had mentioned the existence of a party in Japan who wished to arrive at identically the same end, but by a policy which could appeal to the sympathy of both China and the rest of the world. That party had probably felt at the time of the February revolt that the Army had disgraced itself, and that it would be able to enforce its policy through the Army's shame. The Army, on the other hand, felt that it had cleaned up politics, and it was for the politicians to be humble, and not the Army. Hence there was a good deal of ill-feeling which had been superficially smoothed over during the Army's attack on China. This had revived the power of the Army. As the lecturer had said, there was a deep cleavage in Japan, and nobody really knew where the power lay, but there was no doubt that there was a very strong body of opinion which favoured a much slower and more conciliatory policy. There was no doubt that this opinion would grow. But there still remained the Japanese aim of setting up heavy industry in the Far East. This was only natural, considering the attitude of certain Western Powers who were now taking an attitude of condemnation towards Japan. Their policy had been in the past even more brutal and realistic than that put into the mouth of Japan by the last speaker.

It was necessary to understand both China and Japan so as to be able to mediate when the time came. Above all, it was necessary to understand the psychology of the two peoples. Japan was a very sentimental nation at heart. They realised that when they had been barbarians they had taken their civilisation first from China, and then later their material civilisation from Britain at the time of the Meiji epoch, and there was no doubt that they were very grateful to both States. The Chinese, too, realised that they had given their civilisation to the Japanese, but they were a very proud people. Because of the fact that the Japanese people were grateful to Great Britain for what she had received at her hands, that nation was probably the one nation who could mediate when the time came, and so bring an era of peace to the Far East.

MR. N. SKENE SMITH, who had just come back from Japan, said that the Japanese had a number of grievances against the West. When Japan became a united nation three hundred years ago, she was immediately beset by problems of Western intervention. Spanish and Portuguese missionaries had come over and were making converts in large numbers. The Japanese did not mind this so much from the religious point of view, but it seemed evident that these missionaries were preparing the way for foreign control over the government of Japan; also the Japarese knew the state of Europe, which was torn by religious wars, and, not wishing to be involved, had driven the

missionaries out and closed the country. It remained so for two hundred and fifty years. This enabled Japan to develop along unique lines, which remained the basis of her modern civilisation. In the middle of last century, when an internal explosion was inevitable, Western intervention had come in the shape of the black ships of Commander Perry, who had hinted that if Japan did not open her doors to trade he would blast them down. Later, British, French and other fleets bombarded Japan, and she realised that she must become strong and obtain a knowledge of science. She acquired this knowledge, and very soon astonished her neighbour China, with whom she had a quarrel at the end of the century over the nearest State, Korea. Japan was the victor, and obtained the Liao-Tung Peninsula, thinking that she would now enjoy the fruits of her "rightful" conquest. Russia, supported by France and Germany, advised her to return the territory, and Russia became the arch-enemy. Japan had been insulted, and when Japan was insulted she killed. That was the creed of the Japanese samurai. This might not seem a very Christian attitude, but Japan was not a Christian country. She had later beaten Russia and gained the lease over the South Manchurian railway zone which she had developed very efficiently. At the beginning of the depression in 1929–31, development was held up, and further, Manchurian political conditions outside the railway zone were in a disgusting state. The army became impatient. Suddenly the main line of Japan's enterprise in Manchuria was blown up (nobody to this day knows who did it), and the army just stormed into Manchuria. This, many Japanese would admit, might have been wrong, but they pointed out that Japan did invite the Lytton Commission to come out and investigate. The Commission worked in a way in which every reasonable Westerner who had never studied Japan would have done, but it ignored the psychology of the Japanese people. To begin with, Lord Lytton was an ex-Governor of India, and the Japanese felt that he spoke to them as a ruler. The Army, naturally, felt that the Commission was adopting an attitude of censure. The members of the Commission were irritated by the spying of the Japanese. But the Japanese have for centuries employed spies or "censors." In the past their conception of law was so flexible that it was necessary to have people whose business it was to see that the bounds of flexibility were not exceeded. Instead of saying that the Japanese had previously made a fine job of Manchurian development, and then asking the Army to compromise, to be a little less excessive in its demands, the Lytton Commission said that the Japanese had broken the law. This might be true, but it was not the thing to persuade the Japanese, because in their view reasonable laws must be flexible. They must be "broken," in a Western sense, if they are to exist. Japanese law was rather a statement of opinion of the Government at a given moment and should not be enforced rigidly. Only in this way had Japanese statesmen been able, throughout the centuries, to keep the peasants in a reasonable state of comfort, and at the same time of servitude. The Commission also said

that most Chinese in Manchuria strongly opposed the new Government, and that the State would go bankrupt. Neither of these statements had yet been proved true. Next came the export boom. This began to diminish in 1933–34. Then came the "incidents" of 1936 and the attempt to get peace with China. What had prevented that peace? In July, in Peiping, it was generally agreed that things were much quieter, the drug traffic and smuggling were diminishing, and Japanese troops were much less in evidence. Then it was reported that one night, when the Japanese were out on manœuvres, they were fired upon. They took the roll-call, and found that a man was missing. They then went to the Chinese and asked if they would co-operate in searching for their man. The Chinese refused, with the result that the Japanese departed and immediately bombarded the Chinese. The next day truce negotiations started. Perhaps the report was wrong, but who knows the facts? Time would not allow of a description of later events, but it was hoped that this brief, and therefore not strictly accurate, account of the problem had shown that the need was not for protests, but a wider study and realisation of the complex Japanese outlook.

DR. IAN CLUNIES ROSS said his own opinion of Japanese affairs was diametrically opposed to that of 90 per cent. of his countrymen, but at the present time Australia's attitude to the immediate conflict was fairly clear. Resolutions were being passed there very much in the same way as they were being passed in Great Britain, suggesting that the Government should impose sanctions and boycott all trade with Japan. Some more militant people with apparently even higher principles had refused to load wool on to Japanese ships. He was not saying that the Government would endorse either these resolutions or these actions, but in 1935 it had been prepared to endorse sanctions against Italy which had meant a loss of the Australian wool trade with Italy. Even now if sanctions were generally imposed he felt sure that Australia would bear her share of the burden, but at present she did not think that there was any possibility of this being done.

The present situation was tragic for China and Japan alike. The trouble was undoubtedly precipitated in the north by the Japanese military imperialists, who realised that if they did not seize the opportunity immediately to create the empire on the mainland which had long been their dream, the chance would probably disappear for ever. Even four months ago he had thought that there was a possibility of the differences between the two countries being settled peaceably. A Japanese business man in Sydney who was in touch with official thought in Japan had told him that such a possibility existed. He had added, however, that there were two potential causes of trouble in the near future. One was the Japanese military party; the Navy travelled widely, and were better informed, but the Army did not, and their world was bounded by the horizons of the Japanese empire. The second danger came from the unification of China, and consequently

her consciousness of greater strength and the too great confidence which this engendered. Two years ago in Shanghai the speaker had heard Chinese state that the Chinese Air Force was growing rapidly and could offer serious resistance to Japan. At that time it was said that a thousand pilots had already been through the schools, and a hundred more a month were being trained. Thus a bellicose attitude on the part of the Chinese had grown up and was capable of setting alight the dangerous situation already in existence. Last June there had already been incidents not reported in the Australian Press, such as an attack on the Japanese Consular Police at Swatow, and an attack by university students on the Japanese flag at Tsingtao, which were indicative of an increasing aggressiveness on the part of many elements, and particularly the students and army in China.

He deplored the attitude of moral superiority adopted in Great Britain that Japan was committing atrocities which would be entirely absent on our side if we were engaged in war. The Japanese, though not good haters, in warfare were, and always had been, ruthless, and the Japanese woman had no special place in society, so that to give any special rights to women in war-time would be quite foreign to the Japanese military man. He knew war was a beastly business, and the Japanese would feel his action in killing ruthlessly but rapidly ten or twenty hundred thousand civilian men, women or children to be no more brutal than that of the Allies in the Great War, when they imposed what they hoped would be slow starvation upon millions of people in Germany, and no less upon the women and children. Nor was it. He would consider, as we had done, only that the war was thus being shortened. It was war itself which was wrong. If war were accepted as a means of settling international disputes, then these brutalities must follow, in any war and amongst any peoples.

Sir Frederick Whyte said that it was significant that the Japanese army had embarked upon a campaign of unusual magnitude at this moment. He thought that General Chiang Kai-shek was optimistic when he said that in two years China would have military parity with Japan, but there was not the slightest doubt that the Japanese General Staff had made up their minds to strike before the hour of parity arrived. The most striking event in China during the last few years had been the Sian-fu incident last December. He was sure the lecturer would agree that had that event occurred in 1930 or 1931 General Chiang Kai-shek would not be alive to-day; and the reason why he had survived was not because Madame Chiang Kai-shek took her life in her hands and went to intervene, but fundamentally because the Young Marshal and his Tungpei army and General Yang Hu-Cheng and the Communists realised that General Chiang, if he could be persuaded to do so, was the only person who could lead a united China against Japan when the hour struck. This was the factor—the growing unity of China—which the Japanese General Staff had ignored. During the last twenty-five years it had

been easy enough to deal with isolated incidents from time to time in China. But now it was no longer a question of dealing only with North China, they could not attack any part of China without summoning the whole country to resist their aggression.

The fundamental trouble in the Far East to-day was the enormous disturbance created by the Chinese Revolution and exploited by the Japanese military party. There had been faults on both sides. With regard to Manchuria, had the Japanese chosen to place their case before an impartial tribunal, judgment would certainly have gone against the administration of the Young Marshal, but they did not do so; and although the Japanese had a powerful case, it did not justify the action which they had taken. The day would come when the Japanese would regret ever having challenged the growing power of the Chinese people.

The speaker said that he would like the lecturer to set the very interesting picture which he had painted of the respective forces and influences in both China and Japan in its international framework, to examine the part which those Powers outside the Far East could play immeditaely in order to right affairs in that part of the world. He agreed with the writer of the leading article in the *Manchester Guardian*, who warned people not to talk loosely of an official boycott in the shape of sanctions applied against Japan at the moment. Economic sanctions were no use unless backed by force without stint; this could not be forthcoming against Japan at the present moment; and it was significant to see a recognition of this fact in the *Manchester Guardian*, of all papers. To cease buying Japanese goods in the shops would simply range all the small Japanese producers on the side of the military party, and would not deter that party from its present purpose. When it came to the question as to whether His Majesty's Government would impose economic sanctions upon Japan, it was only necessary to look at their former record to find the answer.

The Rt. Hon. A. V. Alexander, M.P. (in the chair) said that he wished that people in Great Britain and the other major States had understood better the message arising out of the discussions at the Yosemite Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations that, unless some helpful negotiations were instituted between China and Japan, war was certain.

One very important aspect of all discussion regarding any action to be taken, was what would the attitude of Great Britain be in any future disputes. Was it, then, necessary to sit down in a state of complete and utter defeatism with regard to the future of the world? For if no action could be taken against such wholesale slaughter, and the philosophy of a great nation to do what it liked when it liked to get what it wanted, then it was a direct encouragement to other Great Powers outside the collective system to do likewise. Not in this way would the basis be built of a collective and judicial system which would deal with wrongs and maintain a just peace.

MR. CARTER said that he would, in accordance with the wishes of the speaker before the last, refer to the setting in which the present conflict found itself in some of the other countries.

The position of Soviet Russia was apt to be misunderstood because of the way in which the U.S.S.R. was at present regarded by the rest of the world. The Japanese seemed certain that the Red Army was disorganised and immobilised. The lecturer had recently been in the Soviet Far East, and had seen many members of the Red Army. They appeared to feel that with the removal of the eight generals they were stronger than ever before, that morale had improved, and that they were fully prepared for every contingency. What was regarded in many countries at the time of the Amur incident as evidence of weakness in the U.S.S.R. would probably be discovered eventually to have been evidence of strength on the part of the Kremlin. Soviet citizens in the Far East, when asked whether Soviet Russia was going to China's assistance, said that they did not yet know what the attitude of their Government would be, but that it was likely that if Soviet Russia was the only country willing to help China, this might embarrass the Nanking Government. If, however, the League proposed collective action, it was believed that the Soviet Government might give some material aid to China. Distance and the lack of communications would presumably prevent large-scale support. Should the Japanese Army cross the frontier into the Outer Mongolian People's Republic, then the Red Army would have no alternative but to strike. The lecturer was of the opinion that it would strike with vigour.

With reference to France, Great Britain and the United States, it would appear that they were trying to say to each other that if someone would take the lead, the others would follow. In France, opinion regarding the Far East did not seem to be as divided as it was in 1931–32 The members of the Right, the Centre and the Left had all spoken with considerable vehemence regarding what they described as Japanese aggression. Friends in France had said to the lecturer, "We are tied in the Mediterranean, so that the Far Eastern situation is clearly up to the United States." When English friends had said the same thing, he had been indiscreet and replied that Washington had had the feeling that at the time of Manchuria and Abyssinia she had been willing to go a little further than London, and that as British interests in China were so much greater than American interests, it would be only courteous for the United States in this case to let Great Britain take the lead. When they had pressed him further, he had added that if the time ever came when the British Government earnestly desired American co-operation anywhere in the world, it might be well for the United Kingdom Government and the Dominions immediately to join hands with the present Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, and complete the negotiations for an Anglo-American trade agreement. It so happened that Mr. Hull was a man of considerable stature in the United States, who was convinced that one of the principal highways

to the collective system was through reducing trade barriers. He believed that some of the most deep-seated and just grievances of the restless nations sprang from the present world-wide tendency to restrict international trade. The people of France, Great Britain and the United States were all waiting to see whether Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull, who had thus far circumvented the Neutrality Act, would lead American public opinion to support positive action.

With reference to China, the lecturer felt that the soldiers of Japan would never respect a pacifist China. They would only honour a Chinese nation which could fight the Japanese Army to a standstill. If this were true, those who were helping the Chinese with munitions might be blessing the Japan of the future by lessening the temptation of the Army to waste the country's patrimony in ever more expensive and devastating adventures on the mainland. Manchuria had not yet become an economic paradise for Japan, and the permanent occupation of coastal China would be even more expensive. Even the conquest of the Five Northern Provinces would encounter both passive and active resistance on a scale unknown in Manchuria.

Now that the League Powers and the United States had condemned Japan for her aggression, it was up to them to study afresh Japan's real grievances against many of the Western Powers with a view to their ultimate appeasement. Both Great Britain and the United States had it within their power to help Japan without sacrificing an iota of Chinese sovereignty. The Powers might feel that it was necessary to continue the non-recognition policy, and perhaps apply it for a time to a wider area. But this should not blind them to Japan's economic need of wider markets and her psychological need for the recognition of racial equality. Even if Japan occupied the whole coastal plain of China, there would still be an inland China growing stronger all the time, which would harass the army of occupation. If the Powers accepted too lightly a new and temporary *status quo* in the hope of safeguarding present investments, they would be rendering no service either to Japan or China or themselves. No friend of Japan could wish for the progressive impoverishment of the Japanese people that would result from the prolonged occupation of China. In spite of the war-feeling that was sweeping China and Japan to-day one thing stood out clearly and that was that among the masses in both countries the desire for peace was deeper than the desire for war. The far-seeing statesmen of Japan knew that they could have peace with China when they were able to succeed in persuading Japan's representatives in China to *act* as their spokesmen *talked* when they said that Japan had no territorial ambitions. When this time came, the amazing industry and creative energies of the Japanese and Chinese peoples could be released to play their predestined rôle in the building of the commonwealth of nations.

RECENT AMERICAN NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION[1]

By Professor James W. Garner

There is to-day a widespread popular belief throughout the United States that Europe is on the verge of another Great War, and some of my fellow-citizens are convinced that this war is just around the corner. They are fully determined, whether it is near or far away, that the United States shall keep out of it if it is humanly possible to do so. Some of them are convinced that the causes which brought the United States into the last great European war can be avoided, by the very simple and easy process of levying embargoes on trade with the belligerents, by prohibiting them from obtaining money in the United States with which to finance their war, by taking American ships off the seas and by prohibiting American citizens from travelling on ships of belligerent nationality.

A large number of Americans believe that the United States was not justified in going into the World War and that that war was brought on by causes which really did not involve the vital interest of the American people. They believe that the entry into the War by the United States was due in large part to a feeling that it was the national duty of the government to protect the manufacturers of arms and munitions and to enable them to enhance their profits; finally, they believe the United States government was influenced in no small degree by the sympathy of the people of the United States for France and Great Britain.

Those causes, we are told, can be eliminated when the next war comes, if unhappily it should come. We are told in the United States to-day that although the immediate cause which brought the United States into the World War was Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, that policy was caused by the traffic in American arms and munitions. I do not share that opinion. I think the facts are quite otherwise, and I believe this view of the matter has been effectively demolished by some of the very best American writers on the World War and on the prob-

[1] Address given at Chatham House on July 8th, 1937; Professor C. K. Webster, Litt.D., F.B.A., in the Chair.

lems of neutrality which it raised for the United States. Among them I might mention Mr. Newton Baker, who was Secretary of War in the Cabinet of President Wilson, Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, the author of the standard life of Woodrow Wilson, and Professor Charles Seymour, now President of Yale University. All of these gentlemen, and others, have, I think, shown beyond controversy that it was not the traffic in arms and munitions which led Germany to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. On the basis of my own studies I am convinced that what led Germany to resume her policy of unrestricted submarine warfare was her determination to destroy the sea power of Great Britain, to isolate her, to starve her into submission and compel her to sue for peace. We have abundant testimony to that effect in the pronouncements of the late General von Hindenburg and General von Ludendorff.

As to the charge which is made to-day by certain United States Senators that the international bankers influenced the great decision of the United States, I have only to express my opinion that that influence was nil. The international bankers had no access to President Wilson, and, if they had had access, it would not have influenced him in the slightest.

In August 1935, when the war between Italy and Ethiopia was impending, and when it was widely predicted in the United States that other European countries would be drawn in, the Congress of the United States made haste to pass an act, the avowed purpose of which was to safeguard the United States from being drawn into that war, if unhappily it should come. The chief provision of this act was the imposition of an automatic embargo on arms, ammunition and implements of warfare, shipped not only to the belligerents who might be engaged in the war, but also to the other neutral countries from which they might be transshipped to or for the use of belligerents. The President of the United States was authorised by the statute to determine what articles should be comprehended within the category of arms, munitions and implements of warfare, and in October 1935, after the war between Italy and Ethiopia had broken out, he issued a proclamation in which he construed the language of the statute very strictly, adding no articles to the list which were not finished products, *i.e.* which were not, strictly speaking, arms or implements of warfare. If he had chosen to do so, it is difficult to see what could have prevented him from adding to the list unfinished products which enter into the manufacture of arms and munitions; he did not do so largely because a pledge had been

made in the Senate by one of his supporters that he would not exercise his discretionary authority in this respect. The embargo on arms and munitions and implements of war did not, therefore, include any commodities which are essential to the manufacture of the implements of war or in the conduct of war, such as copper, petroleum, scrap-iron, steel, tractors and other articles of this sort.

The Act did not levy an embargo on loans; no prohibition therefore was laid on the right of belligerents to borrow money in the United States for the purpose of financing their wars. Congress may have thought that it was not necessary to do this in view of the Johnson Act, passed several years ago, which prohibits the lending of money to countries which have defaulted upon their war debts to the United States. This, as you know, includes most of the European countries. Whether the failure to place a ban upon loans was due to inadvertence, or to the desire to leave the privilege of borrowing money in the United States still open, I am not certain.

The Act authorised the President in his discretion to exclude war submarines from the ports of the United States. You will recall that during the World War both commercial submarines and war submarines were admitted to American ports freely, and that the governments of Great Britain and France both protested to the United States against this policy, arguing that after refuelling and recuperation, the submarines went out into the ocean, and sank defenceless merchant vessels. The United States, however, did not comply with the Franco-British demand that the submarines should be excluded.

Another provision of the 1935 Act forbade American citizens from travelling on ships of belligerent nationality except at their own risk. You will recall the *Lusitania* incident in which one hundred and twenty-eight American citizens were drowned. The United States at that time vigorously denied the right of a belligerent to sink an unarmed merchant vessel without taking off the crew and passengers, and providing for their safety, and the United States required Germany to acknowledge her wrong and to make compensation to the survivors of the victims of that horrible affair. However, since there had been some doubt as to whether or not neutrals had a lawful right to travel on ships of belligerent nationality, and wishing to avoid controversy of this kind in the future, Congress decided to put the risk upon the traveller, and disclaimed thereby any obligation on the part of the government of the United States to defend the claim of any

American citizen who might be the victim of such an affair in the future.

This in broad outline was the Neutrality Act of 1935. Viewed in the most charitable light it was nothing but a piece of stop-gap legislation; it was incomplete, it was half-baked, having been passed at the tail-end of a long session of Congress, when the members of that distinguished body were frazzled out by the torrid months of a Washington summer. We need not, therefore, be surprised if this first attempt at legislation to safeguard the United States against being drawn into future wars should have proved so great a disappointment to the people of the United States. The law, I may add, was limited to a duration of two years, but its life was prolonged for another fourteen months in February 1936. The Act thus prolonged was to expire on May 1st of this year. Congress, therefore, in the spring of the present year, made haste to pass another statute to renew and extend the expired statute of 1935; it also made certain modifications of and additions to it. In the first place, it took away from the President the discretion provided in the earlier statute, in regard to levying embargoes on exportations of arms and munitions to countries which subsequently entered the war, *i.e.* subsequently to his proclamation of the existence of a state of war. Congress was clearly afraid that the President might abuse this discretion; for example, he might show sympathy for the League of Nations, which might find itself at war with some aggressor, and the members of Congress wanted to be sure that the President would have no discretionary authority to show his sympathy towards the League or to adopt any line of conduct which might possibly bring the United States into the war.

A second provision of the new statute laid an embargo on loans to belligerents. As I mentioned previously, the Johnson Act had already in effect done that, but there are still a few countries which are not debtors of the United States, or have not defaulted on their war debts, for example, Canada, Japan, China, and some others. Congress therefore extended the ban upon loans to any and all belligerents in future wars, whether they are outlawed by the Johnson Act or not. This was the first time in the history of the United States in which a prohibition was laid upon loans by American banks or individual capitalists to belligerents. When the World War broke out, under the pacificist influence of Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of State, the government of the United States informed the great bankers of the country, when they enquired of the Department of State whether it would view

with disapprobation the lending of money to the European belligerents, that in its opinion it would be inadvisable for American bankers to lend money to any European belligerent provided it was done through the form of a popular loan, partly because the sympathies of the lenders would be determined by the prospects of victory for this or that side. Now what happened? We began to sell arms and munitions and other supplies to the European belligerents in huge quantities, and streams of gold began to flow into the United States, the profits of American manufacturers and traders soared to unimagined heights when suddenly it became evident that the European belligerents who were transferring huge supplies of gold to the United States, could not continue to do so indefinitely since a belligerent is under the necessity of conserving its gold reserve. The American manufacturers were confronted, therefore, by the fact that unless the ban on loans and credits were lifted, the European belligerents could not continue indefinitely to buy supplies. So the United States was confronted by the prospect of an economic breakdown of the country, and the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State went to President Wilson and said, "Now we are inconsistent. We are quite willing to sell supplies to the belligerents, but we will not lend them money with which to continue their purchases. We will not permit them to establish credits in the United States, and unless we do it, this large and profitable trade is going to come to an end very soon." President Wilson was convinced by the logic of the argument and the ban on loans was lifted. From then on, until the end of the period of American neutrality, loans, or I should say credits, were established in the United States for any European belligerent wishing to buy American supplies.

That was our policy in regard to loans during the period of American neutrality in the World War. That policy now has been changed; the new Act of Congress puts up the bars and, from now on, no belligerent will be allowed to borrow money in the United States, except, and here is an important qualification, except that when in the judgment of the President it may promote the security and well-being of the people of the United States, he may permit relaxations from this statute. He may permit belligerents to establish ordinary commercial credits in the United States and incur short-time financial obligations, whatever those terms may mean. My guess is that in the event of another European war, if there should arise a large and profitable trade between the United States and the European belligerents, and

great pressure should be exerted upon the President as it was upon President Wilson, the President of the United States would construe his authority in a very liberal way and credits and short-time obligations would be allowed. I think the public opinion of the United States would demand it.

I have no time to discuss the expediency of a ban on loans as one of the means of keeping a neutral country from being drawn into war; I can only say that I am very doubtful as to its utility in safe-guarding the neutrality of the country which adopts it.

Another curious provision in this recent neutrality legislation is the exception which the statute makes in the case of any Latin American country which happens to find itself at war with a non-American State; in that case the embargo, the prohibition on loans, the restrictions upon travel on belligerent ships, and other restrictions which the Act provides for, do not apply to such a belligerent, provided it is not co-operating with a non-American State in a war against another State, which is another way of saying that the Latin American belligerent will not be entitled to this exemption if it happens to be a member of the League of Nations and is co-operating with the League in military measures against an aggressor, and there are sixteen Latin American countries which may be in that category. Why was that exception made in favour of a particular class of Latin American belligerents? The assumption was that, if any Latin American country should find itself at war with a non-American country, we will say some European country, the European country would be an aggressor upon the Latin American country, and therefore the Monroe Doctrine would be involved. But is that assumption necessarily true? I can easily conceive of a war between a Latin American country and a European country in which the aggressor would not be the European country but the Latin American country. I can, for example, easily conceive of a war between Great Britain and Venezuela in which Venezuela would be the aggressor; but it matters not under the statute—the embargo, the ban on loans, the restriction on travel on belligerent ships apply to Great Britain, but not to Venezuela. We give the benefit to Venezuela even though she be the aggressor.

Now, I cannot quite reconcile that provision with the basic principle of the statute, namely that its object is to insure equality of treatment to all belligerents alike and to preserve the neutrality of the United States. Suppose the United States, in a war of the kind I have mentioned between Great Britain and Venezuela in

which Venezuela were the aggressor, applied the embargo and all restrictions of the Act against Great Britain but not against Venezuela; as an international lawyer on a small scale, I would say that such an act on the part of the United States might justly be construed by Great Britain as an act of unfriendliness, and might be regarded as sufficient cause for war.

This renewed statute of 1936 was, as I have previously noted, scheduled to expire on May 1st, 1937. The statute which was approved by the President on May 1st this year to take the place of the earlier law contains some new features in addition to those of the old statute, and I should like to call your attention to one or two of them, because I think they are of particular interest to English people. The original American Neutrality Act did not provide for an embargo on any other commodities than arms, ammunition and implements of warfare. It left trade in all other objects free, and without restriction. Now, I think it is apparent to anyone that, from the point of view of neutrality, the line of demarcation between arms and implements of war on the one hand and the articles which enter into their manufacture on the other—the distinction between the finished product and the unfinished product—is very shadowy. I do not think the distinction is logical. If the purpose of an embargo is to remove the causes of conflict between neutrals and belligerents in matters of trade, it is utterly futile to lay an embargo on arms and munitions but to leave trade free in the other articles which are just as essential to the carrying on of war. The ships of a neutral which carry these other commodities are just as likely to be seized and interfered with, diverted from their courses, destroyed or their cargoes confiscated as are the ships which carry arms and munitions. In other words, if a neutral is going to lay an embargo to keep it from being involved in disputes and conflicts with a belligerent it will have to lay a totalitarian embargo. That is, it will have to lay an embargo not only on arms and munitions but also on oil, rubber, steel, scrap-iron and chemicals, even clothing and provisions, because in modern wars they are all put on the list of contraband. Now, some of the American members of Congress have been quite willing to go the whole length. There is a small group of Senators and representatives in Washington to-day who are pressing a bill to prohibit the sale of arms and munitions to foreign countries even in time of peace. If such a bill should be passed, it would be unlawful for an American manufacturer of firearms to sell to-day to a Canadian hunter a shot-gun with which to shoot ducks or wild geese.

Obviously a totalitarian embargo which would take the United States off the high seas, which would remove all causes of conflict with belligerents, would ruin the United States in a European war of wide area, especially if it were a war of long duration. Some of our isolationist friends do not seem to have appreciated that fact. The United States exports to foreign countries fifty-five per cent. of all the commodities produced in the country. In the event of a long-drawn-out widespread European war, a total stoppage of that export trade would bring on an economic depression in the United States, with widespread distress and suffering, and would ruin various American industries. My guess is that public opinion in the United States would not tolerate it very long. We tried it once. We laid an embargo on trade with foreign countries in the days of Thomas Jefferson, and it failed completely. It brought ruin and distress and suffering to large parts of the United States; it also proved impossible to enforce the law. It almost brought about the secession of New England, which suffered most from the embargo, and finally public opinion became so strong and widespread in favour of the repeal of the embargo that the same Congress which passed it had to repeal it: and I should not be surprised if, should we have recourse to an embargo in the future on the same scale, American history would repeat itself.

As a matter of fact, as the discussion of the recent neutrality legislation proceeded, the idea of an embargo on anything but arms and munitions was finally abandoned. The more the members of Congress thought it over, the more they came to realise that a general embargo on all the trade of the United States was impossible. I have an idea that the visit to Washington of your President of the Board of Trade, Mr. Walter Runciman, had something to do with this change of sentiment in Congress. It is no secret around Washington that Mr. Runciman told the President and his advisers who were talking to him about a reciprocal trade agreement between the two countries, that Great Britain would not be interested in any trade agreement with the United States which provided that at the very time Great Britain most needed supplies from the United States, namely in time of war, the American market would be closed to her. And so the idea of the embargo on other articles than arms and munitions was dropped, and I am happy to say that the present legislation does not provide for it.

At the same time it was clear to Congress that if trade in other essential commodities than arms and munitions with

belligerents was left free there would certainly be disputes and conflicts of exactly the same nature as would be the case with trade in arms and munitions. Congress therefore had to find some means of reducing the possibility of those disputes and, at the same time, preserve to the people of the United States the advantages of trade in other articles than arms and munitions. Congress found the solution, at least it apparently so believes, in what is called the "cash and carry" system, which was adopted as a substitute for an embargo. Under the "cash and carry" system the United States says, in effect, to all belligerents: "Our markets are open to you for everything you want except arms and munitions, which are subject to an embargo. But everything else you can have, provided you come and get them, take them away in your own ships, pay cash for them, and acquire the legal title to them before they leave the United States." Under this arrangement when a ship sails from an American port, let us say, with a cargo of oil or copper, that ship will not belong to any citizen of the United States, the copper will not belong to him, and no citizen of the United States will therefore be interested in whether the ship is sunk or the cargo captured. The scheme at first appearance would seem to be an effective one and is manifestly preferable to an embargo which stops trade entirely. But it has some disadvantages. While foreign ships are carrying cargoes of American supplies American ships are idle and may be rotting in the harbours. American shipbuilding firms will be closed down. And another difficulty lies in the fact that since the purchasing belligerent must pay cash in gold for supplies obtained in the United States, in a long-drawn-out and wide-spread war how long could a belligerent continue to transfer to the United States the huge quantities of gold that would be necessary to pay cash for these supplies? As I have said, nations in time of war have to conserve rigorously their gold supply. What countries, we may ask, are going to be able, under this "cash and carry" system, to buy supplies in the United States? There is one and one only that I know of which will be able to do it for any great length of time, and that is Great Britain. Great Britain is fortunate in having a large supply of gold; she also has the ships with which to carry these supplies. Moreover, she controls the seas and can keep her enemies off. It is quite true that she will not be able to borrow money from the United States with which to pay for American supplies, but she will not need to do so because British investors hold to-day more than a billion dollars' worth of American securi-

ties, and Canadian investors hold another billion. The British government in time of need can therefore convert this huge quantity of securities into American credits, and so far as I can see the " cash and carry " system will not affect her seriously. Now that cannot be said of the countries who are likely to be the enemies of Great Britain. In a war, for example, with any one of the Continental dictators not one of the latter would be able to avail himself of the American market because of the naval supremacy of Great Britain to which I have just referred and because of their lack of gold with which to pay for American goods. Now that leads me to say that the " cash and carry " system is almost certain to operate unequally in spite of the fact that all through the recent neutrality legislation there runs like a red thread the basic idea of absolute impartiality and equality of treatment of all belligerents. But there will be no equality of treatment when Great Britain alone will be able to avail herself of the American market. I confess personally that I am not worrying over that, because in a war between Great Britain and a continental European dictator American public opinion will support this inequality of operation. But the " cash and carry " scheme will not always operate in this way. Take a war between China and Japan; under the " cash and carry " system Japan will have access to American markets while China will not, although Japan may be the aggressor and China the victim, and American public opinion will be on the side of China. In any case this inequality of operation may provoke resentments and hatred which at some future time when the United States is involved in war may operate as a boomerang against her when she is a seeker of supplies in a country which has once been a victim of the " cash and carry " system.

The only provision in our Neutrality Act that is going to operate to the disadvantage of Great Britain will be the embargo on arms and munitions. I have been expecting this to come for some years. On the whole Americans believed in their right to sell arms and munitions to belligerents during the World War. I was one of its defenders. I admit that I was influenced in some degree by my sympathies towards Great Britain and France, but I was also influenced by the knowledge that the law of nations at that time regarded this business as entirely legitimate. But there has been a recent change of sentiment in the United States, and my belief is that you will never again see the United States selling arms and munitions to a belligerent in a future war, especially if the situation is such that the belligerent on one side only

will have access to the American market while the other will not.

The prohibition on loans is not going to hurt Great Britain seriously, and in any case the Johnson Act already closes the American money market to you. The prohibition of travel on British ships if you are at war would not involve much loss to you anyway. The exclusion of British submarines or armed merchantmen from American ports will not affect you seriously. So really Great Britain has very little to lose in consequence of our recent legislation.

May I say this in conclusion, by way of an evaluation of this neutrality legislation : I think it represents an honest attempt on the part of the Congress of the United States to keep America out of the next war. My only disagreement with Congress is as to its judgment regarding the utility of this legislation. I think one criticism of it is that it entirely exaggerates trade disputes as causes of war. Now there are a lot of other causes of war which cannot be prevented by embargoes on trade, by the " cash and carry " system, by restrictions on loans, etc.

I might also criticise this legislation because of the way in which it ignores all moral considerations. Under this Act the aggressor and his innocent victim are to be treated exactly alike. But the people of the United States are so determined to keep their country if possible from being drawn into the next European war that they are willing to close their eyes to the moral considerations that enter into the policy which may be necessary to achieve this object. I do not mean to say that they are indifferent to moral considerations, but their view is that the duty of the United States to keep out of the next European war is paramount to their duty to conform their neutrality legislation to what the strict canons of international morality might require. With them it is a case where considerations of public safety or of self-preservation must be the determining factors.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. WYNDHAM BEWES said that the position of neutrals in a war had always been a difficult one, and, up to the present, an immoral one, the bane of all neutrality legislation being that it did not distinguish between aggressor and aggressed. If the Briand-Kellogg Pact had been properly applied by all its signatories it should constitute every necessary safeguard, particularly if properly supplemented as had been meant in 1928. How would this legislation in the United States, which was only new in its particular application, stand with regard to that country's obligations under the Kellogg Pact?

REAR-ADMIRAL H. G. THURSFIELD said that he was a little disappointed that Professor Garner had not mentioned the declaration made by President Roosevelt at the time of the first neutrality legislation which was put into force on the outbreak of the Italo-Abyssinian war. He had made a pronouncement to the effect that any American citizen who engaged in commercial transactions of any sort with one or other of the belligerents would do so at his own risk, and that he would not be supported by the government of the United States. This pronouncement had very considerably extended the scope of the American neutrality policy in one direction.

The lecturer had said that the prevailing motive in the United States was to keep out of the next European war. What strength of opinion was there for the theory that the only way to keep out of the next war was to take some definite steps to prevent it taking place? He had heard that that opinion was growing in strength in the United States but had not first-hand knowledge of the situation.

PROFESSOR GARNER said that the President had made a declaration in October 1935 that the government of the United States would not protect any citizen who engaged in any transactions whatever with either of the belligerents. It was a very sweeping assertion, and went beyond what he, himself, thought justified. It threw the American citizen overboard and abandoned him to the mercy of belligerents. It abandoned all the things for which the United States had fought in the past. The speaker said he would be in favour of going on with the old system instead of the " cash and carry " system and the embargoes by simply changing the quantum of risk. He would give government protection to those citizens who were carrying on commercial activities which were considered valid and proper according to existing international law, but withdraw such protection from those citizens who chose to step outside that law in their transactions with belligerents. However, this attitude of the President would be of some value to the League of Nations, because in the case of that body being implicated in a war, and the League enforcing a blockade, if the " cash and carry " system were not put into effect, and it was possible that it never would be, the United States government would take no steps to protect its citizens who were intercepted by the ships of the League blockade.

With regard to the second question, which was very interesting, the speaker had intended to discuss whether it would not be better for any neutral wishing to keep out of war, instead of passing this neutrality legislation, nine-tenths of which was not neutrality legislation at all, to take into account some system of consultation and co-operation with the other nations of the world who wanted peace, and instead of trying to keep out of the storm to prevent the storm from breaking. One defect of the American neutrality legislation was that it assumed that the United States was quite uninterested in other nations, with the exception of the Latin American nations. A pan-American treaty

had recently been concluded with them, providing for consultation in the case of war breaking out in South America, but there was no danger from that source, as the United States could never be drawn into such a war, and even if they were the danger would not be very great. The danger to the United States was in being drawn into a European war, but so great was the isolation sentiment in the United States that the President had not felt justified in initiating a policy whose object was to bring about this common solidarity between neutrals.

COMMANDER CARLYON BELLAIRS said that one reference made by the lecturer did not seem as important as the rest of his speech, namely that there might possibly be war between Great Britain and Venezuela. He thought that the British Navy would be able to take care of the coast of Venezuela, provided that active sympathy was not manifested for them by the United States, for in no conceivable circumstances would the British government ever enter into hostilities with the United States, not even in a just cause; this was an absolute certainty.

Whenever Great Britain involved herself in a war that war spread. In 1870 the Franco-German war did not spread, in 1914 it did, and always would if Great Britain took part, and would ultimately involve the United States. This was because of British maritime power, and the absolute necessity, from the point of view of her enemy, of breaking that power, which led to the unrestricted submarine warfare which had involved the United States in the Great War. He considered the Neutrality Act as a strong deterrent on Great Britain involving herself in a war, because through losing the loans Great Britain would lose that help, very considerable help, which she had had before from the United States in the shape of colossal quantities of arms and munitions. Though it was true that she had large gold reserves, if she were involved in a war on the continent it would be necessary, as always in the past, to subsidise her allies, and if she could get no loans from the United States she would only be able to pay for her own war and not that of her allies, in which case the allies would probably drop off.

Under the neutrality legislation the President had power to include other things besides arms and munitions in the list of prohibited articles, but there would be a favourable factor for Great Britain in the shape of the Canadian waterways, because he could allow American vessels to carry everything excepting arms into Canada. When trying to prevent intervention in Spain Great Britain refused belligerent rights to General Franco on the grounds that this would be in his favour and detrimental to the Government, and therefore not just; this was a dangerous precedent, because at some future date it might be represented to the President of the United States that in allowing goods other than arms and munitions to be taken into Canada by American vessels he would undoubtedly be favouring Great Britain in the case of war.

The best way to prevent the United States from being involved in

a war was for Great Britain not to become involved herself. Why should she not, having recognised the Kellogg Pact, accept the assurances of others that they would do the same, although she knew this not to be true, and having done this agree with the United States that if war did break out, they, as the possessors of the two most powerful navies in the world, would jointly protect their neutral merchant vessels against all attack from outside of belligerent territorial waters.

MR. FRANK DARVALL said that he thought Great Britain would have more right to criticise the American neutrality legislation for not distinguishing between aggressor and aggressed if other nations were more inclined to act upon such a distinction. During the last five years the United States, though under less obligation than other Powers, had in fact done as much as any of them in the cause of peace. In the Sino-Japanese dispute she had been the first Power to insist that the fruits of aggression should not be recognised. She had done a great deal to try to mobilise other Powers, admittedly rather late, and did not get the backing to which she felt entitled. In the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, although she had no legal obligations in the matter such as had Great Britain, she had distinguished between aggressor and aggressed, because although the embargoes were on the surface impartial, they were to some extent to the advantage of Ethiopia. Ethiopia would not have been able to trade with the United States, and Americans would not have travelled on Ethiopian ships in any case. The fact that Americans trading with the belligerents did so at their own risk could not have inconvenienced Ethiopia, but it could have inconvenienced Italy. President Roosevelt and other members of the administration had tried to limit the export of oil and other commodities to peace-time proportions although it was beyond the letter of the law to do that. They had done what lay in their power to encourage the members of the League to go ahead and impose an embargo on oil.

It seemed that the present neutrality act was to some extent the outcome of American disappointment over the failure of previous attempts to consult. Those attempts had not been sufficiently encouraging to induce that country to persevere. If Great Britain and other countries were to show more real efforts to prevent war it was quite possible that American sentiment might change. The United States had been very outspoken during the last year, and had shown great desire to co-operate in every non-military way with the democracies. She was now convinced that the most hopeful attack upon the present situation lay in some reduction of the barriers to international trade. That particular lead was not getting the encouragement that it deserved at the present time.

The vital clauses of the present neutrality legislation were limited to two years, and those clauses might possibly be discontinued if in the meantime the other democratic countries made some attempt to put teeth into the Kellogg Pact and the League Covenant. There was an im-

mense desire to co-operate with Great Britain in the United States, but underlying this desire was a feeling of doubt as to whether Great Britain were willing to meet the United States on equal terms, as to whether she would respond to American non-military leads unless she could also get military aid. If Great Britain were to welcome such overtures more warmly and were to make some more vivid and effective contribution towards peace it was quite possible that the present legislation might be amended in two years' time.

QUESTIONS: Could the existing Act be brought into force before the outbreak of war, because nations preparing a war would obviously attempt to build up what reserves they needed before the actual outbreak of the conflict?

Was there any particular clause favourable to Canada similar to that which applied to the Latin American nations?

PROFESSOR GARNER said that the Act could not be brought into effect until the President had proclaimed the existence of a state of war, whatever that might mean. There was a considerable party in the Congress now demanding that the President should declare a state of war to exist between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the Government of Spain on the other. It would have little effect except that it would interfere with the very profitable tourist trade of those countries, as no American citizen would be able to travel on a German or an Italian ship.

No special treatment had been meted out to Canada, she was never included in those countries under the policy of the Monroe doctrine. In case of war she would be under the same embargoes as anyone else.

COMMANDER BELLAIRS asked if there were not a provision with regard to Canadian waterways which left them to the discretion of the President.

PROFESSOR GARNER said he believed that there was.

MR. WYNDHAM BEWES asked whether under the latest draft of the clause relating to the "cash and carry" system American vessels were not allowed to carry goods already paid for by the importer, and whether there was not special insurance for such vessels.

PROFESSOR GARNER said that this was left to the discretion of the President. One of the curious things about the legislation was that in the beginning there had been almost unanimous agreement among the members of Congress that the President's discretion should be curtailed so that he would not be able to show sympathy toward the League of Nations or any country in a particular conflict, but as finally passed, nearly every provision of the present Act depended upon the

discretion of the President, the only exception being in regard to the export of arms and munitions, and even there he had a certain amount of discretion because he could determine what commodities were to be regarded as falling within the category of arms and munitions. In 1935, as neither Italy nor Ethiopia ever declared war upon each other, it would have been within his discretion to declare that a state of war did not exist, and the whole working of the legislation depended upon who was the President at the time of the breaking out of war, and the effect that the legislation might have on the interests of the United States.

PROFESSOR C. K. WEBSTER said that it must be remembered that the United States were apt to swing very rapidly in one direction, much more so than was Great Britain. Possibly she felt to-day about neutrality as she had once felt about Prohibition, and in five or six years views on this matter might also change. The United States would always have a neutrality policy, but it might differ considerably from the present legislation.

Moreover this legislation was founded on the idea of a universal world war like the last one. It had been framed by men with a vivid memory of that experience, and in spite of efforts to the contrary, many Americans held very strange views as to the reason why the United States entered into the World War. Therefore the legislation was perhaps not suitable for what might be called interim wars—wars on a small scale—the kind of conflict that arose between Italy and Abyssinia, and the situation that had arisen in Spain. Then again, no one knew what the next world war would be. Like the Maginot line this Neutrality Act was founded on an experience already out-of-date. It was very unlikely that Great Britain, in the event of being involved in another war, would want to buy armaments from the United States for four years, she might not want to buy anything; she might not be there to buy anything. He ventured to doubt whether Mr. Runciman's remarks were very much influenced by the thought of another world war, rather than by the desire to obtain the best possible bargain in the deal which would have to come between Great Britain and the United States.

The United States had been the inventors of neutrality; it was an historic question with them, and it was inconceivable that if another great war arose they would gather their ships into their harbours and prevent their citizens from taking part in the commerce of the world. Their present attack of nerves was not based upon a full consideration of the facts which would emerge if another war did break out.

EDITORIAL NOTE

An additional interest to the subject matter of the above discussion is given by the speech made by Mr. Roosevelt in Chicago on October 5th, 1937, his broadcast talk on October 12th, and his address to the Press on October 15th. The following are extracts from Mr. Roosevelt's address on October 5th : [1]

" There is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, especially when such upheavals appear to be spreading and not declining.

" There can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardises either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small.

" It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international morality be restored. . . .

" It is true that the moral consciousness of the world must recognise the importance of removing injustices and well-founded grievances; but at the same time it must be aroused to the cardinal necessity of honouring sanctity of treaties, of respecting the rights and liberties of others and of putting an end to acts of international aggression. . . .

" It ought to be inconceivable that in this modern era, and in the face of experience, any nation could be so foolish and ruthless as to run the risk of plunging the whole world into war by invading and violating, in contravention of solemn treaties, the territory of other nations that have done them no real harm and which are too weak to protect themselves adequately. Yet the peace of the world and the welfare and security of every nation is to-day being threatened by that very thing.

" No nation which refuses to exercise forbearance and to respect the freedom and rights of others can long remain strong and retain the confidence and respect of other nations. No nation ever loses its dignity or good standing by conciliating its differences, and by exercising great patience with, and consideration for, the rights of other nations.

" War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement. We are adopting such measures as will minimise our risk of involvement, but we cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down.

" If civilisation is to survive, the principles of the Prince of Peace must be restored. Shattered trust between nations must be revived.

" Most important of all, the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a cause. There must be positive endeavours to preserve peace.

" America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace." [1]

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[1] *New York Times*, October 6th, 1937.

GERMANY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE[1]

THE MOST HON. THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN, C.H.

I DO not think it open to dispute that there is only one question which threatens world peace or which might lead to world war, and that is the German question. If Germany were not in her present frame of mind, if she had not got, as I think still, certain legitimate complaints against the Treaty of Versailles, there would be no risk of world war. There would be risks of local wars, but they I think could be managed. But for this German question there would be no risk of the world becoming divided into two great alliances, each of them being, at any rate in theory, relatively as strong as the other. Is Germany fundamentally responsible for the situation in which we find ourselves to-day? Or is the Versailles settlement still at the root of the trouble? Has Germany, in other words, still a case against the rest of the world on the basis of justice, leaving out of account for the moment the question of the policy of the Nazi régime and whether it is possible to deal with Germany so long as she is under that régime?

Now the Versailles settlement was based on the theory of the sole responsiblity of Germany for the Great War. I do not think anybody who has made a serious study of pre-War history, or even of the events which immediately preceded the War, can hold that view to-day. The pre-War history is a long one. It goes back to the Morocco–Egyptian settlement between England and France, and to the French advance on Fez which precipitated that series of German moves which did so much to divide the world. In my view Germany had more responsibility for the War than anybody else, for two reasons: first of all because of her challenge to the British fleet—at one time she put down a programme of building ultimately involving a fleet greater than the then British fleet; secondly because of her belief in and practice of what are called her politics by force, diplomacy by force. On the other hand, nobody has ever yet suggested that Germany was responsible for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, which precipitated the crisis. Further, what finally made war inevitable, according to the strategic facts known to every one at that time, was the

[1] Address given at Chatham House on June 29th, 1937; Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm, K.C.B., D.S.O., in the chair.

mobilisation of the Russian armies, which inevitably brought into play the Schlieffen Plan. Moreover, I do not think that anybody who is a believer in the general thesis underlying the establishment of the League of Nations can fail to recognise that the fact that Europe was divided into seventeen sovereign States, and the rest of the world into a great many more without any form of international organisation, created a constant predisposition, a constant provocation, towards war. Therefore, I do not think it is possible to say that Germany was alone responsible for the War.

By the end of the War, however, as a result of the opinions which we formed during the War, on very inadequate material, supplemented by war-time propaganda (which is largely directed to maintaining the unity and morale of one's own countrymen by proving that we are wholly right and the enemy wholly wrong), we had convinced ourselves that Germany was solely responsible for the disaster, and the Treaty of Versailles was based on that principle. On the strength of it Germany was deprived of one-seventh of her European territory; she was deprived of her colonies; she was unilaterally disarmed, and she was compelled to demilitarise the Rhineland, which meant, in effect, that at any time a French army could march into the vital Rhineland region and reduce Germany to paralysis. In addition, there was placed upon her a burden of reparations for which I do not suppose to-day there is a single advocate; impossible reparations leading in their turn to impossible claims for war debts.

Even so, what actually happened to Germany after 1918 was a great deal worse than what had been planned by the Big Four, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando, and Wilson, at the meetings of the Council of Four in Paris. Two vital features of the Versailles settlement were never carried out. The first was that the United States should be a member of the League of Nations and a member of the Reparations Commission. The second was that the United States and Great Britain should give to France a joint guarantee against unprovoked aggression by Germany. We can all estimate to-day the tragic consequences of the refusal of the United States to accept membership of the League of Nations. The abstention of the United States from the Reparations Commission was much more serious, because the appointment of the Reparations Commission was the method finally adopted by Lloyd George and Clemenceau (after they had made up their minds that in the then temper of British and French opinion it was not possible to reduce the reparations claim against Germany to anything like a moderate

figure) for achieving sanity later on. While the bill against Germany was almost unlimited a Reparations Commission was appointed, of which the United States was to be chairman, to determine, as one of its duties, Germany's capacity to pay. Mr. Lloyd George has always declared, and I think with justice, that had the United States remained a party to the Versailles Treaty, had her nominee been chairman of the Reparations Commission, it would have been possible as the war-time temper lessened, on the one hand, to scale down the claims against Germany to moderate figures on the basis of her capacity to pay and to make transfers, and, on the other hand, to relate war debts to reparations. But the withdrawal of the United States led to the Reparations Commission being dominated by France, who held not only the chairmanship, but a double vote, a first vote and a casting vote, so that the Reparations question went from one tragedy to another, until it was finally wiped out by the depression, as was later the case with war debts.

The failure of the Anglo-American Treaty of guarantee to France was in my view even more tragic. That treaty would not only have given security to France, who had, in effect, been defeated by Germany twice in fifty years, but would have enabled the United States and Great Britain to insist on a reasonable revision of the Versailles settlement in the interests of the German Republic, since it would have made it possible for them to say that they could not maintain that guarantee unless the French in return were willing to adopt revisions which might have led to a final settlement in Europe. The result of the breakdown of the Anglo-American Treaty of Guarantee was that France fell back upon an almost inevitable alternative, the alternative of insisting in the first place on the maintenance for as long as possible of all the unilateral discriminations against Germany, notably disarmament and the demilitarisation of the Rhineland, and, secondly, of building up overwhelming military preponderance behind the Treaty of Versailles, by her own armaments and by alliances with the countries of the Little Entente and with Poland; with the result that the post-War stability of Europe was based not upon the League of Nations, but on the possession by France and her allies of overwhelming military superiority over an unilaterally disarmed Germany. Great Britain shares that tragic responsibility, for we did not offer our own guarantee to France until her alternative alliances were made, and because, on the strength of France's armaments and the armaments of her allies in the East of Europe, we chose to disarm, or relatively speaking to disarm, ourselves,

and to live the easy, or relatively easy, life until the advent of the Hitler régime forced us to look at realities once more. But the principal victim of the withdrawal of the United States and of the lapse of the Treaty of Guarantee to France was Germany.

Yet Germany had to endure another series of tragic events. In 1922 there took place the invasion of the Ruhr, declared by the British Government at the time to be contrary to the Treaty of Versailles and an illegal act, which was inaugurated ostensibly on the grounds of a technical default by Germany in the delivery of certain categories of timber, but really because Poincaré had made up his mind that Germany would not fulfil the Treaty of Versailles except by violent compulsion. Yet the invasion of the Ruhr resulted in the increase in inflation which had been begun by the excessive demand for Reparations, and which finally wiped out the whole middle class in Germany and produced the National-Socialist Party. It created the body of men called the Ruhr fighters, who, instead of acquiescing, as the German government did, in the military occupation, began to fight the French among the slag heaps of the Ruhr. It was in the occupation of the Ruhr that the spirit of the National-Socialist movement, that is, the view that the way to liberty was not through negotiation but through strength, became established in Germany. Finally, came the depression which ended the hopes of the German Republic and brought Hitler to power. Had it not been for the depression, the Republic might have struggled through. But, in this case also, Germany was the principal victim of the Ruhr policy.

Then began another series, as I see it, of tragic events. In January 1933, Germany was promised equality in a régime of security. But after many negotiations to this end, Sir John Simon, after consultation with his French friends who were terrified by the advent of Hitler to power, announced at Geneva in October 1933 that, in effect, no practical steps in the direction of conceding equality to Germany could be taken for four more years, and M. Paul Boncour added in his speech that, even at the end of four years, it would be necessary to take the political situation into account. That statement was taken by Germany as a default on our promises, and as conclusive proof that the League was completely dominated by the victors of Versailles. So she left the League; and I have no doubt that if we had been treated in the same way we should have taken the same action. The episode led, none the less, to tragic results: on the one hand, it led to the unlimited rearmament by Germany and, on the other, to the conviction that what counts in international affairs is not

the force of your case, but the strength of your armaments. If any nation has had that conviction borne in on her it has been Germany, by everything that has happened to her from 1918 to 1933. She received nothing substantial in response to reason. She only began to recover her position in the world when she had begun to acquire the strength which enabled her to take her natural rights by unilateral action in defiance of the treaties. On the principle that any government that fails to remedy the serious grievances of its people in time must face revolution at home, I think it is true in international affairs that, unless a situation which causes a deep sense of injustice, resentment and grievance can be remedied by agreement, it will inevitably be remedied by unilateral action, or in the last resort by power diplomacy or war. There is no use in talking about the sanctity of treaties unless they are just treaties. That is why, when Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles by the unilateral remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the bulk of public opinion in Great Britain supported her on the not wholly unintelligent ground that, in a re-arming world, it was no use going to war to prevent a nation re-assuming the natural right, accorded to every other sovereign State, to defend its own frontiers.

Is there any doubt that if we put ourselves in the position of the Germans, leaving entirely out of account the existence of the Nazi régime, we should feel bitterly that we had been unjustly and badly treated ever since 1918, that we had just claims against the rest of the world, and that if we could not get our just rights by agreement we were entitled to take them back by force if we could do so? The first thesis upon which I want to found my argument, therefore, is that the fundamental cause of the German question, which lies at the root of the world's trouble to-day, is the Versailles settlement, and, still more, the train of events which followed the Versailles settlement.

The second and more difficult part of the problem is the fact that there is in Germany to-day a totalitarian government of a most formidable kind, produced, as I think, essentially by the treatment which Germany has received from her neighbours in the last fifteen or sixteen years. It is very easy to describe its defects from our point of view. It is ultra-nationalist. It is a nationalism based on belief in race as the product of blood and earth; a form of nationalism which we in Great Britain find it very difficult to understand or attach much importance to, in view of the complexity of our own human origin. It is based on the

complete and compulsory discipline of the whole population under the orders of a single leader for the avowed purpose of generating national strength. In order to increase national strength it indulges in forms of persecution, which are highly repellant to people in Great Britain, in order to eliminate those elements in Germany—Jews, Christians, pacifists and so on—which, in the view of the dominant party, seem to compromise or undermine national strength in time of stress. It relies, primarily, not on persuasion, but on violence as its method of dealing with its opponents, and on propaganda rather than free controversy as the method of forming the opinions of its people. In consequence it is subject to the same weaknesses and difficulties as every other totalitarian government of which history tells us and of which we have recently seen a most conspicuous example in Russia. The difficulty of totalitarian government as opposed either to traditional monarchy or democracy is this: under the democratic system the government can be changed whenever the majority of the people like to vote it out of power, and the use of police power to repress opinion is unnecessary. There is no need either for revolution or for violent expression. The old monarchical system had something of the same merit because when the hereditary monarch found he was becoming unpopular he dropped his prime minister into the *oubliette*, saying that everything was entirely his fault, and put a new prime minister in office. The régime itself was not challenged. The very essence of dictatorship, however, is that everything is done by the man at the top. He gets all the credit for everything that goes well, and therefore he cannot escape the blame for everything that goes badly. When any dictator is in power for any length of time and discontent begins to arise as it invariably does against any government which is long in office, he is faced with the necessity of suppressing every form of opinion which seems to challenge his authority, and as opinion becomes more vehement and especially as opposition appears among his own supporters he is driven back inevitably to killing and violence. It is inherent in the system, as is well described by Aristotle two thousand years ago. Now, these are the weaknesses, the defects and, what is important from our point of view, the dangers of the totalitarian system, which is not only based on violence and propaganda, and prone to use it, but is often under pressure to lessen internal difficulties by foreign adventure. As the ordinary man says: "Can you deal with a government based upon such principles? If you do deal with it, can you expect it to live up to the undertakings into which it has entered?"

On the other hand, I think it must be admitted that National-Socialism has done a great deal for Germany. It has undoubtedly cleaned up Germany in the ordinary moral sense of the word. The defeatism, the corruption so manifest a characteristic in the days after the War has disappeared, at any rate from public view. It has given discipline and order and a sense of purpose to the great majority of young people who in earlier days did not know where to go or what they were living for. It has got rid of open Communism. I do not think that Communism was a menace in the sense that it was ever in a position to seize power in Germany, but I think there is some truth in Hitler's view that once real Communism is established in a community it will either destroy the traditional form of government or must itself be destroyed, because you cannot reason with Communism. Communism is a religious movement which admittedly adopts violence as its technique, so that it can only be met by violence. National-Socialists say that at least they have given Germany peace, and have stopped the constant street fights and continual unrest arising out of the conflict between two violent movements raging up and down Germany. Communist violence may be considered preferable to Fascist violence, but once either gets really rooted in a country there will be no peace until either both are suppressed or one eats up the other. Unfortunately, too, Germany was afflicted by a disease from which Great Britain has never yet suffered, a multiplicity of parties in the Reichstag which could not be remedied by the ordinary electoral process. Election after election was fought, but the parties always came back substantially as numerous as before. I do not think it is possible for any country to have a strong government, a government which is capable of dealing either with international problems or with domestic problems, if it has to be based on the shifting sands of a multiplicity of parties. So, however much people may dislike National-Socialism, the fact must be faced that, in the eyes of the great majority of Germans, Hitler is a saviour, who has given them back international security and standing and internal order, employment and purpose.

Now how is one to deal with a Germany which, in my view, has claims against the rest of the world on the grounds of justice, claims which are the main cause of re-armament and international unrest, but which has a government which many people so respect that they feel that, if concessions are made to it which will strengthen its national power, it will use that power as the

basis for fresh and unreasonable demands, backed, I do not say by war but by force, and so lead Europe from one difficulty to another? In order to answer that question I must first examine what I may call Germany's claims, or where, after as dispassionate an examination of the problem as possible, I think that revision of the *status quo* should be made in favour of Germany.

Let me deal first with Eastern Europe. Speaking very broadly, the German thesis of to-day is that she is entitled to self-determination in Central Europe. The War was fought for self-determination, and at the end of the War not only were certain groups of Germans like the Austrians forbidden to unite with Germany, but considerable numbers of Germans just outside the German frontiers were united with other countries. The Polish Corridor, though then largely peopled by Germans, was created, and severed Germany's connection with East Prussia. Cities like Danzig, which had always been German since the beginning of history, were cut away from Germany. Now, if the principle of self-determination were applied on behalf of Germany in the way in which it was applied against her, it would mean the re-entry of Austria into Germany, the union of the Sudetendeutsch, Danzig, and possibly Memel with Germany, and certain adjustments with Poland in Silesia and the Corridor. If that solution were adopted, especially if it were effected as a result of force, I think that most people would feel that the last state of Europe would be more serious and more difficult than the first. Yet the demand, in itself, is not wicked or absurd. Is there any alternative?

I do not propose to argue at the moment whether the alternative is practicable or not, but to consider what might be a solution if everybody were reasonable. Is not the right basis for the solution of the situation in Eastern Europe—which obviously cannot continue indefinitely as fifteen or sixteen mutually suspicious sovereign States—the same kind of solution as that we have chosen in the British Commonwealth? Supposing, on the one hand, that Germany finally and irrevocably recognised the independence of all the nations of Eastern Europe, and, on the other, that the nations of Eastern Europe, in return for such recognition, came into what may be called the political and economic orbit of Germany, might not Europe settle down? Let me give an illustration from South Africa. The reason why the South African situation is tolerable to-day is not because the British in South Africa are highly delighted at being a minority, for they continually complain that the Dutch majority gets most

of the jobs and has a perpetual preponderance in the legislature. What makes the situation tolerable is that the Dutch majority has accepted, and now I think without serious reservation, membership of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In other words, South Africa is now in the general British orbit, and on the strength of that the British South Africans are loyal South Africans and accept a situation in which so far as one can see they will be permanently in the minority so far as political power is concerned, while the Dutch treat them fairly and without suspicion because they are loyal citizens. But supposing our Dutch friends, for whatever reason, decided to move into some other orbit, let us say the Japanese or the German orbit, the situation in South Africa, and the situation as between Great Britain and South Africa, would become almost impossible. The local British would say that they would not be used in support of an anti-British system, and the Dutch would begin to suspect their loyalty. Great Britain, on the other hand, would become extremely suspicious of every act of policy of the South African Government. Now that, as I see it, is the root of the difficulty in a country like Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia, because she is afraid of the future of her own independence, leans first on France and secondly on Moscow, and that means that the Germans in Czechoslovakia are unwilling to form part, wholeheartedly, of a State which is pursuing, in their view, an anti-German policy. The Czechs, therefore, are frightened to give to the Germans in Czechoslovakia the position in the State which the Dutch feel no difficulty at all in giving to the British in South Africa. If the German–Czechoslovak question could be solved in this way the whole European problem would change for the better. Similarly with other minority neighbours.

Then on the economic side there is a certain natural balance between the various countries of South-Eastern Europe and Germany. If political antagonism could be eliminated, economic arrangements could be made between the various States which would give to all of them a higher standard of living and far greater economic stability. And, provided it was done by agreement, I cannot see that vast Russia to the east or the satisfied colonial powers to the west ought to object. On the contrary, their greatest need is that Central Europe should settle down, and that is only possible, in my view, under German leadership.

The other main aspect of the German question is the colonial economic problem. When Dr. Schacht is presented with the usual British contention that colonies are not much use, that

really we get almost nothing from them, that they are a burden and a liability, and that we will do everything with them except give them up to anybody else, he replies that these considerations may have been true in pre-War days when the development of any colony depended on whether free capitalists thought that they could make a profit on using their capital for the purpose, but that the situation is very different to-day in a world of economic nationalism and universal governmental intervention in economic affairs. Unless the policy of Mr. Cordell Hull prevails, and I hope it will, unless Great Britain goes in much more vigorously than she has yet done for a reduction of international barriers to trade and for the "open door" in the colonies, we are faced with a world in which most countries are still moving in the direction of self-sufficiency. In such circumstances it is very difficult for any country, especially a manufacturing country, to acquire the foreign exchange with which it may buy raw materials or foodstuffs from other countries by the process of selling manufactured goods abroad, because no country is willing to receive manufactured articles in any considerable quantity; since it is the first principle of high protectionism to refuse to accept from abroad anything which can be manufactured at home. Dr. Schacht accordingly declares that, in these circumstances, the colonial problem becomes an entirely different matter. If a colonial area is included in the tariff zone of the mother country, and if the latter assumes the control of the trade of that colony with other countries, then the mother country can develop whatever natural resources the colony has with its own currency without first having to obtain foreign exchange. If the mother country wants to produce rubber or fats, or whatever it is, provided it can control the ingress and egress of trade with the colony concerned, it can provide for development with marks or pounds or francs, or whatever its national currency is; no doubt more expensively than the material could be bought elsewhere if foreign exchange could be obtained in the open market, but it can be done, so to speak, with the mother country's own money. Rubber plantations, or plantations that produce fat, can be developed with the national manufactures, local workers can be paid with the national currency, and they can be required to buy with that currency the produce of the mother country. Therefore, in these days, colonies have, economically, an entirely different significance from what they had in the freer conditions of the earlier capitalist age. Dr. Schacht goes on to say that, inasmuch as Germany is singularly deficient in raw materials and is not in a position even to

produce all her own foodstuffs, and since the greater part of the world has become economically highly nationalist, the colonial question is now very important, not only as a symbol of the restoration of German self-respect and the withdrawal of the accusation that she was unfit to have colonies, but as a vital element in her own economic system if she is to attain the standard of living which the rest of us think necessary for a civilised country. I think there is a great deal in Dr. Schacht's case. Colonies become important in proportion as economic nationalism dominates the world. If we cannot get back to freer trade, and even if we can, I would try to find, by mutual concession among colonial Powers, areas, say in Central West Africa or in the Pacific, where Germany could develop sources of supply of certain raw materials or tropical foodstuffs which she cannot produce at home.

Finally, there is the question of Germany's "place in the sun." It is a difficult question. It is largely concerned, I think, with the future of the League of Nations. The League, in Germany's view, is in effect a combination of the beneficiaries of the Treaty of Versailles who are mainly concerned with maintaining what is left of that Treaty, and with "putting a ring round Germany." I think that that is not an unfair description of the League and its attitude to Germany since 1920, and I do not believe that the League can come into its own until justice has been done to Germany. Directly a solution of the German problem can be found, the dangerous alliance system will begin to disappear, and the League, with Germany as a central member of it, will begin to revive.

I venture to think that if it were not for the anxieties felt about the policy and intentions of the National-Socialist régime, there is hardly anybody who would not say that, if a solution of the German problem could be found on the three bases I have mentioned, it ought to be done. If the situation created in 1918 could be remedied by bringing about in Eastern Europe the kind of Mittel Europa on the model of the British Empire which I have described; if by some such means as I have suggested, and on the basis of Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant so far as the treatment of the natives is concerned, there could be found for Germany areas overseas in which she could produce those special raw materials or minerals necessary to supplement her own economy; and if Germany could be convinced that the League of Nations is not a combination of her enemies, but a group of European nations in which a satisfied Germany would have as much influence as anybody else, I think the peace of the world

would be secure. My own view is that there will be no lasting peace until some such solution is found.

Admittedly, I think, the present régime in Germany has been created by the policy of her neighbours, and mainly by the policy of keeping Germany down and "encircled," which has been relentlessly pursued by France since 1920. But when I say French policy, I do not mean to hold France alone responsible for that policy, because I think the United States and Great Britain are equally responsible. I have already described how we both defaulted on the original Treaty of Guarantee to France. France was deserted in 1920. Few of us realise how terrible a thing that was for France, for the reason that equality for Germany in itself means inequality for France. France has a population of about forty millions, as against Germany's sixty-five or seventy millions. She does not possess the same industrial resources, nor the same organising power. Further, the psychological situation left over by the last war is not always understood. There were two defeated nations. On the one hand Germany was defeated by the world combination against her, and had imposed upon her the severe and drastic punishment the general character of which I have tried to describe. On the other hand, if you look at the War as the last of the historic struggles between France and Germany, it was France who was defeated. In other words, France by herself could never have got Germany off French soil in 1918, any more than she was able to do so in 1870. Therefore, in looking at the policy of France, it must be recognised that without some addition of strength from outside it is impossible for France to face Germany alone. That is why France made the alliances in Eastern Europe, why she insisted on the unilateral disarmament of Germany, why she insisted as long as she could on the demilitarisation of the Rhineland, why she has always refused to give any concession to Germany which she has not been forced to give, and why M. Barthou refused to entertain Hitler's offers, on the one hand, of an army of three hundred thousand men, and, on the other, of an air force half the size of the French air force or one-third that of all neighbouring air forces, whichever was the smaller. France would not let go of the smallest fragment of the Versailles settlement until she was given an alternative security from some other source.

That situation is changed to-day. While Great Britain took advantage of France's armaments or alliances to disarm, and left France to deal with Europe in her own way, one

important consequences of British rearmament and of the new Locarno guarantees which we gave in April 1936 is that, at long last, we have not only entered into a joint defensive entente with France, but for the first time are in a position to mobilise behind it, or shall be in a position to do so, really effective strength. It is that reason which makes me believe that we can eliminate from our minds the fears and hates which are the subject matter of propaganda in all countries to-day, and not least in our own, and that we are in a better position to make a serious attempt to see whether it is not possible to come to terms with Germany before Europe and the world become rigidly embraced in the two great hostile alliance systems of which everyone is talking at present. We shall be able to enter those discussions from strength and not from weakness.

How is it possible to enter into such discussions? Can the League of Nations do it? I doubt it. I think it is true to say that League policy in relation to Germany has always been a policy of dictation by the beneficiaries of Versailles. It has been the failure of the League to attempt in any serious way to do justice to Germany, either when she was a Republic or since, which is the fundamental reason for the moral decline of the League to-day. Why did we fail in connection with Abyssinia? No doubt there are many reasons. For instance, I have always thought that the most fatal policy any government ever adopted was to allow Sir Samuel Hoare to make his speech at Geneva in September 1935 without first being sure that it could be followed by action. I was, at the time, very doubtful whether he should have made that speech at all but, having made it, I thought we should have seen it through, and I did not hesitate to say during the general election of November 1935 that, if necessary, we ought to have closed the Suez Canal or taken some equivalent action. But the fundamental reason why the League failed in regard to Abyssinia was because everybody was mainly concerned to maintain those unilateral discriminations against Germany which ought to have been removed many years ago. That was why nobody saw it through. Supposing the League had done justice to Germany in earlier years, and Germany had been a member of the League, I do not think there would have been any trouble at all. Instead, everybody was looking at Germany to see whether she proposed to take advantage of the situation in order to remilitarise the Rhineland, which from every moral point of view, seventeen years after the Armistice, she was entitled to do.

So, for the time being, I rule out the League of Nations as the instrument for making a settlement with Germany. Is there any alternative way? There are in my view two possibilities. The first is that a commission should be set up, under the chairmanship of someone appointed by the President of the United States, on which should sit no beneficiary of the Treaty of Versailles —neither Great Britain nor France, nor Czechoslovakia, nor Poland, nor any other country which benefitted—and ask it to investigate what alterations in the *status quo* are, in its opinion, advisable or necessary to bring about a relationship between Germany and her neighbours which could justly be regarded as a basis for peace. No government could promise beforehand to endorse the decision of such a body. But I venture to think that, if it were possible to set up such a tribunal and to obtain a report from really eminent people with political experience, not one of whom belonged to a country which in any direct way could be said to be a beneficiary under the Treaty of Versailles, a set of recommendations might result which would pave the way to real discussions which might lead towards a final settlement.

Failing that, I see no alternative at the moment but a British initiative. As I have said, we have at last given to France the guarantee which we promised in 1918 and we are in a position, or in a far better position than before, to make that guarantee good. We are thus in a position to talk with Germany without incurring the charge that we are deserting France, for I would reaffirm in the strongest terms the defensive Locarno guarantee, while reaffirming also that we are in no way bound by France's understandings with other Powers; therefore the great stumbling-block to negotiation in the past has been removed.

I do not think that the Spanish situation is fundamental to the problem which I have been describing, although it may lead to an international temper which will make the solution of that problem very difficult. In my view, Hitler's interest in the Spanish question is mainly what is not very euphoniously called ideological. I do not think that Germany has any territorial or colonial aspirations in Spain. I think, on the other hand, that Hitler, with his well-known antagonism to Communism, feels that the possibility of what he would call a Red Spain is so serious for Europe, and consequently for National-Socialist Germany, that he will go to very great lengths to prevent the success of what he regards as a Red Government. That, I believe, is the root of the problem in Spain as far as Hitler is concerned. But it involves an inevitable collision with Great Britain for the reason

that we do not take that view. In our view the Spanish problem is fundamentally a civil war. I do not think the majority of British people want to see either side win outright. They want something to come out of Spain which will be a more temperate form of government than a victory for either of the two extreme parties to-day. But in any case they feel that this is a matter which should be left to the Spaniards, and that it is wrong for anybody else to interfere, in order to bring about a solution according to their particular point of view. On the other hand, I think that while the attitude of Italy is in some ways similar to that of Germany, it is also strategic. She is concerned with the future of peace in the Mediterranean and her policy may therefore be a challenge to British strategic interests in that historic sea. That is why the Spanish problem is dangerous. There is a conflict of principle between Germany and ourselves, and a conflict of national strategic interest between Italy and ourselves. It will be difficult to come to grips with the main German question until the Spanish question is out of the way.

The root of the German problem to-day, therefore, is that at the back of our minds we feel that there is still justice to be done to Germany, and in the front of our minds we have grave doubts as to the consequences of trying to do justice to Germany as long as the National-Socialist Party is in office.

On that problem I would only make one comment. The removal of legitimate grievances removes the basis of discontent and feelings which the advocates of forcible expansion can exploit for their own ends, even though it may also improve a nation's strategic position for aggression. To refuse to do justice lest the concessions involved may be abused, is to make explosion eventually inevitable. An old saying "Fiat justicia ruat coelum," is the only basis for peace even if it involves risks, and in the long run it is cheaper and safer to prepare to defend yourself against unjust aggression, than to do injustice in the hope of preventing it altogether, as the history of Germany since 1920 abundantly proves. A first step towards solving the problem of Germany and the dilemma involved is a firm but friendly exploration by the British Government of the whole position in Berlin. It is impossible to make final judgments till that has been done.

May I, in conclusion, say a word about diplomatic methods in the contemporary world? We have now passed out of a world in which the power and prestige of the Allied Powers was so over-

whelming that international questions could be dealt with by discussions in which we had the power of decision in our own hands. We are now once more in the traditional world in which successful diplomacy is inseparably connected with the strength that can be brought to bear behind one's case. That situation is almost inevitable under conditions of international anarchy, and the League of Nations, in my view, cannot alter the position, because it is based upon the sovereignty of its member States. The League will work as long as the principal nations of the world are fundamentally satisfied with the *status quo*. If we can solve the German problem, we shall recreate the conditions in which the League can function. But unless the League can find a method of altering the *status quo*, which it has not yet done, I do not think the League system, as originally conceived, can work when a number of important States are profoundly dissatisfied with the *status quo*. The League then, inevitably, degenerates into a combination which, on the one hand, mainly seeks to maintain the *status quo*, and, on the other, seeks to alter it.

I would strongly urge that under the conditions of to-day our international policy must be based on a clear appreciation of where real strength lies. It is not enough to be convinced of the rightness of our case. Before taking action we must be sure that there is strength behind it also. As I have already indicated, the fatal mistake made about Abyssinia was that we did not really estimate beforehand whether in issuing the challenge to Mussolini we either had the strength or the will to see it through. One of the difficulties of the democratic system is that we are so accustomed to free controversy, so accustomed to the view that resolutions can eventually be turned into votes, and so, after a general election, to political power, that we are inclined to think that our democratic methods can be applied to international affairs also. But we cannot do this. To begin with, our arguments do not reach the other countries, and, if they do, they will have no more influence than have the arguments of other countries upon us. And there is no general election to decide the case. In diplomacy you have to agree or resort to force. So in every crisis you have first to face the question of whether you, and such friends as you may have in the League of Nations and elsewhere, are really in a position to win in the case of war, because if you are certain, and the other person is certain, that you are going to win, and your case is reasonably sound, you will probably win, and without war. But bluff, which was fundamentally what happened in September 1935, is the most fatal policy, especially for a democracy to-day.

Therefore, to-day the important thing is for us to consider our political ideals in the light of the power which we can actually bring to bear behind them, and not to take decisions on the policy we propose to pursue until we know what physical power we can rely upon, and what countries are willing to act with us. Because, in the last resort, whether you are talking in terms of the League of Nations or not, in a world which consists of sovereign national States and which is, therefore, fundamentally an anarchy, the ultimate thing behind policy is force, just as the ultimate power behind law inside the State is force. Therefore I venture to think that the two most important things we have to do to-day are, on the one hand to consider whether there is any way of removing those root causes of the German problem that still spring from the Versailles settlement and, secondly, how far any action we may wish to take in foreign affairs is supported by a really superior strength which we, and any allies we may have, are in a position to bring to bear in a crisis.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. WICKHAM STEED said that he had the unexpected pleasure of expressing a considerable measure of agreement with one or two of the things the lecturer had said. He had expected to find himself in total disagreement on every single point. He agreed that nothing would be more fatal than a policy of bluff, and that Great Britain should contemplate no policy without considering the power that lay behind it, although he would qualify that statement by saying " the power which belief in her ideals would enable her to put behind it." With regard to all other points, especially the historical arguments, he was in complete disagreement. All these arguments could be traversed. What was mistakenly called German " War Guilt " had been mentioned. In 1919, when the Germans protested against the text of the draft treaty of Versailles, a very able and penetrating reply had been written putting the case very cogently. Mr. Philip Kerr (now Lord Lothian) had been the author. Was his judgment unsound then, and if so was it sound to-day?

The speaker had said Germany, Germany, Germany where he ought to have said Hitler, Hitler, Hitler. Was he aware that to-day 70 per cent. of the German people were in sullen revolt against Hitler, that animosity between Catholics and Protestants had disappeared, that peasants and large landowners alike were straining at the leash to get away from the present ruinous system? When German trade unionists had been asked, not long ago, by their own people, why they could not do anything, they replied that it was because " they " had got all the machine-guns. In what language had the lecturer spoken with Herr Hitler? A conversation through an interpreter was unreliable, and

even Germans who had spoken German with Hitler had never been able to trust his word. The present speaker had been invited to visit Hitler, but after the murderous " clean up " of 30th June 1934 he did not care to meet such a man.

The real issue was: how were the German people to be saved for Europe? South Africa had been mentioned. There two White minorities lived under the pressure of a great Black majority, and one of those White minorities lived in fear of German strategic designs. In 1911 Botha had warned Winston Churchill that Germany meant ill to Great Britain, and said that when the time came he would clear them out of German South-West Africa.

There remained the great question of how to deal with Germany at the present time. Great Britain should show her ideals plainly to the German people, and uphold their right to live, even if she had to break with Hitler.

LORD ARNOLD said that there would be unanimous appreciation of the able address given by Lord Lothian. If the views of the last speaker prevailed, he was afraid peace in Europe would not last long. Also he felt sceptical about statistics to the effect that about 70 per cent. of the German people were against Hitler. He had been hearing that sort of thing about Italy for years, and also each autumn it had been said that Hitler could not survive another winter. We must recognise that Hitler was in power in Germany, and the only alternative to negotiating with Germany, and that meant with Hitler, was— sooner or later—war. It was ridiculous to speak of standing behind the German people against Hitler.

He had been very impressed by Lord Lothian's closing remarks concerning British initiative. This had been lacking for a long time. Mr. Lansbury had quoted an eminent German who said that there would never be peace in Europe until Germany's economic position was altered. What had Great Britain done in that direction? Everyone knew that the Ottawa Agreements, for instance, were an offence to a country like Germany. The British Empire comprised a quarter of the world's territory and population, and more than a quarter of the world's wealth. Out of twenty-five essential commodities and minerals there were adequate supplies in the British Empire of eighteen. Germany had adequate supplies of only four, and she had no colonies whatever. Great Britain had not only done nothing in regard to Germany's demand for colonies, but had indicated that nothing would be done. It was impossible that Germany should continue to have no overseas territory, while Great Britain, with her smaller population which would soon be declining, should retain in the British Empire a quarter of the world's territory. If Great Britain were in the position of Germany she would feel exactly as Germany does. British statesmen were not good at putting themselves in the position of other people. Some small concession in the matter of colonies would have an enormous

psychological effect. But if provocative attacks were to be made on Germany by a section of the British Press, and if a very temperate speech by the British Ambassador in Berlin suggesting that consideration should be given to certain achievements in Germany was to be considered almost a crime, then it was almost impossible to bring about a better understanding with Germany. Mr. Gladstone had laid it down as a vital principle of foreign policy that no one had a right to subject a great nation to a system of moral espionage and to a constant stream of invective. Yet both of these things had been and were being done by many politicians in Great Britain.

The Franco-Soviet Pact had not been mentioned. *The Times* had said that no Englishman in German shoes would consent to accept the commitments of a new treaty while the Franco-Soviet Pact and the Czecho-Soviet Pact remained in existence. These pacts constituted a partial encirclement of Germany. Here British initiative should make it clear to France that if war came through either of those pacts, Great Britain would not fight. During the last few years Germany had made offer after offer in respect of disarmament and of appeasement in Europe. Nothing had come of any of these offers except the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. This was because the foreign policy of Great Britain had been too much dominated by France. However reasonable an offer might be which Hitler made, the next morning the Paris press would be yelping that it was a trap. It was time that Great Britain had a foreign policy of her own. France would certainly not have been enthusiastic about the visit of Baron von Neurath to London, but that projected visit seemed to mark the beginning of a British initiative. It was necessary to bring about a better understanding with Germany, to see her point of view, and to meet her just grievances. Violence and persecution of the Jews were disliked by all, but these were lesser matters when compared with the great issue of peace and war. Earl Baldwin had said that another European war would very probably mean the overthrow of the rulers in every country participating, and complete barbarism from one end of the Continent to the other. It was worth making an effort to avoid that.

LORD ALLEN OF HURTWOOD said that he had not been satisfied either by the failure of Lord Arnold to be practical, or by the somewhat fierce abruptness of Mr. Wickham Steed. The tangled problems of Europe would not be solved by the evasiveness of the one or the unsympathetic precision of the other.

The lecturer had tried to find some practical method of solving the European problem. On the one hand he gave the impression of being a great realist, on the other hand he seemed to be the embodiment of intellectual *non-sequiturs* in the arguments he used. He was quite right in saying that the one war in Europe that would almost certainly lead to world war would be a dispute with Germany. Therefore justice for Germany was a prime necessity. That was so both on the merits of the case and in order to prevent world war. But the lecturer had

also repeatedly asserted that it was not possible, while national sovereignty remained, to have a procedure by which the law could be collectively protected. Surely he must realise that justice could not be done to Germany unless the other nations concerned were assured of collective protection against unlawful procedure. This was the dual issue which must be faced in Europe. How then could we negotiate peace with Germany?

Negotiations had always broken down because Great Britain, the one nation with prestige and influence sufficient to unlock the door, persisted in negotiating in the wrong way. Great Britain quite realised that she could not fully defend the Treaty of Versailles, and wished to remedy its defects. But she always tried to build a general peace by the mistaken procedure of attacking separate issues in isolation. To take one instance. Germany claimed to have a grievance with regard to raw materials. Thereupon a committee was set up under the auspices of the League, itself one of the points in dispute, to inquire into the matter. But its terms of reference did not include the question of colonies and mandates. Naturally Germany refused to take part in the discussions under such circumstances.

There was only one way to deal with the situation. An offer ought to be made at Geneva, covering all points in dispute. Great Britain should spread a map of the procedure of peace covering all subjects simultaneously. Something of this kind had been done by President Wilson in his Fourteen Points. All subjects had been brought under review together. Having given evidence of bona fide intention, indicating that Great Britain was prepared for the first time since Versailles to grant absolute equality of status to Germany, an attitude of response would be unlocked in Germany. This offer should not be followed by an unwieldy world conference, which would fail because adequate preparations would not have been made beforehand. It should be followed by diplomatic exchanges and then by Fact-Finding Commissions which would deal with the subjects simultaneously—colonies, mandates, territorial readjustments, raw materials and revolutionary propaganda across frontiers either from the Right or the Left which cut across the work of the League of Nations. Finally, an offer such as this could not be made unless it was at the same time declared that Great Britain was prepared, having made an offer of justice, to join those nations who were willing collectively to guarantee the signature of that treaty when signed. Unless this was done there could not be created the mood of security out of which justice could emerge. Did not Lord Lothian agree that if justice had been done and the law made equal for all nations, then there must also be a system, such as that of the League, to guarantee the peace of Europe, even if national sovereignty still remained?

Mr. W. F. Wentworth-Sheilds thought that it was in the combination of the views of the first two speakers in the discussion that the British could most justly and effectively play their part. The lecturer

had advocated such a view, and the meeting was indebted to him on that account. He had stated that public opinion in Great Britain would be very different with regard to Germany were it not for the fact that for the past four years the latter had been under the Nazi system of government. The problem could only be solved if pro-German and anti-German differences of opinion were put aside. It seemed impossible to get away from an attitude of partisanship. The speaker thought it rather a pity that Great Britain had refused so categorically to take part in the naval demonstration desired by Germany during the preceding week. The Germans had been prepared to compromise, and if Great Britain had sent a few of her smaller ships to steam up and down Spanish waters, it seemed with reasonable security from any untoward incident, Germany might not have withdrawn from the Spanish patrol scheme, and the present dilemma might have been avoided. British collective public opinion when it became too forceful was inclined to hamper and handicap the action of the government. Had that opinion been a little less uncertain, and a little less difficult to gauge, the speech made at the end of the previous week by the Prime Minister might have been made a little earlier, and might have borne the fruit which, quite obviously, the Prime Minister hoped that it would bear.

A MEMBER said that it seemed to him utterly impossible for Great Britain to have participated in a naval demonstration off the coast of Spain. Germany had constituted herself accuser, judge, and executioner of an alleged offence which had not been proved. Whether a man were sentenced to a week's imprisonment, or six months, was not relevant if he was innocent. A demonstration by a few British ships would have been quite as bad as a demonstration by the whole fleet.

He admired the lecturer's clarity, and his genuine goodwill and desire to find a way out of the present impasse, but there seemed to be a growing realisation of the difficulty of dealing with the Nazi régime. It had been said that Germany got nothing from 1919 onwards until that régime came into power. In 1926, while Great Britain had nearly two million unemployed, Germany was getting loans from abroad and was experiencing prosperity, which if to some extent artificial was at the time contrasted with conditions here to German advantage. The evacuation of the Rhineland was also carried out in advance of Treaty schedule. Germany had had more loans from abroad than she ever paid in reparations. It had also been stated that the German Republic was ended by the economic distress which brought Hitler to power. Hitler came to power through an intrigue which went wrong. He was meant to be the footstool of others, but when the time came the footstool kicked away those who meant to use it and ruled in their place.

The speaker had recently seen a visitor from East Prussia who would confirm what the first speaker in the discussion had said about

the discontent now prevailing in Germany. A reputable newspaper said that it would be difficult to find any group in Germany which was not in some degree in opposition to the Government, apart, of course, from those connected with it. The Churches, Protestant and Catholic, farmers, shopkeepers, artisans, all were becoming increasingly opposed to the present régime. Again, could a German signature to a treaty be relied upon at present? That was a fundamental question. What had happened to Non-Intervention at their hands? Co-operation with Hitler Germany meant dictation by that country. When what they wished done was not done then co-operation ceased. Self-determination in Central Europe had been mentioned. This had been tried in the case of the Saar, but everyone knew that the Saar had been filled with Secret Police to superintend the supposed free voting! Self-determination as it was understood by democratic countries did not exist with regard to Germany.

In the case of raw materials, Dr. Schacht was so clever that people were apt to be misled by the subtlety of his arguments. What did Norway and Sweden and Switzerland, which had no colonies, do for their raw materials? Germany was short of raw materials because of her own policy. She concentrated all her energies upon rearmament, and imported vast quantities of raw materials of no consequence for the production of goods, and then tried to manufacture wool or rubber, for instance, by means of chemicals. There was the same fallacy in the currency argument. The British Empire consisted of a number of semi-sovereign States who had not all the same currency, but were allied voluntarily with sterling. Germany could enter the sterling area, but Dr. Schacht did not wish that to happen. Germany desired territory under her own control in order to force the natives to buy goods from Germany that could be bought more cheaply elsewhere. They had done this with the Balkan countries, who, now that they could sell their products on the world markets, were not anxious to continue paying so heavily for what they received from Germany or rather failed to receive because in many cases the result was not payment either in goods or cash but only debts. If Germany owned her own territory she could take the rubber produced by the natives, for instance, instead of allowing them to sell it in the best market, and give them in return German products extravagantly priced. This was exploitation and quite inconsistent with mandate or British Empire theory. Germany could buy and had bought large quantities of goods from tropical countries. She could purchase everything she needed for civilian use if she would produce articles at saleable prices for export, and reduce her fantastic outlay on armaments which entailed importing excess supplies of copper, nickel, etc., instead of wool and cotton. In conclusion, he begged the lecturer to answer the question what faith he had in a promise given by Hitler Germany?

Dr. W. J. Rose said that he had been present, recently, at a two-day conference at Rhodes House in Oxford between English

university men and about twenty-two German university students and middle-aged university men who certainly represented the mind of the Führer. Everything that had been discussed at the present meeting had been discussed there. The speaker would like, on the basis of those discussions, to deal with what would happen if, as the lecturer had advocated, Central and Eastern Europe were to be drawn into the German political orbit. They had been assured in Oxford that Germany wished for no territorial expansion whatsoever, but she wanted autonomy for her minorities all over the world. The kind of autonomy she desired for them was cultural autonomy. Now, the type of "cultural" autonomy as it is understood within the British Empire was quite different from the kind of autonomy envisaged by Berlin to-day. Everything in the German system to-day was politics, the schools, their money, everything, and that was why the Czechs and the Poles and all the other countries in the Balkans and Central Europe were afraid of what the German professor at Oxford termed "cultural" autonomy for the German minorities.

Whatever the British might think of the type of Mittel Europa described by the lecturer, the 100,000,000 non-German people of Central Europe did not want it. Nor did they expect Great Britain to go there to fight for them. If left to manage for themselves they would probably be able to take care of themselves.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR NEILL MALCOLM (in the Chair) said that the all-important question in his mind was whether there was still time.

Hitler had come into power because each successive concession in respect of the Versailles settlement had been made just too late, when it could be represented as being due not to generosity but to fear. If Hitler's predecessors had been given freely what Hitler had acquired by force, he would never have come into power. Indeed, it was hardly too much to say that Hitler owed his position to the Allies. That was the tragedy of the present state of affairs in Europe.

THE MOST HON. THE MARQUESS OF LOTHIAN said that the reason he had changed his opinion with regard to War Guilt from the opinion contained in the reply of the Allies given in 1919 was that the reply was based upon the information then available to the British public during the War and after four years of continuous propaganda. He had since read a large number of the books published in English, of which the American were the best, in regard to the origins of the War, and they all pointed to the fact that the information obtained in 1919 was neither accurate nor complete. He was not in the least ashamed of having changed his opinion.

The arguments of the third speaker in the discussion he considered to be *non sequitur*. He had said that justice should be done to Germany, but that this could not be done until collective security had been created. But, in fact, there had been complete collective security up to the time when Germany became heavily rearmed. After the

War an absolute system of collective security had been created, with Germany disarmed and her Western frontier open to attack, and the moment she began to rearm this system was reinforced by alliances. In spite of this, no effective move had ever been made towards meeting Germany's just claims. That was why the lecturer was suspicious of a system that advocated military sanctions without providing anything effective to bring about this revision which the third speaker had put forward as being so necessary. The root of the trouble, and it had been so since the Armistice, was that there was a group of people in Europe who thought that the only way to keep the peace was to keep Germany artificially weak. Military sanctions might be necessary in order to keep what one had got, but as a means of bringing Germany back into the League emphasis on a sanction system without effective revision had failed over and over again, and would continue to do so. Germany had been taught that she got nothing unless she was strong enough to take it. Her policy of unilateral action had been forced upon her by that of her neighbours. Only if the type of settlement mentioned by the third speaker or by the lecturer himself, the outcome of recommendations of impartial third-party judges, among whom were none of the beneficiaries of the Versailles Treaty, were carried out would it be possible to create a true system of collective security.

Lord Allen asked whether, in the case of such negotiations taking place, the lecturer would agree to the system of collective security.

Lord Lothian replied that if a settlement which an independent party deemed just were carried through then he would agree to a system of collective security, but he would not agree to a system which was simply an armed alliance for maintaining the *status quo.*

With regard to the validity of German promises the lecturer felt that all the totalitarian States, Russia, Germany and Italy had a different standard of values from the democratic countries, especially satisfied democracies, because they were subject to internal pressures towards external action to which democracies were not. On the other hand when a country had grievances, the probability of their taking violent action which would menace the peace of others lessened as the grievances were removed. There was no doubt that the best foundation for peace was justice. If there was justice there was less likelihood of these explosive activities taking place. Also, as the third speaker had said, once justice had been done it would be much easier to create collective action against a nation that was clearly trying to get something to which it had no right.

FEARS AND REALITIES IN SCANDINAVIA[1]

George Soloveytchik

In recent years I have had frequent opportunities of visiting the countries of Northern Europe and it has been my privilege on each occasion to talk with a large range of people, from premiers and other ministers, including politicians of all shades of opinion, to central-bank governors, business men, journalists and those who come under the delightfully vague, but very useful description of "the man in the street." I mention this solely to convey that whatever impressions I may have gathered, whatever opinions I may feel inclined to express, are not based on just a flying visit, but on a very substantial and variegated volume of evidence.

If I were to attempt to sum up my impressions in one sentence, I would say, although I know that my Scandinavian friends will not thank me for it, that they have only one problem, a problem from which all the others arise, and that that problem is Great Britain. All the economic and political questions and diplomatic issues with which they are confronted at the present moment devolve from the fact that they are in so very many ways linked with Great Britain and that, as they do not know what Great Britain's commercial policy, or what Great Britain's foreign policy, is going to be, they are rather in the dark, and have to find adjustments which, for the time being, will enable them to make the best of a very uncertain world.

Perhaps I should try to explain how that situation, which has not always been as it is now, has developed. In the comparatively normal and sane days of pre-War economics, when bilateral trade was not even heard of, it was the general rule for a country to select freely its best markets. Countries sold where they could get the highest prices for their export goods and bought where they could obtain what they wanted on most advantageous terms. In those days the whole of Northern Europe sold in Great Britain and bought in Germany. Moreover, in those days Great Britain did not even attempt to sell anything

[1] Address given at Chatham House on July 1st, 1937; Lieut.-General Sir George Macdonogh, G.B.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., in the chair.

to them on any substantial scale and was quite satisfied to purchase a very large part of her supplies of raw materials—such as timber or paper pulp or Danish agricultural produce—from Northern Europe without expecting any reciprocity; she did not try to compete with Germany in those markets, and certainly did not resent the fact that the Germans supplied Scandinavia with machinery, tools, cheap textiles and various other commodities. At the same time, political feeling in those days, in that far-distant period, was not as uniform in Northern Europe as it is now. Sweden, partly perhaps owing to her antagonism towards Russia—because the Russian bogey was always a disturbing feature in Swedish national life—was definitely pro-German. Germany had a very strong cultural and political influence in Sweden, and Great Britain, just as in matters of commerce and finance, did not try to counteract it. Denmark, on the other hand, had not yet outlived the humiliation of the defeat of 1864, and was very strongly anti-German, while her commercial ties with Great Britain and the family ties between the two royal houses made her rather strongly pro-British. Finland, in those days still a part of the Russian Empire, was also sympathetic to the Germans, probably for the same reasons as Sweden, *i.e.* out of antagonism towards Russia. Norway was always pro-British. That was the situation in which Northern Europe found itself at the outbreak of the War.

During the War, for the first time, Great Britain tried to make a drive for the Northern European markets. Between 1914 and 1918 Great Britain repeatedly tried to force the Scandinavian neutrals to adjust their trade and their political relations to London's requirements. But despite the very strong pressure exercised by London, throughout the War the Scandinavian neutrals managed to maintain their neutrality and traded with both sides, and the real fight for supremacy in Northern Europe did not begin until after the end of hostilities. By that time the situation had altered very considerably.

Finland had become an independent State and had, after a very short episode forgotten by most people, adjusted her foreign policy entirely to a pro-British orientation. She had, for a short time, flirted with the idea of getting a German prince as her king, and had had to abandon it as a result of Germany's defeat. Moreover, Germany, who had helped her to clear the country of the Reds, had immediately imposed such an onerous commercial treaty that even the pro-German Finns were constrained to realise that if Germany had remained

there, they would have been reduced to the state of a vassal country.

In 1920, which was, I suppose, the first year that Northern Europe returned to what Americans call normalcy, the great period of adjustments began. Germany was still in a state of turmoil, but Northern Europe had outlived the first paroxysm of War economics and had begun to look at the world with more sane eyes. I may say that during the War the Scandinavian neutrals had had a completely distorted view of things; a great deal of money had been made on paper and even more money had been lost. It was in 1920 that they began to adjust themselves to the period of peace, and it was then that not only the strong pro-British feeling of Norway and Denmark, which had never wavered, but also the awakening of a pro-British orientation in Sweden and in Finland began to crystallise. However, it was still a period of free trade in Great Britain, and, just as before the War, she did not make any attempt to compel the Scandinavian States to buy here, so that the direction of their foreign trade was still much the same as in the more normal days: viz. they went on buying in Germany and selling in Great Britain. But on the political side the *rapprochement*, from the very beginning of the post-War period, developed very rapidly.

All the Scandinavian countries took up the ideal of the League of Nations with tremendous enthusiasm. They not only, as is often claimed by their critics, accepted the League of Nations because it was a useful instrument to protect their interests; they made very heavy sacrifices for it. Financially they contributed a very large share in proportion to their respective national budgets and, as in the case of Sweden, they were prepared to make political sacrifices too, in order to enhance the prestige of the League. Sweden at that time was hopeful that she would get the Aland Islands. The question was put up to the arbitration of the League, and although these islands have a population ninety-five per cent. Swedish, they were attributed to Finland. Had Sweden not been so enthusiastically devoted to the ideal of the League, and had she not accepted the decision of the League, considerable complications might have arisen.

Again, when a few years later the question of luring Germany to join the League arose, and when Germany, for reasons of prestige, demanded a permanent seat on the Council, Sweden was prepared to waive her own rights and claims to that seat in order to make room for Germany. To-day it all seems rather out of focus, but it meant a great contribution to the pacification of

the world then. I do not recollect a single case of any major difficulty in international affairs when the representatives of Norway, Sweden or Denmark did not use their influence (which was morally great, because everybody knew that they had no axe to grind, and that they were affected by the decisions of Europe without being able to influence them); I do not recollect a single instance where they did not act as the most helpful and constructive collaborators of the representatives of Great Britain. That is an important point to bear in mind, because their attitude to the League has since, for very natural reasons, undergone considerable changes.

In the work of economic reconstruction, Northern Europe in those days also played a singularly active part. Although to-day the name of the late Swedish "Match King," Kreuger, is anathema to most of the Swedes, it is impossible to deny that in the early period of post-War reconstruction his loans contributed very largely to the reconstruction of Europe. One need think only of the Baltic countries, which after the War were completely ruined by German invasions, by Russian invasions and by civil war, to realise that Kreuger was the first man who poured money into those countries when nobody would lend them a cent, and that by doing so he enabled them to build up what has since become a very solid political and economic system. I am convinced that whatever his crimes in finance may have been, the social and political significance of Kreuger will one day be recognised; by enabling the Baltic States to establish themselves the world was saved from a Bolshevik invasion, which, taking a long view, is far more important than his swindles.

It must be realised that in Northern Europe economics and politics are more intertwined, more interwoven than anywhere else in the world, and it is practically impossible to draw a line of demarcation in Sweden, Norway or Denmark to show where politics cease and economics begin.

Europe in the ten years immediately following the War was going through a series of ups and downs, all of which naturally affected trading communities in the very highest degree. Owing to the fact that the Scandinavian countries were so very largely dependent on their connections with Great Britain and their sales in the British market, they were even then entirely hitched on to her fate. Denmark was in those days dependent to the extent of eighty per cent. of her total exports on what she sold in Great Britain; Finland was dependent for more than sixty per cent. on what she sold in Great Britain; the figure for

Norway was, I believe, somewhere between twenty-seven and thirty per cent., and that for Sweden was roughly the same. It was therefore highly important for them to be able to adjust themselves to the requirements of the expanding British market when times were good, and to the shrinking British market when times were bad. Yet, as I have said, in those days of comparative economic sanity, when bilateral trade was as yet unheard of, no pressure from Great Britain was exercised upon them, and they went through these various adjustments of their own free will, through their own initiative, until the black years of 1930–31, when Great Britain was forced to abandon the gold standard and also chose to abandon free trade for protection.

That year, in my opinion, meant very much more to Northern Europe than the world crisis which came to them rather later and rather slowly. The change in Great Britain's fiscal and commercial policy was to them the closing of a happy era and the beginning of a new one which was full of uncertainties. They did not try to fight a hopeless battle; they saw from the very beginning, being shrewd and practical people, that there was only one issue, and that the issue was to keep in with Great Britain, and they followed her within a very short time in abandoning the gold standard and in forming the so-called "sterling bloc."

The one attempt made by a well-known Swedish banker to secure a loan in France to keep the krona on gold failed, and it was a very happy thing it did fail, because it would only have prolonged the agony and would have resulted in the inevitable abandonment of gold later and eventual joining of the sterling "club"; so failure to secure help in France was a blessing in disguise.

That period, 1930–32, was the second great period of economic adjustment. Great Britain told the Northern countries, and told them pretty bluntly, that if they wanted to go on selling here they must also buy here, and demanded, in a way which was perhaps not always fair or reasonable, that they should adjust their foreign trade, which had developed over generations, very rapidly. She demanded that within a year or so they should cease buying in Germany and should find British firms capable of supplying their requirements. The Scandinavian countries agreed to that, and it is important to bear in mind that not only commercial but also political considerations played a big part in that decision. Great Britain by that time was not only their best market and their best political friend; she was also, so to speak—if I may be pardoned for using a number of vulgar

stereotype expressions—the great "big brother," the "sister democracy," "mother of parliaments," the only country that showed hope of peace and civilisation, and the one country that was not participating in the various crazy experiments of Central and Eastern Europe. They looked to Great Britain even then as a metropolis of all their national interests, in whatever field these happened to be. Denmark and Norway had, up to a point, always done so. Sweden and Finland had experienced a great disappointment in Germany; the Swedes, moreover, had lost money in Germany, and, being shrewd and good business men, they were rather annoyed with Germany because the experiment of trading with her after the War had not proved a very happy one. All these countries entered into the spirit of this pro-British adjustment with more than just the necessary modicum of practical political feeling. They entered into it with enthusiasm. Organisations were created in all of them for propagating the "buy British" ideal. Several organisations were created in Denmark, non-trading organisations which do not derive any benefit from it, to canvas the Danes, and to tell them that if they wanted to go on selling in Great Britain they should also buy in Great Britain; the Danish–British Association, with its Committee for Trade Development, is one, the British Import Union is another. "If you cannot buy Danish, buy British," became their slogan. Many other groups, societies and associations took up the same work of doing what British exporters should really do themselves. As far as Norway is concerned, the trade even then was one to one, so there was not very much to do; but still the Norwegian Government actively sponsored the ideal. In Sweden every possible kind of organisation supported the propaganda campaign for British goods. The Finns, who were selling most of their timber in this country, went in for it too, and their very efficient Export Union spent a considerable amount of money on the "Buy British" propaganda. In fact, all the four countries did their utmost to facilitate adjustment, in order to meet what was then a very strong, and in many ways an unexpected, pressure from Great Britain.

The results of this adjustment of 1931–32 began to reveal themselves much sooner than might have been expected. The first step was, of course, the negotiation and signing of a series of trade agreements, which took place in 1932–33. Collaboration between the Northern countries had begun during the War, when the three Scandinavian kings met at Malmö, and when the governments established a programme of joint action in order to

protect their political and economic interests; they succeeded in developing inter-Scandinavian trade from ten per cent. before the War to thirty per cent. of their turnover at the end of the War, and that friendly collaboration had continued from 1918 to 1931.

When they suddenly found themselves faced by these demands from Great Britain, they felt that something more had to be done, and it is to the credit of their political and commercial judgment that they kept in extremely close touch with each other, and although their interests frequently overlapped, they did not compete in the negotiations and trade agreements with Great Britain, but consulted with each other and tried to keep each other informed. This goodwill did not last for ever, since there came a point when the Norwegians felt that the Finns were perhaps under-selling them; but that was a later development, and if there has been any ill-feeling it no longer exists to-day.

The new trade agreements stipulated certain definite quotas. They stipulated that all four Northern countries should "buy British"; they stipulated they should buy British textiles and machinery; they cut down, on the other hand, the Scandinavian sales in Great Britain on a rather drastic scale, especially those of Danish agricultural produce. It was a very serious problem for the four Northern countries to carry that through without upsetting their own national, economic and political systems. Let me give one illustration of this. Denmark, who was at that time selling practically the whole of her bacon to England, then had what they call so picturesquely a "pig population" of five million pigs (with only three and a half million human beings in Denmark !), and the new trade agreement cut down their bacon quota in Great Britain to such an extent that they had very rapidly to reduce their "pig population," from five million to just a trifle over three million. To the Danish farmers, who constitute one third of the community, and are, so to speak, the very backbone of Danish national life, this was a very severe trial, and a trial through which they went remarkably well.

Similar drastic reorientation had to be adopted by all the other countries. Trade with Great Britain developed in a most satisfactory way. One or two figures, showing how the Danes managed to switch round their purchases from other countries to Great Britain, are so striking that they should receive more recognition. In the years from 1929 to 1931, Denmark, on the average, bought from the United States seventeen times as much as she sold to that country; this proportion has now been

reduced to seven times the amount sold. At present Denmark imports from the United States mainly grain, spinning materials, oil, etc., while of finished articles not much is left apart from motor-cars, assembly plants for which have been established by General Motors and Ford in Copenhagen. Even with regard to this last, Fords of Dagenham have now taken to shipping a lot of cars to Denmark. From Czechoslovakia, Denmark in the years 1929–31 bought on an average six times as much as she sold there; now the ratio is cut down to the proportion of one to one-and-a-half. From France Denmark bought four times as much as she sold. If we leave out of consideration the import of grain and foodstuffs, which in fact was free, and which could be purchased from any country, the remaining imports in 1935 were in the proportion of one to one. On the other hand, Danish purchases in Great Britain—these are British Board of Trade figures—have risen from eight and a half million pounds in 1932 to fifteen million pounds in 1936, surely a very handsome effort, which deserves acknowledgment. And the position is the same, if not perhaps on quite so large a scale, in the case of Finland, Sweden and Norway. Finnish purchases in Great Britain have been doubled. Swedish purchases in Great Britain have risen by about thirty per cent. Norwegian purchases have also risen. It may be said that all these countries sell in Great Britain not on price merits, but on quality merits. They just happen to be able to turn out the kind of goods that Great Britain wants, and Great Britain does not trade with them out of charity, but because they are a very important, and, in many cases, an essential source of supply. It is therefore particularly regrettable that certain sections of the British Press, instead of encouraging the very handsome and remarkable efforts the Scandinavians have made, keep on criticising them for not doing more, and would like to lay down such strict trade rules that they would probably kill the goose that lays the proverbial golden eggs. It is all the more regrettable because all these countries take legitimate pride in their achievements, and feel extremely sensitive of the fact that instead of being encouraged, they are being continually criticised. I should like to add, with every possible emphasis, that I feel they have *more or less reached the limit of their trade expansion as far as British imports go, and that they cannot do more. If it were attempted to induce them to buy more, the result would probably be a diminution and not the further expansion of imports from Great Britain.*

Simultaneously with this trade development there has been political adjustment. When the Italo-Abyssinian war arose and Great Britain took a firm stand for the ideals of the League of Nations, when Great Britain for the first time seemed to wake up from a state of comparative lethargy and became an active champion of the ideal of collectivity, there was something approaching jubilation in Northern Europe. They all felt that an ideal which had meant a very great deal to them was now becoming a reality, and that Great Britain, the mother of democracy, the pillar of civilisation, was at last doing something tangible, turning from lip-service to practical action, and that if they only followed Great Britain, the ideals for which they all stood could be made into something real, something practical, something which would contribute to security and peace in Europe. I have never seen a greater débacle than the collapse of British prestige in Northern Europe when the events with which everyone is familiar happened, and the stand which fifty-two nations had taken behind the leadership of Great Britain resulted in her abandonment of everything she had so enthusiastically championed.

At that time I happened to be travelling in all the four Northern countries, and one felt positively ashamed of talking to people, not only to political people whose job it was to take an intelligent interest in affairs, but to ordinary people. The newspaper salesmen on the corner, the liftman in the hotel, were saying, "What about Great Britain? That great country who has just been preaching collectivity, and idealism, and League of Nations, and who is now afraid of Mussolini, and betrays the Emperor of Abyssinia?"

It is not for me to discuss why this happened, and whether there was any measure of justification for it. I am only describing the impression it made in Northern Europe, and that impression, whether the cause was excusable or not, was most lamentable. That, coupled with the British attitude on the question of trade—with the lack of encouragement on the one hand and the continual attacks and criticisms made in certain influential sections of the Press on the other hand—led last year to something like a minor crisis in Anglo-Scandinavian relations. They all felt they had been "let down": their efforts were not appreciated either on the commercial side or on the idealistic, on both of which they were ready to accept responsibility and make sacrifices.

It was, therefore, very gratifying to me this year, when I revisited all these capitals, to see that that very bitter feeling

has, to a certain extent, subsided. To-day, although they are no longer as enthusiastic as they used to be, they are feeling much friendlier and much more hopeful and much less embittered than they did last year. Several things have happened to produce that " détente."

In the first place, some of the attacks upon them in Great Britain have ceased. In the second place, trade really is going more smoothly. It has been brought home to British exporters again and again, not only through my own very humble and insignificant efforts, but, for instance, through the Advertising Association, which held a convention in Northern Europe last year and issued a most remarkable report, that if they want to go on trading with Scandinavia, they cannot go on doing it through government pressure. In the long run they can only keep their markets through service. The result has been that British manufacturers, very reluctantly, very slowly, are beginning to take a more active interest in those countries; they even visit them personally, instead of sending commercial travellers. They try to make personal contacts, and they are beginning—although not nearly so actively as Germany—to study the requirements of these countries. It is unfortunate that this turn for the better, embryonic though it is, should have arisen at the very time when the home market in Great Britain is absorbing so much of their activities that some firms, well established in Northern Europe, no longer can or will look after the interests of their Scandinavian clients. I have heard this time and again; not, however, in any spirit of bitterness, but in a spirit of regret. They complain in all these countries that they would like to buy more in Great Britain but cannot place orders or get delivery. This is going so far that Finland and Sweden, who at the present moment are choking with prosperity and are trying to put a damper on that prosperity by forcibly increasing their imports, which they would like to canalise towards Great Britain, because most of their foreign currency has accumulated in sterling, often find it impossible to discover any British firm that will take orders and supply them with the things they want. For instance, the representatives of more than one of the Northern countries have recently tried to order armaments in Great Britain, but the firms they approached told them they were sorry but they could not deliver for a number of years. No business resulted. The same thing happened with a Scandinavian country that wanted to buy some steel here, and was told no steel could be delivered.

Yet, despite these inevitable complications, feeling to-day is much better than it was a year ago. The Scandinavians have seen that, despite her political tergiversations, Great Britain in the long run still stands for the same ideals that they stand for. They realise that although they experience occasional disappointments in the political field, or in the economic field, when it comes to vital decisions they still find a common language, and again, that whatever disappointments they may have experienced in the case of Great Britain, the state of Europe is so unsatisfactory that even with her shortcomings, Great Britain is a better friend to them both politically and economically than any other country.

Their relations with Germany, however, have also undergone a change. All the four countries of Northern Europe are at the present moment governed either by Socialists or Socialist and Liberal coalitions. Three of them have Socialist Cabinets; in the fourth the Cabinet is headed by a Liberal, but the Socialists are very strongly represented. It is natural that to governments like that, and to nations who have been for generations accustomed to freedom and democracy, a dictatorial government should be profoundly repugnant. As far as Germany is concerned, they have all had unpleasant commercial experiences. In recent years they have also had unpleasant experiences politically. The Germans are financing a very pernicious propaganda among the German minorities in Northern Schleswig, which was attributed to Denmark by the most perfect of the plebiscites held after the War, and only involved the handing back of territory that was originally Danish. In Sweden, General Goering, who at the beginning of the Nazi régime paid regular visits to that country, made himself extremely unpopular by trying to dictate to the Swedish press and to Swedish politicians. In Finland, for a long time supposed to be pro-German, the growth of the Social Democratic party on the one hand (to-day the biggest party in Parliament and since recently represented in the government) and, on the other hand, the realisation that from a victorious Germany nothing is to be expected and from a defeated Germany still less have had a most sobering effect, and whatever old ties there may have been in grateful recognition of the help rendered by German troops in 1918, now amount to nothing. Concurrently the feeling against Russia, which in Finland and Sweden was very strong, has somewhat subsided. It must always be remembered that the pro-German orientation in Finland and Sweden was not so much pro-German as anti-Russian. Although there are still people in both

countries who play up the Russian bogey—admittedly the result of German propaganda—the general feeling is very much better, and the visit which the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs recently paid to Moscow has produced a very marked improvement in the relations between those two countries.

The more intelligent Swedes and Finns, however, have now come upon another idea: they no longer rave about the desire of Russia to seize the northern parts of the Scandinavian peninsula, and to establish herself in the soft water harbour of Narvik, but have evolved a most remarkable theory that the struggle between Russia and Germany involving Scandinavia will be over food supplies and iron ore. That idea was launched in Sweden by the Conservative paper *Svenska Dagbladet*, and has been elaborated in a book by a very well-known military expert, Colonel Bratt: "Perhaps we shall not have war"; he has evolved the theory that the Grängesberg iron mines, the chief iron ore deposits of which are in the very north of Sweden, somewhere near the Arctic circle, will be the cause and the scene of the next war in Northern Europe. The theory is, presumably, that Russia will try to prevent Sweden from selling iron ore to Germany, and that Germany for her part will try to prevent Russia's intervention, or try to seize the iron-ore mines even though this means marching through the whole of the Scandinavian peninsula. Various Scandinavian newspapers, probably because things are so peaceful and quiet that there are no major sensations, have been playing up these ideas for quite a number of weeks, printing hair-raising stories of a "Storm over Northern Europe," reporting phantom Soviet spies who are said to be flying over these polar regions at night, and although one does not quite know what they can do there at night or in fact what they could do even in broad daylight, lots of otherwise sane people seem to believe it all. They have also produced a story that Marshal Blomberg was seen in a Norwegian fjord, and that a submarine has also been discovered steaming out of a Norwegian fjord; and they are generally trying to convey to the extremely peaceful Scandinavians and Finns that something very sinister is afoot and that Germany and Russia are indulging in machinations which sooner or later will land that extremely peaceful part of the world in war. The result of this press campaign has been that even well-informed or sceptical people, whom normally one would expect to ignore these fairy-tales, are taking a very serious view, and this is perhaps due to the following reasons. In the first instance the Socialist Coalitions have been so successful in the post-War period in

governing these countries that there is nothing left to the Coı servative and bourgeois oppositions to beat them with; in fa they have no serious grounds for complaint, and this war scare h therefore come as a godsend to them. Now they are saying th the Socialists, who are concentrating on social welfare and on tl economic development of these countries, are not protecting tl nations' interests. The whole of this war scare is, accordingl not really an international complication of any sort, but is ve largely a matter of internal party politics, providing the Conse vative Opposition in all four Northern countries with a stick wit which to beat their governments.

There is also another factor, the importance of which must l taken into account. Germany, who, ever since the end of tl War, has been very unsuccessful in her political propaganda, an whose trade, despite her efforts, has been reduced, is trying put the fear of God into the Scandinavians by telling them th if they do not arm, and if they do not protect themselves, Russ will march in. Only the other day a leading Swedish industriali told me that when he was in Berlin a week earlier, no less a persc than General Goering told him that they must arm very muc quicker and on a very much larger scale than they were doin because if they did not do so the Russians would march in, an he "would never put up with that." General Goering woul never put up with the Russians marching into Sweden! Tl result of all this, which has been very freely and extensivel canvassed in the Scandinavian press, is that it has become a top of general interest, and when a foreigner like myself comes to tl peaceful countries of the North (you must remember that Swede and Norway have not had a war since the days of Napoleon, an Denmark not since 1864, while Finland, apart from the civil wa has not been involved in any wars for very many years either), l cannot help feeling astonished to see these people, who have live in peace for generations, talking very seriously about the in plications of war between Germany and Russia. It is mo perplexing to find them arguing about how such a war woul affect their territory, discussing the various practical measur to be taken to protect themselves, and getting extremely annoye when one pooh-poohs what seems to me their completely futi fears in that respect. I got very severely criticised when ventured to suggest that these phantom Soviet flyers, who a seen only at night and only by peasants, sailors and fishermen an never by government experts or engineers sent to investigat them, and who, moreover, have never been registered by tl

various very marvellous new radio sound-detectors and othe technical inventions at which the Swedes are past masters, wer rather like the Loch Ness monster, which also has a genius fo being seen at night only by peasants and fishermen and never b people who could establish either its identity or its very existence It was brought to bear upon me very seriously by various friend of mine that I should not treat a matter of national and inte national importance of this sort in such a jocular fashion !

Yet these fears, futile though they may seem, work themselve out in certain realities of economic life which are by no mean futile. In the first instance all the four governments, which ar working in close co-operation, have now established an inte Scandinavian body for the economic preparation of war. A Mr. Sandler, the Swedish Foreign Minister, put it to me " Preparation which may not be put to a test now is better tha improvisation dictated by necessity." And the result is tha there are a certain number of commissions, military, commercia and financial, that meet at regular intervals and work out certai measures to be adopted by the four countries, in case they a ever implicated in war, in order to protect their national wel being and their extremely high standard of living, and to develo inter-Scandinavian trade in case they are cut off from the natural sources of supply or from their markets. And in tha respect I may say this : these fears may seem rather ridiculou but on the economic side they are leading to most excellent cor structive work being done, because, whether there is a war dange or whether there is not, it is always a very good thing that the fou countries should examine further possibilities of inter-Scandinavia collaboration. This also touches on their joint interests as a important unit in world trade, and what is known as the "Osl ideal," launched in 1932 by Mr. Mowinckel, the then head of th Norwegian Government, which at that time did not result in an practical step, but has since been revived on various occasion and which is very strongly in the air to-day on an enlarged scal

Only a few months ago the Prime Minister of Holland set th ball rolling again, and although at the moment the variou discussions in connection with the Oslo Convention are merel talk, there is hope that sooner or later Great Britain and th United States and France may prefer to apply the Oslo ideal i one way or another, instead of just paying lip service to i while burying themselves in splendid economic isolation an almost choking as the result of it. The Oslo countries, i anticipation of this probably as yet distant event, have establishe

an Oslo committee, with representatives of each country, which also meets at frequent intervals, and which discusses measures of freer trade between themselves, and which only quite recently worked out a very useful and very constructive, though perhaps as yet modest, programme for a more normal trade turn-over between themselves. They have promised to inform each other of any possible new tariffs, and have further promised to reduce what tariffs they can; they are now examining the possibility of freer trade as between themselves even if the rest of the world remains outside this arrangement. That is one result of this fear of war. And that result is not just futile "hot-air," but is a very practical reality.

There is also another aspect. Since the iron-ore mines of Northern Sweden are considered the bone of contention and have thus acquired a political significance, an attempt is being made to reduce the sales to Germany and to increase sales elsewhere. These iron-ore mines are perhaps the richest in the world, and certainly the richest in Europe. They are under State control, and are allowed to mine only eleven million tons a year, of which, until recently, something like eight to nine million tons have regularly been sold to Germany and about one to one and a half million tons to Great Britain. This dependence on the German market is rather trying to the Swedes both for political and economic reasons, for although they get paid through the clearing agreement at the moment, they never know how long that will last, and they do not know whether one of these days they will not find themselves with all their iron ore without a market, without a customer, without payment. Both political and economic reasons, therefore, converge in inducing them to try to find other outlets for this iron ore, and to diminish the German quota, while increasing the sales in Great Britain or elsewhere. This, happening as it does at a time when Great Britain is at least temporarily cut off from the Spanish iron-ore supplies, gives them a very good opportunity, and they have made very favourable forward contracts in this country, and hope further to increase their sales here very considerably. Yet, even then, Germany will still have the lion's share of their iron ore, and that again is not just a futile cause for fear, because they feel that, quite apart from the scare about the coming war and the possible clash over those mines, something unexpected may happen. They never know what Dr. Schacht may do next. This is very serious, because the iron-ore sales play a most important part in Swedish national economy.

The present trend of world economics has also had very

practical and very trying repercussions in Denmark. Denmark is not only a poor country, but, contrary to general belief, she has a very poor soil. Before the soil produces anything, the Danes have to spend about a hundred million kroner, or about five million pounds sterling, on fertilisers and other things to put into the soil every year, otherwise it would be barren. They have also to import a very large part of the feeding-stuffs for their cattle. They have to import most of their raw materials for industry, because they have no raw materials at all : no minerals, no metals, no oil, no coal. And with the present trend of prices they see a growing, and alarmingly growing, disparity between the continuously rising price of raw materials that they have to import, and the price of agricultural produce, which is lagging behind. The result has been a strain on Denmark's gold reserve, a strain on her foreign currency resources, a growth in unemployment, and a threat to the very foundation of the country's life—agriculture. This, coupled with the absolute uncertainty about Great Britain's agricultural policy in the future, has a most unnerving effect.

Where does Great Britain come in in all this? I began by suggesting that Great Britain was at the root of Scandinavia's problems. The truth of the matter is that both in their political and in their economic issues they cannot do very much without Great Britain. The trend of prices, which to-day affects not only Denmark but also the other Scandinavian countries, is very largely a question of the trend of British prices. It has gone so far that the Swedes and the Finns, who are choking with prosperity and who do not know what to do with their accumulated gold and foreign currency, are very seriously alarmed lest the upward trend of prices in Great Britain may result in such a rise of prices in their own countries that there may be social unrest or complete disequilibrium of their national economic life. Just as here the Oxford economists, or Mr. Keynes, or Sir William Beveridge have been canvassing the probability of an approaching slump, so in Sweden economists have for weeks on end been prognosticating that good times are coming to an end, and that the Government must take some steps to disentangle itself from the dependence on Great Britain. Their panacea is to unpeg the krona from sterling and to try to establish Sweden on her own foundations in order not to follow the British example which they have followed for so long a time. The same in a minor degree applies to Finland.

Finland and Sweden see themselves economically threatened

because of their currency link with Great Britain and rising prices. Denmark sees herself economically threatened because she is so dependent on the British market, which is uncertain and which pays comparatively little for her agriculture, while high prices prevail for the goods she has to import. Norway is somewhere half-way between Denmark and Sweden. The Norwegians are not so devoid of natural resources as the Danes, and not so rich in them as the Swedes. The result is that the whole of the four Northern countries, where economic problems and the experts' opinions on them are in the very foreground, feel rather nervous.

Mr. Keynes once said that he was treated like a Cassandra croaking, and that he wrote books which everybody read but nobody followed; in Scandinavia the economists play a very important part and are very influential. Professor Cassel, Professor Heckscher and Professor Myrdal have been trying to persuade the Swedish authorities to revalue the krona and to abandon the sterling parity—in fact to drop out of the "sterling club," before it is too late. A similar agitation prevails in Finland, but Finland has a safety-valve in that she can still employ her foreign currency in repurchasing foreign loans on a wide scale, and they have practically wiped out all their debts. However, despite all these suggested protective measures, they cannot really do anything substantial, they cannot do anything decisive without Great Britain. Their foreign trade figures and the various aspects of their national and international life show indubitably that in European politics they stand behind Great Britain; in commerce they depend on Great Britain; even in those branches where they compete with her, such as shipping, they are dependent on what she will do. And the fact that they cannot form any opinion on the future of British commercial or foreign policy is exercising a most unnerving influence on them. Whatever protective measures they are considering now, whatever adjustments they are trying to introduce, are like beating the air in the dark. The key to their main problems is not in their own hands. The Governor of the Bank of Finland, for instance, and the Governor of the Bank of Sweden are admittedly most reluctant to unpeg their national currencies from sterling. If they only knew that freer trade and a redistribution of gold, or the much-talked-about new commercial agreement between Great Britain and the United States (which would result in an all-round improvement of the international, commercial and financial situation) could be anticipated within a reasonable future they would gladly stand the strain a little longer, rather than drop out of something which

has worked extremely well. They are reluctant to break up a system which has been a success and take a plunge into the unknown, thereby effecting what undoubtedly, psychologically, would be a very damaging blow to Anglo-Scandinavian friendship. They feel very strongly, and I think they feel rightly, that if they show their lack of confidence in the pound sterling and their apprehension of the trend of British prices it will not make for good sentiment here.

At the same time there is a limit to the risks they are prepared to take. In drawing up their budgets, in balancing their trade, in regulating the economic life of their people, which, as I have said, is so closely connected with the political life that if there is any hitch in economic affairs, which so far have developed perfectly, political troubles might result—in all these matters the question of monetary policy is of supreme importance. They look at Great Britain and they ask themselves how long they can afford to allow London to be their metropolis. They are—and I am saying this in no way disparagingly, because I realise that it might be misconstrued as in some way reflecting on their national sovereignty, on their independence—they are in many ways more of a British Dominion to-day than some parts of the British Empire. There is not, cannot be, and should not be, the same sort of relationship with Scandinavia that there is between the Mother-country and the Dominions. This goes without saying, and I am most anxious that my remarks should not be wrongly understood, either in Scandinavia or in the Empire.

But here are certain facts about the four countries of Northern Europe which speak for themselves and which impose great responsibilities on Great Britain. They are geographically much closer to Great Britain than the Dominions. Their trade with Great Britain is much more active. They are much more dependent on Great Britain to-day than, let us say, Canada or New Zealand, and they would like to see some sort of recognition of that. They would like to see—such is my impression—a little more appreciation on this side of the close ties that exist. They feel, and they are very touchy, very sensitive people, that they are not only Great Britain's best market in Europe (because, taken together, sixteen million Scandinavians buy more from Great Britain than three hundred and fifty million Indians), and her second-best market in the world, but that they are also Great Britain's natural allies. And if there is such a thing as countries or nations liking each other, then one can certainly say that the Scandinavians like Great Britain. They take a keen interest in everything

British. They study the language. They visit the country whenever they can. They read British books, produce British plays, see British films. Only recently, at a not inconsiderable sacrifice to themselves, they invited the Old Vic Company over to Denmark to produce "Hamlet." Only recently, again, the Swedes invited a group of influential British journalists, as their guests, to tour the country and tried to show them something of Sweden. At this very moment the Finns are planning a great Finnish exhibition in London which will cost them a good deal of money, and which has no commercial angle, simply because they like to contribute something to the Finnish-British *rapprochement*. The friendship between the Norwegians and the British is so traditional that there is no need to elaborate it, and it is only necessary to mention the great services rendered by Norwegian shipping to Great Britain during the War—undoubtedly a service which would be rendered again if ever it were needed, despite the difficulties that might arise. This is all taken for granted. Therefore these countries feel that they are being rather cold-shouldered. They feel that Great Britain is too stand-offish, and too casual, and does not seem to care what she sells to them as long as the quotas of the trade agreement are carried out, or whether she rubs them the right way or the wrong way.

All this contributes very largely to the disequilibrium that is at present discernible there. At long last they are all agreed that they do not like the Germans. The German political system is not congenial to them. They have lost money in Germany, and trade with Germany is one endless difficulty. But at least the Germans do take some trouble. They visit the countries to find out what the Scandinavians want. They try to do something by way of cultural propaganda; they translate German books into the Scandinavian languages, and they generally try to take an interest in the various peoples. And, when all is said and done, the Scandinavians are beginning to wonder if they are not rather foolish to look towards London, when there is a next-door neighbour who may not be congenial, but who none the less is there and is the next best market. I am not saying that this feeling has yet reached very serious proportions. Moreover, it is naturally counterbalanced by an appreciation of Germany's probable aims, apprehension in Denmark of a possible Nazi *coup d'état* in Schleswig-Holstein, or apprehension in Sweden about the mines; but, at the same time, there is a latent feeling that the Germans do seem to care, and that the British do not. The result is that these considerations

produce a certain state of havoc in the minds of many leading Scandinavians, because they do not really know what course to adopt. It must be irritating to the statesmen of Northern Europe, who want a lead from London, to receive instead what amounts to completely vague talk about matters of vital importance. It is no joke for these gentlemen when they cannot obtain a definite answer to a single practical question, either with regard to commercial policy or foreign policy. This uncertainty is damaging enough when it concerns Norwegian fishing and shipping, or Finnish timber and wood goods, or Swedish pulp and paper, or iron ore, but the situation is even more difficult in the case of Danish agriculture—a matter of life and death to a country with sixty-eight thousand unemployed. The Danish Government must frame some sort of economic and social policy, but they neither know Mr. Morrison's scheme, nor do they ever appear to receive anything but completely vague assurances that nothing very drastic or dangerous is contemplated. Again, no one in Northern Europe knows whether, in the event of a conflict with Russia or Germany or both, it would be possible to expect from the British Government, if not active help, at least some sort of friendly collaboration.

As a result, is it to be wondered at if these people ask themselves whether there is not some price at which they can buy peace with Germany, assuming always that there is a threat? They look towards Berlin, they look towards London, and they cannot make up their minds whether to go on following London in these uncertain times, or whether to try to "unpeg" themselves, and not only in the monetary sense. It is, of course, impossible to prognosticate what will happen in Europe. It is impossible to say what British policy will be. But I cannot help feeling very strongly that their fears may become very unpleasant realities unless British commercial and foreign policy is made much more clear and definite at the earliest possible opportunity.

Summary of Discussion.

MR. F. N. KEEN thanked the lecturer for a very brilliant and interesting description of the Scandinavian situation. The lecturer had referred to many of the virtues of the Scandinavians, but not to all. He had referred to their efforts towards mutual co-operation, but had not mentioned the extent to which this had gone with regard to the movement for securing uniformity in the laws of these countries. Such a principle of comparative legislation was very valuable, particularly to the commercial community, and it was to be hoped

that the example of Scandinavia in this respect would soon influence other nations. One interesting side of the exchanges between the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain was the matrimonial exchange. In that respect the Scandinavians had maintained the same balance as before the War, in that larger numbers of Scandinavian wives had been imported into Great Britain than the number of British husbands imported into Scandinavia. The number had increased and was undoubtedly considerable. The speaker had been told that the most ideal marriage in the world was that of a Swedish woman and a British man.

As regards the individual qualities of the Scandinavians, he thought that their cultural superiority was striking. They were far ahead of Great Britain and other countries in the matter of education, and in some respects in the matter of invention. In 1893 he had paid a visit to a niece of Grieg, the composer, in Bergen, and found that she ordered all her household goods by telephone each day, a practice unheard of in Great Britain at that date. The same lady spoke English fluently and knew English literature exceedingly well. On a visit to the Nordfjord in a later year he had met a farmer's son who spent six months working on his father's land and the other six months of the year at the University in Christiania. He spoke English, French and German, wrote poetry, and knew Greek and Latin. There was no doubt that the whole level of education of these countries was very high indeed.

MR. SOLOVEYTCHIK said that education in Scandinavia was not only compulsory, but had been free for many decades. There was no illiteracy, and for this reason there was a peasant and working class who enjoyed all the privileges of people of a much superior origin. Peasants' sons and the sons of noblemen sat side by side on the same benches at school, and the former could find their way to the highest offices in the State. If they happened to marry into the families of the most ancient nobility it was in no way considered as a mésalliance; in fact, a peasant's son who had done well was preferred as a son-in-law to an aristocrat who had achieved nothing. This free and general—or one might say, equalising—education was one of the most healthy and vital forces in Scandinavian life to-day as it provided for the continued renewal of the ruling class.

SIR KARL KNUDSEN said how grateful he was to the lecturer for painting on a large canvas such a clear picture of a complex situation. Nobody would go away with a mistaken notion that there was a political and economic unit called "Scandinavia"; they were separate countries with differing interests, co-operating with each other to the greatest possible extent, but that did not constitute a unit.

He spoke as a disappointed man. His great ideal had always been the British Commonwealth as the only practical solution of the world's troubles. Universal peace would never be achieved except on the

basis of some surrender of sovereignty, and that was effected in the British Commonwealth. He had always believed that the Northern countries belonged spiritually to the British Commonwealth as much as any Dominion, added to which there was geographical proximity. This ideal had undergone a great change since 1931, and this change was reflected in the difficulties described by the lecturer.

In 1930 it could be seen that war debts and reparations had unsettled every system of trade. It was not a question of protection versus free trade, but of the after effects of the War which dislocated all trading systems impartially. At the time the speaker had discussed the matter with a leading free trader in Great Britain, telling him of his fears, and had been regarded as rather pessimistic. Yet in 1931 the same man had taken a leading part in bringing about the present situation; so the revulsion of feeling had been very great. In the same year the speaker had addressed the leading business men of Oslo, and told them that the one thing they could do was to support Mr. Graham at Geneva, and to say on every occasion how dangerous it was not to support actively those people in Great Britain who were still holding out for some freedom in trade in spite of the difficulties of the situation.

The election programme of the National Government in 1931 stated that tariffs were to be used to further world trade. He had spoken at Bergen advising people to approach Great Britain with an assurance that they had no intention of departing from their liberal methods of trading, which, if generally practised to-day, would seem to be almost a return to free trade. The next day a leading London daily announced that Great Britain would not be able to say anything to the small countries until she had been to Ottawa. What must have been the feelings in those countries, which had learned their economic lessons from Great Britain, and which now heard a language spoken in political and business circles which was not heard, and could not have been heard, before 1931? They had been told that the Ottawa agreements, in that they increased trade between Great Britain and the Dominions, would increase world trade. If that were true, it would be equally true that increased trade between foreign countries and Great Britain would help trade with the Dominions. When reference was made to growth in trade with the Dominions since the slump, 1929–31, people were apt to forget that trade with the Northern countries had hardly suffered during that period, so that comparisons were not made on a true basis. Bilateral agreements were really a negation of world trade. The world had forgotten that the great invention called money released individuals from primitive barter, and stable exchanges did the same for world trade. Stability within the sterling area was designed to promote trade between all its members. It was understandable that the Northern countries should feel a little sore; yet it was true that sympathy for Great Britain was very great. But the Scandinavian nations were not quite such angels as they had

been depicted. They were hypercritical, and justified their criticism of Great Britain by saying that they expected so much more from her than from others. In remonstrating with them about this, he had frequently reminded them that it was a great privilege to be a small country. It was a privilege to be free of the enormous responsibilities carried by bigger countries, and to have been able to develop an educational system and social services beyond what others had been able to achieve. But the crux of the matter was that those people did not know what British policy was. This was hardly strange. Probably no single member of the audience knew, and although Sir John Simon would be able to give the pros and cons of every system, it was improbable that he would advise the adoption of any line. When one had given one's best to strengthen the ties and develop the understanding between the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain, the present situation could not be anything but disappointing.

The problem of Denmark was perhaps the most perplexing: the speaker questioned whether it was good international policy to place a country that by industry and ability had developed a superb agriculture based on the British market face to face with a cruel choice.

With regard to Norway, the speaker did not agree with the lecturer that she would, in the long run, depend upon British trade. She would like to do so, but most of her export articles were based on timber, and, thanks to her shipping, she could develop markets overseas. Her export of newsprint was a trifle in the American market. While on the subject of shipping, the speaker said that when one knew what the Norwegian mercantile marine had done during the War, it was a little provoking to hear it said at the Royal Society of Arts by a shipowner, who had been very vociferous on behalf of government aid for his trade, that in another war Great Britain might be unable to "bribe" Norway to let her have the use of her ships. It illustrates the mysterious working of people's minds to-day when the same shipowner asked why the Northern countries did not use British shipping to bring about a better balance of trade. The shipowner, who is also an exporter of coals, circularised all Norwegian shipowners with offers of his goods. One would be tempted to ask him whether he had ever heard of the old saw of bringing coals to Newcastle.

The speaker had had the opportunity of speaking to prominent Norwegian public men, and it illustrated their attitude when one of them asked whether it was not strange that there could be any one Norwegian who did not realise the supreme importance of Norway's relations with Great Britain. Another said with reference to the dismal happenings during the Napoleonic Wars that now, when Norway managed her own foreign policy, her decisions would be taken in time of danger in line with Norway's interest, and personal pique would play no part.

The speaker liked the word commerce. Essentially it meant interchange of ideas. He had taken twelve British editors round Norway, among them two Scots, a Conservative and a Radical. He had shown them the kitchens in one of the big municipal schools, and the Conservative had asked whether the children were fed there. The speaker replied that they were if they wanted food. They also received free school books. Then they went to see a beautiful swimming-bath, and on hearing that this was paid for out of the ratepayers' money, the Conservative said he was losing his respect for the Norwegians. To which the Radical replied : " You believe in free education. Will you tell me where the body ends and the mind begins ?" At present all doors were wide open, and he trusted that none would be closed, as it would mean the breaking of some bridges for the commerce of thought.

MR. SOLOVEYTCHIK said that the last speaker was a very distinguished Anglo-Scandinavian, while he himself was only a very humble one. He did not disagree with Sir Karl Knudsen in any appreciable degree except upon the question of Norwegian dependence upon Great Britain. Although it was no doubt true that she could find other markets in time, he felt that, having regard to the present structure of her national life, she was very dependent upon Great Britain, and that it would take considerable time to build up a reorientation of trade so as not to cause damaging disequilibrium; twenty-seven per cent. of a country's commerce was so important that it constituted a vital and decisive factor.

SIR KARL KNUDSEN replied that he had meant that such an adjustment could only be effected over a period of years.

MR. A. V. BURBURY said that as he knew and loved the Scandinavian countries and felt in some ways more at home in them than in Great Britain, he welcomed Mr. Soloveytchik's admirably sympathetic statement of their point of view.

He had in 1929 and still more in 1931 heard high officials in those lands suggesting that their countries would like to receive " Dominion Status," by which they meant inclusion from a commercial and tariff point of view in the nations of the British Commonwealth. Could the lecturer say if this idea was practicable, and if there was any chance of its being realised ?

That phrase had also clearly implied that they sought commitments from the British Navy in respect of possible danger from the east—and nowadays, presumably, from the south too. Now that a stronger German Fleet considered themselves half-masters of the Baltic, it seemed most unlikely that the Royal Navy could be committed much in that area. Did the lecturer feel that there was much defence unity in Scandinavia, or likelihood of even provisional and contingent commitment from our side ?

There was no doubt that the Scandinavian countries were very aware of their consanguinity with Great Britain, and this feeling was, unfortunately, not enough reciprocated. They were naturally her best and in a sense her only friends; and she could not afford to stand alone, or with mere lip-service friends. It was most desirable that the British should stand in their eyes for something definite and something noble; the Scandinavian countries had long held such a belief, and though it had wavered during and after the Abyssinian débacle, it still existed. The need was not so much for a *Scandinavian* policy on the part of His Majesty's government as for *a* policy; the lecturer had pointed out how sane and sound these countries were under their Left governments, and the inference was that such a policy might most naturally be awaited from a Left government in the United Kingdom.

MR. H. L. BROWN said that as a Canadian he would like to say that Canada had never regarded the Scandinavian countries as more than natural rivals in commerce; their competition had been felt most severely at times, but bad feeling had seldom arisen. He suggested that the Ottawa agreements should be seen in their true light, in that they are arrangements arrived at when world economy was in a state of chaos, when the bilateral features of international trade had developed to such an extent that it became necessary that those who enjoyed that consanguinity which had been mentioned, should put their heads together and do something toward helping themselves.

So far as concerned the inclusion of the Scandinavian countries in some arrangement approximating Dominion status, he pointed out that Canadian sympathy with Scandinavia was not entirely impersonal, since there was a large element of Scandinavian origin in Canada, particularly in the West, and that, while such an association of north-western Europe with the Empire would be an ideal more to be hoped for than expected, he considered there would be little real objection from the people of Canada to the idea of including Scandinavia in a group with the British Commonwealth of Nations.

MR. SOLOVEYTCHIK replied to the speaker before the last that he had deliberately given the Scandinavian point of view because he had just returned from that part of the world, where he had studied it on the spot. To attempt to indicate the British point of view, utterly vague as it was, was not the object of his lecture.

With regard to the suggestion of including the Northern countries in a Commonwealth scheme, he could not hold out the least hope of this being done. With regard to the matter of defence, the lecturer did not think that the British Government would be prepared to commit itself in any way, and, also, he did not think that the Northern countries were ready to commit themselves to each other in any way. Commercially and diplomatically there was an unspoken and implicit understanding between them, but strategically they had too large

territories and too small armies, and the principle of neutrality was too deeply ingrained in all of them to allow them to commit themselves to each other from a military point of view. The Danish Prime Minister had made himself very unpopular in Sweden by saying that a Scandinavian military alliance was just a phrase, but nevertheless this was true.

Lieut.-General Sir George Macdonogh (in the Chair) said that he felt every sympathy for the bewilderment of the Scandinavians over British policy. He had always felt that the policy of various members of the Cabinet differed widely, that for instance the policy of the Minister of Agriculture and that of the President of the Board of Trade did not always tally. The question of British agriculture was extraordinarily difficult. There was no doubt that nobody knew where it would lead, and that it would cause difficulty not only abroad as affecting trade agreements but also at home as affecting exports.

STANDARDS OF LIVING AS A FACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS[1]

DR. CARL ALSBERG

MY subject is a very academic one, and one which, so far as I can judge, has not seemed important politically in Great Britain. In the United States, however, the subject has been very important politically. The maintenance of the American standard of living has been set forth as vital by our politicians, and I mean no disrespect by the word " politicians," because all our statesmen are politicians. Unlike the British practice, we make the distinction that anybody who is in public life and alive is a politician, and anybody who is dead is a statesman. For our public men the " standard of living " has been a tremendously valuable catch-phrase, something that the public thought it understood, but did not. It has been used as the most potent argument for high tariff policies after it became impossible to apply the " infant industry " argument.

But the subject has been important not merely from the standpoint of tariffs and trade barriers, and the enormous influence that such tariffs and barriers, and other obstructions to trade, have upon international relations; it has also been an immensely important factor in determining the flow of population. That, again, is a question that has not been very important to Great Britain, but it is important to us. There were years, just before the War, when we gained more than a million people a year, who came to us from the ends of the earth. The reason they came was that the standard of living in the United States was higher than the standard of living in their home countries. It seems to be a law of the flow of population that population moves, not necessarily from an area of dense population to an area of thin population, but rather from an area of low standard of living to an area of

[1] The above was a meeting held at Chatham House on Thursday, June 24th, 1937, with the Rt. Hon. A. V. Alexander, M.P., in the Chair.

Dr. Alsberg explained, in his introductory remarks, that he had received the invitation to speak at Chatham House on the day before he sailed from New York and that, in accepting the invitation, his feelings had been mixed since the statistics upon which he would have liked to base his remarks were at his home in California. He therefore asked the indulgence of the meeting on this account.

high standard of living. That is perfectly obvious. A man emigrates to improve his condition of living. He will not improve his conditions if he emigrates to a country or an area where the general standard of living is lower than that from which he came.

The potential gradient, if one may borrow a metaphor from engineering, that seems to determine the flow, and also the rate, of population, is, therefore a gradient of standards of living, not a gradient of density of population. If it were otherwise the Mexicans, who live in a very thinly populated country, would not migrate to the United States; and, conversely, the Japanese would be migrating to Manchuria. The Japanese are not so migrating, nor is there any prospect that they will do so. This is a determining factor in the long run for the fate of Manchuria, which is and must remain Chinese and cannot racially become Japanese. The Japanese have a higher standard of living than the Manchurians. (I do not mean to say that no Japanese go to Manchuria, some do, but they are merchants, professional men, officials, railroad and other skilled workers, and people of that kind.) The peace and order which the Japanese are trying to introduce into Manchuria—no doubt they will succeed—and above all the capital which the Japanese are pouring into Manchuria—most unwisely, I think—will raise the general standard of living of Manchurians as compared with the Chinese elsewhere in China. Now, it is entirely possible, and indeed probable, that Manchuria may, some day, want to throw off the Japanese domination. That does not mean that the people of Manchuria will want to become part of the rest of China: they are already raising tariff walls against the rest of China. If their standard of living becomes higher than that of the rest of China, it may well happen that Manchuria will want to be independent of the rest of China, much as they will probably want to be independent also of Japan. Therefore, the standard of living may be an important factor in determining political questions of this kind.

This is not the only direction in which differences in standards of living are important. Another is colonisation. A country cannot be colonised if the colonists have to move from an area of high standards of living to an area of low standards of living. The colonists must either be promised a better life than they have had, or what they imagine to be a better life, or the expectation of achieving what they regard as a better life. The colonist may be willing to suffer for a decade or two, or all his life as a pioneer, with a low standard of living, in order that he may give

more comforting thing to our politicians than phrases which are so general and so vague, that they can always be defined to suit the particular occasion. They never tell you just what they mean by the phrase " the standard of living." They simple tell the American voter that their party is the party that is maintaining the sacred American standard of living. They do not say whether they mean by the phrase an ideal which is to be striven for but has not yet been attained, or whether they mean by the use of the word " standard " a measuring-stick which will be for society what the yardstick or the metre staff is in measuring distances. Nor again do they tell you that what they mean is *not* an ideal to be striven for nor a standard of measurement, but an actual condition or level of welfare which exists or ought to exist. If the term " standard of living " is to mean something there should be some method of measurement, some definition of what is meant when it is stated that one standard of living is higher than another.

The moment this is attempted all kinds of difficulties arise. Suppose you try to compare the standard of living of a North Dakota farmer with that of a Filipino. You cannot take income, because they use it for different things. The winter in North Dakota and the corresponding portion of Canada is, with the exception of a part of Siberia, one of the coldest regions in the world. The summer temperature, moreover, may run up to a hundred and two, three and four in the shade. The North Dakota farmer needs a weather-tight house and much fuel, and he must also have a reasonably weather-tight barn for his livestock. The Filipino only needs something to keep off the wind and rain. The North Dakota farmer has to have at least two sets of clothes, winter and summer clothing. The Filipino only has to have one set of clothes, and not very much of that.

It has been suggested that the proportion of income expended on food should be taken as a standard of comparison; but that will not do. In the first place, the North Dakota farmer probably has an average height of five feet ten, or it may be more. He weighs probably on an average a hundred and eighty pounds, while the Filipino is on average probably five feet three. Our Filipino cook at home in California is actually five feet one, and weighs probably not much over a hundred and ten pounds. He needs less food than the North Dakota farmer.

When you attempt to define the standard of living in terms of what are called spiritual and psychological values, then you are dealing with complete incommensurables. In any consideration of this kind you must leave such things as happiness and spiritual

values out, because they are subjective, not capable of measurement or of scientific appraisal.

It has been proposed to take as a standard the amount of time left for leisure, or the proportion of income available for savings and expenditure on amusement. But that will not do, because in the matter of amusement and leisure certain psychological and spiritual values are involved that are incapable of measurement, and probably always will be so.

Therefore, the phrase " standard of living " has a vagueness that suits our politicians very well. This may be illustrated by the story which went the rounds in Washington many years ago concerning a certain Senator who had the reputation that he never committed himself. Two of his friends made a bet that they would succeed in making him commit himself. They took him for a ride in a buggy, a one-horse carriage; those were what President Roosevelt calls the horse-and-buggy days. The road led by a hillside on which sheep were grazing. One of the men said: " Senator, all those sheep have been sheared." And the Senator replied: " It looks so from this side." Now, the phrase " standard of living " commits one almost as little as the Senator committed himself that afternoon. There is no such thing as a standard of living for a country as a whole. There are many standards of living within one and the same country; the standard of living in the different social and income classes varies. You cannot take per capita national income as an index, because you do not know how it is distributed among the different classes.

In our Food Research Institute at Stanford University we have thought a good deal about methods of measuring or comparing the standards of living of different countries. There is no doubt that there is a difference in the level of living in different countries, even if psychological and spiritual values are left out of consideration. We have thought of two possible ways of measuring such differences. One of them we have exploited, the other we have not. The one we have *not* exploited is based on the assumption that the standard of living finds its expression in physical welfare; you see, I am leaving out all matters of psychological and spiritual values. I think it is reasonable to assume that in a country in which the expectation of life is greater than in another country, in which, moreover, the incidence of morbidity, for instance, is less than in another country, there is a higher standard of living. Thus all subjective questions are avoided. Unfortunately there are not many countries with adequate statistics on the expectation of life; but the differences in the expectation

of life may be really enormous. When I was in Java I tried to get statistics on the expectation of life of the Javanese. There were none. So I thought I had a bright idea, and I went to see the actuary of the largest insurance company. He told me that he did not know exactly, but he thought the expectation of life of the Javanese of the class they insured, the aristocrats and the wealthy upper classes, was probably about fifteen years less than that of Europeans living in Java. For the peasants in Java it may be very much less than that. In any case we do not know whether this is due to the very low level of living or whether the Javanese belong to a shorter-lived race than the White man. At present the vital statistics of the Japanese are not in a very satisfactory state. When I went to see the chief vital statistician at the Home Office in Tokyo in 1935, he told me that they had just taken a census, and their last two censuses did not agree. The last census indicated that the Japanese had an expectation of life considerably shorter than at the preceeding census, which is almost absurd. He could not explain this discrepancy. The shorter expectation of life of the Japanese does not necessarily mean that this is a racial characteristic or is due to a low level of living, for the expectation of life of an Englishman or an American in 1840 was probably no greater than the expectation of life of a Japanese to-day. The Japanese are a race which has only recently come into close contact with western culture, with the rest of the world, and our information about them is incomplete. At the present moment they may be in the condition of the Polynesians in the South Sea Islands when the European sailors gave them diseases new to them. Perhaps the great incidence of tuberculosis in Japan is due to the fact that, having been shut off from the world for so many years, our particular kind of tuberculosis is a new disease for them; they may be particularly susceptible to it.

So these questions are very difficult. My colleague, Dr. Bennett, has followed a different method in trying to compare standards of living. Dealing only with Western Europe, he has taken such statistical data as the number of telephones used, the number of letters circulated by post, the circulation of newspapers, the proportion of the population in schools, the number of four-wheel vehicles, the consumption of luxury foods, fruit and vegetables, and things of that kind. For each item of that sort representing different factors entering into well-being, he has tried to construct an index number; then he has combined these index numbers, and the results are interesting. As nearly

as I can remember the results were these: Denmark and Britain stand at the top; France is fairly far down, and Portugal and Spain are about at the bottom, with Italy a little above them. Holland, Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries are lower than I had expected. (At the present moment in the United States Sweden is held up to us as the great model country which handled its situation in the depression more effectively than any other, excepting possibly Australia: both countries are held up to us as models of what we ought to have done but did not do.)

It is a matter of first importance to develop a really good method for making comparisons in the level of living as between different classes of society in a given country and as between countries. It is particularly important for us in the United States because our politicians and statesmen are using, and have been using, the idea that the standard of living must inevitably be depressed if the importation of goods is permitted from a country with a lower standard of living than your own. They are careful not to say what they mean by the American standard of living: whether the very high standard of living of the Iowa corn (maize)-hog-belt farmer, or that of the farmer on Californian fruit-ranches, or of the Colorado cattle-rancher, or of the negro tenant farmer raising cotton in the old cotton-belt, or of the New England farmer whose milk is being produced for the industrial cities of the United States; or whether he means the slum-dweller of New York and Chicago. Each one of them has an American standard of living, and these standards of living are very different. I am not at all certain that one of the reasons why we beat the rest of the world in cotton production is not due to the fact that it is the negro, with a low standard of living, who raises much of our cotton.

This matter of comparison is important, because it determines all kinds of international policies. In the United States it has gone so far that at one time we had a law which authorised the President to increase or reduce the tariff rates on any given commodity so as to make the cost of production in the United States equal to the cost of laying down the imported product in an American port. This, of course, is a ridiculous concept, because if the cost of producing a given article in Great Britain and the United States is identical, then Great Britain could not sell in the United States. You do not buy a thing because it is the same in price in a foreign country; you buy it at home in that case. If all costs of production were the same everywhere in the world, you would not have much, if any, foreign trade.

Foreign trade, international trade, assumes that one country produces something at a lesser cost than another country. Actually this provision of our tariff act authorised the President to reduce or raise rates by fifty per cent. of the existing rate if our tariff commission proved that the cost of production in another country was different from that in our own. We tried to find out the cost of production of this, that and the other thing in all sorts of countries. If you ever have had any dealings with what we call certified public accountants, or what you call, I believe, costing experts, you know that no two of them will ever agree exactly on the cost of production of any one given thing in the same factory, because there are always joint products. It is a question of judgment whether you allocate given costs to one product or the other. When a farmer produces milk he also produces manure, and when he produces manure he uses the manure to produce grain, so you have a joint situation. How are you to disentangle costs? The queerest case, that caused many a laugh in the United States, was the duty on quail. Why it was put in the law I do not know. I do not mean dead quail: the sportsmen of the United States wanted to import quail from Mexico for their game preserves. Since we have no industry producing quail, there was no opposition. But the law required that the tariff commission should determine the difference in the cost of producing quail in the United States and in Mexico. So men were sent into Mexico to trap some quail, and they kept careful account of what it cost them to trap quail. Then the question arose whether the cost of the production of quail was the cost of trapping the quail, or of trapping the quail and delivering them at the port of entry into the United States; there was a long argument over that. Finally it was decided that the cost of production of Mexican quail was the cost of trapping them, caging them, and transporting them to the border between Mexico and the United States, and on that basis President Coolidge reduced the duty on quail. I think it was the only case in which this so-called flexible provision was flexible downwards.

The standard of living and its significance in international relations is really a vast subject. The task that I set myself was to endeavour to explain the importance of the concept. I have not tried to present a free trade or a protectionist argument. I have not attempted to discuss the economic theory that lies behind the concept that to permit the entry of goods produced by cheaper labour than you have yourself is not necessarily an evil to the importing country. All that, or part of it, is so

hackneyed that it is common knowledge, and part is so abstruse that I, being really a professional biochemist, have really no right to discuss it.

Summary of Discussion.

MRS. MARION PICKETT asked whether the cost of a high standard of living did not lower the standard of living. This seemed to be the case in Australia. If a thing cost too much, people did not buy it. In the cheaper hotels in Australia there was generally one wash-basin with running water between two rooms, because they cost so much. This must lower the standard of living and result in more unemployment.

DR. ALSBERG replied that a rise in prices lowered the standard of living of a section of the community, *i.e.* that section whose incomes were fixed and who did not benefit from the rise in prices.

MRS. MARION PICKETT said that the high wages and high cost of certain conveniences in Australia caused certain people to do without them and to cease to employ labour. This caused unemployment and made life more inconvenient for the average householder, and therefore lowered the standard of living all round.

DR. ALSBERG said that in the United States of America they paid their cook a hundred dollars a month (£240 a year). The reason why the Americans had been the most inventive people with regard to labour-saving devices was because of the high cost of labour. They substituted capital for labour. Did not the situation envisaged by the last speaker lower the standard of living of the people with high incomes, and raise the standard of living of the people with the lower incomes? This was the case in the United States. He did not consider that absolute high wages, high purchasing power on the part of the working classes, lowered the average standard of living. It lowered the standard of living of some people, but raised it with regard to most people. He considered one of the reasons for the recent depression in the United States was that profits of industry rose very much faster than wages, so that the products of industry could not be bought.

MRS. MARION PICKETT said that if unemployment were increased, then the general standard of living must be lowered accordingly.

DR. ALSBERG said that it remained to be proved that raising wages increased unemployment. It had been said that labour-saving devices caused unemployment, but someone had to make those labour-saving devices. He did not believe that doing a job more quickly and efficiently, and thereby making society more productive, resulted in anything more than temporary unemployment for the particular classes affected and larger employment for the rest of society.

LIEUT.-COLONEL C. WALEY COHEN said that, with regard to the lecturer's remarks about the standard of living and longevity, he would

find that in India the increased wealth had not only gone into increasing the population, but also into raising the standard of living between the years 1870 to 1920. There were very good statistics, and it would be found that the longevity in India had increased considerably in this same period. A snag in this case was that in about the year 1870 roughly five to seven million people died in the big famine in Madras, followed by the famine in Bengal. As a result of improved communications, very few people now died from famine in India.

Then with regard to the measurement of the standard of living by the use of "incidentals," a good deal depended upon the habits of the people in the different countries. One reason why expenditure on incidentals was low in France was because the habit of the people was not to spend their surplus money upon luxuries, but to save it and to spend it in buying more land. Under-nutrition was probably the best test. If this was applied to India, it would be found that the population suffering in this way was very much less than in 1870, in spite of the fact that the population had increased so much. He doubted whether a rise in the standard of living did tend to reduce the population. During the middle of the nineteenth century the section of population that increased the most, apart from the agricultural population, was the mining population, and they, with the members of the engineering trade, were the aristocrats of labour. A very important thing was the method of living. If it was desired to decrease the population of the Yellow, Brown or Black Races, they should be given skyscrapers to work in and slums to live in. Congestion certainly reduced the rate of increase of the population.

The North Dakota farmer had been compared with the Filipinos, but difficulties of comparison could be found within the United States itself. One had only to compare, as the lecturer had himself suggested, the conditions of the Dakota farmer with those of the Californian fruit-grower. The profits of the individual farmer increased as one travelled west until California was the climax. The profits of the milk-producers in the East were low, in the last ten years they had been a little better than those of the wheat-producers, but nothing compared with those of the Californians. The result had been, towards the end of the 1920's and beginning of the 1930's, a huge migration of population into California. The situation was very different in Europe. In the United States, where there was a stable political system, only economic conditions counted in these matters, but the migration from Europe to the United States was often due to political pressure. This was particularly true in the case of Ireland, Germany and Russia from 1848 onwards. It was significant that in England, up till 1911, migration was always greatest when prosperity was greatest. Migration was never caused by bad times, the only exception being between 1905 and 1908, when, for the first time, large government funds were available to assist emigration.

The lecturer had been a little hard on the subsistence colonist. Deductions could not be based upon Great Britain's experience in

Australia, because the land settlement of ex-soldiers after the War had violated every known principle of how land settlement should be done. It was extravagant, and no provision had been made for the people to sell their produce. But all the biggest and most successful movements of migration in the early nineteenth century were subsistence migration. The Wakefield system had been a subsistence system. It was necessary to take a long period of time. If the value of the land went back to the colonising body who had advanced the money for colonisation, over a period of fifty years, the subsistence migrant prepared the way for the exporting migrant, so that eventually there was a profit. Of course, capital was necessary, but that was the whole justification of migration, that the capital necessary to employ people on virgin soil was very much less than that necessary for adding to the working population in a congested country. In Canada in 1907 it was estimated that for every family £150 of capital was needed in land or industry, while the amount of increased capital required in Great Britain was between £300 and £400.

An important factor in many countries of recent years had been the decrease in the rate of increase of the agricultural section of the community which previously had been the most prolific.

MR. F. L. McDOUGALL said that he felt a debt of gratitude to the lecturer. He had been working recently on both the Nutrition Committee and the Economic Committee of the League of Nations. At a recent meeting of the Economic Committee the conclusion had been reached that if real progress were to be made towards the revival of world trade, it was essential that governments should associate the various steps which would be necessary to this end, such as the lowering of barriers of trade, with the improvement in the standard of living. The Committee felt that if a well-informed public opinion were to be behind the governments, it was essential that the ordinary man in the street should realise the association between his own welfare and international trade.

The lecturer had come to the conclusion that one of the best and most reliable methods of gauging the standard of living was the test of morbidity, but he found that the results should probably be qualified by the fact, for example, that the Javanese or Japanese were perhaps a shorter lived race than others. If, however, this test were applied to the people of one country and one blood and differences of up to fifty per cent. could then be found in both the rate of morbidity and infant mortality, then some indication of the effect of the standard of living upon human welfare could be ascertained. With these ideas in mind, both the Nutrition Committee and the Economic Committee of the League of Nations intended to present to governments a picture of what might be achieved if they were really to pay a considerable amount of attention to this factor, the standard of living.

It was impossible to divorce this factor from its great political significance. If a comparison were made between the totalitarian

countries and the democratic countries, it would be found that the standard of living in the former was definitely suffering. In Italy, for instance, not only was the birth rate not going up, but the death rate was going up. In Germany the fall in the standard of living had been particularly apparent during the last two years. She had had bad luck, as she had started the system of autarchy after four consecutive good harvests, and now they had had two mediocre ones, and looked like having a third.

He did think that the morbidity test was the best one, although it might be a number of years before improvements in vital statistics enabled it to be applied really efficiently.

A MEMBER asked if the lecturer thought that there was any value in the investigations of the International Labour Office upon the standard of living, undertaken through the bounty of Mr. Henry Ford. Might there not be some value in isolating a particular social class or a section of the community and establishing some sort of comparison with reference to that standard?

MR. C. E. TOMLINSON said that the lecturer came from a country which was regarded as the highest tariff country in the world. Two years ago he had been told in the Produce Exchange in New York that despite the very high tariff policy Polish pigs were undermining their own particular market. Would the lecturer give his opinion of this statement?

MR. A. COOMBE TENNANT said, "To the negro population in the United States in this connection" might stand as it is. He had been there about four years ago, and had heard much talk that the White population in certain states might be overwhelmed by the rapid increase of the Black population, but last year he had heard little on this subject. It had occurred to him that the birth rate of the coloured population might have fallen considerably in the eastern cities, where the standard of living was relatively high, and to which immigration from the south by the coloured population had been particularly heavy during the depression, while at the same time the high birth rate might have been maintained in the Southern States, where the standard of living was lower.

This would, in fact, be a good instance for the practical proof of Dr. Alsberg's statement.

REAR-ADMIRAL A. H. TAYLOR said that a professor of agriculture in Chicago had told him that the Red Indian population of the United States was now something like ten times as great as it had been before the great movement west which drove them out of their own country, in spite of the diseases which had decimated the population about the year 1840. This was an interesting effect of the standard of living on a

race which had had its conditions altered by circumstances beyond its own control.

MR. E. M. H. LLOYD said that he was interested in the lecturer's reference to the fact that the term "standard of living" was used in different ways. He did not quite agree that while it occupied a very important place in the United States, it had not received much attention in Great Britain. In recent times a great deal of attention had been given in this country to the standard of nutrition. The standard of living was often treated as the same thing as the level of wages, but in any examination of this problem it would be found that the standard of living varied greatly, according to the ratio of earners to dependants in the family, and that the level of wages might be quite irrelevant in considering the standard of living of the individual. It was this aspect of the subject which, under the auspices of Mr. Bruce at Geneva and Sir John Orr in Great Britain, had given rise to a more intensive study of family budgets, and this was being done also in the United States. Attempts had been made not only to measure the variation in the standard of nutrition from family budget inquiries, but also to estimate the distribution of the national income according to family income per head. The latter could only be done with precision by a census of family incomes, or at least a sufficiently large random sample of family incomes. Partly as a result of unemployment among the clerical workers in the United States, three hundred thousand families had been chosen at random throughout the country to find out their family income and the ratio of earners to dependants in the family. When the position in any country was measured in that way, a very different result was obtained from a crude comparison of wage levels.

The standard of living meant something very different when applied to the producer in the sense of the wages which entered into cost of production, and when applied to the consumer; and one of the most hopeful features of recent investigations was that attention was being increasingly concentrated, among others by the International Labour Office at Geneva, who in turn were influencing the various governments, on the standard of living of the consumer as purchaser rather than on that of the producer as seller.

Progress was being made, and would continue to be made, in giving greater scientific attention to the measurement of the standard of living among different classes in a community and among different communities, using in the sphere of nutrition something that could be regarded as definite and objective, namely the optimum amount of food necessary. In animal husbandry science had laid down the optimum amount of food required, and the modern farmer saw to it that his animals received that amount. It was a new conception as applied to what might be called human husbandry; but if a yardstick of the optimum nutrition required for different sections of the population were applied, it would be found that even in the most advanced countries there was a large proportion of children, on whom the future of the

race depended, being brought up under conditions where optimum nutrition was impossible. This had a direct bearing upon the policy of leaving to the individual wage earner full responsibility for the burden of bringing up his offspring. When these facts had been brought to light by scientific research, there might be a chance of evolving a more rational economic and social policy.

MR. GRAHAM WHYTE confirmed the statement of the last speaker that the problem of the standard of living and its relation to international affairs was now being studied in Great Britain. Quite recently he had been among a section of the community embracing every conceivable type of organised thought, and had been surprised at the unanimous agreement which existed that more attention should be paid to this matter, especially with a view to aiding political appeasement and relieving the tension unfortunately prevailing in Europe at the present time. This was especially necessary in view of the new and atrocious technique of certain governments in Europe at present which consisted in arousing the worst sentiments of the people and exploiting them for the benefit of an individual or a régime. Nothing was more easily exploited than a feeling of inferiority with regard to the standard of living. It was perhaps encouraging to note that those practising autarchy at the present time did seem aware that under that system the standard of living decreased. In Great Britain there was a growing belief that President Roosevelt and Mr. Cordell Hull were willing to help to smooth out the differences in the standard of living, and to give a broader basis to international economic co-operation, as a foundation for peace.

THE RT. HON. A. V. ALEXANDER, M.P., said that the question of the standard of living in relation to the changing balance of power and the general well-being of populations in the world had been very widely discussed at the Sixth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Yosemite. If Great Britain, the United States and the British Dominions would do something with regard to loosening their barriers to international trade, removing their own restrictions, they would probably be doing far more, not only for the standard of living, not only for increasing trade, but also towards removing that tension in the world which was so highly dangerous at the present moment, than could be realised.

DR. ALSBERG said that with regard to the second speaker's remarks, he felt that he had not made quite clear what he meant by the relation of the birth rate to the standard of living. He did not mean that when the standard of living went up from a very low level, the rate of increase of the population immediately began to drop. As a rule with a rise of the standard of living the rate of population increased, because a factor in the rise of the standard of living was a diminution of infant mortalify. Only after a while the effect of the high standard of living

was to diminish the birth rate. Japan was just on the turning-point of the curve. In India there had been an increase in the birth rate, in longevity, and in the standard of living; but if the latter continued beyond a certain point, the rate of increase of the population would drop. The incidence of famine was an index to the standard of living, because in a country with a high standard of living there were no famines. Modern methods of transport and a sufficient purchasing power to buy food had put an end to death because of famine. Under-nutrition would certainly be a good test, but there was a lack of statistics in this connection, also the class of society within which tests should be made must be chosen. It was also quite correct that high wages among a certain section of the community, such as the miners, could be a cause of an increase of population; but again in this case the standard was not high enough, and that section of the community was still on the upward trend of the curve. While it was true that congestion was a cause of bad health and a low standard of living in New York, the only people who could afford to live in skyscrapers were millionaires, because of the enormous rents, and the people suffering from a low standard of living were mostly housed in buildings of four to six storeys. It was also true that the income of farmers rose as one moved from the Eastern States to California, and the lecturer could have found his example in the United States; he had taken a Filipino as being more dramatic. The reason for this difference was that California had a completely different type of agriculture from anywhere else in the United States. Luxuries were produced there almost exclusively, and mostly perishable eatables, and never, even during the depression, were people so absolutely broke that they did not buy oranges and grapefruit and raisins and other things that they would not do without and which were produced in California.

With regard to the remarks of the third speaker, the lecturer was delighted that the League of Nations Committees had given attention to this matter of morbidity so that statistics might be collected. This would be of great service to the whole world. It was quite true that the standard of living had considerable political significance, and it was very important whether a country had arrived at its standard of living from above or from below. That of the Japanese was enormously better to-day than it was forty years ago, and it had been definitely proved from measurements that the stature of the Japanese had greatly changed; they were both taller and broader. This was probably very largely due to the improvement in their diet, made possible through the improvement of the average income. There still remained a great deal to be done in this respect because of psychological factors. To the average Japanese milk, butter and cheese were unacceptable, and they were not meat-consumers. On the other hand, Germany provided an instance of a country where the standard of living was arrived at from above, *i.e.* was depressed; such a nation had a conviction that it must do something to alter the new state of affairs. A nation might even have that feeling when it had arrived at its standard of living from

below. The lecturer had spent a good deal of time in Japan, in the small villages and elsewhere, and knew the Japanese mentality. They were convinced that their standard of living was lower than that of the rest of the world. He did not think it was any lower than that of the negro tenant farmer on the cotton plantations, it might even be higher, but the Japanese were confident that it was lower, and they were going to raise it by force if necessary. This was an important psychological consideration.

In reply to the fourth speaker, the information procured through Mr. Ford had been both interesting and valuable, but the lecturer was irritated by the thought that Europeans regarded Mr. Ford as the typical American, because Fordism stood for all that he objected to in American public life.

He did not know why the Poles had been importing pigs into the United States, but thought that it could only be a very small amount of no very great importance. American farmers were in a dilemma with regard to the production of pork because their principal client had been Germany, and the Germans had put a tariff upon lard. The United States did not raise a bacon hog, but a very fat, lard hog. Owing to the German restrictions one of the important points in the American production restriction programme had had to be restriction of the production of hogs. They had had a hog St. Bartholomew's Day two or three years ago. The only dangerous competition to the United States' hog production was the production of vegetable oils in the tropics, because chemists could take them and produce a fat of any desired consistency. Western women had always used animal fats for cooking, and these fats were solid, but it was merely a matter of habit, as the fat had to melt before cooking. Women in the Mediterranean countries had always used liquid fat such as olive oil, etc. In the United States they used hardened cottonseed oil themselves and exported lard, just as in Denmark the people ate margarine and exported butter.

In reply to the sixth speaker, the standard of living of the coloured people in the United States had been rising ever since the Civil War. There was now very little fear of their swamping the White races, because during the boom, prior to the depression, there had been enormous migration of coloured people from the land into industry. There had not been enough labour to go round, and so the coloured man had had a chance. More serious was the condition of the coloured people in the south-east, the tenant farmer in the old cotton-belt who had one mule, large numbers of children, and forty acres of rented land. He produced cotton at high cost with the aid of his mule and his children, and could not meet the competition of the cotton farmers to the west of the Mississippi river, who farmed two hundred and fifty acres with machinery.

It was quite true that the North American Indians had been increasing in the last thirty or forty years, largely because they were better treated by the government, and because they had finally been able to

adapt themselves to the civilised diseases. It was not known whether they were now more numerous than when Columbus discovered America, but probably there were not more than a million Indians in the United States at that time, or more than twenty-five million in the whole of the Western Hemisphere. Now they were very much more numerous. Mexicans were, of course, mostly Indians.

The lecturer quite agreed with what the eighth speaker had said about the importance of the relation between the family and the family budget as well as nutrition, but had not touched upon this aspect of the subject because of lack of time. The fact that a specific inquiry was being made into the consumption of families in different classes in the United States had been mentioned. The purpose of this survey was to see whether agriculture could not be re-organised so as to produce enough of the right kind of food and a sufficient quantity to give people the kind of diet that they should have but unfortunately had not. Three types of diet had been worked out, one fairly good, one good, and one very good indeed, and it was considered that if the United States would produce the food to give their people a really good diet, they could use all their land to perfectly good advantage, and would have no need to export. Their farmers were at present suffering from the need to export a certain amount of their produce. The reason for this was that foods such as milk, butter and eggs, what the bio-chemist called secondary foods, made by feeding the products of the soil to an animal, took more land and were thus more expensive products than if the immediate product of the soil were used for human nutrition. All the arable land of America could be used by making more high-class food. If the purchasing power could be given to the people to buy these high-class products, there would not be so much talk of taking land out of production.

The lecturer said that he agreed with the ninth speaker, and was proud of belonging to the country which, although it had produced bad tariff acts, was now the first to take the lead in the direction of freer trade. He gave the bulk of the credit to Mr. Cordell Hull, who was a fine gentleman and a traditional democrat, using the word not in its philosophical sense, but to designate a member of the old Democratic Party, which had always stood for freer trade and low tariffs. He did not wish to give the impression that the United States was suddenly going to introduce free trade. In the present condition of the world this would provoke a major crisis, but they were at present making some slight attempt to develop a freer trade system.

The lecturer fully agreed with the last speaker in the discussion.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Any book reviewed in this Journal may be obtained through the Publications Department of the Institute. Members of the Institute wishing to cable an order may use, instead of the title of the book, the number which it bears, e.g., "Areopagus, London: Send Book Twenty May Journal: Smith."

Books marked with an asterisk (*) are in the Library of the Institute.

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

1*. THE NORTH CHINA PROBLEM. By Shuhsi-hsu. Prepared under the auspices of the Council of International Affairs, Nanking. 1937. (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh. La. cr. 8vo. 112 pp.)

READ in the light of what is happening at the moment in China, Mr. Shuhsi-hsu's little book gives us more than a "brief survey of the international problem which centres round North China" (his own description of it); it provides an extremely illuminating background to the whole Sino-Japanese conflict. For it is in the position in North China from 1931 onwards that the fierce struggle now in progress in China finds its origin. It must be added that the book is by no means confined to the local aspect implied in its title, but deals with Sino-Japanese relations generally since the Manchurian Affair.

It starts with the invasion of Jehol in February 1933 and the attitude of the Chinese Government at the time. Mr. Shu does not hestitate to admit that it was a thoroughly submissive (not to say "defeatist") attitude, excusable—in so far as he feels that it needs excusing—by Nanking's preoccupation with the internal communist threat. The "Tangku Truce" which was concluded in May of that year, and which gave the Japanese the demilitarised zone together with various other concessions and provided the basis on which they have since built up an endless series of claims, was China's price, as the author remarks, "for adopting a policy of peace."

Nine months later the Japanese military men in North China were again vigorously pressing their demands, which included a further extension of the Japanese sphere into Chahar Province. Still "true to the policy of peace," the Chinese Government told the Peip'ing authorities to submit, and sent their own Minister of War, General Ho Ying-chin, to negotiate a settlement with the Japanese militarists, headed by General Umetsu. The Ho–Umetsu Agreement was one of those informal and ambiguous pacts subject to widely different interpretations by each of the two parties, which have injected so much confusion into the study of Sino-Japanese relations during these last few years. As in the case of the "Tangku Truce," it is impossible to get at the truth as to what was actually conceded and, hence, at the justification for subsequent Japanese charges of Chinese perfidiousness.

Mr. Shu's account of the facts can, of course, only be taken as a Chinese version of what occurred, but it is interesting to note the distinction which he makes between two sets of Japanese demands. The first included the dismissal of certain officials, withdrawals of

Chinese troops, the dissolution of various "patriotic" organisations, and the prohibition of anti-Japanese agitation. These General Ho accepted, and they were duly carried out. The second provided for the placing of *personæ gratæ* to Japan in provincial and municipal posts (in other words, the Japanese right to nominate Chinese officials), and also the pregnant stipulation that Japan be allowed herself to supervise the carrying out of the pact. Mr. Shu, having recorded General Ho's denial of having even so much as discussed the second batch of demands, is content to leave it at the statement that he and the Japanese disagreed on the facts of the case. It is the chronic inability of Chinese and Japanese negotiators to come to a straight understanding, or openly to state that no understanding is possible, that, for the foreign observer, has drawn such a heavy veil over the real situation.

The next stage in the "North China Problem" was the "autonomy movement," by means of which the Japanese military party hoped to absorb into their sphere the northern Chinese provinces without having to fight. It is again a perplexing tale. The part played by the Japanese is easily understood. What is far less clear is the extent of Chinese disloyalty on which the Japanese were able to count. On this point Mr. Shu is, naturally perhaps, not very explicit. Mr. Yin Yu-kêng, the "puppet" governor of the pocket-Manchukuo which the Japanese succeeded in erecting in East Hopei, he designates bluntly a traitor; but he glosses over the rôle of General Sung Che-yuan and the others who took over the Government in Peip'ing more or less under Japanese auspices, to whom he refers comprehensively as the "Chahar Group," but with no indication of what the "Group" meant. He briefly relates how the Chinese Government "parried the Japanese blow" by anticipating a managed revolt and setting up by their own action a semi-autonomous government for Hopei and Chahar, which at the time seemed destined to come under virtual Japanese control. It seems probable that the unforeseen recalcitrancy which the Japanese subsequently met with from Sung and his military subordinates—a reflexion, one must add, of the general stiffening up of Chinese resistance to Japan—inspired the Japanese militarists to reopen hostilities in the summer of this year.

After dealing thus with the "Problem" in North China proper, Mr. Shu goes on to survey the other half of the problem, namely Japan's attempt to extend her corridor through Inner Mongolia, resulting in the fighting last year in Suiyuan. He introduces the subject with a review of Sino-Mongolian relations. Here he is less impartial than in most of the rest of the book. The crimes of Chinese provincial officialdom against the nomadic Mongols are so notorious that a Chinese historian of Mr. Shu's reputation might well have admitted them more freely. To say that "the complaints against misrule which we have occasionally heard from the Mongols are not entirely without foundation," or that the lot of the Mongols was "not very ideal," is an understatement at which one can only smile, while the inexplicable reference to Great Britain at the point where the author speaks of "the gradual closing in on the Mongols by the Russian and British Empires" shows how far the search for scapegoats may go when a writer is concerned to exculpate his own Government. However, we are concerned here with the present rather than the historical past, and it is sufficient to say that Mr. Shu gives in Chapter IV a useful, connected account of the Mongolian autonomy movement of 1934, the establishment of the abortive Pailingmiao government, the behaviour of

Prince Teh (whose protestations of loyalty to Nanking Mr. Shu considers quite insincere), and the unsuccessful campaign of the Japanese-aided rebels which took place last summer. What bearing the failure of Japanese plans in Inner Mongolia had on their policy in North China is a subject for speculation on which one regrets that Mr. Shu has no suggestions to offer.

The last chapters of the book are given to the long-drawn-out negotiations at Shanghai and Nanking in 1936. Mr. Shu's view of this attempt at a readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations as coming principally from the Chinese side is open to some doubt, and he certainly minimises the effect on relations of the series of outrages committed—sometimes, no doubt, under severe provocation—upon Japanese nationals and property in various parts of China. "With or without them," he says, "it is doubtful if any good result could have come out of the discussion, the Japanese temper being what it was." He could have added that the Chinese temper itself had undergone a radical change since the "defeatist" period of three years before. The spirit of resistance had enormously increased, and China was in no mood to accept proposals which at the earlier date might have seemed relatively moderate; her spokesmen refused to discuss a settlement on any other terms than the cessation of Japanese political interference in North China, including, of course, the notorious smuggling "ramp."

The breakdown of the Kawagoe conversations ended the last phase of Sino-Japanese relations prior to the drama of this summer, which began with the clash between the Japanese "garrison troops" near Peip'ing and the Chinese provincial forces under General Sung's command, and, after the incident at Hungjao aerodrome, when two Japanese officials were shot, developed into the murderous warfare in and around Shanghai. Intolerable pressure on the one side met too long by a vacillating and indeterminate policy on the other led inexorably in the end to this tragic result.

In the finishing pages of his book, which he must have been writing only a month or two before the present trouble, Mr. Shu expresses the rather pathetic hope that improvements, such as economic recovery, in the international sphere, coupled with the increasing strain on finances and political disagreements in Japan would lead to an easing of the problem which he has so admirably surveyed.

G. E. HUBBARD.

2. CHIANG KAI-SHEK UND DIE REGIERUNG DER KUOMINTANG IN CHINA. By Gustav Amann. 1937. (Berlin: Vowinckel. 8vo. viii + 240 pp. Maps, illus. *Rm.* 7.50.)

THIS book, written by a German engineer who resigned a high commercial position to devote himself to the Chinese Revolution, is a sequel to one upon Sun Yat-sen and the earlier phases of the Kuomintang. It describes, and succeeds in making intelligible, the confused politics of the years 1927–1931, a period eclipsed in interest by the events immediately preceding and following it, but the study of which is necessary if China's present position is to be understood.

The book is a biography of Chiang Kai-shek only in the sense that Chiang dominated Chinese history at this time, as he has done down to the present day. It opens with a recapitulation of Sun Yat-sen's ideas, which, in Dr. Amann's view, are as a rule interpreted in too Western a sense. This is followed by an interesting chapter on the breach with the Comintern. Dr. Amann's thesis is that doctrinaire

communism involves the destruction of the family system; that the attachment of the Chinese peasant to this form of organisation is too strong to be overcome; and that the communist party therefore made a profound mistake in basing its hopes upon peasant discontent. Insurrection in the countryside, however started, ends, he argues, as a movement for the redistribution, not the socialisation, of property.

The phases which followed the expulsion of the communists are then defined and in outline described: the struggle between Chiang Kai-shek, standing for some sort of modern conception of the State, against the warlords and their more primitive and paternal ideas of government; the growth of faction among the civilians, and the struggle between them and Chiang Kai-shek; the movement for financial and economic reconstruction; the repudiation of China's 'colonial status'; the revival, in a new and more dangerous form, of the communist movement. The narrative brings out the qualities of Chiang, especially his tenacity and adroitness, and gives a very clear account, from the point of view of Chiang himself, of the problems with which he has been faced. On the appropriateness of Chiang's policies, Dr. Amann leaves the reader to form his own conclusions. Chiang's task has been an appallingly difficult one. On the one hand, the disintegration of Chinese society, due to the impact of the West and to an over-population crisis, has split the country into almost irreconcileable groups and parties; whatever line Chiang took, he was bound to meet with fierce opposition. On the other hand, the more nearly he succeeded in unifying the country and creating a stable government, the closer he came to conflict with Japan, which is naturally unwilling to see the emergence of a great military power in China.

Both as a concise record of events and as an interpretation of them in many respects original, this book is useful to read and to keep.

G. W.

3*. Population Pressure and Economic Life in Japan. By Ryoichi Ishii. 1937. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. 259 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

In spite of the considerable amount which has been written on Japanese population problems, this book will prove an addition of considerable use to those interested in the serious study of the question. The author deals with the history of Japanese population from early days until the Meiji Reformation, and then with the development of the problem since Japan was thrown open to foreign intercourse and became a highly industrialised nation. There are useful chapters on regional and occupational distribution, on the proportion of the sexes, and on marriage, fertility and mortality; estimates of future population as given by the various authorities are cited. In the later chapters of the book rural economy, problems of food supply, emigration, industrialisation, and birth control are all dealt with.

There is an increasing tendency in Japan, as in many other countries, for people to flock into the larger towns. While in 1898 over 82 per cent. of the population was to be found in communities of under 10,000, by 1925 the proportion had fallen to 63 per cent.

The author gives some interesting tables of comparison between marriage rates and birth rates. While between 1886–1890 and 1926–1930 the marriage rate in England remained nearly stationary, the birth rate declined from 31·4 to 16·8, and in Germany from 36·5 to 18·4; whereas in Japan the marriage rate between the same period rose only

from 6·8 to 8·7 per thousand of the population, the birth rate increased from 26·9 to 34·9 per thousand of the population.

Mr. Ishii reaches the conclusion that while Japan will continue to industrialise, the field of free competition will be limited, and therefore a well-planned programme is essential. Increasing rationalisation of industry will probably proceed faster than the absorption of those seeking employment. Emigration will not solve Japan's problem, but the unemployment problem in Japan, owing to her peculiar family system, is unlikely to present the type of difficulties with which Western nations are faced. Birth control is making headway, and the marriage age is becoming somewhat later, but in any event some means will have to be found to absorb into industry upwards of 400,000 new entrants annually during the next fifteen years.

BARNARD ELLINGER.

4*. EYES ON JAPAN. By Victor A. Yakhontoff. 1937. (London: Williams and Norgate. 8vo. xv + 329 pp. Map; illus. 16s.)

The American edition of this book was reviewed in the July–August 1937 issue of this *Journal* (p. 650). In this review it is stated: "It is clear that he (the author) knows his subject well. His attitude is critical but friendly towards the Japanese and tolerant towards the Soviet Union. His book, which is just one degree nearer to good journalism than it is to profound study, is both readable and instructive." P. J.

5. ESTREMO ORIENTE. IERI, OGGI, DOMANI. By Carlo Pestalozza. 1936. (Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale. 8vo. 435 pp. Map. *Lire* 18.)

THIS is a manual of general information concerning the internal and external relations of China and Japan, presumably written for the students of the Institute for the Study of International Politics, in Milan. There is a special chapter on the development of communist propaganda and Soviet policy in the Far East, to which the author attaches great importance. Except as a manual of instruction, the book has little value. It is neither stimulating nor enlightening for the non-Italian reader. Speaking as an Italian, with keen interest in Pacific markets, Signor Pestalozza's plea for the support of Italian missionaries, also "important centres of Italian . . . influence and perhaps of support for other developments of a practical character," is clumsy and is likely to do more harm than good.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

6. PRINCE ITO: A Biography of Japan's greatest Statesman. By Kengi Hamada. 1937. (London: Allen and Unwin. 8vo. 240 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

7. JAPAN AT THE CROSS ROADS. By Walter Smith. 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 125 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*.)

A BIOGRAPHY of Prince Ito has been long overdue. This tough farmer's boy, born in "an uncouth mediæval village," takes his place with Lincoln and Bismarck and Cavour among the great nation-builders of the nineteenth century. He was born in 1841. In 1853 the arrival of Commodore Perry's squadron brought the long period of Japan's seclusion to a close; and from that time onwards the hand of destiny seems to select Ito almost at hazard, and to use him as its chosen instrument through every significant scene in the amazing progress of Japan's development as a Great Power, from the attack of the *ronin*, of whom Ito was one, on the new British legation at Gotenyama, down to the abdication of the last independent king of Korea

under Japanese pressure in 1907. Before he was thirty, he was already a leader in the Japanese revolution which ended in the restoration of the Imperial power; with Inouye, he was the first (recorded) Japanese to visit London (in 1864); he was a State Councillor and Governor of Hyogo (Kobe) at twenty-seven (in 1868); he was the principal architect of the Japanese constitution; he was the leader of the peace party as opposed to the militarists; he was the organiser of the first regular political party in the Japanese Diet, the Seiyukai; he was four times Prime Minister, and he was the first Resident-General of Korea on the absorption of that country after the Russo-Japanese War, which he had striven so hard to prevent; "a furious smoker, an inveterate drinker, and an inordinate lover of beautiful women." He was assassinated by a Korean fanatic on the platform of Harbin railway station on October 26th, 1909. "With him died the guiding personification of modern liberal Japan."

Mr. Hamada has given us a fascinating book and a revelation of a great personality. It is written at times in an engagingly florid style, and throughout in a generous spirit of admiration. It contains some quite new material from Ito's Secret Memoirs regarding the fateful visit to St. Petersburg, which was Ito's last effort in 1901 for agreement with Russia before the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance; and a very interesting record from the same source of a Council meeting on the Manchurian question in 1906, which shows how Ito, Inouye and Hayashi were in absolute opposition to the annexationist ambitions of the military party (Yamagata, Kodama, Katsura, etc.). "The actions of the military are contrary to the will of the Government," said Inouye, "therein lies the source of our trouble." "Manchuria is not a dependency of our country," said Ito, "there is no justification for our exercising the rights of sovereignty within that sphere." The author disclaims an analogy with modern conditions in Manchuria, but his intention is clear and significant. If this important book has appeared in Japanese, its message is more significant still.

Japan at the Cross Roads—the title has already been used on a book written some years ago by Mr. A. M. Pooley—is little more than a pamphlet, inspired by pro-Soviet interests and designed to arouse distrust of and alarm at Japan. The curious transliteration of geographical names bewrays a foreign origin; thus Johore appears as Djohar. Certain recent Japanese publications of the blood-and-thunder school supply just the kind of material which the author requires for quotation. Among them are *The Imminence of a Japano-American War* by Lieut.-General Sato, *Save Japan* by Lieut. Goto, *An Anglo-Japanese War is inevitable* by Lieut. Ishimaru, *A Japano-American War is inevitable* by Mr. Ikezaki, *Will Japan and the U.S.S.R. fight?* by Mr. Uehara, *If we fight* by Mr. Hirata, *The Crisis of Isolated Japan* by Major Toyama, *The East smells Blood* by Captain Adachi and *Japan's War against the Whole World*. The book is mainly based upon these authorities. Fortunately they are of no importance whatsoever; neither is this rejoinder.

P. J.

8. Lectures on Japan. An Outline of the Development of the Japanese People and their Culture. By Inazo Nitobé. 1937. (London: Ernest Benn. 8vo. xii + 393 pp. 7s. 6d.)

This is the last book which we shall have from the wide knowledge and high idealism of Dr. Nitobé. He died in 1933 at Victoria, British

Columbia, on his ninth and last visit to North America; and three worlds are the poorer for his passing—the world of Japan, the beloved country whose national virtues it was his especial mission to extol; the world of America, which had given him his New England culture, his religion and his love; the world of international politics, where as assistant Secretary of the League of Nations he gained a unique position and still further enlarged his wide circle of friends. So, the reading of this little book, which contains the whole of Dr. Nitobé's message in a series of twenty-four lectures and addresses, is as it were a farewell to a rare and lovable personality. He also possessed in high degree the gift of the popular lecturer. His instruction is clear, vivid, easy, apt in illustration and quotation; and he was one of the few foreign writers who have mastered English style. Here is a specimen; the subject is Abraham Lincoln:

> "It is enough to look at his brow, his eyes and lips, to know the deep melancholy which was wrapped about the soul of this Man of Sorrows. We have in our language two words which express Lincoln's normal state of mind. These words—*awaré* and *nasaké*—are not easy to translate. The nearest English rendering will perhaps be respectively sadness and the feeling of something a-missing. We are a smiling, merry-making folk, but beneath the smile and the mirth, there is an undercurrent of sadness. We are ever conscious of the vanity of life and its pangs. Through all our literature runs an undertone of *awaré* and *nasaké*, and I venture the remark that for this reason we can understand, perhaps better than some other peoples, the melancholy side of Lincoln's mental constitution."

The subject of the book, the subject of all Dr. Nitobé's books, is the national character of Japan and her claim to a high place in the world of culture. He traces this theme through the history of Japan—her debt to Chinese civilisation, the ideals of the Restoration period, her poetry, her family life, her religion, her code of honour, her attitude towards Christianity. The later lectures deal with the economic stress of recent years, the Manchurian question, the relations (then strained to breaking point) between Japan and the League of Nations. The book closes with five addresses, including two delivered at conferences of the Institute of Pacific Relations, one on Abraham Lincoln, from which the above quotation is taken, and one on Quakerism (Dr. Nitobé was a Quaker) which, although aside from the main theme, is perhaps the most interesting individual chapter in a book which is readable throughout.

The tragic drama of these lectures lies in the fact that even as he spoke, the country which he loved so dearly was moving away from the cause of international peace to which he had dedicated his later years; or, as he himself saw it, the world of his adoption—United States and Great Britain and Geneva—in its ignorance of history and reality, was driving Japan into isolation and defiance. For in the last resort—and the struggle must have been a cruel one to a very sensitive soul—Inazo Nitobé is seen to be the Japanese patriot rather than the Citizen of the World. P. J.

9. THE NEXT WORLD WAR. By Lieut.-Comdr. Tota Ishimaru. 1937. (London: Hurst and Blackett. 8vo. 352 pp. 15*s*.)

THOSE who read Lieut.-Commander Ishimaru's previous work, *Japan Must Fight Britain*, probably felt that the title was misleading. Rather should it have been called *Must Japan Fight Britain?* The name of the book now under review is likewise not as well chosen as it

might have been, for the contention is that, although there is serious danger of another World War, it is not by any means inevitable.

Like most other close observers of contemporary international politics, Commander Ishimaru recognises that a war in Europe would almost certainly, in existing circumstances, start a conflagration on the other side of the world, and *vice versa*. While, therefore, he is primarily concerned with the Far East and with the countries bordering on the Pacific, he devotes a very large portion of his book to the situation developing in Europe, in order to emphasise the interdependence of East and West.

For reasons fully explained in these pages, the author considers that the issue of peace or war is likely to be settled in the years 1939–1940. It is not everyone who will agree with his conclusions, but the reasons he adduces for fixing on these years as the period of greatest danger cannot be lightly brushed aside. He admits that the world has been passing through a series of crises for the past few years, and that the danger is likely to continue, but his contention is that war is unlikely to break out before 1939, as the nations are not yet "technically ready to fight." No one, he avers, wants war; but mutual fear and suspicion are rife, and everyone is accordingly preparing for war. Although he makes no reference to Clausewitz, he clearly believes that the major Powers are at one in keeping in mind the principle laid down by that professorial writer in regard to "preventive war," and he makes it clear that he himself is a firm believer in that principle.

Some of his arguments are difficult to follow, as, for instance, when he apparently proves to his own satisfaction that, whereas both Britain and the United States lack naval-building capacity, Japan has no such handicap, and has no reason, therefore, to fear the threat of a race in naval armaments. While holding the orthodox Japanese views on the question of naval ratios, however, he admits, after some preliminary criticism, that a good case can be made out for British preponderance in auxiliary craft, though he considers that, if "equality of security" is to be the criterion on which naval strength is to be based, Japan is really entitled to a superiority over the United States. He is inclined to blame Britain, accordingly, for having refused to Japan what she permitted to the United States. This is, of course, a point on which others besides Japanese have had cause to ponder.

Though not a "great" book, this latest work from the pen of Commander Ishimaru is of considerable interest and value in that, not only does it set forth the views of a representative Japanese observer on the situation in his own part of the world, but it shows also what is thought by intelligent Japanese of recent developments in Europe and of their probable trend. M. D. KENNEDY.

10*. CHINA. By F. C. Jones. 2 Volumes. [*Modern States Series, Nos.* 13 and 14.] 1937. (London: Arrowsmith. 8vo. xii + 276 pp. 3*s*. 6*d*. each volume.)

IT is not easy to compress the story of China from the dawn of history to the present day into two small volumes of no more than 268 pages in all. Professor Jones has accomplished this task in competent fashion. The outline that he has drawn is clear, simple and easy to grasp: he has selected the salient facts with skill and presented them with due regard for perspective and proportion. His work makes no pretension to original scholarship or research, or even to much first-hand knowledge of the subject. It is rather a summary

of the results of recent studies by foreign and Western-trained Chinese students in the fields of economics, history and archæology, where workers are still too few.

Volume I is a rapid sketch in 132 pages of the rise of Chinese culture from somewhere between 2000 and 1000 B.C. to the eve of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895–96. Professor Jones points out that Chinese culture, unlike European civilisation, was never submerged beneath ages of barbarism, and that Buddhism, unlike Christianity in Europe, did not destroy rival creeds and philosophies, but combined with other religious and intellectual systems in China to enrich her civilisation. He is on less sure ground, however, in attributing to Sung philosophy virtues that enabled Chinese civilisation to resist the disintegration that might otherwise have taken place as a result of the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century. Is it not rather the case that the intellectual isolation that shut in China towards the close of the Sung dynasty combined with the rigid formalism of Sung Confucianism to check the development of the Chinese genius? For nearly a thousand years China has been descending a gentle slope from the heights she scaled in the Tang period, and it is perhaps only now that these Confucian beliefs have been broken up by the impact of Western ideas that she may begin once again—if Japan permits—to tread the upward path.

It would be difficult to find support for the theory that the Chinese sense of their own cultural and political superiority is in any way derived from their Mongol Conquerors (page 92). Among minor inaccuracies it may be noted that the monopoly of the East India Company dates back not to 1699, but to 1600 (page 113), and that an Anglo-Chinese alliance did not nearly come into existence either in 1885 or in 1893, nor would it have altered the course of history if it had (page 130).

When we come to Volume 2, which relates the story of the last forty years in 136 pages, it becomes more difficult to present the facts as a connected development, outlines become less sharp and errors more numerous. It may be commonly believed, but it is not true, that the loans secured upon the Customs at the end of the nineteenth century involved increased foreign control over the administration of Chinese revenues (page 135). That unfortunate development only came in 1911, after Sir Robert Hart had disappeared from the scene. There was no particular reason why London should help the Manchus against the revolutionaries, and the Tibetan question had nothing to do with it (page 147). During the revolution there were massacres of Manchus all over China (including, for example, Nanking), and not merely at Sian in the north-west (page 148). Shantung was not ceded to Japan at Versailles (page 156). The Nine-Power Treaty did not guarantee China's administrative and territorial integrity (page 157), and British readers will be interested to learn that the famous Memorandum of December 1926 was issued by the British Government because it was "harassed by labour troubles at home and unrest in the Empire" (page 173).

These are minor matters, but a really serious error occurs in the author's narrative of the tragic events at Shanghai in January 1932. Had Professor Jones consulted the Report of the Assembly of the League of Nations of February 1933, where a lucid and authoritative account of exactly what happened on January 27th and January 28th is given, he would not have mis-stated the facts leading up to the

Japanese occupation of Chapei, nor would he have added the following comment:

"It would appear that the action of the foreign municipal authorities was prompted by the desire on the part of some of them to answer the Chinese demands for the retrocession of the Settlement by a further extension of its boundaries."

This, of course, is quite untrue. It is most unfortunate that Professor Jones should have been led into making an accusation for which not a shadow of evidence exists, for one of the chief merits of his book is his conspicuous fairness and complete absence of prejudice.

On page 258 there is some sound criticism of the New Life Movement, and it is useful to be reminded of the shallowness of much of Sun Yat-sen's thought, especially in the economic sphere, and to the disasters in which his actions sometimes involved his country. At the end of Volume 2 are two useful chapters on the Task of Rural Rehabilitation and the Development of Commerce and Industry. On page 240, however, Professor Jones slips again when he says that "railway construction under foreign auspices was mainly devoted to tapping the mineral resources of China." JOHN BRENT.

11*. TERRITOIRES ET POPULATIONS DES CONFINS DU YUNNAN. Traduit du Chinois par J. Siguret. 1937. (Peiping: Editions Henri Vetch. 8vo. x + 266 pp. 16s.)

M. SIGURET (of the French School of Oriental Languages), who has translated this collection of comparatively (1931) recent Chinese documents on the Yunnanese borderlands, tells us in his foreword that he undertook the task because of the interest and importance attaching to the attitude of "Young (Nationalist) China" to the problems of the Frontier. He has rendered a real service, for the documents are of considerable interest from many points of view. They were compiled under the auspices of the Yunnan Bureau of Popular Education, with the approval of the Governor of the province, who contributes a preface. They are all the more illuminating because they were not written for foreign eyes to read. They were essentially intended for home consumption, and are frankly propagandist, their object being to impress upon "Young China" the gravity of the situation and the imperative need of a new policy towards the unassimilated native peoples of the borderland. The standpoint adopted is that public interest in China has been almost exclusively centred in the affairs of the north-eastern (Manchurian) and north-western (Mongolian) frontiers, but that in reality the problems of the south-western border zone, where it makes contact with Tibet and Burma, are equally serious and menacing. The six writers, to their credit, make no claims to be specialists in the field of anthropological and sociological research, and it is not difficult to criticise some of their methods and conclusions. Their studies, however, are based upon their own inquiries and observations, and are intended to stimulate more detailed research by specialists. They make some use of investigations made by foreign travellers, notably those of Dr. Joseph F. Rock, the American, and of the expedition from the Sun Yat Sen University, Canton, organised by the German geographer, Dr. W. Credner, in 1930 (*Yünnanreise des Geog. Instituts der Sun Yatsen Universität*), but curiously enough there is no mention of the important English work by Major Davies, *Yunnan: The Link between India and the Yang-tze.*

The general plan of the studies covers the following topics:

(1) The geographical conditions and economic possibilities of the frontier regions under review, *i.e.* the upper basins of the Salween, Mekong and Kin-sha-Kiang or upper Yang-tze and particularly the Burmo-Yunnan frontier.

(2) The mode of life, organisation and characteristics of the native peoples (Shans, Kachens, Liso, Tibetans, etc.) who constitute the great majority of the population.

(3) The attitude of these native peoples to the Chinese (and, in the case of the Burmese frontier region, to the British), and the policy of China towards them.

As one reads these accounts it is most interesting to observe the struggle in the minds of the writers between their traditional and nationalist prepossessions on the one hand and the objective conclusions to which they are led by their inquiries on the other. Thus they set out with, and constantly tend to revert to, the traditional Chinese distinction between the "civilised" Chinese and the "barbarian" native tribes, but are impelled to insist that the "barbarians" have in many cases a culture and art of their own which are not only worthy of respect, but must be appreciated if the native problem is to be solved. Again, they suspect, and sometimes denounce, the alleged imperialistic designs of the missionaries, and particularly of the British, who, as the author of the chapter on "The Undelimited Sino-Burmese Frontier" contends, have made serious encroachments on Chinese territory; indeed, he credits Great Britain with the intention of controlling the routes between Szechwan and Tibet and of establishing dominion over the upper reaches of the Yang-tze. (The disputed territory is fortunately now the subject of a joint Anglo-Chinese Boundary Commission.) But they equally demonstrate and hold up for emulation the educational policy of the missionaries who have conferred great benefits on the Kachens and other groups by devising an alphabet for their language, and the wisdom of the officials in British Burma in winning the confidence of the native tribes by real care for their welfare. This is frankly contrasted with the supineness and frequent corruption of Chinese frontier officials, which result either in direct revolt or the deliberate movement of tribal groups across the Burmese frontier.

The writers frequently demand that the Central (Nanking) Government should adopt a more active defensive policy against revolt and aggression, urging, for example, that Li-Kiang should be organised as a strategic centre. They also have many suggestions to make concerning the better utilisation of natural resources and the organisation of trade, particularly in relation to the economic future of Yunnan. The main plea, however, is for a more sympathetic and liberal policy towards the native peoples and for the systematic training of frontier officials. In this connection the importance of a new college for this purpose at Li-Kiang is emphasised.

The increased interest in the problems of frontier administration, of which this book affords striking evidence, raises the important question of whether China in the future will be forced to recognise the existence of "minorities" within her borders. Her growth in the past has been a long story of gradual assimilation, and the process long ago completed in the Northern Plain and the Yang-tze Basin is still in progress in the remote south-west. The authors of this work believe that it can be greatly accelerated by good treatment and the extension of education, and the claim can no doubt be allowed in the case of the less-developed peoples. But what of the Shans, and particularly of the Tibetans, who have a distinctive culture of their own and whose kinsmen live

beyond the frontier? At any rate, the bitter experience of Europe in these matters is not unworthy of study by future Chinese frontier officials.

P. M. ROXBY.

12*. THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF SUN YAT SEN: an Exposition of the *San Min Chu I*. By Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger, Ph.D. 1937. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; Oxford University Press. 8vo. xiv + 278 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

IT is hardly possible, as Dr. Linebarger points out at the beginning of his useful and interesting book, to have any real understanding of political events in China, in which so deep an interest is taken in Europe and America, without some knowledge of Chinese political thought. But owing chiefly to the immense difficulties that attend any serious study of the subject, this has remained up to now, so far as Western scholars are concerned, an almost unexplored region. Dr. Linebarger's present contribution is a study of the political thought of Sun Yat Sen, which, though it may comprise only one corner of the whole field, is yet of great importance, by reason of the immense influence of Dr. Sun Yat Sen on the minds of his fellow-countrymen and on the political and constitutional developments of the last few decades in China. Dr. Linebarger devotes an opening chapter to an exposition of the Confucian background from which Sun Yat Sen emerged; and we are thus at the start brought up against the difficulties of interpretation and translation that confront the student in this field. The type of society which grew up at a very early period in China had no counterpart elsewhere, and accordingly gave birth to a whole range of ideas not easily apprehended by the Western mind. The Chinese also evolved a method of expressing their ideas—the Chinese written character—that is wholly different from our system of writing; and the combined effect of these two factors is to make it all but impossible to express Chinese thought in any Western language. It is necessary, for example, to grasp the meaning of *jên* before one can understand the Confucian doctrine, for the root of all Confucian and ethical thought is *jên*. But how is *jên* to be translated? "Benevolence," "sympathy," "humanity," "to have a common purpose with and fellow feeling for mankind," "consciousness of one's place and function in society," "social consciousness," "expression of fellowship among men," "society mindedness"—these and other expressions represent each only one aspect of the full meaning of the word, and Western writers accordingly generally find it best to leave it untranslated. When men have *jên*, their behaviour conforms to *li*, which the dictionaries tell us means rites or ceremonies, but the word also means "appropriateness of relationships," "behaviour in accordance with virtue and propriety." *Li* is the mass and individual behaviour pattern and *yueh* is the emotional pattern. A ruler of superior penetration will feel, without recourse to electoral machinery, whether the *yueh* is good or bad. *Yueh* enables rulers to ascertain the general sentiment of the people, and it cultivates a type of individual attitude that is most harmonious with the environment. "The joint work of *li* and *yueh* would produce social harmony and social happiness—which is the ultimate aim of the State." *Yueh* is commonly translated "music" or "harmony," but, as Dr. Linebarger observes:

"Nothing like *yueh* can be found in Western political thought. However significant it may have been in China, any attempt to deal with it in a Western

language would have more than a touch of futility, because of the great chasm of strangeness that separates the two intellectual worlds at so many places."

Confucius believed that a group exists as a group because it has a common ideology, the character of the group being determined by the nature of the ideology. Applying this doctrine to society as a whole (and avoiding the use of the term nation, for what Confucius envisaged was a world society), he believed that ideology was all-important, and that the function of the statesman was that of an educator rather than an administrator. The ideal society was one where the same body of moral ideas was generally prevalent, and where there was consequently no disagreement in outlook and no disharmony in thought and behaviour. The Confucian Utopia was "a society where the excellence of the ideology and the thoroughness of conformity to ideology had brought perfect virtue, perfect happiness." In such a society there would be no necessity to enforce conformance to the generally accepted criteria of conduct, and the State, to borrow a Marxian phrase, would wither away.

The Chinese World Society of Eastern Asia that grew up under the all-pervading influence of these teachings is described in pages 36 to 47 of Dr. Linebarger's book. It was a society where political control was reduced to a minimum, and where ideological control over the individual was maintained by the irresistible pressure of the family, the village, the district and the *hui* (association). It was indestructible because it had no one nerve-centre, and the Confucian ideology continued in spite of invasions, famines and insurrections. Imperial China consisted of some half-million cities, towns, villages and hamlets, each of which was to a high degree autonomous. The Government supervised and exhorted, but took no direct initiative and did not interfere.

The important facts about this society are that it was to a very high degree homogeneous, welded together by the Confucian ideology, and that it was a world-society. The peripheral societies were all barbarians who looked up to China in awe as constituting the civilised world, and who, before invading, settling down in and being absorbed by China, had already been subdued by Chinese culture and the Confucian ideology. This is the source of the superiority complex that crops up in the writings of Sun Yat Sen and is reflected in unguarded moments in the attitude of most modern Chinese politicians. It seems slightly ridiculous in Western eyes, but that is because the Western mind, even when aware of, finds difficulty in grasping the fact that China for some 2000 years did apparently constitute the whole civilised world.

The impact of the West in the nineteenth century brought the Chinese up against an aggressive culture that not merely ignored and despised the Chinese culture, but was able, by reason of its superior powers of organisation and greater military strength, to enforce its claim to superiority. This happened just when the virtue had gone out of the ruling dynasty: it was no longer able to fulfil its rôle in the Confucian system, and the time for a rebellion was ripe. The structure of Chinese society, political, economic, social and cultural, was shaken to its foundations, and the whole Chinese world was smitten with fear and uncertainty. The hold that Sun Yat Sen gained on the imagination and in the affection of his fellow-countrymen is due to the fact that he pointed out the road by which the goal of regeneration was to be reached and himself blazed the trail. And he did both in a manner that appealed irresistibly to their deepest and most cherished instincts and to

their newest and most passionate prejudices. Sun Yat Sen was not only a preacher and a thinker, but also an active revolutionary. The most serious criticism to be made of Dr. Linebarger's work is that, inspired by filial piety and devotion to the memory of Dr. Sun, he has failed to realise that his activities in the latter capacity were guided by an expediency hardly compatible with the rôle which he aspired to fill in the former capacity.

So long as China was a world-society there could be no such thing as a national consciousness; but when the nations of the West came crowding and jostling on to the Chinese scene, Sun Yat Sen perceived that China was now no longer unique, but one of several nations : if she was to survive she must become conscious of herself as a nation and, after driving out the dynasty, must discover a form of government adequate for her new environment and capable of enabling her people to resist the encroaching foreigner. This was the origin of the famous Three Principles usually translated Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism. A better name for the last is perhaps economic well being, but Dr. Linebarger prefers to leave it untranslated as Min Shêng. Dr. Sun's skill as a revolutionary and propagandist may be seen in the form in which he served up this very sound political thinking for the assimilation of his fellow-countrymen. Nationalism, which of course had never existed, and could never have existed, in China, was represented as something of which the Chinese race-nation had been deprived by the wicked Manchus. The Manchus must be driven out and China become conscious once more of being a nation. Similarly, democracy, in the sense of democratic institutions (the Chinese had always been strongly egalitarian in sentiment), was represented as something which the ancient sages had desired, but had never been able to attain. China, while becoming a nation, must yet somehow retain the virtues of the old-world society. Sun was a revolutionary only as regards Manchus and foreigners. For his own people he was a reconstitutionary. China was to find regeneration by a return to the old morality and the ancient learning. On these were to be superimposed Western skill in physical science.

Dr. Linebarger's discussion of Min Shêng—Sun Yat Sen's third principle—suffers most from the inhibitions hinted at above, and is the least satisfactory part of his book. He does not face up to the necessary implications of the contradictions and confusion in Sun Yat Sen's pronouncements on economic matters. He explains away the episode of the wholesale plagiarism from Maurice William in the lectures on Min Shêng, but it is difficult to believe that, if Sun Yat Sen had had any well-thought-out message of his own to deliver, he could not have clothed it in language of his own, instead of plagiarising wholesale from the work of an obscure American author which had only just come into his hands and of which, but for this plagiarism, little would ever have been heard. Dr. Linebarger also takes at its face value the extraordinary programme—utterly divorced from realities—set out in Sun Yat Sen's *The International Development of China.* In this book written just after the end of the Great War, Sun Yat Sen propounded the view that another world war could only be avoided by a scheme for the International Development of China. The nations should convert their billions of dollars worth of war industries into peace industries under the control of an International Organisation, which would on the one hand arrange to dump the products of these industries into China, and on the other hand, after winning the confidence of the

Chinese people, conclude a loan agreement with the Chinese Government to enable the said products to be used in the industrial development of China. 'The workshops that turn out cannon can easily be made to turn out steam rollers for the construction of roads in China.' If competition for the trade of China is ended by this plan, 'this will root out probably the greatest cause of future wars' and the plan will, Dr. Sun is sure, 'culminate to be the keystone in the arch of the League of Nations.' A more detached observer than Dr. Linebarger might have seen in this proposal no more than a resurgence of the 2000-years-old superiority complex which makes it so hard for Chinese to remember that China is no longer a world civilisation surrounded by a ring of humble and admiring barbarians.

JOHN BRENT.

13*. POLITISCHE GEOGRAPHIE DES AUSTRALASIATISCHEN MITTELMEERES. By Kurt Wiersbitzky. [*Petermanns Mitteilungen*, Ergänzungsheft Nr. 227.] 1936. (Gotha: Perthes. 4to. 126 pp. Map. Bibl. *Rm.* 16.)

14. DAS JAPANISCHE KAISERREICH. By Herbert Rosinski, forming parts 14 to 17 of the *Handbuch der Geographischen Wissenschaft.* (Potsdam: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion.)

THE areas described in these two publications respectively are dealt with in accordance with the German *geopolitische* method. In the case of Mr. Wiersbitzsky's work, this implies the working out of the relationship between geographical characteristics and political conditions and developments. Dr. Rosinski's treatment of Japan is more on the lines of an encyclopædia.

Mr. Wiersbitzsky's "Australasiatic Mediterranean" is the archipelagic region bounded on the north by a line stretching from Siam to the Philippine Islands and on the south by the arc of the Netherlands East Indies from Sumatra to Timor. The author first enumerates the essential characteristics of each separate part of the region, and then proceeds to a comparative study of certain important features including situation, size, shape, boundaries and political relations. Under this last heading he deals with the point of view and interests of the various colonial empires (the area is, of course, predominantly "colonial"), and he makes special reference to native movements and communism. The particular interest of Mr. Wiersbitzky's monograph lies in his presentation of the "Australasiatic Mediterranean" as a single unit with many common problems as seen from the point of view of the student of international politics.

Dr. Rosinski provides a reference book of no small value to the student of conditions in the Far East. His book gives a brief historical outline of the Japanese empire, followed by a comprehensive and thorough analysis of its physical characteristics, racial features and economic development.

Both authors have made use of specially prepared maps and charts, the illustrations in the *Handbuch* being particularly valuable and including some half-dozen attractive coloured reproductions of paintings of typical landscapes. G. E. HUBBARD.

15*. A SHORT HISTORY OF ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS. By Chozo Muto. 1936. (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press. 8vo. iii + v + 83 pp. 4*s.*)

THIS short survey of early Anglo-Japanese relations was designated

by its reviewer in the *Japan Advertiser* as "primarily a source book." The description is a fair one. The author is not attempting to supply a connected story of the relations between the two countries, and the use of the word "history" in the title of his book is, to this extent, somewhat misleading. On the other hand, he provides the historical student with a detailed and thoroughly documented chronology of the principal isolated events, from the time of Will Adams' landing in Japan at the end of the sixteenth century to the arrival of Admiral Stirling's squadron at Nagasaki in 1854, which form the landmarks in Anglo-Japanese contact during those two and a half centuries. The book savours rather of an historical scrapbook, an impression which is heightened by the inclusion of a rather haphazard collection of photographs of ships, persons, documents and historic memorials.

Although the book will mainly appeal to students who are already immersed in Professor Muto's particular line of study, it is not devoid of points of interest to the casual reader. The latter will find in it several little known facts and one or two interesting theories. For instance, Professor Muto relates the failure of the early attempts to establish British trade with Japan to the marriage of King Charles II to Princess Catherine of Portugal. This, he tells us, aroused suspicions in the mind of the Shogun who at that time had been seriously concerned with the proselytising activities of the Portuguese priests and had only lately suppressed the so-called "Christian Revolt."

Readers who find their appetite whetted by this mere outline, as the author himself calls it, will hope for an English translation of his fuller work which, he tells us, is shortly to be published in Japanese by a Kyoto publishing firm. In this connection one may add that the present "Short History" is an example of the excellent book production which Japanese publishers achieve. G. E. HUBBARD.

16*. NIPPON: A CHARTED ACCOUNT OF JAPAN 1936. By T. Yano and K. Shirasaki. 1936. (Tokyo: Kokusei-Sha. La. 8vo. xxxvi + 487 pp. Charts, tables. 12s. 6d.)

STUDENTS of Japan's economic life will find this well-conceived, and, on the whole, exceedingly well-produced survey, extremely useful despite its textbook character.

Mr. Yano, President of one of the largest life insurance companies of Japan, and a member of the Bureau of National Resources Research and of the Central Government Statistical Commission, has been successful in assembling in it a wealth of material unequalled except by the Mitsubishi Bureau's standard treatise, while it is often of the greatest value in supplementing that work. Thus amongst other subjects omitted by the Mitsubishi publication such a highly important aspect of Japanese economics as the fisheries and fish-export trade here receives most lucid and well-documented treatment, as do also a number of minor, but highly interesting branches of the chemical industry, such as the production of bakelite and perfumes. Again, we find in *Nippon* a considerable number of highly instructive statistics, not otherwise available in a western language, covering, in particular, agricultural machinery, rice supplies, fish, meal, salt, scrap, timber used for pulp production, etc. Moreover, the text itself contains a large amount of fresh data—unhappily without any indication of their sources—some of which, as in the case of water-power, is of the highest importance.

The book is an English edition, appearing for the first time, of a

biennial series of surveys which Mr. Yano has been producing since 1926, and it is to be hoped that the practice of making these surveys available to western students will be continued. H. ROSINSKI.

17*. PROBLEMI NAVALI DEL PACIFICO. By Roberto Sandiford. 1936. (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estreme Oriente. 8vo. 58 pp. *Lire* 4.)

A COLLECTION of articles originally published in *Il Lavoro Fascista* analysing the naval position in the Pacific of the ten Powers most directly concerned. The strategic factors are set out broadly in each case. Among the conclusions reached is that, while Japan's position is extraordinarily strong for defence and for raids against neighbouring territory, including the Philippines, she is in no position to fight a decisive action against any one of her possible adversaries, and, further, that as a naval rival to Japan, Russia at present is of major importance only as offering support by means of her naval bases in the Pacific to the action of an allied fleet. The brochure gives a fair conspectus of the general Far Eastern situation from the naval standpoint and may usefully be read in conjunction with the article on "Soviet Submarines in the Far East" in the March issue of *Pacific Affairs*.

G. E. HUBBARD.

UNITED STATES

18*. CAN WE BE NEUTRAL? By Allen W. Dulles and Hamilton Fish Armstrong. 1936. (New York: Harper and Brothers, for the Council on Foreign Relations. 8vo. 192 pp. $1.50.)

THIS little book, which was written and published for the Council on Foreign Relations in 1936, could not have appeared at a more opportune time. Ever since the Great War and the subsequent withdrawal of the United States from Europe, the question of American policy in the event of another war has been a burning one. While it seemed that collective action and the League of Nations might prevent war, little public attention was given to it, although scholars continued to discuss it and write about it. With the outbreak of war in the Chaco, the Japanese conquest of Manchuria, and the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, however, the Government and people of the United States were again faced with a realisation that they still lived in a war world and that some kind of action on their part was necessary if they were to avoid some of the more disastrous consequences of such a world. Naturally enough, in view of the American tradition and geographical position, they turned towards isolation, and towards the devising of plans which would enable them to stay out of all wars in the future. The result has been a flood of words, both written and spoken, and some very interesting legislative and executive measures on the part of the Congress and Government of the United States. With the developments in Spain and its attendant division of sympathies in all democratic countries, and with a major war developing in the Far East, the problem of maintaining American neutrality is becoming increasingly complex and difficult. Nor is the problem one which is peculiar to the United States alone. Every "status quo" country, including the nations of the British Commonwealth, is confronted with the same kind of problem.

The authors of this book are unusually well qualified to discuss their subject. Mr. Dulles, who is secretary of the Council on Foreign

Relations, was a member of the American delegations at the Peace Conference, the Conference on Arms Traffic, the Three Power Naval Conference and the Disarmament Conference. Mr. Armstrong is the editor of *Foreign Affairs* and the author of a number of important books on international affairs. In this book they consider the experience of the United States in respect of neutrality in the past, and more particularly during the Napoleonic wars and the earlier years of the Great War. They then go on to consider the measures taken to ensure American neutrality down to the end of February 1936. The remainder of the book is taken up with a general discussion of "Our Future Neutrality Policy"; "Trade and Peace"; certain conclusions and a number of appendices which contain official statements and documents. Since this book appeared certain important changes in and additions to the American Neutrality laws have been made. These may be found in convenient form in *International Conciliation Pamphlet No. 331*.[1]

But it is the opinions of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Armstrong in respect of the feasibility and desirability of American neutrality which are really important, and these, fortunately, survive changing legislation and even changing conditions. These opinions are sane, well-balanced and restrained, and are deserving of the most careful consideration. Their statement on p. 7 seems admirably to sum up their attitude :

> The best we can hope to secure from our neutrality policy is to avoid as many as possible of the incidents that might arouse public feeling, and in the pursuit of this aim to avoid the assertion of rights which are not well-founded and fundamental, and which, once asserted, may involve our national honour and prestige.

Perhaps one of the most useful things they do is to point out the danger of over-simplifying the reasons why the United States entered the War on the side of the Allies, as they suggest Mr. Walter Millis does in his book, *The Road to War*. Their conclusion that "from the very beginning of the War American sympathies were engaged" seems true of the last war and is likely to be true of future wars, as is their statement on p. 117 that "The only sure way for the United States to escape entanglement in foreign wars is for there to be no wars." It is by the production of timely books of this kind that the Council on Foreign Relations makes an important contribution to the public understanding of national and world problems. NORMAN MACKENZIE.

19. AUTOPSY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE. By Caslon Nerval. 1934. (New York and London : Macmillan. 8vo. xi + 357 pp. 15*s*.)

20*. AMERICAN CONSULTATION IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By Russell M. Cooper. 1934. (New York and London : Macmillan. 8vo. xiv + 406 pp. 15*s*.)

THE author of the *Autopsy of the Monroe Doctrine* concluded, from his experience over a number of years in interpreting Latin American affairs for the newspapers of the United States, that the whole story of inter-American relations turns on the Monroe Doctrine. He therefore set out to discover the truth about this doctrine, and the results of his search are set out in this book. Whether they are the truth or not will be very much a matter of opinion, but, in his own words, the book is an indictment from a Latin American view-point

[1] *International Conciliation No. 331*, June 1937. Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 405 West 117th Street, New York City.

both of the modern version and the original formula of the doctrine. He consoles himself, however, with the thought that "the Monroe Doctrine is dead. It has died of old age. Its spirit no longer has any place in the world of to-day." In his indictment he states that

"the original Monroe Doctrine was not intended for the benefit of the Latin American Republics; its results and merits have been grossly exaggerated; it is worn-out and useless; it is a unilateral, egoistic policy, and exclusively of the United States; it did not create Pan Americanism but, on the contrary, it arrested the Bolivarian Pan Americanism of equal rights and mutual obligations; it has been violated and disregarded on numerous occasions with the knowledge and, at times the connivance, of the United States; it has been distorted to serve as an instrument of the hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere; it has been misinterpreted and abused to serve as a cloak for the interventions of the United States in Latin America and as a tool of United States imperialism in the Caribbean area; and finally it is in conflict with the peace machinery painstakingly erected by mankind since the end of the world war and is made obsolete by the present trends in international relations."

The author then goes on to produce evidence in support of these various points, and proceeds chapter by chapter to show that on the evidence, they are well founded. With much of this the disinterested observer must agree, but Mr. Nerval, like many other Latin American sympathisers, seems obsessed with the necessity of correcting two rather obvious illusions or misconceptions.

The first, that the Monroe Doctrine was something more than a statement of national policy by one State or nation made in its own interests. The other, that national policy, whether in the nineteenth century or in the modern world, is altruistic or directly interested in anything save national self interests. To these may be added a third, natural enough to any well-meaning observer of the period 1920–1930, that governments really are seriously interested in the "elimination of force in international relations, or in world co-operation." One ardently wishes that they were, but all the contemporary evidence is to the contrary. Thus, while these aims, set out by Mr. Nerval, and enthusiastically supported by him, are both desirable and enduring, in the sense that nations, if they are to survive and prosper, must sooner or later, pursue them, they are still in the nature of aspirations rather than concrete realities.

In the course of his investigations, the author does reach certain interesting conclusions, among them that,

"John Bull stood for the Spanish Americans' right to decide their own fate, from the very beginning of their struggle for independence. John Bull helped them with men and money. John Bull stood in the way of the Holy Alliance. John Bull suggested a joint policy to keep the American continent free from European interference. John Bull destroyed the last possibilities of a European attack by gaining France to his side. John Bull, alone, had the ships and the cannon to keep the European princes off the South American coast. But Uncle Sam got all the credit."

The rest of the book goes on to prove how, unlike the proposals of Bolívar and other Latin American statesmen, which aimed at ideal Pan-Americanism based on equal rights and mutual obligations, the Pan-Americanism of the Monroe Doctrine has always been concerned with the furthering of the interests of the United States—"The Pan-Americanism of the big brother and the big stick, or at its best of resolutions and recommendations, and of congratulatory notes from the Director General of the Pan-American Union."

The book is well written, contains a wealth of interesting and

relevant extracts from official documents and other sources, a valuable bibliography and is an excellent corrective of the opinion so widely held in the United States as to the value of the Monroe Doctrine to Latin America. One should not overlook the fact, however, that the policy and action of one nation may result in benefits to others, and it does seem clear that the existence of the Monroe Doctrine, combined with the strength of the United States, has proved, and continues to prove, a deterrent to any attempts to invade the western hemisphere by militant combinations in Europe or Asia.

The second book, *American Consultation*, presents the other aspect of United States foreign policy: the refusal to take part in the organisation of an international society, or at least to present a United States substitute for collective action and sanctions as a means of preventing war. Certainly at the present time, when positive collective action and sanctions seem to have failed, and when the League of Nations seems due for reconsideration and reform, it is useful and desirable to have this thorough analysis of an alternative method. Professor Shotwell in his introduction points out the importance of the conference method, or *Consultation*; he deplores the lack of literature and intelligent analysis of this whole field, as contrasted with *Judicial Settlement*, and goes on to suggest that the reasons for its failure, as instanced by recent examples in Manchuria and the Chaco, were based primarily upon the lack of confidence of the parties in the impartiality of the probable conferees or consultees. Mr. Cooper examines in detail the Sino-Russian dispute of 1929, the conflict in the Chaco, the conflict between China and Japan and the Leticia dispute. He also discusses in a more general way the problem of organising peace, something of the history of the development of Consultation and the future. In the main, his attitude is an objective one and is not open to criticism or objection. With him, as with Professor Shotwell and many others, there is a tendency to ignore or overlook what may be the real weakness in Consultation and in the conference method—namely, the fact that a great Power, desiring or determined to get its way or achieve its objectives, may refuse to consult or to take part in conferences, for such Consultation may prove an obstacle to their ambitions. Certainly, Consultation did not make the task of Japan in Manchuria or of Italy in Abyssinia any easier, nor does the Non-Intervention Committee help Russia, Germany or Italy in Spain. This is not to decry Consultation. Far from it, for any and every measure which furthers international co-operation and defers war or deters the war maker is to be commended. But it does suggest that Consultation alone is not enough and that to pin too much faith to it may be positively dangerous. It may, however, be all that is possible to-day, and if that be true and if we realise that it does not provide security or guarantee anybody against anything, certainly it should be encouraged, particularly if the obligation to consult is accepted in advance and there is some expectation that this obligation will be lived up to. The larger question of whether the obligation to consult implies the obligation to give effect to the results or decisions of that Consultation re-introduces the whole issue of sanctions and of collective action; which is, of course, implicit in any consideration of security. But that need not be discussed here. Mr. Cooper's study is a very useful and valuable contribution to the problem of international relations, for it

concentrates upon one particular section of them and gives the reader and the student a reasonably adequate picture of this.

NORMAN MACKENZIE.

21. GERMAN INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION AND CULTURE. By Dr. John A. Walz. 1936. (Philadelphia: Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation. 8vo. 72 pp.)

This is rather a patchy little book. The author rightly emphasises the stir made in the United States and elsewhere by Cousin's report to the French Government in 1832 on Prussian elementary education which was then far ahead of anything in other countries. He points out that the post-graduate course came largely from Germany in the palmy days when Germany was the centre of academic freedom, but he makes no mention of America's debt to the German refugees after 1848.

C. WALEY COHEN.

22*. THE FOREIGN BORN IN THE UNITED STATES. By Dwight C. Morgan. 1936. (New York: American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born. 8vo. 82 pp. 10*c*.)

23*. NEUTRALITY REVISION BEFORE CONGRESS. By Elton Atwater. Published by *The Digest Press*, American University Graduate School, Washington, D.C. January 1937, Vol. VI, No. 7. 6 pp. Mimeographed. 25*c*.

24*. THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE PEOPLE'S FRONT: Report delivered Dec. 4, 1936 to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. By Earl Browder. 1936. (New York: Workers Library Publishers. Sm. 8vo. 87 pp. 10*c*.)

LATIN AMERICA

25*. FRANCES TOOR'S GUIDE TO MEXICO. 1936. (New York: McBride. Sm. 8vo. viii + 270 pp. $1·75.)

26*. DEUTSCHE IN BOLIVIEN. By Fritz Kübler. (*Deutsches Ausland-Institut, Stuttgart: Neue Reihe der Veröffentlichungen, Band 4*). 1936. (Stuttgart: Strecker und Schröder Verlag. 8vo. 91 pp. 75 illus. 43 plans. 1 map. Paper cover: *Rm.* 3·50; linen: *Rm.* 5.)

27*. GROSS-SIEDLUNG IN BRASILIEN? Ein Kolonie-Plan Schweiz-Paraná. By Felix Moeschlin. 1937. (Horw-Luzern: Montana Verlag. La. 8vo. 32 pp.)

28*. DIE VOLKSPOLITISCHE LAGE DES DEUTSCHTUMS IN RIO GRANDE DO SUL (Südbrasilien). By Dr. Karlheinrich Oberacker. 1936. (Jena: Gustav Fischer. Cr. 8vo. vi + 101 pp. 1 map. *Rm.* 1·45.)

29*. REVISTA DE DERECHO Y CIENCIAS POLITICAS. Organo de la Fácultad de Derecho y Ciencias Politicas de la Universidad Mayor de San Marcos. 1st year. No. 1. 1936. (Lima. La. 8vo. 160 pp.)

29*a**. COMMUNISM IN MEXICO. By M. R. Madden. 1936. (New York: The American Press. Sm. 8vo. 19 pp. 5*c*.)

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

30*. SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS. VOLUME I: PROBLEMS OF NATIONALITY, 1918–1936. By W. K. Hancock. Supplementary legal chapter by R. T. E. Latham. 1937. (Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. La. 8vo. ix + 673 pp. Map. 25s.; to Members of the R.I.I.A., 16s.)

THIS volume covers a wider field than is suggested by its title. It deals, and very completely, with certain of the outstanding problems of nationality which have engrossed the attention of Empire statesmen since the close of the Great War, but throughout the whole book, and particularly in the "perspective view" contained in its first chapter, there is an historical examination of the theories and principles of the government of the British possessions of a valuable and practical kind which is not limited to the post-War period.

Professor Hancock is clearly an enthusiast for liberty, and a perusal of this work will probably convince any reader who follows its arguments with care that the survival of the Empire in its present form is due to that innate love of liberty and of justice which as a general rule characterises the bulk of the people of Great Britain. Where Great Britain has sinned against these principles, as in the case of those colonies which are now represented by the United States of America, and in the case of Ireland, the Imperial nexus has been loosened or lost. This is not to suggest that a consistent colonial policy of liberty has been adopted or followed. Policy has changed from government to government and from period to period. But behind the policy has been the tendency, and whether the government has been Whig or Tory, Conservative, Liberal or Labour, the love of liberty characteristic of the British peoples has had its influence on the colonial policy of the government of the day.

In the period covered by Professor Hancock in this book, the liberal tendency of Imperial policy has been intensified. As evidence we have the progress of Indian Reform, the Kenya White Paper recording the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government that the interests of the African natives must be paramount, the settlement with the Irish Free State, the Statute of Westminster, and, most recent instance of all, the reluctance of the British Government to transfer the three Protectorates to the Union of South Africa.

Two chapters, III and VI, deal with Ireland. They cover more than one quarter of the portion of the book for which Professor Hancock is responsible. This would seem to indicate that the Irish question occupies a disproportionate area in the Survey. In fact, however, this is not so, for Ireland illustrates in very full measure the effect of failure to apply that policy of liberty which is, as a rule, instinctively followed in Imperial affairs, and, in addition, and in acute form, the problem of nationality. The chapters are melancholy reading, and one is tempted to speculate after their perusal, and with the knowledge that Ireland took no part in the Imperial Conference of 1937, how long an unwilling member will continue to belong to the *comitas comitatum* constituting the British Commonwealth. The right to secede is discussed in the final chapter of the book (pp. 502 *et seq.*) in a most interesting analysis, in which the author compares the position of Ireland to that of the border states of the Soviet Republic. It is difficult to refute the right of secession on legal grounds, but Professor

Hancock refuses to accept it for practical and moral reasons with which only the partisan will quarrel.

India presents racial problems of two distinct kinds, of which one is domestic, affecting the Indian Government, the other external, affecting inter-Imperial relations. With the former this book does not deal. The latter is examined in detail in Chapter IV. Both in South Africa and in East Africa that problem has been exceedingly acute, but in both areas has subsided. In South Africa the position has been improved by the appointment there of a representative of the Government of India "in order to secure continuous and effective co-operation between the two Governments." In Kenya, where the quarrel was between the immigrant Indian and the white settler, the importance of the problem was placed in its proper perspective by the White Paper in 1923 (Cmd. 1922), asserting the paramountcy of the interests of the African natives. The racial question is not, however, confined to Kenya and South Africa, and relations between India and the other Dominions cannot be placed on a satisfactory footing until irregularities on the ground of race and of colour are a thing of the past. Progress in this direction is being made, though with lamentable deliberation.

In Chapter V Professor Hancock deals with the constitutional advance of the Dominions from 1922 to 1936—an advance, in fact, from constitutional dependence on the mother country to complete liberty—in certain cases unwilling independence, for neither New Zealand nor Australia has availed herself of the freedom provided by the Statute of Westminster—"So far from seeking the enhanced status which the Statute offered them, their chief concern was to prevent that status from being foisted upon them." In law each Dominion is now competent to deal as an independent unit with its foreign relations, and Canada, South Africa and the Irish Free State have established certain Dominion legations. This principle having been admitted, however, even these three Dominions resort to agents of the British Government in those cases (and they form the large majority) in which they have no direct representation.

It is interesting to trace the steps by which the present position of the Dominions has been reached. The choice lay between the attempt to constitute the self-governing Empire an Imperial unit, and to allow it to form, as it now does, a Commonwealth of independent states. The latter result has been achieved without apparent planned policy. The Empire has grown into its present form, notwithstanding the anticipations on the one hand that it would emerge as a unit, and serious efforts, on occasion, to secure that end, and on the other that extension of freedom would result in the break-up of the structure.

It may truly be said that to-day the nexus of Empire in the case of the Dominions is the Crown. As is pointed out in this book, difficulty might arise at any moment if from separate Dominions ministers were to tender varied, or even possibly conflicting advice to the King. This contingency will doubtless be faced and overcome, should it arise, for the major material interests of commerce and, above all, of defence, lie in a maintenance of the imperial connection.

The question of Palestine, where the war of discordant nationalism is notable, is examined in some detail. The author points out and condemns the absence of any reasoned policy on the part of the Government. Palestine is an instance of Imperial failure. It is remarkable that though both in Canada and in South Africa it has been found

possible to frame a constitution under which communities differing in race and religion are able to live in peace and eventually to coalesce, the remedy now proposed by the Royal Commission as the " medicine of the body politic " in Palestine is a surgical operation, which, it is hoped, will eliminate the racial and religious difficulty. The acuteness of the problem may possibly be due to the intensity of nationalist feeling on the part of the Jewish immigrant community, whose attachment to the soil of Palestine is hereditary from countless generations, while, on the other hand, the Arab has not the same passionate regard for the country. His interest lies rather in his religion. The nationalist argument is used by him as an effective appeal to the sympathies of the nations of the world. The Arab feels that his livelihood, rather than his country, is being threatened by the influx of the Jews. This explains the virulence of his antagonism. It may be that the feeling is baseless, but of its existence there can be no doubt. It would be interesting to have the views of Professor Hancock as to the remedy—the " medicine " which he would prescribe for this body politic.

The work ends with a long supplementary chapter on the Law and the Commonwealth by Professor Latham, which can be read with interest and understanding by the ordinary layman. The appendix, dealing with the constitutional and legal aspects of the abdication of King Edward VIII, presents an instructive picture of the constitution of the Commonwealth of Nations in actual practice.

JOHN HOPE SIMPSON.

31*. LE CANADA ET LA DOCTRINE DE MONROE : étude historique sur l'influence de l'impérialisme Américain dans l'évolution de l'Empire Britannique. By Pierre Sebilleau, with a preface by Patrick Bury. 1937. (Paris : Recueil Sirey. 8vo. vii + 219 pp. Bibl. 36 *frs.*)

THAT her relations with Great Britain and the United States have been a dominant factor in the history of Canada is a truism. That Canada, in order to avoid being ground between the upper and nether millstones, should have increasingly sought to act as mediator between the two great Powers, was but an obvious result of this position. Too often the approach to this theme has been by way of generalities about the rôle of Canada as interpreter, but happily scholars have also given attention to it. A few months ago M. André Siegfried, in his *Canada*, analysed the contemporary position of Canada in this aspect ; and even a second French scholar, M. Pierre Sebilleau, has devoted a volume to this triangular relationship, seen from an historical point of view.

His book begins with the American War of Independence and the position of Canada in regard to American imperialism and British control. On the whole M. Sebilleau has read widely in both manuscript and printed materials, though he seems to have missed two important studies : Pratt's *Expansionists of 1812* and New's biography of Lord Durham. There are a few mistakes in the early period—the Constitutional Act was passed in 1791, and did not itself divide Canada (p. 32) ; the rebellions of 1837 were much more complicated than a mere attempt at freedom from Great Britain (p. 35) ; William Lyon Mackenzie was defeated not by British troops, but—in so far as there was a military activity in Upper Canada—by the militia (p. 37) ; Durham's ideas were far from being " faithfully carried out " in the Union Act of 1841 (p. 45) ; George Brown was a statesman of Upper Canada, not Nova Scotia (p. 86).

While such errors as these mar the book, they do not seriously detract from the value and interest of the argument. To M. Sebilleau the Monroe Doctrine stands for the imperialism of the United States, which that country held extended to Canada, and which Canada resisted. At the same time, Canada kept as far as possible to a North American policy. Her participation in the Boer War and in the War of 1914 were, in the author's view, departures from the Monroe Doctrine policy which she otherwise followed. The plan which Canada evolved was a constant attempt to balance one external force against another, British imperialism against America's imperialism.

"Le Canada restait membre de l'Empire Britannique, il agissait ainsi en pleine connaissance de cause, sachant que s'il n'était pas anglais il deviendrait, tôt ou tard, de droit, ou de fait, américain, sachant que l'Amérique lui laisserait moins de liberté que la Grande-Bretagne. Il restait anglais pour ne pas admettre la doctrine de Monroe, expression de l'impérialisme américain, toujours existant. Mais il voyait déjà clairement son rôle historique de jeune État qui lui était dicté par les deux faits suivants. Il était un État Américain dans l'empire Britannique, il était un État Britannique sur le continent Américain."

A number of examples of the operation of this plan are given, of which the most famous is the Canadian attitude in relation to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

The thesis of the book, as expressed in the quotation given above, is of the greatest interest, it is supported by a wealth of historical events. In places the conclusions may seem to some readers as too definite, and the issues as too clear cut. One may question whether annexationist sentiment in the United States was as lasting as the author suggests, or whether the Canadian attitude toward Great Britain was so fully coloured by fear of centralized institutions. There are more shades of opinion in Canada than M. Sebilleau seems to realise. He does not, however, claim any finality for his argument; it is, as he says, a thesis; and it is certainly one that should be of the greatest interest to students of international relations.

C. DE T. GLAZEBROOK.

EUROPE

32*. BRITAIN FACES GERMANY. By A. L. Kennedy. 1937. (London: Jonathan Cape. 8vo. 194 pp. 5*s*.)

33*. EIN MANN GEGEN EUROPA. By Konrad Heiden. 1937. (Zürich: Europa Verlag. 8vo. 390 pp. *Sw. fr.* 6; bound, *Sw. fr.* 8.)

THE authors of these two books are concerned, from widely different angles, with the same ultimate problem—by what means can some way be found out of the European situation created by German rearmament, except by war? Mr. Kennedy, as the title of his book shows, regards the question from the British angle. He gives us an acute analysis of the failures of British diplomacy and of the ideas, aims and methods of National Socialism. As to these he entertains no illusions. "Hitler's offers," he writes (p. 144), "have grown steadily less, his demands steadily greater" or, more brutally (p. 127), "it seems nevertheless to be true that Hitlerism in its present form is a manifestation of the Hun spirit." But, for all his candidly avowed hostility to the Nazi system, Mr. Kennedy would have the statesmen and people of Britain make a sacrifice of colonial territory for the sake of world peace. This sacrifice—"a fairly substantial offer in West Africa" (p. 167)—is to include Gambia and Sierra Leone and (p. 168) "the strips we still administer of the former German colonies of Togo-

land and the Cameroons," but not, be it noted, either German East or German South-West Africa, still less any of her other former colonial possessions. Yet this limited cession of parts of West Africa, carried through by a spontaneous British offer in the name of justice, is to produce, by some unexplained alchemy, a change of German policy, internal and international, that will lead her to abandon warlike propaganda and preparations and bring her back to the paths of peace. It can only be said here that, if Mr. Kennedy's analysis of Nazi ideology is correct—as in the main we believe it is—his remedial proposals are hopelessly inadequate to effect the result which he—and all of us—desire.

Herr Heiden has continued his biography of Hitler with a widening of scope in that it is now not primarily the domestic German movement which he presents, but the reactions of that movement on the world at large. Not that he neglects the process of political and economic development within Germany—his book contains much valuable and vividly presented information about many aspects of that development. But the German development in all its phases: the attempt at autarchy, the extension of State control of industry and its concomitants in the reduction of the standard of living and of the independence of the entrepreneur, the rearmament programme, the reintroduction of compulsory service, the relations of the Army to the Party; all this is considered in relation to German foreign policy and to the reaction of other nations, of Europe as a whole, to the facts themselves. It need not be said, at least to those who have read Herr Heiden's earlier writings, that his new book gives a fascinating and, on the whole, a well-documented and well-arranged analysis of the complicated process of German politics. There are signs of haste in the compilation of the new book; an anecdote of General Fritsch's toast to the Soviet envoy at the manœuvres of 1936 appears twice over and, in general, the work would have been improved by some conscientious pruning. But it is emphatically a book to be read, for its special knowledge, for its vigorous presentation and for its acuteness in analysis.

Unhappily here, as in Mr. Kennedy's book, the solution of the problem is its least satisfactory aspect. How can Europe escape disaster? Only, answers Herr Heiden, by a movement of the peoples towards peace—of the young primarily, and of the young of all European nations—a democratic movement which will create its own machinery, "ein Völkerparlament, gebildet aus frei gewählten Vertretern aller Nationen" which must replace "die Konferenz der Diplomaten und sonstigen Beamten in Genf . . ." (p. 369). "Bahn frei," cries Herr Heiden, "der Jugend durch Europa." One reflects sadly that this European youth, in Italy, in Austria and, above all, in Germany itself, is being trained in a set of ultra-nationalist and authoritarian ideas which render the appearance of the great democratic movement of the peoples, for which Herr Heiden hopes, singularly unlikely.

It is, perhaps, in that section of his book in which he analyses the difficulties which Germany would encounter if she embarked on war in the near future, from which we can all take most comfort. The insufficiency of raw materials, the difficulty of providing an adequate food supply, and the rapid development of counter-armaments stimulated by Germany's own rearmament programme—these considerations without doubt have not escaped the attention of the trained minds of the German General Staff. Yet the problem of justice, to which Mr.

Kennedy rightly addresses himself, still remains. If his solution seems inadequate, and Herr Heiden's hope of a democratic wave in Europe frankly impossible at the present time, their readers owe them a debt for stating an urgent problem from two different angles in a way which both stimulates thought and assists in bringing out the essential difficulties which have to be faced and overcome if European peace is to be preserved. E. J. PASSANT.

34*. HITLER, WHENCE AND WHITHER? By H. Wickham Steed. Fifth Revised Edition. 1937. (London: Nisbet. 8vo. xxiv + 221 pp. 4s. 6*d*.)

35. HITLER'S CONSPIRACY AGAINST PEACE. By S. Erckner. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 288 pp. 6s.)

THE fifth edition of Mr. Wickham Steed's book deserves special notice because it contains, in a new Chapter II, "Germany's Sacred Mission," selections from the correspondence of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, author of the *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, with both Kaiser Wilhelm II and with Hitler. The letter to Hitler written in October 1923 and here printed (pp. 66—68) is of great interest and, in view of Hitler's relatively obscure position at that date, is an extraordinary tribute to his personal magnetism. That there was a direct personal connection between Chamberlain, whose ideas run through the pages of *Mein Kampf*, and Hitler is a fact of importance in itself.

"S. Erckner," according to the dust-cover of his book, is "the pseudonym of a former Staff Officer in the German Army." His book consists largely of extracts from the *Deutsche Wehr*, the *Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften*, the *Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*, together with quotations from *Mein Kampf*, the *Völkische Beobachter*, Vowinckel's *Der Mittelmeerraum* and other sources. The whole is put together, it would appear, with the object of showing that the dreams of pre-war pan-Germanism are still, with some necessary modifications, the driving force behind German foreign policy. Many of the quotations are well worth study as examples of the logic of militarism carried to its extreme, and contain serious warnings to some of the more complacent friends of the present régime in Germany. But the author of this work handles his material so uncritically that he fails to convince us that the present rulers of his country are entirely possessed by "the philosophy of the footpad, crafty and brutal, pathetic and cold-blooded" which he finds as the basis of the essay published by the *Deutsche Wehr* in 1935. Few men are completely consistent exponents of their own philosophy in practice, and we may take leave to doubt whether even the present rulers of Herr "Erckner's" fellow-countrymen will live down to the precepts which some of their more wild "philosophers" provide. E. J. PASSANT.

36*. LE CORPORATISME AGRICOLE ET L'ORGANISATION DES MARCHÉS EN ALLEMAGNE. By Raymond Bertrand. [*Bibliothèque de Science Économique*, I.] 1937. (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 8vo. 349 pp.)

M. RAYMOND BERTRAND's study of the conditions affecting agriculture and the marketing of the products of the land is both profound and interesting. A few months before this book was published, an interesting report by the Commercial Counsellor of the British Embassy in Berlin was brought out by H.M. Stationery Office. The pictures

painted by the two authors are strikingly similar, though M. Bertrand resorts more to deduction and considers the political side in greater detail.

The agricultural and marketing position between the Armistice and the advent of Herr Hitler is admirably described. The " free market " system of the nineteenth century clearly did not meet twentieth-century requirements, and was rapidly breaking down everywhere. By 1930, German agriculture was on the verge of collapse. The Government tried subsidies and various other measures, but they were piecemeal measures and, instead of relieving agriculture, they made confusion worse confounded.

The latter half of the book is devoted to the action taken under the Hitler régime. Anyone interested in the question of organisation on a national scale—and it is a vital question—should read this book. Compared with the measures taken in England, the contrast is great, since a comprehensive plan was formulated at the outset, and all sections of the industry had to fit into the plan. The English method has been piecemeal in comparison, resembling the action taken by the Government preceding Hitler. We have clung to the " free-market " system, but force of circumstances made us subsidise this and control that branch of agriculture. With our love of compromise, we have been trying to combine the system of " free market " with the system of a controlled market. It is more than doubtful if such a combination is possible.

It would be both interesting and instructive to have a report written by M. Bertrand on the methods adopted by Mussolini, which have now been working for ten or twelve years. Does M. Bertrand prefer the new controlled market to the old free-market system? He certainly recognises that for Germany there was no alternative. He shows that since Hitler came into power there has been an increase in consumption and in the percentage of home production. M. Bertrand certainly approves the results of regulation and organisation of distribution, but he holds that " to aim at effective national self-sufficiency can only be justified on military grounds—for reasons of defence in time of war." Wisely he concludes that the only sound solution to the organisation of markets is an international one. Only by the co-operation of *all* countries can each individual country reform its internal agricultural economy with the smallest degree of control and restraint. CHRISTOPHER TURNOR.

37*. HITLER AND THE CHRISTIANS. By Waldemar Gurian. 1937. (London: Sheed and Ward. 8vo. vii + 175 pp. 5*s*.)

38*. CHRISTIANITY IN THE EASTERN CONFLICT. By William Paton. 1937. (London: Edinburgh House Press. 8vo. 224 pp. 2*s*. 6*d*.)

THESE two books have this in common, that they deal with Christian conflicts; one with Hitlerism in Germany, the other with Japanese Political Idealism, especially in Manchuria. They differ in that while Mr. Paton writes of Japan from without as a traveller, Mr. Gurian writes of Germany from within as a participant in the struggle.

Waldemar Gurian's book on Bolshevism, and its sequel, *Bolshevism and Hitlerism*, have already introduced his qualifications as a writer; they have also revealed him as one who had taken part in the Church and State conflict in Germany, and suffered exile.

Hitler and the Christians gives a more intimate and realistic view of

the German struggle than other books on the subject written from the outside, however well-informed the writer. It also follows the windings so characteristic of the conflict in detail, and enables the reader to realise its accumulating volume, if not to foresee its inevitable end.

Introductory chapters on the " Christian Creeds," and the " German Nation under the Republic," prepare the reader for the main theme. Wisely the author deals separately with the " Fight for Protestantism," and the " Attack on the Catholic Church." While succeeding in being fair in judgment, he is weakest in his treatment of the Concordat, as subsequent happenings have shown. This is a live book, written by one who appreciates the spiritual as distinguished from the ecclesiastical issues at stake. Gurian can grip the reader, and E. F. Peeler, his translator, has not sensibly weakened his grip.

In *Christianity in the Eastern Conflict*, Mr. Paton gives the results of a journey through the countries, in which he reaped richly from his own observation, conferences with representatives of Christian Native Churches, and study of their difficulties and environments.

Mr. Paton's objective was to submit a report to the International Missionary Council to be held in the Far East in 1937, similar to the Councils held in Edinburgh in 1910, and in Jerusalem in 1928. Considering his limitations of time and inside experience, he has succeeded in producing not only a valuable contribution to the discussions of the Council when it meets, but also an interesting and informative book for the general reader. His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury heartily commends it to the attention of all Christian people.

JOHN LOVE MORROW.

39. I SPEAK OF GERMANY. By Norman Hillson. 1937. (London: Routledge. 8vo. ix + 301 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

TWO-THIRDS of this book are devoted to an account of a tour round Germany in the autumn of 1936, and the remainder to Mr. Hillson's " plea for Anglo-German friendship." The correctness of Mr. Hillson's picture of conditions in Germany is seriously open to question: almost all his information appears to have been derived from the convinced Nazis who accompanied him on his visits of inspection. He gives hardly any indication of the undercurrent of opposition to the régime. He mentions that strikes still occur, but does not inquire what conditions must be like to drive men to strike in the face of almost certain imprisonment. Moreover, he gives a thoroughly misleading impression of the cost of living in Germany by calculating in terms of his visitor's Registered Marks. Some of his remarks are amazingly naïve: " One has read of the spirit of fear and terror which prevails in Berlin and other great German centres. Ordinary observation produces no evidence of this." The " ordinary observation " of the visitor could hardly be expected to produce evidence of the constant espionage in private and in public life which is experienced, not merely by foreign residents in Germany, but also by tens of thousands of Germans. Similarly the visitor can hardly expect to meet, as the resident does, family after family over whose lives hangs the shadow of the concentration camp.

There remains Mr. Hillson's plea for Anglo-German friendship. Unfortunately he sees the problem only in terms of the over-simplified choice: France *or* Germany: " Our close co-operation with France at the expense of Germany can only serve to exasperate a situation which may soon grow desperate. And is it worth it? Must

we for ever go on backing the wrong horse?" Further, he makes no attempt to explain how the conflicting colonial interests of Britain and Germany are to be reconciled, while his statement that "there is nothing evangelical about the Nazi movement" hardly seems correct in the light of recent experience in South-West Africa and Spain.

The book gives evidence of having been hurriedly written. There are many mis-spellings of German words and names, and the meaning of some of Mr. Hillson's sentences is uncertain. A. J. H.

40*. ANGLETERRE ET FRANCE: LEURS POLITIQUES ETRANGÈRES. ESSAI D'UNE DÉFINITION PSYCHOLOGIQUE. By Jacques Bardoux. [The Zaharoff Lecture for 1936.] 1937. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 8vo. 27 pp. 2*s*.)

41*. LEON DEGRELLE ET LE REXISME. Par Pierre Daye. 1937. (Paris: Fayard. Sm. 8vo. 250 pp.)

A highly-coloured account of the Rexist Movement in Belgium, and of its leader. H. G. L

42*. LA BELGIQUE NEUTRE? By Henri A. Rolin. 1937. (Bruxelles: Ferdinand Larcier. Sm. 8vo. 125 pp. 10 *frs*.)

Monsieur Rolin defines the term neutrality and traces the course of Belgian neutrality from 1831 to 1914. He analyses the problem of Belgian security in the light of the Kellogg Pact, the League Covenant, etc., and is of the opinion that a guarantee of Belgian neutrality is not only inconsistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Covenant, but contrary to Belgian interests, and that Belgium has no more pressing duty than to uphold the principles of the League of Nations and the ideal of international co-operation.

43*. IL REGIME INTERNAZIONALE DELLA SCHELDA. By R. Rossetti. 1936. (Roma: Cremonese. 8vo. 109 pp. *Lire* 6.)

A short history of the Scheldt Question, with a bibliography and list of treaties.

44*. RECHT FÜR EUPEN-MALMEDY. [Heft 3 der Reihe *Kämpfendes Volk*.] 1936. (Berlin: Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland. 8vo. 31 pp.)

A brief survey of events since the annexation, in which the author looks forward to the day when justice will be done to the Germans of Eupen-Malmedy.

45. UNHAPPY SPAIN. By Pierre Crabitès. 1937. (Louisiana: State University Press, Baton Rouge. 8vo. 244 pp. $2.50.)

46. VOLUNTEER IN SPAIN. By John Sommerfield. 1937. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 8vo. 159 pp. 2*s*. 6*d*.)

47. THE SPANISH PLOT. By E. N. Dzelepy. 1937. (London: P. S. King. 8vo. xi + 157 pp. 6*s*.)

48. THE ROAD TO MADRID. By Cecil Gerahty. 1937. (London: Hutchinson. 8vo. 254 pp. Illus. 8*s*. 6*d*.)

MR. CRABITÈS invokes a hundred years of history in support of a theory. In his book *Unhappy Spain* he sets out to prove that, due to inherent racial characteristics, the Spaniard is completely incapable of self-government. Two deposed sovereigns, one temporary sovereign, two republics, a dictatorship, and more than one civil war all in the space of just over a century is indeed a sorry record, and one which would appear to lend weight to the author's arguments. But to claim that the Spaniard, throughout this period, has shown an abysmal

apathy and callousness is neither true nor fair. Particularly when little or no mention is made of the forces that held the country in its grip during all this period. Spanish Roman Catholicism, military despotism, and widespread corruption and ignorance are more to be blamed for the present situation than any racial characteristics.

Whilst one may question the author's interpretation of history, one cannot but agree with him when he claims that there is no permanent peace in sight.

Early in the Spanish Civil War John Sommerfield enlisted as a volunteer in the International Column, and his book *Volunteer in Spain* is a vivid if rather self-conscious account of his experiences. These experiences include months of actual fighting in the front line at Madrid.

Personalities rather than events appear to have interested Mr. Sommerfield most, but the few details he does give provide a picture of almost incredible muddle and lack of discipline.

The publishers claim this book to be an uncompromising indictment of war, but I must confess to have been left a little doubtful of the validity of their claim.

M. Dzelepy, as a student of international politics, is profoundly disturbed by the consequences which he claims must inevitably follow in the train of the present war in Spain. In his opinion this war has never been, from the start, a domestic affair, but is in fact the first steps in the Great European War that has been threatening for so long. He sets out to prove that Italy and Germany precipitated the Spanish Crisis of the summer of 1936 and that under cover of the subsequent confusion they have taken up positions for their next move: the attack on France. Germany, by introducing a formidable number of her troops and military technicians into Spain, has immediately provided France with an entirely new and unexpected frontier to protect. Italy, by taking possession of the Balearics, has shut off the free movement of those coloured troops which form such an important part of the French fighting machine.

But great as is the danger that threatens France from Rome and Berlin, there is an even greater, because unpredictable, danger: the perfidious England. He is quite convinced that behind her façade of neutrality England is working hand in glove with the Fascist group. The book has a preface by Pertinax.

The Road to Madrid is a record of journalistic experiences in Spain. There is nothing that distinguishes this book from the many others that have been written on the same subject. Mr. Gerahty has only seen the war from the Insurgents' side. C. H. GUYATT.

49*. DER FLUCH VON NÜRNBERG: Hitlers Kriegsrat gegen Freiheit und Frieden. Mit Beiträgen von W. Pieck and others. 1937. (Strasbourg: Éditions Promethée. 8vo. 190 pp. *Frs.* 8.)

Acid criticism of National-Socialist policy by six Germans of the Left. The former Reichstag deputy W. Pieck contends that the real income of the working classes in Germany has gone down since the coming of National-Socialism. Peter Wieden accuses Herr Hitler of being "undeutsch," and of encouraging a feverish nationalism, which is the opposite of true German patriotism, and causes the German people to be mistrusted and disliked abroad.

50*. THE DAVOS MURDER. By Emil Ludwig. Translated by E. and C. Paul. 1937. (London: Methuen. 8vo. ix + 132 pp. 3s. 6d.)

The story of David Frankfurter, a Jewish student, who shot the Nazi leader Wilhelm Gustloff in 1936. Herr Ludwig gives a fairly full account of the events leading up to the murder, and gives particular attention to Frankfurter's state of mind and the influence upon it of the treatment of Jews in Germany. He also deals with political murder as such, and particularly with post-War assassinations.

51. DE NOVISSIMO AUSTRIAE REGIMINE. By Dr. Joseph di Meglio. 1936. (London: Herder (Vatican Polygot Press). 8vo. 107 pp. *Lire* 7.)

This Latin study by an Italian priest, already known as a writer on International Law, treats of the present Austrian régime in the light of Catholic teaching—particularly of the corporative system urged by Pius XI in the encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*. He has little difficulty in showing that the written Austrian constitution and the intentions of its authors are very much in accordance with the Papal teaching, but does not pretend to deal with the system as it is actually being worked out. E. Q.

52. GUERRA DIPLOMATICA. Ricordi e Frammenti di Diario (1914–1919). By Luigi Aldrovandi Marescotti. 1936. (Milan: Mondadori. 8vo. 477 pp. illus. *Lire* 22.)

53*. POLITICA ESTERA ITALIANA. By Carlo Giglio. 1936. (Padova: Casa Editrice Dott A. Milani. 8vo. 123 pp. *Lire* 15.)

54. MUSSOLINI ET SON PEUPLE. By René Benjamin. 1937. (Paris: Plon. 8vo. 263 pp. 18 *frs*.)

CONTE ALDROVANDI has made a most valuable contribution to the history of the War years. In his preface he complains of the ignorance and misunderstandings which still exist about Italy's contributions to the Allied victory and also about the action of her representatives at the Peace Conference. Those who hold the view that Italy was a "traitor" to the Triple Alliance should read Conte Aldrovandi's opening chapter dealing with the period preceding the War. He gives example after example of the violation both of the letter and the spirit of the Alliance by the other members.

After a brief survey of the negotiations leading to Italy's entry into the War, the book consists of extracts from the author's diary and verbatim reports of the meetings of the statesmen of the Allied countries during the War and of the "Big Four" during the Peace Conference. The account of the Conference at Rapallo after Caporetto, and particularly the words and attitude of Mr. Lloyd George, should do much to destroy the legends which are still current about that battle.

With the entry of October 29th, 1918, the curtain rises on the long and weary struggle among the Allies which only ended—partially—with the signature of the Peace Treaty with Austria on June 2nd, 1919. It is to be hoped that Conte Aldrovandi's diary was continued and that he will give us another volume.

When the present book is published in English, in addition to the interesting illustrations, maps of Fiume and Dalmatia should be included.

Signor Giglio has followed his excellent *Inghilterra d'oggi* with another interesting book. His clear and succinct account of European diplomacy since the Armistice makes as ever, melancholy reading—a chapter of "might-have-beens." He believes most firmly that the

only hope of peace is in a clear and friendly understanding between Italy, Great Britain, France and Germany, and that the Little Entente attack on Signor Mussolini's Four-Power Pact was stupid and short-sighted. The smaller Powers can exist only so long as their larger neighbours keep the peace. His analysis of Italian–German relations is remarkably topical at the present moment; he shows where their interests are identical and where antagonistic. Economic collaboration in the Danube basin for the development of international commerce would be to the advantage of both, but there must be no "Anschluss," no attempt by Germany to establish a political hegemony in the Balkans; the threat to Italy in the Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean would be too grave.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter for the ordinary reader is that which deals with Italian diplomatic activity in the Arabian peninsula, a matter about which practically nothing is known in Great Britain. Signor Giglio believes that it is to the advantage of Great Britain and Italy to collaborate in inducing the Arab States of the peninsula to live in peace and friendship. While taking the same wise view of Anglo-Italian relations in the Mediterranean, Signor Giglio emphasises the strategic importance of Libya and advances the theory that it should not be undervalued in Italy, because the colony has a great future as an entrepôt and outlet for goods coming from Central Africa.

M. Benjamin's introduction to Fascism was remarkable. One evening in December 1933 he was set upon at the corner of a street in Grenoble by a crowd of teachers, municipal councillors and employees of the Mayor and was hit over the head because they said he was a Fascist. He managed to escape with the loss of his hat and with a deep dislike for his assailants. He knew nothing about Fascism, but if they were against it he was prepared to think well of it. Finally he decided to go to Italy and study the question on the spot; his book is a record of his impressions.

He adopted the Socratic method, he asked questions of everyone; his most interesting chapter is the one in which he describes a long discussion with three young men, a poet, a naval officer and a professor of law. Each from his own point of view gave his reasons for his belief in Fascism and the enthusiasm which it inspires. He devoted much time to studying the training of the youth, made the regulation visit to the reclaimed areas in the Pontine Marshes and finally had a long talk with Signor Mussolini. M. Benjamin left Italy with what he believed were better reasons for being a Fascist than merely being hit over the head by Communists. He has approached his subject with the object of discovering the effect of the régime on the everyday lives of men, women and children of all types and classes—not isolated in time and space, but set against the lovely background of the Tuscan countryside and the classical and modern buildings of Rome.

M. CURREY.

55*. L'ORGANISATION DU PROCHE-ORIENT ET LE MOUVEMENT DE RAPPROCHEMENT BALKANIQUE. By Michel Dendias. 1935. (Paris: Rodstein. 8vo. 182 pp.)

THE author,[1] professor of law in a Greek university, is a realist in politics. He believes that "a Balkan Union will always remain an ideal,"

[1] Cf. *ante*, xiv. (3), p. 433.

but "avows himself a fervent partisan of the improvement of mutual Balkan relations." The former part of his treatise demonstrates the reasons for his belief, the latter contains suggestions for achieving "Balkan possibilities." After showing that the Balkans occasioned many of the wars of the last century, he mentions Garashanin's and Michael Obrenovich's plan of a Balkan confederation, Bourchier's part in the Balkan League of 1912, and Papanastasiou's championship of the Balkan conferences. He considers Eastern individualism hostile to the idea of union, that a defensive alliance at most is possible, and that the first step, though difficult, should be a customs' union, as in the historic case of the *Zollverein*, though Germany and Greece are different. But only 14 per cent. of Balkan exports go to the Balkans, from which Greece takes only one-fifth of her imports. The book was finished in 1932 and only partially revised, as is evident from the use of the future and present tenses for events now past (pp. 167, 177); accordingly, this argument is stronger now, when Greece's latest trade returns show that Germany is by far Greece's best customer, because she takes nearly all the Greek tobacco crop and Greece, in return, prefers German goods to all others. Albania is even more closely bound commercially with Italy, although their political relations have not always been cordial. Albania and Bulgaria still remain outside the Pact of Athens, and the Bulgaro–Yugoslav demonstration of friendship in 1937 aroused, despite official statements that it nowise contravened the Pact, some apprehension in Greece. The author sees that "Bulgaria's relations with her neighbours dominate the problem of Balkan co-operation," while that depends upon the authority of the Bulgarian government over the Macedonian terrorists, though he thinks that the increased Serbian immigration into Serbian Macedonia since 1929 has diminished the importance of the minority question there. An additional chapter discusses the Pact of Athens, which caused some alarm lest it should involve Greece in war with Italy, the ally of Albania, if Albania attacked Yugoslavia, the ally of Greece. Stress is laid on the teaching of Balkan history. This is taught by Professor Laskaris at Salonika University; but the teaching of Balkan languages is neglected in Greece, where German is now the dominant foreign tongue, and Gretchen, the governess, is an instrument of Goebbels, the propagandist. "Wake up, England!" WILLIAM MILLER.

56. DRUMS IN THE BALKAN NIGHT. By John I. B. McCulloch. 1936. (New York: Putnam. 8vo. 361 pp. $3.)

THIS brightly written book describes the author's impressions of the six states of South-Eastern Europe between the autumn of 1934 and the summer of 1936. He discourses of Balkan politics and food alike, and his judgments of the former, despite occasional superficiality, are shrewd. It is not true that "French and English are the two foreign languages most commonly heard in Athens." German is easily first. He admits that German trade in all these countries, except Albania, which is almost an Italian protectorate, is predominant and that British prestige has fallen. Of Greece he who prophesies is apt to be wrong, and residents in that country usually leave prophecy to special correspondents. But he considers "the Greeks, least amenable of all European peoples to regimentation." In that, Venizelos once said to the reviewer, they resemble the British. Mr. McCulloch's account of Jugoslavia and Bulgaria shows foresight in anticipating their recent *rapprochement*, with its natural

reaction on Greco-Turkish relations. He justly extols the influence of Miss Durham over the Albanians: the reviewer during the Maltsori rising of 1911 witnessed her ascendency over their chiefs, who sought her advice. The Roumanian chapter contains character sketches of the encyclopædic Jorga, Magda Lupescu and the Queen Mother, but he considers King Carol to be clever rather than popular. He defines "the most important fact in Turkish foreign policy" as "the close tie-up between the Kemalist Republic and Soviet Russia." Since he wrote, Kemal's birthplace at Salonika has been presented to him in proof of Greco-Turkish friendship. There is a good history of Robert College, one of the makers of Bulgaria, which provided the majority of its students for many years, whereas in 1936 "about 90 per cent. were Turkish." He deplores the lack of Anglo-American culture in the Near East, and rightly remarks that the sum which "the British have put aside for cultural propaganda abroad" is "miserly in comparison with that which the French are spending." He might have added that France, Germany and Italy have chairs of their respective literatures at Athens University, Britain none, although one has lately been founded at Bucharest and one announced at Athens. A few slips have escaped notice. "Edward Street" at Athens should be "Edward Law Street"; Aristides, not "Alcibiades" was "ostracised because men were tired of hearing him called 'Just'"—a precedent for the deaths of Trikoupes and Venizelos in exile. Palles was not a "Venizelist senator," but a "deputy" in 1935. The book has 18 illustrations. It would be better for less food in bars and more politics, less about cabarets "in the Balkan night" and more about cabinets. WILLIAM MILLER.

57. EASTERN CARPATHIAN STUDIES: ROUMANIA. By H. J. Fleure and others. 1936. (London: The Le Play Society. 4to. 80 pp. *2s. 6d.*)

A short account of a visit to Roumania by a small group of geographers, botanists and geologists. First-hand impressions and notes are recorded of their observations on the journey and in a Carpathian village taken as typical; there are also some more general historical and economic chapters. There are some beautiful photographs.

58. QUESTIONS JURIDIQUES ET DIPLOMATIQUES ROUMAINES. Cinq conférences faites dans les Universités françaises. By Victor-G. Cadere. 1936. (Paris: Librairie de Jurisprudence Ancienne et Moderne. Chauay et Quinsac. 8vo. 147 pp. 15 *frs.*)

Five lectures delivered at Universities in France, Roumania and Poland and before the Society of Comparative Legislation in London. The first four deal with legal questions in connection with the projected Roumanian Civil Code. The fifth examines Roumanian policy during the War of 1914–18, from neutrality to participation on the side of the Allied Powers, from invasion and defeat to ultimate victory.

The author is Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Cluj and a former Roumanian Minister to Poland. S. A. H.

59*. BIBLIOGRAPHIE BALKANIQUE, 1936. Rédigée par Léon Savadjian. Introduction d'Edouard Driault. 6th vol. 1937. (Paris: Société Générale d'Imprimerie et d'Edition. 8vo. 97 pp. 60 *frs.*)

60. DENMARK. By Agnes Rothery. 1937. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. xi + 275 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

IT must be very seldom that a foreigner has succeeded in giving so vivid and accurate a picture of the structure and habits of another

country as Miss Rothery does in this book. She writes easily and brightly, and her study is to be warmly recommended to anybody who wishes to learn something of Denmark and its ways. Indeed, many Danes, even with ten years of Danish schooling behind them, could spend a very profitable time in reading certain of the more detailed sections.

The most interesting chapters to the English reader will probably be the descriptions, first, of the agricultural co-operative system; secondly, of the régime of social security; and, thirdly, of the model Danish administration of Greenland.

Although much of the book is laudatory, yet a more critical note is sometimes sounded. The present Danish passion for bridge-building is described as "grandiose and useless." But it is well to recall that one of the major considerations in undertaking the "Great Stream" bridge was the furtherance of Anglo-Danish relations for part of the capital, and much of the steel-work is supplied by Great Britain.

Miss Rothery is very correct in her facts, and it is only rarely possible to detect errors. It is, however, to Cambridge and not to Oxford that the honour belongs of having suggested to Bishop Grundtvig the idea of the Danish folk-high school.

The oldest kingdom in the world, and once one of the most extensive in Europe, is now one of the smallest. Questions are frequently asked about the value of the contribution of small nations to the civilisation of the world. This study suggests one possible reply. It is for the reader himself to decide whether it is acceptable or not. KAREN VIBEKE BAILEY.

61. FINLAND: THE NEW NATION. By Agnes Rothery. 1936. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. x + 257 pp. *12s. 6d.*)

BETWEEN Scandinavia and Russia lies a great territory which, viewed from the air, looks like a vast pine-forest broken here and there by lakes and occasional clearings. Here in this rocky land live the Finns, numbering rather less than half the population of Greater London, an austere and pertinacious race of high natural intelligence and great bodily vigour.

The latest book to deal with this hardy and forceful people and their Republic is by an American lady, full of the enthusiasm and generous appreciation characteristic of the United States citizen abroad. Largely helped by these agreeable qualities, Miss Rothery presents a lively and on the whole accurate account of a remote people whose language she does not understand. And if some of us who have known and loved Finland for more years than we would care to admit, might hint at a somewhat too rosy tint in Miss Rothery's spectacles, that is a fault on the right side, and does not seriously detract from the general merit of the book.

Having begun with the small but important Swedish-speaking element in the south-west, Miss Rothery takes us to the eastern province of Carelia, where, owing to their geographical situation, a difference is to be discerned in the character of the people. Thence to the great lake systems of central Finland, where, in the idyllic Savo backwoods, the country's greatest poet, Runeberg (1804–1877), learned to recognise and admire the undaunted spirit of the nation, and later enshrined it in verse of incomparable freshness and originality.

Omitting all mention of the important and characteristic region of Ostro-Bothnia, Miss Rothery whirls the reader along the great Arctic

highway from Rovaniemi to Petsamo on the coast, discoursing entertainingly en route of Finnish Lapland and its inhabitants.

A large part of the book is devoted to the arts, institutions and industries of the country, and all this is well done. Emphasis is laid on Finland's well-deserved reputation for financial stability, and tribute paid to M. Ryti, Governor of the Bank of Finland, and a financial genius of international fame. A map is included in the book, and there is a useful appendix and bibliography. In spite of a certain number of misprints and a few downright errors, this book is essentially sound and well balanced. It is a pity that Miss Rothery has allowed herself to be overawed by the Finnish language. Finnish is admittedly difficult, but not so hopeless as the author seems to think. Oddly enough, English-speaking people, if they only set their minds to it, can and do make a better hand of Finnish pronunciation than most foreigners. H. M. BELL.

62*. DEN SVENSKA RIKSDAGEN UNDER FEMHUNDRA ÅR. By Nils Edén. 1935. (Stockholm; Kungliga Boktryckeriet P. A. Norstedt and Soener. 8vo. 332 pp. *Kv.* 3·50.)

IN 1935 Sweden celebrated the Fifth Centenary of its Riksdag at the small town of Arboga, and Professor Nils Edén, at the request of the " Komitté för Riksdagens Femhundraarsminne," has written a book for the more general public on the origin and development of Swedish parliamentary government as set out in the great work on Sweden's Riksdag published on the occasion of the Jubilee.

Sweden's parliamentary government has by no means always run smoothly. Not until the reign of Gustav Vasa was the Riksdag consolidated as a meeting of the Estates, and endeavours were made again and again to suspend it altogether. However, under Karl IX, " who did not take a step without the estates of the Realm," the meetings became more regular, and Gustav Adolf gave his country the first constitutional charter, so that loyal collaboration between the throne and the estates became the keynote of his reign. It is surprising to find that after the reign of Gustav Adolf, the Riksdag, during the reign of Karl XI, should have voluntarily divested itself of its power, so that its influence was hardly felt during his reign or that of his successor, Karl XII. The estates were no longer the " Estates of the Realm," they were " H.M. Estates."

Thus, Professor Edén takes the reader through the history of Sweden's parliament to the 22nd June 1866, when the new Riksdag order drawn up by De Geer was adopted by parliament, leading to the form of representative government in Sweden which, with some amendments, is in force to this day. Parliament was divided into two chambers, with equal competence and power, Members of the First Chamber being elected for nine years—regardless of the date of their election—while Members of the Second Chamber were elected for a term of three years by direct voting. For more than four decades the parliamentary order of 1866 remained unchanged in its main points. In 1902 the conviction began to gain ground that universal military service demanded general franchise, but this met with decided opposition from the First Chamber. However, during the premiership of Arvid Lindman in 1909, a parliamentary majority was obtained for a considerable extension of the franchise. Universal Franchise (including votes for women) was introduced after the Great War (1918–1921).

Professor Edén concludes his book by pointing out that, while to-day's democratic Riksdag is in character greatly changed from that of the original Two-Chamber Riksdag, its outer form has remained fundamentally the same. I cannot find, however, that he gives details of these changes, and he assumes, perhaps naturally, a certain amount of knowledge of procedure, etc., which many English readers will not possess, and in regard to which they will look for information in vain. However, the book makes exceedingly interesting reading for any student of Swedish parliamentary history. A. H. Hicks.

63*. Sweden: The Middle Way. By Marquis W. Childs. 1936. (London: Faber and Faber. 8vo. 223 pp. 10s. 6d.)

In *Sweden: The Middle Way*, Mr. Childs has given us a book, the need for which has been felt for some time, since he not only describes the country and its people, but explains also how this small nation has dealt with problems of modern economy. The first half of the book particularly, which deals with the course followed by Sweden between the absolute socialisation of Russia and the development of capitalism in America, makes most absorbing reading. "The State, the consumer and the producer have intervened to make capitalism 'work' in a reasonable way for the greatest good of the whole nation," and Mr. Childs shows that this is being done by State ownership and State competition, consumers' co-operation, producers' co-operation, and by a strong all-inclusive labour movement.

The remarkable achievements of the Swedish co-operative movement in face of bitter opposition are given in great detail. The movement claims to be independent of political parties, and the author feels that it has "gone a long way towards proving it."

The Swedish liquor control is also explained, and it is interesting to learn that, *e.g.*, restaurants are licensed for a definite amount of spirits and on quantities sold in excess no profit is allowed, so that the incentive to induce customers to drink too much is lacking.

The chapter "Denmark Organises the Farm" comes as a surprise, though Mr. Childs explains that Denmark's agricultural reorganisation has greatly influenced Sweden. But he does not show in what way Danish influence has made itself felt.

In conclusion, Mr. Childs' own words might be quoted as also being applicable to his book: "A record of a people who cultivate their garden, their rocky, remote, lonely garden, with patience, with courage, and with an extraordinary degree of intelligence." A. H. Hicks.

U.S.S.R.

64*. Moscow in the Making. By Sir E. D. Simon, Lady Simon, W. A. Robson and J. Jewkes. 1937. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 8vo. xii + 253 pp. Illus., maps. 7s. 6d.)

Books on Russia pour out of the printing presses every year, but unfortunately the number of expert studies of one or other aspect of the Soviet system is still most inadequately small. This is all the more to be regretted in the case of a country like Russia, where the language barrier prevents many seeking information from getting at the facts for themselves. *Moscow in the Making* is an ideal addition to the specialist's Russian library in English. It analyses with great acumen the main features of city government in Moscow. The four joint authors have the great advantage of long and active participation

in public life in England. They honestly admit that they know no Russian, but they approach their problem with such perspicacity that their work does not suffer as a result. The story of the many-sided activities of *Mossoviet* (Moscow's County Council), of the complex relations between the local and central authorities, the interpenetration of all departments of the city administration by the Party machine, makes fascinating reading. The comparison with English methods and possibilities of city government heightens the interest. In the absence of large private vested interests, the city fathers of Moscow are actually able to do many things, it seems, which the Chairman of the London County Council can only dream of doing. The authors pay high tribute to the "moral conviction, the sense of unity, the optimism, the belief in themselves, the enthusiasm for the common cause" of the *Mossoviet* officials with whom they came in contact. They feel equally constrained to mention "the fanatical intolerance which is holding them back." It would be unfair to quote from a book crammed with fresh, well-digested information. It should be bought and read *in toto* by everybody interested in the hitherto neglected subject of Soviet municipal government. There is only one point on which I think Professor Jewkes has accepted his mentor's information too credulously. We are told that differences of opinion rarely arise between the *Mossoviet* and the Commissariat of Internal Trade and "are always settled to the satisfaction of all parties." This is too good to be true even in Moscow. It is the considered opinion of Sir E. D. Simon that in *Mossoviet*, the Russians have the best constitution yet devised for effective city government.

VIOLET CONOLLY.

65. L'ÉCONOMIE PLANIFIÉE EN U.S.S.R. ET L'ÉCONOMIE DIRIGÉE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS: Étude Comparative. By Lola Zahn-Golodetz. 1937. (Paris: Nizet et Bastard. 8vo. 159 pp.)

THE first part of this brochure, consisting of 29 pages only, deals superficially with State direction of capitalist economy, but fails to live up to the title's promise of a comparative study of the capitalist and Soviet systems. The remainder is devoted to an uncritical exposition of Soviet planned economy in which the superiority of the Soviet system is asserted without much reasoned proof. In the chapter on "Les Investissements," for instance, it is pointed out that in capitalist systems decisions regarding the investment of savings are mainly taken by a comparatively small number of entrepreneurs and financiers, who are swayed by considerations of money profits. In the U.S.S.R. saving and investment are a function of the Government, which pays no attention to money profits, but forms its plan with the aim of satisfying the desires of the whole community in proportion to their urgency. That is to say, the Soviet Government plans production with a view to social utility, and not monetary profit.

It would be hard to quarrel with a system which insisted that nobody should have cake till everybody had enough bread and butter, especially if that system proved more efficient than others in providing bread and butter. But Soviet planning, to justify itself, must prove not only a means of effecting a more equal distribution of consumable wealth than the capitalist system, but also a more efficient producer of such wealth. If instead of taking it as a matter of course that Soviet production is more efficient and that Soviet

distribution is more equal than in capitalist countries, tangible proof were given for such assertions, the author might have contributed something to the literature on Soviet economics. L. E. HUBBARD.

66. SOVIET DEMOCRACY. By Pat Sloan. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 288 pp. 6*s*.)

THIS is a well-meant but dreary example of its mechanically pious kind. Starting from the view that, in contemporary practice, democracy and dictatorship are not mutually exclusive, the author arrives at the conclusion that the system of government in the Soviet Union possesses all the essential features of "real" democracy. On the way to reaching that conclusion he elaborates the opinion of the Webbs that "the U.S.S.R. is a Government instrumented by all the adult inhabitants," and seeks to illustrate his case by reference to the principles of education, the functions of the trade unions, the administration of justice, the organisation of the Red Army, and so on. Unfortunately, an argument of this kind needs to be sustained by exact statement, and of exact statement there is hardly a trace in the book. Instead there is a mass of random and frequently muddled generalisations, which leave the nature of democracy in Russia as ambiguous as it was before. The enthusiast of Soviet institutions, spurred to further enthusiasm by the promise of the new Constitution, may well continue to ask whether democratic forms of government which do not establish equality of opportunity imply "real" democracy; but, unlike Mr. Sloan, he may also ask whether the denial of liberty inherent in what is called Party guidance implies the existence of democratic forms of government. R. D. CHARQUES.

67*. RUSSIE NEUVE. By Charles Vildrac. 1937. (Paris: Emile Paul Frères. 8vo. 254 pp. 15 *frs*.)

The author, well known in France as a poet and playwright, describes two short visits to the U.S.S.R., in 1929 and 1935. His book differs from the average tourist's impressions only by its excellent style, and is a wholly favourable account of the Soviet régime. D. C.

68. DESTIN D'UNE RÉVOLUTION: U.R.S.S. By Victor Serge. 1937. (Paris: Grasset. 8vo. 326 pp. 18 *frs*.)

A violent attack on every aspect of Soviet life, written by a prominent supporter of Trotsky. D. C.

69*. THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FAR EAST. By Victor A. Yakhontoff. (*Special Publication No.* 3. *Dec.* 1936). 1937. (New York: The American Russian Institute. 8vo. 30 pp. 15 *c*.)

GENERAL

70*. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE THE PEACE TREATIES. By E. H. Carr. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. 285 pp. 6*s*.)

71. PRELUDE TO 1937. By F. J. C. Hearnshaw. 1937. (London: Murray. 8vo. 180 pp. 5*s*.)

THESE two booklets are both examples of the tabloid treatment of post-War history which is now in vogue. Such pocket histories undoubtedly serve the useful purpose of diffusing a superficial knowledge of international events over the very wide circle of readers with limited means. They are also a searching test of their authors'

capacity. Just as the mastery of a great painter is more clearly demonstrated in a rough sketch than in a finished picture, these works, setting the same problems of selection, elimination and arrangement, ruthlessly expose the fumbler, and call for a combination of rare insight and profound knowledge for their successful accomplishment. From this test Professor Carr emerges with flying colours. His book is a miracle of accurate condensation. It is difficult to see how so much could be presented in fewer words, or with a better sense of proportion and composition. Of course, a work of this kind, while an admirable starting-point for further study, must never be treated as the last word on the subject. The whole truth about a complicated situation cannot be told in a sentence; and those who see the picture differently from Mr. Carr, while they may not be able to say, "No, that is wrong," may often be tempted to object, "Yes, but——" and to advance considerations which the author has ignored.

The point that there is something more to be said may be readily illustrated by a comparison between the two works before us. While covering much of the same ground—more, indeed, than the six years to which he ostensibly confines himself, Professor Hearnshaw often states conclusions which are in piquant contrast with those of Mr. Carr. To read the two works in quick succession will, indeed, land the uninstructed reader in a state of considerable bewilderment. For example, he will find the Anglo-German naval agreement hailed by Mr. Carr as "a tribute to British common sense," and dismissed by Mr. Hearnshaw as "a most amazing manifestation of political ineptitude." The Ottawa agreements, which to Mr. Carr were "in all probability a necessary condition of the revival of British trade," are, to Mr. Hearnshaw, "an almost unmitigated misfortune." There is an even more diverting contrast in the description of Dr. Dollfuss's elimination of the Austrian socialists.

(Carr: p. 206.) "Signor Mussolini demanded the overthrow of the Austrian Social-Democrats, who still controlled the municipality of Vienna, and the establishment in Austria of a régime on Fascist lines This demand was complied with in February 1934. There was no serious resistance."

(Hearnshaw: p. 107.) "The infatuated trade-union leaders of the Viennese workmen, in their hatred of Italy, proclaimed a revolutionary general strike and sought to overthrow the pro-Italian Government. Dr. Dollfuss accepted the challenge thus wantonly thrown down, and he was strong enough, although at grave cost in life and property, to suppress the mad and wicked rebellion."

The task of deciding between views so conflicting obviously demands a more detailed study of the questions involved than either of these volumes has space to provide. Yet, if we are to choose between the two authors, there can be little doubt that Mr. Carr is the more satisfactory guide. There are no half-tones about Mr. Hearnshaw's picture, and even those who, like the present reviewer, are often in greater sympathy with his opinions than with the alternative version must deplore the persistently exaggerated language in which they are expressed. It is really not fair to many of the countries now reluctantly engaged in rearmament to say that "the Powers of the world once more, like the Gadarene swine of old, and possessed by the same unclean devils, aligned themselves for a race down the steep descent into the sea of war." It is possible that Germany is making "feverish preparations for war." But it is certainly untrue that this preparation is "openly" made (p. 77), that

the language of Herr Hitler "is free from ambiguity" (p. 105), or that, in 1934, he "made no secret of his intention

(1) to recover Memel and partition Lithuania; (2) to reoccupy Danzig and convert it into a great naval and air base; (3) to re-annex the 'Polish Corridor'; (4) to conquer the Ukraine from Russia; (5) to crush France and retake Alsace and Lorraine; (6) to get back Northern Schleswig from Denmark, and finally (7) to challenge Great Britain, invade her long-inviolate shores by air and sea, reduce her to abject submission, enslave her amiable pacifists, bleed her white by means of enormous and inescapable indemnities, and annex her helpless Empire."

Such a statement wholly ignores a long series of declarations of pacific intention which some people even believe. There are further grounds of criticism. The arrangement of chapters, by years rather than by subjects, necessitates a disconcertingly intermittent treatment of connected topics. Omissions are no doubt inevitable, but it is rather surprising to find no mention of an episode so important in its indirect results as the negotiations for the Four Power Pact. Finally, some of the historical statements are of questionable accuracy. Germany did not agree, in the peace settlement, "to make good the damage that she had inflicted upon the allies during the War." Reparation was expressly limited to a particular category—"damage to the civilian population." It is surely incorrect, too, to represent the admission of the U.S.S.R. to the League of Nations, or the Franco-Soviet Pact, as due to Russian initiative, the latter only obtained in 1936 in the face of serious French opposition. Both were essential parts of M. Barthou's project for an Eastern Pact, in 1934, and the Franco-Soviet agreement was actually signed in 1935, though not ratified till the following year. Mr. Carr, like Mr. Hearnshaw, does not shrink from the expression of his private opinions, but these are couched in temperate and cautious language, while *Prelude to 1937* is carried away by an unfortunate penchant for epigram and caricature to an extent incompatible with the writing of serious history.

G. M. Gathorne-Hardy.

72*. Forward from Liberalism. By Stephen Spender. 1937. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 295 pp. 7s. 6*d*.)

Poetry has sometimes been a vehicle for the detection of truth by minds more sensitive than the common clay, sometimes, as with Byron, a lash to stir men to passion. Mr. Spender's cult is of the "embittered idealist revolutionary worker." Almost precisely he is the kind of person whom Julien Benda accuses of "the treason of the clerks." Mr. Spender disclaims any special knowledge of Marxism, and the customary half-truths freely spray these pages. No man in his senses denies that there is "much truth" in Marx; but if, in a vital political situation, exact terms are to be ignored in favour of a generous sentiment, it is the end of accurate thinking.

Bluntly, Mr. Spender, in the first third of his book, is merely one of a host of rather young young men indulging in some competent political pamphleteering. The work is still dewy with irresponsible emotion. Incidently Mr. Spender assumes that the leaders of the proletarian revolutions, the professional revolutionaries, have been proletarians. That has only been true of the Fascist revolutions, and of neither the French nor the Russian Revolutions, nor of the Marxist movement.

The second portion of the book, entitled "The Inner Journey,"

is far more significant, since it has a basis in personal experience. It explains the pilgrimage of a Liberal to the shores of the classless society (which Mr. Spender, oddly enough, seems to think exists in Russia). The reviewer at least will not disagree with Mr. Spender when he writes, " The liberal individualist on the one hand is fighting on the side of the community for a just and secure society; on the other hand, he is fighting for disinterestedness and spiritual freedom within that society; and here he may find that political dogma is against him." Mr. Spender, however, here states a problem, and not a solution. Nor is the matter answered by saying, " I am a Communist because I am a Liberal." I fail to see that " giving one's life " to an unresolved contradiction, such as he leaves us with, is an intelligent substitute for this solution. Mr. Spender's demolition, however, of those who do not even attempt a solution, on the ground of some supposed inferiority of politics to " life " (Mr. Spender chooses David Garnett's attitude towards Aldous Huxley's recent books as instance), is a joy to the reader.

Mr. Spender has a pathetic belief that, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, a few people like himself—granted that he plunges with sufficient *élan* into some red-blooded " movement "—will be permitted, remaining " impartial and without hatred," to " judge and criticise the party line," just as Mr. Gollancz permits him to do. I should have more hope if, instead of being so noble, he set to work to restate liberalism in a fashion with which what is valuable in Marxism (and there is much) may be brought happily to terms. Incidently, Mr. Spender, like Mr. Fenner Brockway, clearly regards direct representative democracy as dangerous—not aristocratic and " pyramidical " enough. His present book is the record of the distress of a divided mind seeking to regain its integrity. It has, however, little bearing on the veritable objectives of liberal socialism—on the concrete advance to better the living conditions of the workers and to vindicate the personal dignity of every citizen who will discipline himself.

As I conclude this review, I have happened to see the *Fear Came on Europe* of that well-informed journalist, John Whitaker. " The poet," he writes, " who sings the glory of life in the Soviet Union and Moscow's mission of peace is either a fool or a liar." Mr. Spender might do well to meditate on that judgment. It should be added (since Mr. Spender believes the English to be " neurotic ") that Mr. Whitaker is an American.

GEORGE CATLIN.

73*. THE PRIVATE MANUFACTURE OF ARMAMENTS, Vol. I. By Philip Noel-Baker. 1936. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 574 pp. 18*s.*)

MOST people have made up their minds, on one side or the other, about private profit in the arms industry. For the time being, British governmental policy is settled; nationally, by rejecting all save one of the proposals of the Royal Commission; internationally, by destroying the American plan of 1935. Yet the debate continues, and must grow in importance with the growth of material of war. Nobody can be justified in taking part in it in future who has not read this book.

Mr. Noel-Baker is an advocate of nationalisation of arms manufacture, and of international control of trade. His survey of the industry is therefore a long indictment; he finds it injurious to national interests and peace alike. But he preserves the tradition of British prosecuting counsel; he is scrupulously moderate, tending to understatement, summing up each chapter only with conclusions which he has fully proved. He is also impersonal, regarding individuals as part of a

bad system, not as themselves blameworthy, though he gives a very piquant collection of quotations from arms-makers' speeches. The exception is the Mulliner case, told as an instance of deliberate incitement of the pre-War arms-race. Four chapters prove, once more, that technical subjects are dull in outline and absorbing in detail. As a rule, people remember the Mulliner scandal merely as a sordid tale; here it is an astonishing drama, as shipbuilders, the Admiralty, the Cabinet, the Opposition, the press and public opinion all become involved.

Most of the book treats the disadvantages of the private trade internationally; features like corruption, sale of arms to potential enemies, support by "patriotic societies" and trade journals are widespread. The British Navy League forms an honourable exception in refusing subscriptions from the trade. The peculiarly British custom of offering officials posts in arms-firms, and the French and German methods of press-control, are fully discussed. The mass of carefully documented detail might make the book hard to read, but it is rendered pleasurable by its style, which is clear, taut, and elegant.

FREDA WHITE.

74*. THE PAPACY AND WORLD AFFAIRS, as reflected in the secularisation of Politics. By Carl Conrad Eckhardt. 1937. (University of Chicago Press; Cambridge University Press. 8vo. xiv + 310 pp. 18s.)

THIS work, which is primarily an historical study of the reactions of the Papacy to the process of secularisation of politics and its definitive expression in the Peace of Westphalia, is valuable to students of contemporary affairs in that it provides the historical background of the present situation and quite a number of shrewd observations on actual tendencies of our times. After Catholic and Protestant rulers had agreed to exclude the Papacy from all influence in the sphere of politics, the Popes continued to protest until, by the Lateran treaty, Pius XI accepted the situation as a fact and agreed to remain extraneous to political disputes which were not directly submitted to him for arbitration. Dr. Eckhardt shows that both the Papacy and the modern world have benefited from this situation. The Pope has been freer to promulgate the general moral principles of peace and war and the social order, and the world has listened with greater respect to him now that he cannot be suspected of furthering his own political interests. But, since the secularisation of politics has over-reached itself in the Totalitarian State, and not only excludes, but threatens to overwhelm religion and Western civilisation itself, the Papacy has to struggle fiercely for the freedom of the Christian conscience and the integrity of Christendom. Dr. Eckhardt perhaps does not bring out with sufficient emphasis the fact that the Popes have never given up the *principle* of intervention in political affairs, from the moral standpoint; but he implies that they are putting this principle into practice to-day in a way that cannot but prove beneficial to our civilisation. Students of the conflict, he modestly claims, "will find much of interest in the historic background that is disclosed in the movement called the "secularization of politics."

EDWARD QUINN.

75. I FOUND NO PEACE. By Webb Miller. 1927. (London: Gollancz. 8vo. 352 pp. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

IN his search for peace Mr. Miller tells us that he has been in six wars on four continents, has witnessed numberless riots, rebellions and

revolutions in a dozen lands, has stood fifteen feet from a guillotine watching one man chopping off the head of another, has seen death and destruction in such diverse places as Mexico, India, Abyssinia, Spain, Morocco and the Meuse Valley, and has risked violent death himself on more than one occasion.

In view of all this one is left with the justifiable suspicion that Mr. Miller's title for his book is in the nature of a gentle leg-pull. Nevertheless he tells the story of his supposed search extremely well. He is a highly trained observer, and a first-class reporter, and, as he says himself, has had grand stand seats at nearly every crucial happening during the most disturbed two decades in the history of humanity.

One might have asked for a little less of the reportorial aspect; scoops, telegraphic rate value of news, and the ingenuity of its transmission, are of little importance in relation to the events that he is describing. But this is a minor criticism compared to the disappointment one feels that Mr. Miller has made no attempt to analyse causes, and has contented himself merely with the reporting of effects.

Except as an interesting record of personal experiences this book has little or no value. C. H. GUYATT.

76*. THOMAS CLARKSON: the Friend of Slaves. By Earle Leslie Griggs. 1936. (London: Allen and Unwin. Demy 8vo. 210 pp. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

FINDING no standard life of Clarkson in existence, Professor Griggs (of Michigan) has produced this study. It is a clear and conscientious piece of work, but a little pedestrian, and overshadowed by the brilliant monograph on Wilberforce which Professor Coupland published in 1923. In fairness, however, the difficulty must be admitted of being brilliant about Clarkson: his was a dour, prosaic, tenacious character, which the fire within rarely illumined for the outside observer. Yet it was exactly his tenacity, harnessed to his high purpose, which aroused England from apathy to enthusiasm between 1775 and 1800, and made possible the triumph over the horrors of slavery which is primarily associated with Wilberforce's name. It is well, therefore, that we should see the man as he was, even if there is, in the picturing of him, a touch of that " mild and genial dullness " which Coleridge ascribed to Clarkson's own style.

Starting practically from zero, Clarkson built up his assault upon the conscience of England by years of intense labour and self-sacrifice. He tackled everyone and everything that could help in the cause, from the Czar of Russia (his interviews with Alexander I are particularly revealing) to the slums of English seaports. And there was no mere theorising in his plan: he took into his own house, obviously at the cost of much discomfort, the exiled family of that remarkable character Henri Christophe, the black king of Haiti. His doughty spirit knew no rest and little happiness; and even when age and honours came thick upon him, the hostility of Wilberforce's sons embittered his end. His literary friendships (Coleridge, Wordsworth and particularly the Lambs) were a solace, but for maintaining these he was largely indebted to his talented wife. MESTON.

77. ACROSS THE YEARS. By Charles Steadman Macfarland. 1936. (London and New York: The Macmillan Company. 8vo. xi + 367 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

THIS book of reflections has a double interest. Dr. Macfarland is a

stimulating personality of great spiritual force and courage—almost as well known in Europe as he is in America, where he is a Congregationalist Minister. But he was also General Secretary of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America from 1911 till 1931. He visited Germany during the War and, after America entered, was a kind of Spiritual Ambassador on the Allied front. Apart from its pastoral interest the book, therefore, contains many interesting sidelights on international questions. Dr. Macfarland interviewed Hitler in 1933, and considers that "if at the beginning the Protestant Church leaders and the Roman Catholic Bishops had stood together in their resistance to the National Socialists the outcome might have been different. The three main faiths, Catholic, Jewish and Protestant, all stand for the Spiritual Life."

In a later chapter he states, "Far more injuries are done by men through fear or timidity or by a false conception of expediency than from any other cause."

The book contains excellent reflections on the duties of army chaplains, the "Art of living together" and an amusing exposure of some of the vagaries of the Daughters of the American Revolution.

C. WALEY COHEN.

78*. THE QUEST FOR EMPIRE. By Mahmud Husain. 1937. (Published by the author. The University, Dalla. 8vo. 240 pp. 4*s*. 6*d*.)

A clear and succinct account of the events leading up to the present expansionist policies of Germany, Italy and Japan, not dominated by any attempt to ascribe them to a single cause. L. P. M.

79*. THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK, 1937. Edited by M. Epstein. 74th Edition. 1937. (London: Macmillan. 8vo. 1502 pp. 21*s*.)

The 74th Edition of the *Statesman's Year-Book* is as indispensable a book of reference as its predecessors. The two maps illustrate recent happenings in Syria and in Abyssinia. Details of trade in 1936 have been included for a number of countries, and recent census returns are given for the Irish Free State, South Africa, France, Algeria, Denmark and Italy. The sections on India have been brought up to date and include information on the separation of Burma and on the two new Provinces of Sind and Orissa.

80*. THE ANNUAL REGISTER: a Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad for the Year 1936. Edited by M. Epstein. 1937. (London: Longmans Green. 8vo. 190 pp. 30*s*.)

The *Annual Register* for the year 1936 is, as usual, indispensable as a work of reference. The public documents reproduced are the Soviet Constitution, the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the guarantees given by Great Britain to France and Belgium in March–April 1936. The selection of the documents published under this last head seems a trifle arbitrary, for, although the guarantees themselves are independent facts, they were occasioned by a whole complex of events and proposals arising out of the Rhineland episode; the question of space may, however, have been a ruling consideration. It might be possible in future to reconsider the value of "The Chronicle of Events" in Part II in relation to the whole work. The chapters devoted to foreign history are, in general, valuable summaries, although that on "France and Italy" is perhaps not as adequate as most of the others, and there are one or two discrepancies, as for example, in the accounts of the Abyssinian crisis given in the chapters on the "League of Nations" and on "France and Italy" respectively. H. G. L.

81*. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL YEAR BOOK: A Compendium of the World's Progress for the Year 1936. Edited by Frank H. Vizetelly. 1937. (New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls Company. xiv + 802 pp. La. 8vo. Illus. maps.)

An encyclopædia of the events of the year in all aspects of national and international affairs, political, economic and social.

82. AN ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF PACIFISM. Edited by Aldous Huxley. 1937. (London: Chatto and Windus. 8vo. 125 pp. *6d.*)

This is a series of short anonymous articles, alphabetically arranged, each from one to four pages long, setting forth the pacifist point of view on the most important contemporary problems. An attempt is made to give pacifism a positive aspect by applying its principles to economic questions, on which the view taken seems to approximate to that of the old guild socialists. E. H. C.

83*. IN THE SHADOW OF TO-MORROW. By J. Huizinga. 1937. (London: Heinemann. 8vo. ix + 218 pp. *7s. 6d.*)

Professor Huizinga begins by postulating the "fundamental prerequisite of a sound culture" and then investigates the shortcomings, spiritual as well as cultural, of modern civilisation. He holds that we are in the midst of "the gravest combination of dangers, the counterweight to which can only be found in the highest metaphysical and ethical values." What is required is not further "progress" nor intervention by social organisations, but "an internal regeneration of the individual, a change in the spiritual *habitus* of man himself." H. G. L.

84*. L'ÉCHEC DE LA S.D.N. DANS L'ORGANISATION PRATIQUE DE LA PAIX: Ses causes, son avenir. Par Ali Akhbar Akhair. 1937. (Paris: Siver. 8vo. 216 pp. 30 *frs.*)

The first part of this book recounts previous attempts towards the international organisation of peace, from Confucius down to the present day. The author then examines the Covenant of the League of Nations, which he considers defective both in premisses and in form, and suggests lines on which, in his opinion, it might be improved.

85*. SLAVERY: Report of the Advisory Committee of Experts: Fourth Session of the Committee, Geneva, April 5th to 10th, 1937. (Series of League of Nations Publications, VI.B. Slavery, 1937. VI.B.2. Geneva: League of Nations. London: Allen & Unwin. 83 pp. *3s.*)

The Advisory Committee of Experts on Slavery at its fourth session discussed the following questions: Ratifications and Reservations to the Slavery Convention of 1926; Slave-Raids, Slave Trade and Captured Slaves; Born Slaves; Debt Slavery, Pawning and Peonage; Mui Tsai System in China, the International Settlements of Kulangsu and Shanghai, in Hong-kong and Malaya, etc.; Serfdom.

86*. POLITIK VON A BIS Z: 2000 Worte Politik und Wirtschaft. By H. Schmoll and E. G. Zwahlen. 1936. (Berlin: F. Vogtmann. 8vo. 154 (= 77) pp. 60 *pf.*)

A quick reference book, in dictionary form, for the ordinary newspaper reader. Only matters of current interest are dealt with.

87*. JEWS, JOBS AND DISCRIMINATION: A Report on Jewish Non-Employment. By J. X. Cohen, with a Foreword by Stephen S. Wise. 1937. (New York: American Jewish Congress. 8vo. 31 pp.)

COLONIAL QUESTIONS

88*. THE COLONIAL PROBLEM: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1937. (Oxford University Press. Demy 8vo. xii + 448 pp. 21s. To members of the Institute, 14s.)

WHILE there is a considerable literature on colonial affairs, most of it consists of isolated volumes and scattered articles on specific questions, and there are few studies of a comprehensive kind. Certainly, there is none on the scale of this latest production of Chatham House, which gives a full and up-to-date presentation of the facts about our own and other colonies. A working knowledge of these facts is necessary for sound judgment on colonial matters, whether in reference to the circumstances and associations of individual colonies or to their place and importance as factors in international affairs.

It is naturally from this latter angle that the subject has been mainly viewed in this investigation, and the international aspect has been given pride of place as the opening section of the book. This has been criticised, with some justice, as being out of natural sequence, but it has the merit of focusing attention on what is of the greatest general interest and political importance at the present time. The emergence and the nature of German claims for the return of her colonies and the imperialistic ventures of Italy and Japan have surprised trusting souls who believed that domination and exploitation among the members of the human family were slowly yielding to the influences of advanced civilisation, never again to resume their former place. Citizens of Colonial Powers find themselves called upon—in addition to other unpleasant commitments—to justify to the world their possession of a considerable part of the earth's surface. This book will help them to discover if that is possible.

The Chatham House tradition has been well maintained: the experts who generously gave their services have produced something "at once comprehensive and accurate, objective and well-documented." They have reminded us that colonies are inhabited by human beings who cannot be entirely left out of account in considering "Do Colonies Pay?", "The Strategic Position of Colonial Powers," or in discussing the transfer of territories or of mandatory responsibility.

To those—an increasing number—who find a fascination in the colonies themselves, the second section of the book will make a great appeal. Questions of native policy, racial problems, nutrition and health, education and labour are examined in the light of the most recent and accurate facts and figures obtainable. No discrimination or partiality is shown in the search for objective truth, and it is salutary for the British reader to discover how much we can learn from other administrative systems.

The third section, which deals comprehensively with colonial investment, trade, finance and settlement, and has much to tell on the important subject of raw materials, is invaluable for the economic investigator; and the population, trade and other figures in the appendices are illuminating and often surprising.

Lord Astor, in the foreword, pays a well-deserved tribute to the important part which Miss Margaret Bryant, the Secretary of the Colonial Group, has taken in this great achievement. Miss Harvey and Mr. Lewis have also given valuable help. All concerned are

entitled to feel satisfaction in a fine contribution to the study of a vital factor in international relations. T. D. S.

89*. LE PROBLÈME COLONIAL DU POINT DE VUE INTERNATIONAL. By O. Louwers. [*L'Institut Royal Colonial Belge, section des Sciences Morales et Politiques*, T. V, fasc. 2.] 1936. (Bruxelles: Librairie Falk fils. 8vo. 130 pp. 20 *frs. belges.*)

90*. ORGANISATION POLITIQUE ET ADMINISTRATIVE DES COLONIES. 1936. (Bruxelles: Etablissements Généraux d'Imprimerie. 8vo. 533 pp.)

M. LOUWERS here sets out to discuss how far colonies are of value to countries that possess them, and how far the general interests of international peace require the modification of the colonial *status quo* in favour of countries which have no colonies of their own. He thus covers ground which has been pretty thoroughly explored in the last few years by a number of writers in Great Britain. Confining his view to Europe, he does not deal with the position of Japan in regard to this problem; but he carries the discussion into relatively new territory when he outlines the colonial aspirations not only of Poland, but of Norway and Denmark as well.

Like most subjects of colony-owning countries, M. Louwers reaches the conclusion that colonies are of no particular economic value; and he makes the usual further inference, not that colonies are not worth keeping, but that they are not worth giving away. Eventually he makes shipwreck in a kind of imperialistic mysticism. In spite of their economic worthlessness, colonies do, he thinks, bring political prestige with them. But their real value is seen in the spiritual sphere. Colony-owning countries enjoy a sense of self-perpetuation outside themselves; "it is one of the great laws of life." What is to become of countries to whom this sacramental ecstasy is not open, M. Louwers does not consider. His book, however, does a genuine service in giving a documented account of the history of public opinion on the colonial question in various countries since the last war.

At a meeting of the Institut Colonial International held in Lisbon in 1933, there was passed a resolution calling for the publication of a series of short descriptive studies dealing with the political and administrative structure of the main types of modern colony. In carrying out the project the Institut has added another useful volume to its lengthening list. The studies, which cover the dependencies of Belgium, France, Italy, Holland, Portugal, and Great Britain, are expository rather than critical, and are written by experts of the metropolitan Powers concerned. Mr. John Coatman writes on the British colonies, and his essay is supplemented by extracts from Professor Keith's *The Governments of the British Empire*.

LEONARD BARNES.

91*. LES CLAUSES COLONIALES DANS LES ACCORDS FRANCO-ITALIENS DU 7 JANVIER, 1935. By Paul Goiffon. 1936. (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 8vo. 210 pp.)

92. EMPIRE OU COLONIES? By Gaston Pelletier and Louis Roubaud. 1936. (Paris: Librairie Plon. 8vo. 234 pp.)

THE "*accord*" on which Mussolini and M. Laval entered early in 1935 was intended to be a full settlement of all the colonial differences then existing between France and Italy, and in particular to extinguish

all the claims which Italy might be thought to be able to make against France in terms of the notorious Treaty of London of 1915. Liquidation of the colonial quarrel, however, was not regarded as an end in itself; it was to provide the conditions necessary for a common programme of action in Europe at a time when the German challenge to French continental hegemony was reaching a critical stage. The colonial provisions have to be understood as subject to the influence of general European policy in this sense.

In this well-documented survey of a topic hitherto little explored, M. Goiffon reminds us that the colonial provisions fall under three heads. There is first of all the settlement dealing with the position of Italians in Tunis; next, territorial adjustments, *i.e.* the cession of a strip of French tropical Africa to enlarge the Italian colony of Libya, and the rectification of the frontier between Eritrea and French Somaliland; and finally the agreement as to Ethiopia. So far as Tunis is concerned, the special convention foreshadowed in the treaty as required for the settlement of details has not yet been drawn up. Meanwhile, the exchange of ratifications, and consequently the coming into force of this part of the accord, has been delayed.

M. Goiffon discusses how far M. Laval gave a free hand to Italy in Ethiopia. Without perhaps much extending our previous knowledge on this matter, he comes to the conclusion that the question of a repartition of Franco-Italian interests in Ethiopia was certainly before the negotiators at Rome, and probably formed the subject of a number of unpublished articles.

In his final conspectus of the new situation, the author recognises that the Italian conquest of Ethiopia is " assez important pour modifier l'équilibre africain actuel." Nevertheless, he welcomes the fact that the Rome accords have disposed of the old colonial issues which used to trouble the relations of France and Italy, and that to this extent the political horizon has been cleared.

The eloquent essay by MM. Pelletier and Roubaud preaches, with fervour and passion, the gospel of what used to be called in England thirty years ago liberal imperialism. The authors embrace the crude myth of the white man's burden, and translate it into the relative refinements of trusteeship and the dual mandate, though the idioms they use are French, and not Lugardian. Their conscious debt, indeed, is evidently more to de Kat Angelino than to Lugard.

The main purpose of the book is to arouse in the French people a warm imperial sentiment corresponding to that which the authors suppose to animate the people of Britain. The French imperialism of their dreams has, of course, nothing to do with monopoly or exploitation; its aims and its methods alike are assistance, education, protection and co-operation. Nevertheless, " notre prestige en dépend et aussi notre securité."

The authors' general outlook is fairly indicated by the following passage:

" In this there is a pitfall against which the native intelligentsia should be on its guard, for Moscow, in trying to foment colonial revolution, must logically be seeking to extend social revolution as well

" That being understood, we must none the less recognise that certain native claims, when they are reasonable and do not imply independence or even autonomy, cannot be rejected en bloc and deserve to be examined with some goodwill."

LEONARD BARNES.

93. ESSAI SUR LE RÉGLEMENTATION DE LA NATIONALITÉ DANS LE DROIT COLONIAL FRANÇAIS. By Auguste-Raynald Werner. 1936. (Paris: Librairie du Recueil Sirey. 8vo. 261 pp. 30 *frs.*)

DR. WERNER has given us an excellent study of the extraordinary complexities of the system of French nationality in regard to the colonial empire; to the French protectorates of international law, Morocco and Tunis; the protectorates of colonial type, Annam and Cambodia; and the mandated territories, of types A and B, France having none of type C. The fundamental difference between the British and the French systems lies in the distinction between French citizens, subject to French civil law and possessed of political rights, and French subjects, who enjoy their various forms of personal rights and have such political privileges as may be granted to them according to the conditions in the very varied territories which make up the empire. French policy has from time to time aimed at wholesale grant of citizenship, vaguely in the much-contested law of 1833, definitely in the decree of 1870 according it to the Jews of Algeria, a concession soon regretted and systematically whittled down by legal decision, clearly to the people of Tahiti in 1880, and facultatively to those of the French territories in India in 1881.

The policy is no longer in vogue, nor has effect been given to the suggestion, induced by stress of war in 1916, that citizenship should be granted to the Algerians without requiring renunciation of their personal law (p. 27). Dr. Werner regards such a proposal as juridically unsound, but notes (p. 124) that the natives of Guiana are not in practice treated as subject to the full civil rights, and that, as regards the four communes of Senegal, citizenship is combined with the maintenance of personal law, the courts resolutely refusing to combine it with the application of French civil law (pp. 134–40). The readiness of the courts to correct what they deem errors of legislators is paralleled by the readiness of governments to ignore decisions of the courts, of which a remarkable example exists in the dispute (pp. 126–32) over the position of the natives of St. Mary Island in Madagascar; the author suggests that an application to the Conseil d'État for the annulment of the actions of the administration for exceeding its authority would have been more effective than the attempt to rely on the findings of the Cour de Cassation. The contrast with the authority of British courts is characteristic of the differences between the two juridical systems. Of much else that is interesting may be noted the references to the dispute with the United Kingdom (pp. 212–22) over the nationality of certain British subjects born in Tunis, the compromise in which Dr. Werner holds (pp. 238, 239) must in principle be deemed applicable as regards Morocco also, and the terms of the accord of January 7th, 1935, with Italy regarding Tunis, which was part consideration for the French abandonment of the claim of Ethiopia to protection against Italian aggression. The lack of an index is the chief defect of a good book.

A. BERRIEDALE KEITH.

94*. RECORD OF THE XXIIIRD MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE, October 5th to 8th, 1936. 1937. (Bruxelles: Etablissements Généraux d'Imprimerie. 8vo. 435 pp. 20 *Belgas.*)

This meeting, which was held in London, and attended by representatives from every colonial Power, discussed two questions of par-

ticular interest: the condition of native communities in or near European centres, and means of the spreading of thought and ideas in the colonies. The present volume also contains a Report by M. P. Fontainas on Monetary Regulations in the Belgian Congo.

95. COMITÉ SPÉCIAL DU KATANGA: RAPPORTS ET BILANS DES EXERCISES 1934 ET 1935. 1936. (Brussels: Imprimerie de l'Office de Publicité. 4to. 177 pp. Illus., maps.)

THIS report on two years' activity of the Katanga Company consists largely in detailed balance-sheets, with a very brief discussion of policy. In the latter the outstanding features are, on the one hand, the progressive recovery of the mining industry, where production has now almost reached the 1930 level, though the number of European employees remains at less than a third of what it was in that year; and on the other, the encouragement of colonisation. Agricultural colonists are assisted by advances, or by the grant of stock and implements; a quota of minor posts in the company's service has been allotted to candidates who are prepared to settle permanently in the Congo, and contracts for building and transport, and orders for building materials and furniture, are to be placed with local Europeans. The agricultural colonists are advised to concentrate on the production of foodstuffs for the local European market, though tobacco is regarded as an export crop with prospects of profit. The planning of colonisation with a clear view of its economic possibilities is a new departure in Africa, but there seems a certain risk of conflict in a policy which seeks to create a permanently resident European artisan class at the same time that it has encouraged, largely for motives of economy, the substitution of native for European skilled labour in the mines. It will be interesting to follow its developments. L. P. M.

96*. L'ITALIA NEI PAESI NERI. By Mario dei Gaslini. 1937. (Milan: Casa Editrice "Alba." 8vo. 224 pp. *Lire* 5.)

A series of short sketches dealing with colonial development under the Fascist régime. L. P. M.

97. AFRICA AND WORLD PEACE. By George Padmore. 1937. (London: Martin Secker and Warburg. 8vo. xi + 285 pp. 7*s*. 6*d*.)

THE concluding paragraphs of Mr. George Padmore's *Africa and World Peace* read as follows:

"Let the ruling class tremble in view of the impending Communist Revolution. The working class have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

Workers of all countries unite."

Those who like this sort of thing will no doubt enjoy Mr. Padmore's book, which tells his version of how Great Britain acquired her African territories and how she holds them.

His book is written to teach the reader that our African Empire was acquired by grab and the worst political trickery; that this was instigated by the capitalists and maintained in the interest of that class only. The fact that the British worker has and is materially benefited is entirely left out, and, further, he would make out that the African worker is a miserable slave. Germany, France and Italy all come under the lash, and he appears to resent the existence of the European in the African continent. It can be supposed that Africa should remain free of all influences other than those that have led to centuries of fear, disease and starvation.

The main idea is that the capitalists will force Germany into war in order to get back the African territory which she lost in 1918. And further, that there will be no peace under any form of European administration as long as jealousy and covetousness are found amongst the strong ones of the earth.

It is distressing to feel that there may be a public who will believe that this book is written with fair and impartial judgment.

J. M. LLEWELLYN.

98. WANN KOMMEN DIE DEUTSCHEN ENDLICH WIEDER? EINE REISE DURCH UNSERE KOLONIEN IN AFRIKA. By Senta Dinglreiter. 1935. (Leipzig: Koehler und Amelang. 8vo. 216 pp. *Rm.* 2.85.)

An account of a journey through the former German colonies in Africa. The theme is the now-familiar one that Germany was the most successful colonial Power in Africa before the War, and that natives and settlers are alike longing for the day of the German return. In Tanganyika a German farmer told the authoress that out of the black *menschen-material* marvels could be achieved, but only by the Germans. In South-West Africa the authoress found, undoubtedly, the most promising material for her thesis, and made good use of it. H. G. L.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor, *International Affairs.*

SIR,

In thanking you for Professor Hancock's admirable review of my book *Ireland and the British Empire, 1937 : Conflict or Collaboration ?*[1] may I trespass on your courtesy with a word as to the appropriate method of approaching that Anglo-Irish peace which we both desire?

Professor Hancock has been more than generous in his appreciation of the spirit of my approach and of the constitutional and legal arguments by which I support my thesis that Britain is in serious default under the Treaty. But he is critical because I treat it "as a controversy solely between Great Britain and Ireland." In his view, this means two over-simplifications: (i) the omission of Mr. Cosgrave's point of view, and (ii) the omission of the point of view of the "ordinary Fianna Fail deputy (to say nothing of the I.R.A. men)." But, for international purposes, the Irish point of view is one and indivisible. And it is in form, spirit and substance represented by Mr. de Valera's Government, expressed by that Government's official pronouncements, and given effect, so far as may be, by that Government's action. For identically corresponding reasons, I omitted all discussion of the views, on the British side, of Mr. Attlee, Sir Archibald Sinclair and Mr. Maxton. In neither case are Opposition views of more than domestic interest. And they cannot properly be made the subject of international dealings such as I was discussing. Nor should it be forgotten that Mr. de Valera's Government remains in power after five years of Anglo-Irish conflict, although there have been two Irish General Elections at which the domestic hardship caused by British "economic war" measures, reinforced by what, for brevity's sake, one may term Mr. Cosgrave's pro-British arguments had full opportunity of causing its overthrow. Its mandate cannot be questioned.

Thus, in the quest for peace, it is with Mr. de Valera's Government that the British Government—and all well-intentioned British peace-makers—must deal. Otherwise it will be said that the British, in

[1] *International Affairs*, September-October 1937, p. 784.

trying to impose their will upon the Irish nation, are again employing their secular and well-hated device of "divide et impera"—of intriguing with minorities and according special rights and treatment to them. The wound over the Ulster minorities is still raw.

Professor Hancock's gentle jibe about the extremists on the other flank reinforces my point. The "ordinary Fianna Fail deputy" is a follower of Mr. de Valera, and the I.R.A. men are so few as to be politically impotent. The immensely significant fact is that Mr. de Valera, who was the head and front of the Opposition to the Treaty in 1921–22, has, for the last five years, treated it as *de facto* operative, whilst British legalism was providing constant justification for his original suspicion of it. The atmosphere of the negotiations of 1921, save at the very end, was an atmosphere of negotiation in good faith on terms of equality—agree or fight. Professor Hancock appears to agree with me that once the Treaty was made the lawyers sought to use the courts which they control to re-establish a domination which the Treaty had clearly abolished, and that the attempt was ultimately backed by "economic warfare."

Surely, then, the first step is to give effect to the Treaty in *uberrima fides*—that is, to do justice? Professor Hancock thinks that some Irish people might want still more—might ask Britain to be generous. But "be just before you're generous" is a wise maxim. The fear that your creditor may ask for a gratuity is no justification for refusing to pay his just and legal claim.

Personally, I have always believed in and supported the Treaty. In spite of the infinite harm done by its perversion, I believe that, if honourably executed, it will supply all the essential elements of an Anglo-Irish peace.

Yours faithfully,
HENRY HARRISON.

c/o Messrs. Robert Hale & Co. Ltd.,
Great Russell Street, W.C. 1.
September 21*st*, 1937.

The Editor, *International Affairs.*

SIR,

With reference to the short notice of my book, *International Law*, which appeared in the July–August 1937 issue of *International Affairs* (p. 618), it has become necessary to note that it is neither a fair review nor a short notice.

A mere observation that "the errors are so numerous" is certainly not a helpful criticism. None is more aware than my humble self that at six portions of the book different views are possible; but I have tried to argue out the positions taken. For instance, it should have been stated at p. 34 of the book that Oppenheim's view regarding recognition is opposed to recent juristic opinion.

The same book has been pointed out to be "well-balanced and documented" by the *Juridical Review*, Edinburgh. It has been uniformly well received by the jurists and the press in India. Dr. A. B. Keith writes of it as a valuable guide to Indian students since it contains "a conspectus of the topic in reasonable space and with desirable modernity of facts and of outlook."

While it is of great value to the author to receive sustained criticisms, it does not assist the world of scholarship to indulge in a vague condemnation which could not be met.

A true guide for a reviewer has been long ago laid down t!
"Neither extenuate nor set down aught in malice."

Yours truly,
K. R. R. SASTR

Law Department,
The University,
Allahabad (India).
September 18th, 1937.

Our reviewer writes as follows :—

I gladly comply with Mr. Sastry's request for particulars of grounds upon which my criticism rested, but limitations of s compel me to select only a few examples out of many.

An author who dates the Crimean War in 1870 (p. 249) can scai complain if he is charged with inaccuracy, nor is this the only erri its kind. For example, the North Sea Fisheries Convention of is dated as 1887 (p. 102), and the Jay Treaty of 1794 is describe "the Treaty of Peace between England and U.S.A." (p. 260).

The phrase "a Proclamation issued by the Parliament of U.S (p. 125) will strike most readers as somewhat odd, and I venture to it as illustrating a certain slovenliness of expression which re frequently throughout the book.

On p. 294, after a reference to the ruse employed by the *Emde* Penang, we read the following amazing statement : "Equally j fiable was the act of H.M.S. *Vandreara*, which carrying no col hoisted the white flag before attacking a German submarine." sumably the author means the "White Ensign," but the passage m seriously mislead the inexperienced Indian student.

Although the book consists very largely of excerpts from off documents and from the works of other writers, it is impossible to upon the accuracy of Mr. Sastry's quotations. For example, the t article of the Declaration of Paris is quoted as follows (p. 3 "Neutral ships, with the exception of contraband of war, are liable to capture under enemy's flag." Since the author offer: comment upon the bare text of the Declaration, the student is without any guidance as to the meaning of a passage which, upor face of it, is mere nonsense. With this we may group the stater (p. 316) that "Art. 4 of the Sixth Hague Convention extends immu from confiscation to enemy cargoes in yachts, tugs, lighters, and c small craft." On the same page we find the assertion that "pers may be contraband of war.

On p. 317 goods are divided into absolute and conditional coi band, but no attempt is made to explain the meaning of this tinction. On pp. 321–2 certain acts which constitute unneutral sei are cited as examples of acts rendering the ship liable to be capt for carriage of contraband.

Mistakes in the spelling of proper names are far too numerou mention in detail. For example, on p. 73 a list is given of six mand territories, and the names of four are wrongly spelled (*e.g.* "Br Cameron" and "Ruana Mund"). On p. 312 we have a referenc the prize case of the *Posteiro*, but this vessel has been given improbable name of "the *Posterior*."

Mr. Sastry's desire for more exact particulars is entirely laud: and I hope that your readers will agree that my few words of comı were not wholly unreasonable. H. A.

[illegible]